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Abstract
The present research project questions the central argument of the literature on 
competitiveness: that firms in the same economy specialise in the same competitive strategy 
(Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990; Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Given that national institutions provide one set of input factors, as required for 
one specific competitive strategy, this body of literature expects firms to exploit such institutional 
advantages by pursuing the institutionally favoured strategy. Contrary to these expectations, my 
analysis of the pharmaceutical sector shows that firms in Germany, Italy and the UK pursue (1) a 
radical-innovation-, (2) a high-quality-, and (3) a low-cost- strategy to the same extent.
Aiming at understanding how firms can pursue different strategies within the same 
institutional environment, my research project explores the link between (national) institutions, 
input factors and competitive strategies. In so doing, I first test whether the competitiveness 
literature rightly suggests that each competitive strategy requires a specific set o f input factors. 
Finding this hypothesis to hold true, I then analyse how firms secure required factors in diverse 
institutional environments. Exploring different institutional pathways to firm competitiveness, I 
show that the competitiveness literature falls short in its overly narrow focus on national 
institutions: The literature simply ignores the fact that firms secure input factors not only through 
national institutions, but also through 'improvisation* on a contractual basis, and through 
*importation ' by drawing on international institutions.
This finding has two implications. Firstly, given the variety of institutions on which firm 
competitiveness is based, national institutions do not assume their shape with the aim of 
supporting one specific production regime. Hence, I retain a historical account more useful to 
explain institutional development than the functionalist explanations proposed in the 
competitiveness literature. Secondly, the inventiveness of entrepreneurs in securing required 
input factors indicates that they are Schumpeterian innovators rather than institutionally 
constrained actors. Accordingly, a Schumpeterian perception of entrepreneurs is more instructive 
for understanding how firms gain international competitiveness than the approach of the 
competitiveness literature, which perceives entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers. These 
insights lead me to conclude that the increasing internationalisation of economic affairs entails 
divergence in the shape o f institutions, and convergence in entrepreneurial practices.
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l .  The Puzzle*
The mathematician Stanislaw Ulam once challenged nobel laureate Paul 
Samuelson: "Name me one proposition in all of the social sciences which is both 
true and non-trivial." It was some thirty years later that Samuelson arrived at an 
answer which was appropriate in his view: The theory o f comparative 
advantage. "That it is logically true need not be argued before a mathematician; 
that is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men 
who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it 
after it was explained to them." (Samuelson 1969:9)
1*1. One Political Economy, one Competitive Strategy?
The idea that different competitive strategies require different input factors will hardly 
strike anyone who has ever contemplated firms’ international competitiveness as peculiar. To 
date, a broad body of literature exists which studies how diverse input factors impact competitive 
strategies, and how these factors are provided by national institutions. This literature ranges from 
early neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933) to strands of modem neoliberal 
theory (Sinn 2005); it includes strands of strategic management literature (Porter 1990; Porter 
1985), as well as the literature on ‘national innovation systems’ (Lundvall 1992b; Nelson 1993; 
Hollingsworth 2000) and on ‘varieties o f capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001b). In the following, 
I will address and summarise this literature as ‘competitiveness literature’.1
* In essence, the competitiveness literature distinguishes between three competitive 
strategies, namely Radical Product Innovation (henceforth RPI)2, Diversified Quality Production 
(henceforth DQP)3, and Low Cost Production (henceforth LCP)4 (see e.g. Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance o f Laura Magazzini in sampling the PHID database. Without her help, I 
would have been unable to select the case sample, presented in this chapter, in a consistent way.
1 It should be noted that another broad body o f  literature exists which studies how sub-national institutions provide 
the input factors required for diverse competitive strategies. In essence, this literature includes studies of regional 
(Saxenian 1996; Cooke, Gomez Uranga, and Etxebarria 1997; Malmberg and Maskell 1997) and sectoral innovation 
systems (Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; Breschi and Malerba 1997), as well as the literature on industrial districts 
(Piore and Sabel 1984; Pyke, Becattini, and Sengenberger 1990; Pyke and Sengenberger 1992) and local production 
systems (Crouch and Trigilia 2001; Crouch, Le Gales, Trigilia, and Voelzkow 2004). However, contrary to the 
above-named competitiveness literature, these studies are compatible with the view that firms in the same economy 
pursue different competitive strategies. Accordingly, the findings of this research project cannot contribute to the 
latter body o f  literature, which I therefore exclude from all following considerations.
2 In line with the conceptual approaches proposed in file competitiveness literature (Lundvall 1992b: 11-12; 58-59; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-39; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:149; 174; Casper 2001:398), I define an RPI strategy as the 
competitive effort o f  a firm which leads to the market launch o f a hitherto unknown product, being the result o f a 
radical technological innovation.
3 In line with the conceptual approaches proposed in the competitiveness literature (Lundvall 1992b: 11-12; 57-58; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 148-149; 174; Casper 2001: 399-400), I undeistand a DQP
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riitfifMifirtW
2005: 18-19; Lundvall 1992b: 11-12; 57-59; Freeman 1992: 182; Porter 1990: 10; 37; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 38-39; Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice2001: 148-149; 174-175; Casper 2001: 
398-400). Interestingly, the pursuit of each strategy is found to require very specific input factors: 
To pursue an RPI strategy, based on a radical technological innovation, firms are said to require 
employees with high but rather general skills (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 40-41; see Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Ohlin 1933: 51), ‘short’ finance ‘for risky 
undertakings’ (Ohlin 1933: 55; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 40; Vitols 2001: 350-351; see Lindgaard 
Christensen 1992: 153; 162-163), and competitive standardisation processes (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 31-32; Tate 2001: 445; 468; see Lundvall 1992c: 58). The pursuit of a DQP strategy, 
which is based on incremental technological innovation, is found to rely on employees with high 
and firm-specific skills (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-40; see Porter 
1985: 127-128; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Ohlin 1933: 51), on Tong* finance ‘for safe 
investments’ (Ohlin 1933: 55; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-40; Vitols 2001: 351-352; see 
Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 153; 160-161), and on cooperative standardisation processes (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Tate 2001: 445-446; see Lundvall 1992c: 57-58). Finally, firms that 
wish to pursue an LCP strategy of technological imitation are said to require cheap input factors, 
and most importantly an unskilled and, consequently, low-cost labour force (see Ohlin 1933: 7; 
51-54; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Porter 1985: 127-128; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 44; Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001: 175).
Interestingly, the competitiveness literature also argues that firms in each developed 
capitalist economy are provided with one specific set of input factors, depending on the 
economy’s institutional arrangements. With regard to the latter, the literature broadly 
distinguishes between two types of economies - those with flexible market regulation on the one 
hand, and those with rigid market regulation on the other (Hall and Soskice 2001b; Sinn 2005; 
see Hollingsworth 2000; Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 1992; Ohlin 1933: 52-56). In 
flexible regulation economies, the interaction between firms and their employees, financiers and 
suppliers is said to be essentially organised by the market. Thus, a flexible labour market allows 
firms to hire and fire employees according to their changing needs (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29- 
30; see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 150-155; Ohlin 1933: 52-53). Deregulated financial markets 
enable firms to attract shareholders in accordance with their short-term stock market performance
strategy to be the competitive effort o f a firm which leads to the market launch of a hitherto known but improved 
product, being the result o f an incremental technological innovation.
4 In line with the conceptual approaches proposed in the competitiveness literature (Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: 18-19; 
Porter 1990: 10; 37; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 148; 175; Casper 2001: 398-399), I define an LCP strategy as the 
competitive effort o f  a firm which leads to the market launch o f a standardised product, resulting from the imitation 
o f an established technology.
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(see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27-29; Vitols 2001; Ohlin 1933: 55-56). In addition, restrictive 
competition law and anti-trust regulations guarantee firms that, whenever a radically new product 
is launched, that with the most competitive standard will win the market-race (Tate 2001: 443- 
444; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31; see Teubner 2001: 433-435). Such flexible, or short-term 
oriented, regulation is said to provide firms with generally skilled employees, short-term finance, 
and competitive standardisation processes -  exactly those input factors required for an RPI 
strategy.
The opposite holds true for rigid market economies, where rigid market regulation means 
that interaction between firms and their employees, financiers, and suppliers is often channelled 
by cooperative institutions rather than the market. Hence, a rigid labour market is not only the 
result of powerful trade unions, obstructing hiring and firing at short notice. It also supports 
collaboration between unions and employer associations in negotiating industry-wide pay levels 
and vocational training programs (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 
150-155; Ohlin 1933: 52-53). Similarly, the strong say of shareholders in major corporate 
decisions makes the former less susceptible to selling their shares in accordance with the firm’s 
short-term stock market performance. Instead, shareholders often hold stocks and, hence, provide 
‘patient’ finance even in times of economic downturn (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 22-24; Vitols 
2001; see Ohlin 1933: 55-56). Finally, permissive competition law and anti-trust regulations 
enable large-scale cooperation between suppliers and producers which, in turn, facilitates 
cooperative standardisation processes (Tate 2001: 443; Teubner 2001: 433-434). In sum, long­
term oriented market regulation is found to promote cooperation between firms and their most 
important interlocutors which, in turn, leads to the provision of those input factors required for a 
DQP strategy.
If we accept that these claims o f the competitiveness literature hold true, a remarkable 
conclusion may be drawn. If firms need a specific set of input factors to pursue a specific 
competitive strategy, and if the institutions of an economy actually provide just one set of factors, 
then firms within the same economy should specialise in the pursuit of the same strategy (see 
Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005; Porter 1990; Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 
1992; Nelson 1993; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38- 
44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001:442-455). It is important 
to note that the competitiveness literature empirically grounds this claim on macro-level data. 
Hence, the technology intensity o f entire industries is taken as a proxy to measure competitive 
strategy (Dalum 1992; Fagerberg 1992; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990: 179-541; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 41-44). Accordingly, the finding that specific (high- or low-tech) industries are more
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developed in some economies than in others is cited as empirical proof of the idea that firms in 
respective economies specialise in the same (high- or low-innovation) strategies. Yet this 
approach is grounded on the assumption that all firms within the same industry pursue the same 
competitive strategy.
Interestingly, the strategy-specialisation argument of the competitiveness literature has, to 
date, not been tested on the basis of micro-level data. This is noteworthy to the extent that one 
can well imagine firms to pursue different competitive strategies within the same industry. 
Hence, the question arises whether empirical evidence still supports the claim that firms in the 
same economy pursue the same competitive strategy, if die technology intensity o f firm s is used 
as a proxy for competitive strategy. It will be the aim of the remaining chapter to shed light on 
this question.
1 2 . Operationalising the Notion of Competitive Strategy
So, how can we measure at the micro-level whether firms in the same economy pursue the 
same competitive strategy? In other words, how can we operationalise the notion of competitive 
strategy so as to determine whether a firm pursues an RPI, a DQP, or an LCP strategy? To this 
end, the Abemathy-Utterback model is very instructive (see Utterback 1994). In order to describe 
how technological innovations impact upon industries, Abernathy and Utterback introduce the 
concept of a “dominant design”. This concept makes it possible to distinguish between the 
emergence of radically new products, the improvement of already existing products, and the 
imitation of standardised goods.
“A dominant design usually takes the form of a new product synthesized from individual 
technological innovations introduced independently in prior product variants. [Hence], a 
dominant design has the effect of enforcing or encouraging standardization so that production or 
other complementary economies can be sought. [Once a dominant design has emerged], effective 
competition begins to take place on the basis of cost and scale as well as product performance.” 
(Utterback 1994: xx). To give an example, when the first cars were invented, an impressive 
variety o f  technology existed with regard to their operation. In addition to fuel driven cars, steam 
and electric vehicles, as well as cars with an internal combustion engine were produced. At some 
point, however, fuel driven cars turned out to be the most efficient and, hence, emerged as the 
dominant design of what we, today, understand as ‘a car* (Utterback 1994: 27-29). Importantly, 
Abernathy and Utterback (1994: 75-76; 83-84; 88) show that firms are not necessarily obliged to 
compete by producing radically or incrementally new products. Instead, they can opt to imitate 
existing goods with a view to selling them at the lowest possible price. In other words, instead o f
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proposing a new or improving an existing dominant design, a firm can simply imitate the latter. 
This, in turn, signigicantly reduces the product’s retail price.
Let us apply the concept of ‘dominant design’ to the end of distinguishing between the 
three competitive strategies. To begin with, a firm can be said to pursue an RPI strategy if it 
competes by constantly inventing radically new products, i.e. products leading to a new dominant 
design. In contrast to this, a firm can be said to pursue a DQP strategy if  it improves existing 
products by slightly modifying, although not substantially altering, the underlying dominant 
design. Accordingly, a firm pursues an LCP strategy if it does not change but merely imitates a 
dominant design so as to sell the respective product at the lowest possible price.
Abernathy and Utterback also show that technological innovations occur in waves. The 
latter are particularly distant in traditional industries (Utterback 1994: 131-132; 178). Once a 
product based on a new dominant design has emerged, it usually takes many years -  if not 
decades -  before the next radical product innovation is made. In other words, the number of firms 
successfully pursuing an RPI strategy is rather limited in traditional industries. This is different 
for the so-called high-tech industries. Since the latter are particularly technology-intensive, 
radically new products are invented more frequently. In order to determine the frequency with 
which firms in different economies pursue different competitive strategies, it is therefore useful to 
study a high-tech industry.
Amongst these, the drug industry seems particularly opportune for two reasons. Firstly, 
radical innovations are made frequently. With the decoding of the human genome, so vast 
technological opportunities to exploit this knowledge base commercially were opened that many 
firms began work on the development of not one, but several, new drugs at the same time. Hence, 
a comparatively high number of firms pursuing an RPI strategy can be found in this industry.
Secondly, the concept of dominant design can be applied in a particularly straight-forward 
manner to pharmaceutical firms with the aim of distinguishing between radical and incremental 
innovation, as well as imitation. New, i.e. patent-protected pharmaceutical products can take one 
of two forms. They may be radically new in that they are based on a New Chemical Entity 
(henceforth NCE), i.e. on a chemical entity which has not been discovered before. In other words, 
the resulting drug proposes a new dominant design (an NCE) for treating a disease. Alternatively, 
patent-protected drugs can be incrementally new in that they are not based on the discovery of an 
NCE. Instead, they are based on slight changes to already discovered chemical entities with the 
result that the drugs’ efficiency is improved. Consequently, undesired side-effects are limited, or 
the frequency or quantity with which a drug has to be consumed is reduced. Such incrementally 
new drugs do not propose a new dominant design, but improve established designs by
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introducing slight modifications to them (see Bottazzi, Dosi, Pammolli, and Riccaboni 2001: 
1164). Yet not all drug producers engage in research and development activities on their own. A 
large number of (generics) firms compete by imitating a product’s dominant design, as invented 
by a competitor, in order to sell the respective product at the lowest possible cost as soon as 
patent protection expires (see e.g. Wittner 2003).
I shall now apply these insights to differentiate between diverse competitive strategies in 
the pharmaceutical industry. To begin with, firms which compete by inventing drugs based on an 
NCE will be said to pursue an RPI strategy. On the other hand, firms that compete by improving 
already discovered chemical entities are held to pursue a DQP strategy. Finally, firms which do 
not engage in R&D, but focus on imitating innovations made by others, will be said to pursue an 
LCP strategy.
In the following section, I will use this operationalisation to determine the frequency with 
which pharmaceutical firms in different economies pursue different competitive strategies. 
Before doing so, it is useful to point out that one strand of the competitiveness literature, namely 
the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach (Casper 1999b),(Casper 1999a; see also Casper, Lehrer, 
and Soskice 1999) has employed an alternative operationalisation of competitive strategies in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Focusing on the biotech segment, Casper suggests that firms developing 
therapeutics pursue an RPI strategy as this market segment is often characterised by radical 
innovation. On the other hand, the market segment of platform technologies is particularly 
susceptible to incremental innovation so that developers o f platform technologies are said to 
pursue a DQP strategy. On the basis of this distinction, Capser finds that biotech firms in 
Germany have specialised in the development of platform technologies, i.e. in Diversified 
Quality Production, whereas firms in the UK have specialised in the development o f therapeutics, 
i.e. in Radical Product Innovation.
Today, these specialisation patterns have almost disappeared (see Emst&Young 2002), 
and they are most likely not a result of German and UK biotech firms’ preferences to pursue just 
one competitive strategy. Instead, the abovementioned specialisation patterns seem to have 
resulted from a time-inconsistency problem, in that the German biotech industry is younger than 
its British counterpart. Thus, at the time of Casper’s analysis, the German biotech industry was 
significantly less developed. It is well documented by the literature that the development of a new 
drug is extremely expensive. On average, it takes about 12 years before a pharmaceutical research 
project can be turned into a profitable drug (Gambardella, Orsenigo, and Pammolli 2001: 38; 
Grabowski and Vernon 1994: 438; Drews 1999: 186-190). This puts start-up firms under 
particular financial pressure because they cannot usually rely on retained earnings to finance their
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highly expensive research project(s). In order to get through this financial drought, biotech firms, 
which ultimately aim at developing a therapeutic product, commercialise their knowledge by 
providing platform technologies to other companies. Yet this provision of platform technologies 
is usually a temporary means to secure finance, rather than a strategy in itself (Freyberg 2004). 
As a result, a ‘young’ biotech industry is characterised by a comparatively high number of firms 
providing platform technologies.
In addition to the time-inconsistency problem related to Casper’s argument, his distinction 
between DQP and RPI falls short in two respects: Firstly, as Capser (Casper et al. 1999: 21) 
notices himself, “(...) platform-technology firms create the research tools used in therapeutics”. 
Indeed, platform-technology firms do not provide molecules which can be used to target a 
disease. Instead, these firms (provide the knowledge to) synthesise proteins which, in turn, can be 
used as carriers for transporting other molecules. Thus, platform-technology companies are 
suppliers to therapeutics firms (Freyberg 2004). Hence, Casper compares two different market 
segments, rather than two different competitive strategies. As a corollary, the second problem of 
Casper’s distinction between RPI and DQP is that he does not compare two secondary, i.e. two 
manufacturing sectors. Instead, he compares the manufacturing sector o f therapeutics to the 
tertiary, i.e. the service sector of platform technologies. In sum, Capser compares two market 
segments which are presumably not comparable.
These flaws suggest that the approach to operationalisation proposed at the beginning of 
this section is more fruitful for identifying a firm’s competitive strategy than the approach of 
Casper et al.. I will therefore use the former operationalisation in order to determine the 
frequency with which pharmaceutical companies in different economies pursue RPI, DQP, and 
LCP strategies. So, is it true that firms in the same political economy specialise in the same 
competitive strategy?
13 . Identifying different Competitive Strategies in the Drug Industry*
13.1. The D iv is io n  o f  L a b o u r  in  t h e  D r u g  I n d u s t r y
The most comprehensive database allowing the identification of competitive strategies on 
the basis of (new) chemical entities is the Pharmaceutical Industry Database (henceforth PHID)6.
5 An overview of the sampling strategy developed in the present section is provided in the technical appendix.
6 In addition to the PHID database, I also sampled the Phannaprojects database in order to classify pharmaceutical 
firms with regard to their competitive strategies. However, the Phannaprojects database did not allow me to identify 
whether a drug is based on an NCE. Comparing the sampling results o f both databases, I found those o f the PHID 
database more instructive for the purposes of distinguishing between different competitive strategies.
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Developed by a group of researchers at the University of Siena, this database keeps track c 
16751 pharmaceutical projects carried out by 3522 firms and public research organisations in 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, USA, UK)7.8 A firm is included in th 
PHID database i f  it is, or has been, involved in at least one pharmaceutical project which ha 
reached the stage of preclinical development since the 1980s. Thus, even those pharmaceutics 
projects that are/were not granted patent protection are included in the database. Furthermore 
pharmaceutical projects are considered only if they translate(d) into therapeutic drugs curing o 
alleviating human diseases. Pharmaceutical firms which are active in the service sector, such a: 
platform-technology suppliers, are only included in the database if they (have) also develop(ed) i 
therapeutic product.
In order to understand the approach used for sampling the PHID database, it is important 
to note that the division of labour in the pharmaceutical industry is pronounced (see Gambardella 
et al. 2001: 36-53). Any drug which is sold on the market must have passed through three major 
stages. The first one is the research stage (drug discovery and preclinical development) during 
which a firm discovers how a chemical entity interacts with other molecules in such a way that a 
curative effect can be obtained. The second, development stage consists in turning this discovery 
into a pharmaceutical product. During the so-called phases of ‘clinical development I, II and HT, 
a firm experiments under which form and in which dosage the pharmaceutical product should be 
administered. Furthermore, undesired side effects are recorded and, if possible, reduced or 
eliminated. Finally, any relevant information with regard to both the drug’s features and its 
production process are documented in the third, registration stage. This documentation is then* 
handed to the responsible national or international authorities in order to obtain a marketing 
authorisation (see Drews 1999: 117-154). j
The Italian researchers administering the PHID database show that the three 
abovementioned stages are often not carried out by the same firm. Instead, pharmaceutical 
companies tend to specialise in one of these stages (see Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni 2001; 
Bottazzi et al. 2001; Owen-Smith, Riccaboni, Pammolli, and Powell 2002; Magazzini, Orsenigo, 
and Pammolli 2002). Interestingly, it is shown that labour division is not only pronounced 
between innovative pharmaceutical firms on the one hand, and generics firms on the other (see 
Magazzini et al. 2002). Labour division is also pronounced among innovative firms (see Orsenigo 
et al. 2001; Bottazzi et al. 2001; Owen-Smith et al. 2002). To shed light on the division of labour 
in the research and development phases of a pharmaceutical project, the Italian researchers
7 To be precise, the PHID database covers 67 countries. However, the number of pharmaceutical projects considered 
in the other 60 countries are too few to provide representative results.
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distinguish between developers, licensors and licensees. A developer is a firm with a fully 
integrated value chain that carries out all stages on its own. In other words, a drug is discovered, 
developed and registered by the same firm. A licensor, on the other hand, initiates a project 
which ultimately translates into a new drug. However, by focusing on the research stage (i.e. on 
discovery and preclinical development), the licensor decides at a certain point to licence its 
discovery to another firm, which continues the clinical development and registration process. 
Accordingly, a licensee focuses on the stages of (late) clinical development and registration in 
order to translate the respective discovery into a marketable drug. On the basis of this distinction, 
the Italian researchers show that biotech firms tend to be licensors, whereas traditional 
pharmaceutical firms are often licensees (Orsenigo et al. 2001).
In order to obtain a better understanding of this labour division, it is useful to discuss 
briefly the differences between a pharmaceutical firm , a traditional pharmaceutical firm , a 
biotech firm  and a generics firm. The term ‘pharmaceutical firm* is commonly used to assign a 
firm to an industry on the basis of the product which it manufactures, namely a drug that cures or 
alleviates a disease. The term ‘biotechnology firm*, instead, assigns a firm to an industry on the 
basis of the technological approach which it employs. Generally, the term ‘biotechnology’ 
describes any technology which uses processes on the level of the cell and sub-cell to create 
industrially useful substances. Accordingly, the literature distinguishes between green 
biotechnology, grey biotechnology, and red biotechnology9. Since this research project only 
considers firms active in the ‘red’ drug industry, all studied biotechnology firms are at the same 
time pharmaceutical firms. In a similar vein, all pharmaceutical firms are aware of 
biotechnological opportunities to discover and develop drugs10. Thus, the drugs produced by 
pharmaceutical firms are often based on biotechnological approaches. Yet drug firms differ in the 
extent to which they rely on biotechnology in the research, development, and manufacturing 
process of a pharmaceutical product.
Accordingly, I propose the following definitions in order to distinguish between different 
types of firms active in the drug industry. I define a pharmaceutical firm  as any firm which 
discovers, develops, produces, sells or markets a pharmaceutical product curing or alleviating a 
human disease. A traditional pharmaceutical firm, instead, is a pharmaceutical firm which uses
8 Since this database is constantly updated, these figures refer to November 2004.
9 Whilst green biotechnology aims at creating industrially useful substances in the field o f agriculture, grey 
biotechnology seeks to do so in the field o f ecology. Red biotechnology, in turn, aims at creating industrially useful 
substances in the pharmaceutical area.
10 As Casper et al. (Casper and Matraves 1997: 5) note, ‘[i]n the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology is used in 3 
different ways: i) to produce drugs and vaccines using rDNA technology; ii) to make intelligent screens for new 
compounds; and iii) to apply techniques for rational drug design by understanding molecular structure.*
19
i tw  M » d i a ü i  ti K H w w iS ftir tiliH  i l  u n  mfi— tr^
the more traditional techniques in the research, development, and production process of < 
pharmaceutical product. In contrast, I refer to a biotech firm  as a pharmaceutical firm which relies 
on biotechnology in order to discover, develop or produce a drug. Finally, a generics firm  is 
understood as a firm that does not engage in any sort of research and clinical development 
activities, but merely imitates drugs as soon as their patent protection expires.
That said, let us turn back to the findings of the aforementioned group of Italian 
researchers. As pointed out previously, the latter show that labour division in the pharmaceutical 
industry is pronounced. Graph 1.1. provides an overview of this phenomenon.
Graph 1.1.: Labour Division in the Drug-Industry
Value Chain
Source: Own illustration based on the work of Magazzini et al. (2002), 
Orsenigo et al. (2001) and Gambardella et al. (2000)
The distinction between a developer, a licensor and a licensee is very useful for the 
purpose of distinguishing between different competitive strategies. In order to sample the PHID 
database in a coherent way, I made the following distinctions:
* A firm is pursuing an RPI strategy if it is the developer or the licensor of a pharmaceutical 
project which translates into a drug based on an NCE. Since the discovery of the NCE is made 
by the licensor, the latter is radically innovative in that it proposes the dominant design o f the 
resulting product. Hence, it does not matter whether the agreement is made at the development 
or the registration stage of a pharmaceutical project.
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- Following this logic, a firm pursues a DQP strategy if it is the developer or licensor of a 
pharmaceutical project which improves a previously discovered chemical entity. Furthermore, 
a firm can also be said to pursue a DQP strategy if it in-licences a pharmaceutical project 
based on an NCE at the stage o f clinical development. At that moment, the hitherto unknown 
chemical entity has already been discovered. Accordingly, it is the main task of the licensee to 
improve the known chemical entity in such a way as to optimise its effectiveness and dosage. 
Hence, a licensee which develops a pharmaceutical project, translating into an improved 
chemical entity, can also be said to pursue a DQP strategy. In sum, both licensees of a clinical 
development agreement, and developers or licensors of an improved drug pursue a DQP 
strategy in that they are not radically but merely incrementally innovative.
- This leaves us with a third group of firms consisting of those companies that conclude 
agreements with the purpose of registering and marketing both radically or incrementally new 
drugs. Interestingly, these firms concur with generics firms in that both abstain from engaging 
in any sort of expensive research and development activities. Instead, their strategy consists in 
producing and selling drugs at the lowest possible costs.
13.2. RPI, DQP AND LCP IN THE UK, GERMANY AND ITALY
So, to what extent do pharmaceutical firms in different political economies vary with 
regard to the competitive strategies they pursue? Sampling the PHID database according to the 
abovementioned criteria allows us to distinguish between radically innovative firms (Radical 
Product Innovators), incrementally innovative firms (Diversified Quality Producers), and non- 
innovative firms (Low Cost Producers).
To this end, it is sufficient to limit the firm sample to Germany, the UK and Italy. Of the 
seven countries covered by the PHID database, Germany and the UK are the two European states 
which the competitiveness literature in general, and the literature on ‘varieties of capitalism* in 
particular, claim to be ideal-typical economies, respectively of rigid and flexible market 
regulation (Hall and Soskice 2001b; Hollingsworth 2000; Sinn 2005; see Freeman 1992; 
Lindgaard Christensen 1992; Porter 1990: 355-382; 482-507). Hence, firms in Germany are said 
to specialise in the pursuit of a DQP strategy, whereas firms in the UK are held to specialise in 
Radical Product Innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; 
Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455; Porter 1990: 355-382; 482-507; Hollingsworth 2000:
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626-630; Sinn 2005:18-19; see Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 1992)11, Consequently, the 
reason for including Italy in the sample is that, of the two remaining EU members covered by the 
PHID database (France and Italy), firms in Italy can be expected to specialise in the pursuit of an 
LCP strategy. While collective wage agreements in Italy fix minimum wages which employers 
must not undercut, these legal wage floors are extremely low compared to the average income in 
most other European countries. Since minimum wages can, but need not, be topped up by 
employers, the latter can be expected to exploit the competitive wage advantage for the pursuit of 
an LCP strategy (see also Porter 1990:421-453).
i
So, is it true that British firms specialise in RPI, whereas German companies engage in 
DQP, while their Italian counterparts prefer the pursuit of an LCP strategy? Tables 1.1 -  1.3. 
summarise the results obtained from sampling the PHID database12. The most important finding 
for the purpose of this research project is that the resulting firm patterns are virtually the same for 
Germany, the UK and Italy. In other words, a considerable number of Radical Product 
Innovators, of Diversified Quality Producers and of Low Cost Producers can be found in 
Germany, the UK, and Italy alike.
Interestingly, the firm sample is larger for the UK than for Germany and Italy, because 
comparatively few biotech firms are included in the German sample, while almost no biotech 
firms are contained in the Italian sample. The reason for this is the difference in age of the 
British, German, and Italian biotech industries. While the British biotech industry began to 
cystallize in the 1980s, most German biotech firms were founded in the mid- and late 1990s. 
Italian biotech firms are even younger, as they were mostly founded around the turn of the 
millennium . Therefore, many German and most Italian biotech firms had not yet brought a 
pharmaceutical project beyond the stage of preclinical development, or had done so only shortly 
before the PHID database was sampled, in November 2004. Since this database considers only 
those projects which have reached the stage of preclinical development, many German and Italian 
biotech firms were simply not included at that point in time. Consequently, the German and 
Italian firm samples are smaller than the British one.
11 It should be noted that the competitiveness literature also portrays the US as an ideal-typical economy of flexible 
market regulation (see e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001b; Hollingsworth 2000; Lindgaard Christensen 1992; Porter 1990: 
284-307). However, a comparison o f  EU and non-EU member states seems unwise. The legal requirements w hich 
pharmaceutical firms have to fulfil for obtaining the authorisation to commercialise their products are very 
demanding. While these requirements are identical for all EU member states, they can differ quite substantially 
between EU and non-EU countries. Thus, potential differences would not necessarily result from the preferences o f  
pharmaceutical firms to pursue different competitive strategies. They could, simply, result from different legal 
requirements.
12 It is important to note that the sample is limited to the last 20 years. In other words, only those firms are considered 
which are/were involved in at least one pharmaceutical project since 1985.
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That said, let us analyse the results reported in tables 1.1.-1.3 in order to classify firms 
with regard to the competitive strategy they pursue. The most clear-cut distinction between 
competitive strategies can be made between non-innovative Low Cost Producers on the one hand, 
and innovation-driven pharmaceutical firms on the other. It should be noted that not one generics 
company is included in the entire firm sample. As mentioned above, a firm is included in the 
PHID database as soon as it is, or has been, involved in a pharmaceutical project which has 
reached the stage of preclinical development. Generics firms, imitating a once patent-protected 
drug, must not perform any clinical trials as long as they can demonstrate that the imitated drug is 
bioequivalent to the original pharmaceutical. Avoiding the extremely expensive stages of clinical 
development is precisely what allows generics firms to produce and market generic drugs at 
comparatively low prices. Hence, the absence of any generics firm from the sample is rather 
unsurprising and shows that this category of firms, indeed, pursues an LCP strategy.
A second group of Low Cost Producers consists in those firms which specialise in the 
registration phase of pharmaceutical products. Apart from these Marketing Specialists, several 
pharmaceutical firms conclude marketing agreements at the registration stage even though they 
are also active in R&D. Importantly, though, these seemingly ambiguous cases are almost 
exclusively constituted by large, intemationally-active firms with an extensive product range. In 
these cases, the in-licensing of pharmaceutical products for commercial purposes does not 
constitute a strategy in itself, but is rather a means to complete the own product range and to be 
internationally present. Since these firms do not pursue a genuine LCP strategy, only the pure 
marketing specialists are counted as Low Cost Producers.
Among the pharmaceutical firms which are active in R&D, the distinction between 
Radical Product Innovators on the one hand, and Diversified Quality Producers on the other, 
requires some interpretation. Whilst one group of Pure Diversified Quality Producers in­
licensing pharmaceutical projects at the development stage can be unambiguously identified, the 
identification of pure Radical Product Innovators is more difficult.
13 The question o f  w hy the biotech industry is at a  different stage o f  developm ent in Italy, Germany, and the UK will 
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Interestingly, no single firm exists which merely develops or out-licenses pharmaceutical 
products based on an NCE. As shown by Utterback (1994), a new dominant design occurs much 
less frequently than the improvement of an already existing dominant design. This finding also 
holds for the pharmaceutical industry. Here, the discovery of an NCE is by far less frequent than 
the improvement of a known chemical entity. As in any research project, the chance element 
involved in pharmaceutical research is high, making the actual outcome rather unpredictable 
(Muffatto and Giardina 2003: 111). Hence a pharmaceutical firm cannot be sure that it will 
discover an NCE. It can make all possible efforts, yet it may ultimately end up using its research 
outcomes for improving an already known chemical entity. That said, a pharmaceutical firm can 
decide to focus on the research stage (i.e. on the discovery and preclinical development) of 
pharmaceutical projects in that it out-licenses their development and registration to (an)other 
firm(s). Accordingly, licensors of both NCE and non-NCE projects can be said to be more 
innovative than licensees focusing on the development or registration of a pharmaceutical project. 
I therefore classified all pharmaceutical firms which had (developed and/or) out-licensed at least 
l  pharmaceutical project based on an NCE as Radical Product Innovators because they are 
discoverers o f NCEs with a strong propensity to out-license the clinical development and 
registration of pharmaceutical projects to other firms.
This leaves us with a group of ambiguous cases composed of firms which are either pure 
licensors of already discovered chemical entities, or they are developers of known chemical 
entities which were in-licensed at the research stage from Public Research Organisations 
(henceforth PROs), i.e. universities or research institutes. On the one hand, these firms are not 
particularly innovative as the resulting pharmaceutical products are based on known chemical 
entities. On the other hand, they are innovative as the licensors focus on the research stage of a 
pharmaceutical project. Similarly, the developers of this group have a research focus, as they 
collaborate closely with PROs, from which they in-licensed pharmaceutical projects at the 
research stage. Often, these projects have not yet arrived at the stage of clinical development or 
registration -  meaning that the respective developers (still) have a strong research focus. Since 
the classification of these firms is not possible purely on the basis of their involvement in the 
different stages of pharmaceutical projects, I have categorized them on the basis of their 
technological approach. Accordingly, I classified all pharmaceutical firms relying on the more 
modem biotechnology as Radical Product Innovators, whereas I categorised all pharmaceutical 
firms relying on more traditional technologies as Diversified Quality Producers.
Another, partly similar group of firms can be identified. These firms are similar to the 
group of ambiguous cases in that they are either developers and/or licensors of already discovered
27
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chemical entities. However, in contrast to the previous group of firms, they do not in-license 
pharmaceutical projects at the research stage. Instead, they in-license projects at the development 
stage which, in turn, suggests that they are rather incrementally than radically innovative. 
Accordingly, I have classified them as Diversified Quality Producers. In addition, all those firms 
which are exclusive developers of pharmaceutical products based on known chemical entities 
have also been classified as Diversifed Quality Producers. ,
Finally, a last group of cases consists of those pharmaceutical firms which pursue both an! 
RPI and a DQP strategy. On the one hand, they are Radical Product Innovators, as they out- 
license (and develop) pharmaceutical products based on NCEs. On the other hand, these firms 
also pursue a DQP strategy by developing drugs based on previously discovered chemical 
entities, or by in-licensing pharmaceutical projects at the development stage. I therefore classified 
these firms as Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers alike.
The existence of this last group of firms raises one important question which I want to 
address before proceeding to a final evaluation of cases: Are the three competitive strategies 
mutually exclusive or can a firm pursue two, or even three strategies at the same time?
1 3 3 . The Mutual Exclusivity of Competitive Strategies
The question of whether the three competitive strategies are mutually exclusive brings us 
back to the Abemathy-Utterback model (Utterback 1994: 90-101). Utterback’s in-depth studies ol 
various industries show that firms initiate a product’s life cycle by proposing radically nev 
product designs. Once a dominant design has emerged, firms usually start to change theii 
competitive strategy in that they turn from radical innovators into incremental innovators or 
imitators. In other words, as time goes by, firms which once pursued an RPI strategy turn either 
into Diversified Quality Producers making slight improvements to a once radically new product 
or into Low Cost Producers manufacturing and selling at the lowest possible price. This said, it is 
important to note that Porter shows DQP and LCP to be mutually exclusive strategies because 
‘differentiation [i.e. DQP] is usually costly’ (Porter 1985: 119-120) and therefore not compatible 
with LCP, The reason is that ‘a firm must often incur costs to be unique because uniqueness 
requires that it performs value activities better than competitors. Providing superior applications 
engineering support usually requires additional engineers, for example, while a highly skilled 
sales force typically costs more than a less skilled one. Achieving greater product durability than 
competitors may well require more material content or more expensive materials (...)* (Porta 
1985:127-128).
Interestingly, Utterback also shows that the strongest resistance to the introduction of a 
radically new technology often comes from the industry’s Diversified Quality and Low Cost 
Producers which were radically innovative at the last innovation wave. According to Utterback, 
the reason for this is that over time these firms have accumulated significant sunk costs to enable 
the production of highly sophisticated or particularly cheap goods. Inventing and producing an 
entirely new product means competing against their own, existing goods, and to risk that the 
latter will sooner or later become obsolete. This, in turn, means to cannibalise on the returns 
resulting from the production and sale of the existing goods (Utterback 1994: 162-165; 223-226). 
Thus, particularly in traditional industries, RPI, DQP and LCP are mutually exclusive in that a 
firm is most likely to maximise its returns on investment if it pursues just one competitive 
strategy.
This argument also seems to apply to the pharmaceutical industry: The fact that the firm 
sample contains one clear-cut group of Low Cost Producers (Marketing Experts), (pure) 
Diversified Quality Producers and Radical Product Innovators (NCE-Discoverers being often 
pure Licensors) confirms the idea that LCP, DQP and RPI are mutually exclusive strategies. But 
how do we explain the fact that the sample also contains one group of ambiguous cases, and one 
group of cases which pursue both an RPI and a DQP strategy?
In contrast to traditional industries, the pharmaceutical industry is peculiar in two 
respects. Firstly, like all high-tech industries, the technology intensity of pharmaceutical R&D 
allows for a comparatively frequent emergence of new dominant designs. Yet, in contrast to 
traditional industries, the emergence of a new dominant design, i.e. of an NCE, does not entail a 
wholesale transformation of the industry. Its effect is rather to improve the market position of a 
firm. The technology intensity of the pharmaceutical industry therefore makes RPI a particularly 
attractive strategy as the risk of making the firm’s own products obsolete is comparatively low.
Secondly, the pharmaceutical industry is also peculiar in that the development of a new 
product is extremely expensive (see e.g. Muffatto and Giardina 2003:108-110). In order to obtain 
a marketing authorisation, a pharmaceutical firm must carry out a large variety of clinical tests in 
order to document all the features and possible (side-)effects of the product. This means that any 
Radical Product Innovator which does not want to concentrate merely on pharmaceutical 
discovery by out-licensing pharmaceutical development and registration, but which also aspires 
to turn its discoveries into marketable drugs, will find it necessary to start pursuing a DQP 
strategy at a certain point. The reason is that the firm can thereby cover the massive costs linked 
to clinical development. The longer a patent shelters a pharmaceutical product from low cost 
imitations, the higher the product’s returns on investment. Therefore, once a patent expires,
j
pharmaceutical firms often seek to obtain a new patent, or to extend patent protection, by 
introducing slight improvements to the once radically new drug. Furthermore, a pharmaceutical 
firm is well-advised to in-license pharmaceutical projects in its field of expertise in order to use 
its development (and registration) facilities efficiently. Thus, any research-intensive firm which; 
wants to develop and register its pharmaceutical discoveries on its own will find it necessary to : 
cover costs by pursuing a DQP strategy in parallel to an RPI strategy. j
Following this logic, it can be argued that the group of ambiguous cases consists mostly 
of those firms that have reached the point where they must decide whether to pursue a pure RPI j 
strategy out-licensing clinical development and registration, an RPI and a DQP strategy, or 
whether to use their expertise for becoming (pure) Diversified Quality Producers. If this life-: 
cycle argument holds true, we should find that the discoverers ofNCEs, the DQP/RPIfirms, and 
the (pure) Diversified Quality Producers are older than those firms classified as ambiguous cases. 
With a view to assessing this idea, I assigned an ambiguity score of 0 to all NCE-discoveres, 
DQP/RPI-firms, and (pure) Diversified Quality Producers, whereas I attributed an ambiguity 
score of 1 to all the ambiguous cases. The result of a bivariate correlation analysis shows that a 
strong correlation actually exists between a firm’s age and the pursuit of an unambiguous 
competitive strategy (R = -.405; R2 = . 164; p < 0.001).
Turning back to those firms which pursue both an RPI and a DQP strategy 
simultaneously, it is interesting to note that these firms usually embed each strategy in a separate 
business unit. From an operational point of view, these business units are independent in that they 
encompass all those departments necessary for discovering, developing and producing drugs. 
Accordingly, the two business units are only interdependent in that they are financed by the same 
holding company. In a strict sense, one RPI/DQP firm does not therefore pursue two different 
competitive strategies. Instead, two different business units belonging to one holding company 
pursue one competitive strategy apiece. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the group of 
pharmaceutical firms pursuing both an RPI and a DQP strategy consist almost exclusively of the 
industry’s international giants. These findings confirm that Radical Product Innovation and 
Diversified Quality Production are incompatible from an operational point of view because each 
strategy requires a separate business unit.
In sum, the argument that these three competitive strategies are mutually exclusive, as 
they all follow a different operational logic, is justifiable both from a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective. This is particularly true for LCP on the one hand, and the cost-intensive DQP and 
RPI on the other. Nevertheless, due to their different technological foci, DQP and RPI are also 
mutually exclusive. Accordingly, the firm sample indicates that a company cannot pursue the
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latter strategies at the same time, unless they are embedded in two separate business units.14 In 
sum, while the identification of a firm’s competitive strategy is definitely not without its 
problems, the classification approach used in this section clearly illustrate one point: Contrary to 
the expectations of the competitiveness literature, patterns in the strategies of pharmaceutical 
firms are strikingly homogenous in Italy, Germany and the UK alike.
1*3.4. F in a l  A s s e s s m e n t
Let us finally assess whether firms in different political economies vary in the extent to 
which they pursue different competitive strategies. Is the competitiveness literature right in 
suggesting that firms in the UK specialise in the pursuit of an RPI strategy, whereas German 
companies rather pursue a DQP strategy, whilst their Italian counterparts engage mostly in LCP 
(Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 
2001: 442-455; Porter 1990: 482-507; 355-382; 421-453; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; Sinn 
2005:18-19; see Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 1992)?
Table 1.4. summarises the results obtained from sampling the PHID database15. These 
summary results do not provide empirical support for the idea that the vast majority o f firms in 
the same political economy pursue the same competitive strategy. Instead, table 1.4. shows that 
firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK alike pursue all three types of strategy. While 47.5% of 
pharmaceutical firms pursue an RPI strategy in the UK, 39.4% of firms pursue this strategy in 
Germany, and 34.5% of their counterparts do so in Italy. The DQP strategy, in turn, is pursued by 
51.5% of German, by 37.9% of Italian, and by 42.5% of British firms. Finally, the probability 
that firms purse an LCP strategy is 27.6% in Italy, 10.0% in the UK and 9.1% in Germany. Thus, 
even though the number of firms pursuing the same strategy varies from one economy to another, 
it is not drastically different between the considered countries.
14 While I will carry out in-depth analyses in chapters 2 to 4, it is worthwhile to mention here that empirical evidence 
confirms the operational incompatibility of RPI, DQP and LCP, because each strategy requires a very specific and 
distinct set of input factors.
15 The nine firms which pursue both an RPI and a DQP strategy are counted as two cases each.
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Table 1.4.: Summary Results of RPI, DQP and LCP in the UK, Germany and Italy
R ad ica l P ro d u c t 
In n o v a to rs
D iv ersified  Q ua lity  
P ro d u c e rs
L ow
C ost P ro d u ce rs S u m
Nb Firm s % Firm s N b Firm s % Firm s Nb Firms % Firms Nb Firm s % Firms
U K 19 47.5% 17 42.5% 4 10.0% 40 100.0%
G erm an y 13 39.4% 17 51.5% 3 9.1% 33 100.0%
Ita ly 10 34.5% 11 37.9% 8 27.6% 29 100.0%
A verage 14.0 40.5% 15.3 44.0% 5.0 15.6% 34.0
A bove
A verage 7.0% 7.5% 12.0%
Source: PHID database
While table 1.4. shows that firms in the same economy are far from pursuing the same 
strategy, slight specialisation patterns can be observed. Table 1.4. reports the average probability 
that companies in Germany, Italy and the UK will pursue an RPI, a DQP or an LCP strategy. 
Interestingly, British firms are 7.0% more likely to engage in Radical Product Innovation than the 
average pharmaceutical firm included in the sample. Similarly, the probability of pursuing a DQP 
strategy is 7.5% higher for a German firm than for the sample’s average company. Finally, Italian 
firms show a preference for Low Cost Production as they pursue this strategy 12.0% more often 
than the average pharmaceutical company. In other words, British firms seem to prefer Radical 
Product Innovation, whereas German firms show a preference for Diversified Quality Production. 
Italian firms, in turn, choose to pursue an LCP strategy. Thus, even though the majority of 
companies in the same economy definitely do not pursue the same competitive strategy, the 
competitiveness literature could be right to the extent that firms specialise in the pursuit of the 
same strategy (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Vitols 
2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455; Porter 1990: 482-507; 355-382; 421-453; Hollingsworth 
2000: 626-630; Sinn 2005:18-19; see Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 1992).
Since the observed strategy-specialisation patterns are not pronounced, the question arises 
as to whether they are statistically significant enough to support the latter interpretation of the 
competitiveness literature. To answer this question, I carried out a Chi-Square test which assesses 
the strength o f the association between a firm’s location and the probability that the firm pursue a 
specific strategy. Results are reported in table 1.5. At a glance, the table shows that differences in 
strategy-specialisation patterns are too weak to produce significant results. This tells us that the 
specialisation patterns observed in table 1.4. are the result of an (im)fortunate coincidence rather
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than of explicit firm preferences for the pursuit of different strategies. Thus, no empirical 
evidence can be found for the central argument of the competitiveness literature that firms in the 
same political economy pursue, or specialise in, the pursuit of the same competitive strategy.16
Table 1.5.: Results of Cross Tabs Test (Country x Competitive Strategy)*
C om petitive S tra teg y T o ta l
R P I D Q P L C P
C o u n try U K Count 19 17 4 40
Expected Count 16.5 17.6 5.9 40.0
G erm an y Count 13 17 3 55
Expected Count 13.6 14.6 4.9 33.0
Ita ly Count 10 11 8 29
Expected Count 11.9 12.8 4.3 29.0
T o ta l Count 42 45 15 102
Expected Count 42.0 45.0 15.0 102.0
* Chi-Square = 5.996 (2 cells = 22.2 % with expected count less than 5); p  >  0.10; Cramer’s V = .1 7 1 ;p > .1 0
1.4, R esearch  A im , A ssum ptions a n d  H ypotheses
To recapitulate the above, the strategy-specialisation argument of the competitiveness 
literature rests on two assertions. Firstly, the pursuit of one specific strategy is said to require one 
specific set of input factors (Hall and Soslrice 2001a: 21-44).(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-175; 
Vitols 2001: 350-352; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Ohlin 1933: 7; 51- 
55; see Porter 1985: 127-128; Lundvall 1992c: 57-58; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 153; 160- 
163; Sinn 2005: 18-19) Secondly, national institutions are held to provide just one set of input 
factors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-33; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145-155; Vitols 2001; Tate 
2001; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 153; 160-163; see Freeman 
1992: 170-171; 182; Porter 1990: 69-130; Sinn 2005; Heckscher 1919: 55-58; Ohlin 1933: 6). 
While both assertions are plausible in themselves, jointly they lead to the central argument of the 
literature that a majority of firms in the same political economy will pursue the same competitive 
strategy (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005; Porter 1990; Freeman 1992; Lindgaard 
Christensen 1992; Nelson 1993; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; see in particular Hall and Soskice
16 It should be noted that the present analyses do not consider firm performance. That is, I do not consider whether 
firms perform better or worse according to the institutional environment within which they choose to pursue a
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2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455). The 
above analyses have shown this claim to be wrong: Firms in the same economy do not specialise 
in the same competitive strategy. Hence, the question arises of how this finding can be reconciled 
with the central argument of the competitiveness literature?
It is the aim of my research to shed light on this puzzle in general, and to reveal the 
sources of international firm competitiveness in particular. More precisely, I ask how firms in the 
same economy can pursue different competitive strategies, despite unilaterally facilitative 
institutions . In other words, how is it possible that firms in the same institutional environment 
compete by pursuing different strategies? To answer this question, the following chapters will test 
the two sets of hypotheses upon which the central argument o f the competitiveness literature is 
grounded. Accordingly, my analyses will proceed in two steps: To begin with, I will test the 
hypothesis that each competitive strategy requires a specific set of input factors. Having 
identified those factors that are indispensable for the pursuit of each strategy, I will assess in the 
second step whether specific national institutions are the only providers of these factors.
Potentially, a large number of input factors exist which may facilitate the pursuit of a 
particular competitive strategy (see e.g. Porter 1985: 85-86; 122; 343-350). To limit the scope of 
my research endeavour, I focus on those factors which are decisive for the success of each 
strategy. To this end, the competitiveness literature is very instructive. Pointing out that three 
input factors — namely (1) financial means, (2) labour qualifications, and (3) new component 
standards — cannot be secured by a firm acting alone, the literature assumes these three factors to 
be decisive for the success of any company (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see 
also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 
2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). The reason for this is that the respective factors are only 
provided following the successful solution of a coordination problem between a firm and other 
economic actors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6). Accordingly, the provision of finance depends on 
he successful solution of the principle-agent problem between a firm and its financiers (Mayer 
1998: 145-146; Vitols 2001: 337; Kenyon and Vitols 2004: 11), whilst adequately skilled 
employees can only be secured if the free-riding problem related to the training of employees is 
esolved (Le Gales and Voelzkow 2001: 4-5; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 25-26; see Estevez-Abe et 
1. 2001: 145; Culpepper 2001: 278-281). Similarly, new component standards can only be 
greed if  the hold-up problem between competing firms is overcome (see Tate 2001: 442-443;
)ecific competitive strategy. The reason for this is that I dedicate a separate chapter to the discussion of how 
itional institutions impact on the performance o f  a firm's competitive strategy (see chapter 5).
In line with Steeck and Thelen (2005: 9-16), I understand institutions as ‘formalized rules that may be enforced by  
tiling upon a third party’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 10).
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Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; Rogerson 1992: 777; Malcomson 1997: 1916-1917). 
While a more in-depth discussion of these coordination problems will be provided in the 
following chapters, suffice it to say here that I will limit my analyses to the impact, and the 
institutional provision of finance, labour qualifications, and new component standards.
As pointed out in the beginning of this section, the reasons why the competitiveness 
literature may be wrong in suggesting that firms in the same economy specialise in the same 
competitive strategy are essentially twofold. It could, firstly, be possible that the literature 
wrongly assumes each competitive strategy to require a specific set of input factors. Should this 
be the case, it wpuld simply not matter which factors were provided by national institutions. 
Secondly, a specific strategy may indeed require specific input factors, yet the latter could be 
provided by many different institutions. In other words, the competitiveness literature may ignore 
that specific factors can be provided by a variety of functionally equivalent institutions. In both 
scenarios, the extent to which national institutions provide specific input factors would be 
irrelevant.
In aiming at understanding how firms in the same institutional environment can pursue 
different competitive strategies, I will assess these two sets of hypotheses, as proposed in the 
competitiveness literature. Accordingly, the first question is:
1. Is it true that the pursuit of an RPI, a DQP, and an LCP strategy requires specific types of 
finance, labour qualifications, and component standards (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-44; 
Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-175; Vitols 2001: 350-352; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Ohlin 1933: 7; 51-55; Porter 
1985: 127-128; Lundvall 1992c: 57-58; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 153; 160-163; Sinn 
2005:18-19)? Should this hypothesis be verified, I will secondly enquire:
2. Is it true that those input factors, required for the pursuit of a given strategy, are only provided 
by specific national institutions (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-33; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 
145-155; Vitols 2001; Tate 2001; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 
153; 160-163; Freeman 1992:170-171; 182; Porter 1990:69-130; Sinn 2005; Heckscher 1919: 
55-58; Ohlin 1933: 6)?
In the following chapters, I seek to answer these questions for each of the three input factors 
separately.
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1.5. Co n c lud ing  Rem arks and  O utlo o k
This chapter has clearly illustrated one point: as soon as a firm’s competitive strategy is 
identified at the firm  rather than at the industry level, no national strategy-specialisation patterns 
can be observed . This finding is puzzling as it contradicts the central argument of the 
competitiveness literature, i.e. that firms in the same economy exploit national institutional 
advantages by specialising in the same competitive strategy (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; 
Sinn 2005; Porter 1990; Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 1992; Nelson 1993; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001: 174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455). It is the aim of my research to shed 
light on this puzzle by studying the link between national institutions, input factors, and 
competitive strategies. Accordingly, I ask how firms in the same institutional environment can 
compete internationally by pursuing different strategies. To this end, I will first isolate those 
financial means, labour qualifications, and component standards which are indispensable for the 
pursuit of an RPI, a DQP, and an LCP strategy. Once identified, I will assess which institutions 
provide the respective input factors.
Since I will study the link between the institutional provision of input factors and their ; 
impact on competitive strategies for each input factor separately, the remaining parts of this thesis 
are organised as follows. Chapter 2 analyses the importance of diverse financial means for the 
pursuit of an RPI, a DQP, and an LCP strategy. In so doing, I find the competitiveness literature 
right in suggesting that each strategy relies on specific types of finance -  although the literature is 
wrong with regard to the exact financial means that actually promote each strategy (see Vitols 
2001; Bronk 1998; Mayer 1998; CPB Netherlands 1997; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 
162; see also Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). 
Empirical evidence shows that Radical Product Innovation is facilitated by institutional share 
capital and long-term debt, while Diversified Quality Production relies on private share capital. 
Low Cost Producers, in turn, mostly finance their activities from short-term liabilities. 
Consequently, the only strategy on which national institutions can have a facoltative impact is 
Radical Product Innovation, in that national pension and insurance systems differ in the extent to 
which they stimulate the emergence of institutional investors. I therefore investigate in a second
18 It is noteworthy that strategy-specialisation patterns can only be observed i f  the technology intensity o f a firm’s 
industry is used as a proxy for competitive strategy, because this indicates that the competitiveness literature 
misinterprets empirical evidence. That is, differences in the development o f  national (high-tech) industries seem to 
be historically grounded, rather than the result o f  country-specific firm preferences for a given strategy. Since this 
argument will be explored in-depth in chapters 5 and 6, suffice it to say here that an historical explanation o f industry 
development seems more plausible than the functionalist approach o f the competitiveness literature.
36
step how radically innovative firms acquire institutional share capital in countries where this type 
of finance is scarce. In so doing, I find that many firms in these economies simply turn to 
international financial markets in order to secure institutional share finance from abroad.
Chapter 3 analyses how different ways of elaborating new component standards impacts 
on an RPI, DQP, and LCP strategy. To begin with, a strong correlation is found to exist between 
a firm’s competitive strategy and its standardisation policy. However, contrary to the findings on 
finance, empirical evidence shows that a firm’s standardisation policy does not facilitate a 
specific strategy. Instead, it is a result o f the latter. In other words, specific component standards 
do not constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit of a given strategy, but emerge from it. 
This finding makes any further analysis of how institutions provide component standards 
superfluous. Nevertheless, I briefly review how firms collaborate in order to develop new 
component standards in accordance with the competitive strategy they pursue. In so doing, I 
arrive at a similar finding as that of chapter 2: The competitiveness literature in general 
(Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005; Lundvall 1992b; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990), and the 
literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’ in particular (Hall and Soskice 2001b), overestimate the 
stringency of national institutions on the one hand, and underestimate the international dimension 
of economic activity on the other.
In chapter 4 ,1 assess the importance of specific labour qualifications (namely skill levels 
and skill profiles) for the pursuit of different competitive strategies. While the hypothesis that low 
skill levels constitute a necessary input factor for Low Cost Production is shown to lack empirical 
support (see Ohlin 1933: 7; 51-54; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Porter 1985: 127-128; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 175), I find that employees with certain skill profiles are 
actually indispensable for the pursuit of an RPI and a DQP strategy (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 
174; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-41; see Porter 1985: 127-128; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; Ohlin 1933: 51). More precisely, employees with firm-specific 
skills are central to Diversified Quality Production, whereas employees with field-specific skills 
are essential for Radical Product Innovation. Following up on this finding, chapter 4 continues 
with an analysis of how national institutions, namely differences in labour-market regulation, 
impact on the provision of the required skill profiles. How do firms in flexible labour markets 
secure a workforce with firm-specific skills, and how do firms in rigid labour markets attract 
employees with field-specific skills? Addressing these questions, I illustrate that a variety of ways 
exist by which employers circumvent national labour-market regulation -  be it by turning to 
international labour markets, by (mis)using training subsidies provided by the government, or by 
developing particularly strong links to local, national, and international universities.
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Before concluding, chapter 5 opens up an excursus on strategy choice and change over 
time. Since all previous analyses are of a static nature, chapter 5 attempts to provide some 
dynamic insights. While synchronic empirical evidence shows that firms in the same economy 
can pursue different competitive strategies, I acknowledge that from a diachronic perspective one 
last possibility exists in which the competitiveness literature could be right with regard to its 
strategy-specialisation argument (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 
174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455; Porter 1990: 482-507; 355-382; 421-453; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; Sinn 2005: 18-19; see Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 
1992). It could be possible that firms which choose to pursue a strategy that is not facilitated by 
national institutions are destined to fail in the long run. I therefore analyse whether the stability of 
a competitive strategy depends on the institutional context in which it is pursued. Since empirical 
evidence refutes this idea, I propose an alternative explanation for strategy stability on the one 
hand, and strategy choice on the other. Regarding strategy stability, it seems that firms are more 
likely to change their legal status in general, and their strategy in particular, if  they are situated in
i
countries where seed finance for new businesses can be acquired comparatively easily. Regarding 
a firm’s strategy choice, I find the latter to depend on the extent to which entrepreneurs attempt to 
seize technological opportunities in order to develop them into marketable products. While it is 
beyond the scope o f my research project to understand which conditions make entrepreneurs 
seize technological opportunities, my analyses clearly demonstrate that national institutions do 
not constitute a significant determinant, if  any at all, of an entrepreneur’s strategy choice.
Finally, chapter 6 concludes with a summary interpretation of the results obtained. In 
recapitulating that diverse institutional pathways to international firm competitiveness exist, I 
find that the competitiveness literature falls short in one essential point, namely in its overly 
narrow focus on national institutions (see Lundvall 1992b; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990; Hall and 
Soskice 2001b; see also Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 68). This makes the literature ignore that 
required input factors are not only provided by national institutions. As a matter of fact, 
entrepreneurs often circumvent national institutions in order to secure required factors through 
what I call ’improvisation ’ on a contractual basis, and through ’importation ’ by drawing on 
international institutions. This finding has two noteworthy implications. Firstly, given the variety 
of institutional equilibria on which firms’ competitiveness are grounded, institutions most 
definitely do not assume a shape with the aim of supporting one specific production regime. 
Hence, I retain a historical account to be more useful for explaining institutional development 
than the functionalist approach proposed in the competitiveness literature. Secondly, the 
inventiveness with which entrepreneurs secure required input factors indicates that entrepreneurs
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are Schumpeterian innovators rather than institutionally constrained actors. Accordingly, 
Schumpeter’s perception of entrepreneurs as independent innovators (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, 
chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106) is more instructive for understanding how firms gain 
international competitiveness than the approach of the competitiveness literature, which perceives 
entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers. These insights lead me to conclude that the increasing 
internationalisation of economic affairs leads to divergence in the shape o f institutions, whilst 
simultaneously entailing convergence in entrepreneurial practices.
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2. On the Link between Institutions, the Provision of 
Specific Financial Means, and Their Impact on Competitive 
Strategies*
2.1. Entrepreneurs: Constrained Institution-Takers or Voluntaristic 
Innovators?
No finn can operate without financing its activities. The idea that finance constitutes an 
indispensable input factor for the pursuit of any competitive strategy is an uncontested fact. 
However, a broad strand of the competitiveness literature devotes itself to the question of whether 
specific types offinance facilitate specific strategies (Vitols 2001; Bronk 1998; Mayer 1998; CPB 
Netherlands 1997; Lindgaard Christensen 1992; see also Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-41; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). Finding this to be the case, the literature also 
asserts that national corporate-governance systems differ with regard to the types of finance they 
provide. In so-called outsider systems, the participation rights o f shareholders are limitpd, so that 
the latter are said to provide outsider share capital19. In insider systems, by contrast, shareholders 
have an important say in major corporate decisions, and are thus held to supply insider share 
capital20 (see Bronk 1998: 5; CPB Netherlands 1997: 348-351; 357-362; Mayer 1998: 146-149). 
Overall, these findings lead to the central argument of the competitiveness literature that firms in 
the same corporate-governance system are provided with the same type of finance which, in turn, 
makes them specialise in the same competitive strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-40; Vitols 
2001: 350-352; Bronk 1998: 15; CPB Netherlands 1997: 355-356; Mayer 1998: 159-160; 162; 
Ohlin 1933: 7; 55; Lindgaard Christensen 1992:146-147; 162; Hollingsworth 2000: 628).
Chapter 1 has demonstrated that this claim of the competitiveness literature is wrong: 
firms in the same economy pursue different competitive strategies to the same extent. Hence, the 
introductory chapter leaves us with an interesting puzzle to be explained. How can firms in [
* I am grateful to Karin Herrmann, Carolin Oelschlegel, and Antonio Testoni for providing me with precious 
information on various financial databases. I also wish to thank Paolo Barbanti, Bemd Berg, Rolf Daxhammer, Knut 
Lange, André Meier, Luigi Orsenigo, and Ottmar Schneck for their patient explanations of how capital markets are 
organised in Germany, Italy, and the UK respectively.
19 It should be noted that the literature uses various terms to describe the same type o f corporate-governance system, 
and the type o f  finance it provides. More precisely, the outsider system (Mayer 1998)- associated with limited 
shareholder rights and greater firm flexibility -  is also called shareholder model (Vitols 2001; Bronk 1998). 
Accordingly, the type o f  finance provided is not only termed outsider, but also short-term , or impatient share capital 
(idem; see also Hall and Soskice 2001a: 22).
20 As with outsider systems, the literature also uses various different terms for insider corporate-governance systems 
and the type o f  finance it provides. More precisely, the insider system  (Mayer 1998) -  associated with important 
shareholder rights and lower firm flexibility -  is also called the stakeholder model, whereas the type o f finance 
provided is not only termed insider, but also long-term , or patient share capital (Vitols 2001; Bronk 1998; see also 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 22).
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different countries pursue the same variety of competitive strategies, even though national 
corporate-governance systems are said to facilitate the pursuit of just one strategy? My research 
aims at answering this question by studying the link between (national) institutions21, input 
factors, and competitive strategies. In so doing, the present chapter focuses on the relationship 
between corporate-governance systems, the provision of the input factor finance12, and the three 
competitive strategies Radical Product Innovation (henceforth RPI), Diversified Quality 
Production (henceforth DQP), and Low Cost Production (henceforth LCP)23. To this end, I aim to 
assess the two sets of hypotheses proposed in the competitiveness literature. Accordingly, I ask:
1. whether it is true that an RPI, a DQP, and respectively an LCP strategy requires specific 
types of finance (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 354-356; Bronk 1998:14-15; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992:162; Ohlin 
1933: 7; 55)? Once all the necessary types of finance have been identified, I continue by 
asking:
2. whether it is true that each type of finance is only provided by country-specific corporate- 
governance regulations (Vitols 2001: 350-352; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 27-29; CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 351-354; Bronk 1998: 5-8; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 
Ohlin 1933: 55)?
In addressing these questions, my research findings show that the arguments of the 
competitiveness literature need to be qualified in three respects. Firstly, while the literature is 
right in suggesting that finance provided by external investors (i.e. creditors and shareholders) 
significantly facilitates the pursuit of specific strategies, it is wrong in its detailed hypothesis on
21 In line with Steeck and Thelen (2005: 9-16), I understand institutions as ‘formalized rules that may be enforced by 
calling upon a third party* (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 10).
22 As pointed out in chapter 1 (section 1.4.), a large number of input factors exist which may potentially facilitate the 
pursuit o f a competitive strategy (see e.g. Porter 1985: 85-86; 122; 343-350). To limit the scope o f my research 
endeavour, I decided to focus on those three factors which the competitiveness literature judges decisive for the 
success o f any competitive strategy, namely (1) financial means, (2) labour qualifications, and (3) new component 
standards. These factors are said to be decisive in that a firm cannot secure them on its own. Instead, finance, labour 
qualifications and new component standards are only provided following the successful solution of a coordination 
problem between a firm and other economic actors (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 
1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 
20). The provision of finance, around which the analyses of this chapter are centred, depends on the successful 
solution of the principle-agent problem  between a firm and its financiers (Mayer 1998: 145-146; Vitols 2001: 337; 
Kenyon and Vitols 2004: 11). Section 2.2. will elaborate on this coordination problem and illustrate how different 
solutions provide different types o f finance.
23 I took the decision to distinguish between three competitive strategies on the grounds o f deductive reasoning, as 
well as an in-depth review o f the competitiveness literature (see e.g. Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Lundvall 
1992b: 11-12; 57-59; Freeman 1992: 182; Porter 1990: 10; 37; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-39; Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001: 148-149; 174-175; Casper 2001: 398-400). My assumption that a distinction between three strategies is both 
sufficient and necessary was empirically confirmed ex post by the fact that I could attribute one strategy to each firm 
o f  the sample (see chapter 1; section 1.3.2.). Furthermore, operational differences between the three groups o f firms 
turned out to be statistically significant in that each strategy requires specific input factors. Thus, the decision to 
distinguish between three strategies is justifiable both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
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debt finance (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Hollingsworth 2000: 628): 
Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers do not finance their activities from debt 
any more than Radical Product Innovators do. Quite the opposite is the fact: I found firms 
pursuing an RPI strategy to rely on debt finance more heavily than firms pursuing a DQP and an 
LCP strategy.
Secondly, and more importantly, the idea that insider share capital furthers Diversified 
Quality Production, whilst outsider shareholder funds facilitate RPI, is not supported empirically 
(Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; 
Bronk 1998: 14-15). Instead, empirical evidence suggests that a distinction between share capital 
provided by institutional investors on the one hand, and by private investors on the other, is more 
viable to explain differences in the pursuit of competitive strategies. Whilst Radical Product 
Innovators rely heavily on institutional share capital, Diversified Quality Producers tend to use 
privately owned shareholder investment as a source of finance.
Thirdly, and in my view most importantly, the competitiveness literature must be 
criticised for its exclusive analytical focus on national institutions which, in turn, leads to the 
misconception of entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers (see Hall and Soskice 2001b in general; 
and Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56 in particular; see also Porter 1990, chapter 3; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). 
It is both correct and noteworthy that country-specific regulation facilitates the emergence of 
specific types of finance. Accordingly, the (still) rather generous public pension and insurance 
systems in Germany and Italy lead to a lower number of institutional investors than in the UK. 
However, the fact that fewer institutional investors exist in Germany and Italy does not mean that 
German and Italian entrepreneurs are unable to pursue an RPI strategy. Instead, I illustrate that 
Radical Product Innovators in Germany and Italy acquire share capital from foreign institutional 
investors. In other words, entrepreneurs circumvent national regulations by importing the 
required input factors from abroad, thereby drawing on international institutions. Thus, contrary 
to the perception of the competitiveness literature, entrepreneurs are not mere institution-takers. 
Instead, I find a Schumpeterian approach, which perceives entrepreneurs as independent and 
inventive actors (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4),(Schumpeter 1942: 81-106) more 
instructive for understanding how firms can pursue the same variety of competitive strategies 
within the same economy.
To illustrate this argument, the remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. In 
section 2.2., I introduce the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature on the link between 
corporate-governance regulations, financial input factors, and competitive strategies. I test these 
hypotheses in section 2.3. and 2.4.. In so doing, section 2.3. asks whether financial means
provided by external investors actually facilitate competitive strategies significantly more than 
potential rival factors. Finding this to be the case, section 2.4. studies which (national) institutions 
provide those financial means which are required for a specific strategy. Section 2.5. concludes 
by elaborating on the implications of the previous findings.
2*2. T h e  Hypotheses o f  The Com petitiveness L iter a tu r e: H ow  different  
C orporate-G overnance Reg ulatio ns provide Finance  fo r  different  
C om petitive  Strategies
The decision to limit my analyses to three input factors was grounded on the argument of 
the competitiveness literature that (1) finance, (2) labour qualifications, and (3) standards are 
decisive for the success of any competitive strategy (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6- 
7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 91-92; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). The reason for their decisive role is that a 
firm cannot secure these factors on its own. Instead, they are provided only following the solution 
of a coordination problem between a firm and other economic actors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6). 
With regard to finance, a coordination problem arises whenever a firm seeks to acquire capital 
from external investors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 7). More precisely, a principle-agent problem 
emerges in that the interests of the firm’s managers (agents) can differ substantially from the 
interests of its investors (principals) (Mayer 1998: 145-146; Vitols 2001: 337; Kenyon and Vitols 
2004: 11). As a rule, investors want to be assured that their money is used in such a way that it 
yields the highest possible return on investment. Managers, instead, ‘may indulge in empire­
building, which includes investments in large offices, in staff departments or in R&D activities, 
launching of over-extensive advertising campaigns or acquisitions* (CPB Netherlands 1997: 
347). Thus, the coordination problem, related to the provision of finance, consists in finding 
mechanisms that keep managers in check by aligning their interests with those of external 
investors.
Two ways exist in which this principle-agent problem can be resolved, as investors have 
two possibilities for making sure that their funds are used efficiently: by determining the returns 
on their investment ex ante, or by preserving the right to participate in the decision-making on 
how their funds are used. Whilst the provision of debt finance is typically made dependent on the 
former type of agreement, the provision of share capital is made dependent on the latter. But how 
can these two types of finance facilitate the pursuit of different competitive strategies?
Various authors suggest that debt finance promotes both DQP and LCP, whereas it 
forecloses the pursuit of an RPI strategy (Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354;
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Hollingsworth 2000: 628; see Bronk 1998)24. The reason for this is straightforward. Debt finance 
is provided on the condition that the creditor and the borrower agree on an amount of money, the 
sum of interests, which the borrower has to pay back in addition to the loan granted. Since the 
return on investment is fixed from the outset, the creditor cannot achieve a higher return on her 
investment than the invested amount itself, increased by the sum of interests. Thus, to safely 
recover their ftmds, creditors are risk-averse. Instead of investing in risky RPI projects where the 
danger of failure is high, they prefer to invest in DQP or LCP projects which promise secure 
returns (CPB Netherlands 1997: 346). Thus, whenever a firm relies to a large extent on debt 
finance, it is unlikely to pursue an RPI strategy but is, presumably, engaged in DQP or LCP (CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 353-354).
To illustrate the hypotheses on how share capital furthers different competitive strategies, 
it is necessary to distinguish between insider share capital on the one hand, and outsider share 
capital on the other. As mentioned above, shareholders provide money to a firm on the condition 
that they are granted a say in how their funds are spent. The distinction between insider and 
outsider shareholder finance refers to the extent to which shareholders can influence management 
decisions on major financial issues.
In insider systems, shareholders elect a supervisory board which, in turn, exerts control 
over the management board. This supervisory board comprises representatives of both 
shareholders and employees. It may or may not have the power to appoint managers. More 1 
importantly, though, the members of the supervisory board have inter alia the right to approve 
major investment decisions, to control the annual statement of accounts, and to consult the firm’s 
management in major corporate affairs. Thus, shareholders in insider systems not only acquire 
considerable insight into how a firm is run, they also have notable decision-making power in all 
major financial issues (CPB Netherlands 1997: 350-351; 357-362).
By contrast, in outsider systems shareholders merely elect the firm’s management. They 
do not elect a supervisory board which would, in turn, participate in the decision-making process 
on major corporate affairs. To monitor whether their funds provide an acceptable return on 
investment, shareholders are therefore limited to consulting ‘outsider* information, such as 
publicly available accounting indicators (e.g. the firm’s balance sheet or the performance of the 
firm’s stocks at the stock market). If these accounting indicators and, hence, the return on 
investment are disappointing, shareholders may decide to rapidly exit the company by selling
24 It should be noted that the competitiveness literature does not make any explicit suggestions regarding the type o f  
finance which facilitates an LCP strategy. However, extending the reasoning of the literature to Low Cost 
Production, it is possible to propose arguments with regard to the type o f finance that facilitates or hampers this 
strategy.
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their shares. They have no other means to ensure that managers use the capital provided in a 
profitable way. Outsider control mechanisms therefore oblige managers to maximise shareholder 
value and to focus on the short-term performance of their firm’s shares (Bronk 1998: 5; CPB 
Netherlands 1997:348-350).
But how do outsider share capital (i.e. share finance provided by shareholders in outsider 
systems) and insider share capital (i.e. share funds provided by shareholders in insider systems) 
impact on different competitive strategies? The competitiveness literature argues that insider 
share capital furthers Diversified Quality Production, whilst outsider share capital is assumed to 
facilitate Radical Product Innovation (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 
39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; Bronk 1998: 14-15; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 
162).
The reason for which insider shareholder finance is said to promote DQP is based on the 
idea that pronounced shareholder control rights encourage actors with a particular interest in a 
firm to acquire a comparatively large number of shares. Indeed, the firm’s founding family, 
banks, suppliers, and processors are often major shareholders in companies in insider systems 
(Bronk 1998: 11-12; Mayer 1998: 158-159; Kenyon and Vitols 2004: 17-18). This is said to 
facilitate Diversified Quality Production for three reasons. Firstly, the fact that banks, suppliers 
and processors -  together with employee representatives -  are strongly represented on the firm’s 
supervisory board furthers long-term, trust-based relations between the firm and its major 
stakeholders. The reason for this is that the latter, being members o f the supervisory board, can 
make sure that their relations with the firm are not immediately cut-off in periods of economic 
downturn. Thus, whenever a firm finds itself in economic difficulty, the supervisory board 
members supposedly discourage the management from immediately dismissing employees, or 
switching to cheaper suppliers (Bronk 1998: 14). On the one hand, this motivates employees to 
acquire firm-specific skills. On the other hand, it strengthens the link between the firm and its 
suppliers, thereby increasing their willingness to contribute to the firm’s quality management. At 
the same time, however, long-term relations make it difficult to oblige suppliers to deliver at the 
lowest possible prices. Similarly, long-term relations between a firm and its employees prevent 
the latter from acquiring field-specific skills. In brief, insider shareholder finance furthers the 
emergence of labour qualifications (see chapter 4) and supplier-producer relations (see chapter 3) 
which are said to be crucial for the pursuit o f a DQP strategy, but which militate against RPI and 
LCP (Bronk 1998:14; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39; Mayer 1998:159-160).
The second reason for which insider shareholder finance furthers DQP is a corollary of the 
first. Since employees, the founding family, banks, suppliers, and processors alike have important
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commercial relationships with ‘their’ firm, they have a vested interest in its persistence. 
Therefore, they prefer production strategies with secure returns to high-risk strategies. 
Accordingly, block shareholders are rather risk-averse and do not force managers to divest 
rapidly from unprofitable business units (CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354). Finally, since the ( 
firm’s major shareholders are often active in the same or related industries, they can significantly | 
increase the firm’s knowledge of the market. While banks help to evaluate investment projects, I 
suppliers provide valuable information about technological development and niche markets. This, j 
in turn, makes business activities in high-quality segments particularly attractive, whereas the j 
wholesale shift from existing to radically new production activities becomes less appealing 1 
(Bronk 1998:14). |
l
In contrast to insider share capital, outsider share capital is assumed to further RPI. I have 
already illustrated that the reduced monitoring capacities of shareholders in outsider systems ; 
obliges managers to focus on the maximisation of shareholder value. The predominant concern of , 
managers to maximise shareholder value is said to promote RPI for three reasons. Firstly, 
shareholder value is maximised whenever managers successfully pursue high-risk, high-return ' 
strategies. Shareholders, presumably, also favour the pursuit of an RPI strategy because ‘the costs ' 
of bankruptcy in case o f total failure of high-risk strategies are divided between shareholders and ! 
creditors’ (CPB Netherlands 1997: 346). Secondly, since shareholders in outsider systems have 1 
no say in how their money is used, managers are highly autonomous when taking investment 
decisions. Accordingly, they can rapidly reallocate resources to those radically innovative . 
projects which promise the highest returns. This, in turn, is incompatible with the pursuit of long­
term oriented low-risk, low-return strategies, i.e. DQP and LCP (CPB Netherlands 1997: 348). 
Finally, outsider shareholder finance hinders the development of long-term, trust-based 
relationships between a firm and its employees on the one hand, and its suppliers on the other. 
The reason for this is that, in order to maintain shareholder value, managers are obliged to • 
dismiss employees and to look for cheaper suppliers as soon as company sales start to decline. In j 
outsider systems, employees are thus discouraged to acquire firm-specific skills, whilst suppliers j 
are reluctant to cooperate closely in a firm’s quality management (Bronk 1998: 7; CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 352-353). Thereby, outsider shareholder finance hinders the development of 
labour qualifications (see chapter 4) and supplier-producer relations (see chapter 3) which are 
crucial for the successful pursuit of a DQP strategy.
To recapitulate, the competitiveness literature hypothesises that the pursuit o f an RPI 
strategy is facilitated by outsider share capital, whereas DQP is promoted by both debt finance 
and insider share capital. The pursuit of an LCP strategy, in turn, would appear to rely on a
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comparatively high level of debt finance (Vitols 2001: 350-352; 359-360; Bronk 1998; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 
162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). Table 2.1. provides an overview of the hypotheses regarding the impact 
of finance on each competitive strategy. It is the aim of the two following sections to test these 
hypotheses.




Finance Outsider ShC Insider ShC
1. Radical Product Innovation X
2. Diversified Quality Production X X
3. Low Cost Production X
23. T estin g  t h e  H y po th eses  o n  D if f e r e n t  F in a n c ia l  M eans: D o  Sp e c if ic  
St r a t e g ie s  r e q u ir e  Sp e c if ic  M ea n s  o f  F in a n c e?
In the following section, I test the first part of the hypotheses which I derived from the 
competitiveness literature as laid out in section 2.2.. Accordingly, I assess whether each 
competitive strategy actually relies on specific types of finance. In so doing, I reveal to what 
extent firms finance their activities from debt on the one hand, and from share capital on the 
other. However, I do not assess in section 2.3. whether specific types of share capital facilitate 
specific strategies. This assessment is reserved for section 2.4., as it is closely linked to the 
question of whether national corporate-governance institutions provide specific financial means.
Before starting the empirical assessments, I wish to stress that the following analyses are 
based on two sources of information. While I predominantly studied balance sheet data, I also 
carried out about 20 in-depth interviews with company representatives and financial experts in 
Germany, Italy and the UK25. These interviews provided me with important background 
information and a general understanding of how specific types of finance impact specific
25 The questionnaire I used as a guideline when talking to employees o f the firms' Finance Departments is 
reproduced in the appendix.
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competitive strategies. To reveal the extent to which firms rely on different types of finance, I 
analysed the balance sheets of 74 pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy the UK.26
Before presenting the results of these analyses, it is useful to say a few words about how I 
arrived at the final firm sample. Let me repeat that the initial sample, obtained from the sampling 
strategy described in chapter 1, was composed of 93 firms (see section 1.3.2.). In studying these 
companies more closely, it came to light that in the course of the last few years some had gone 
bankrupt (namely Axis Genetics, and Virogeri), whilst others had merged or been acquired 
(namely Imperial Cancer Research, KS Biomedix, Nycomed Amersham, Amersham Pharmacia 
Biotech, Bioglan, Oxford Glyco Sciences, Plantorgan) . In a limited number of cases, it was 
impossible to identify the firm as denominated in the PHID sample (namely Scotia, Biopharm 
(UK), GLE Medicon, Ausonia, Bruno, and Biotoscana). This shrunk the initial sample from 93 to 
78 cases. In about 30% of these 78 remaining cases it was not possible to obtain financial data. 
This constituted a problem in that the number of cases became almost too small for carrying out 
quantitative analyses.
However, the initial sample was limited, for good reasons, in two respects. Firstly, it did 
not include any generics firms. As explained in chapter 1 (section 1.3.1.), a firm is only included 
in the PHID database if it has participated in a pharmaceutical project that has reached the stage 
of pre-clinical development. Generics firms, imitating a once patent-protected drug, are not 
required to perform any clinical trials as long as they can demonstrate that the imitated drug is 
bioequivalent to the original pharmaceutical. Since generics firms do not engage in R&D, they 
are not recorded in the PHID database which, in turn, shows that they actually pursue an LCP 
strategy. Secondly, the initial firm sample contained only a limited number of biotech firms for 
both Germany and Italy. The reason for this is that the biotech industry is notably younger in 
Germany and Italy than in the UK. Since many biotech firms in Germany and Italy were founded 
in the late 1990s, they have not yet brought any pharmaceutical project beyond the stage of pre- 
clinical development. Accordingly, they were not yet included in the PHID database when I 
sampled the latter in November 2004. As a result, the sample contains comparatively few German 
and Italian biotech companies.
As discussed in chapter 1 (section 1.3.1.) the term pharmaceutical firm  is used as a generic term for all types of 
companies which are active in the drug industry, i.e. for biotech-, traditional pharmaceutical-, and generics firms 
alike.
27 In addition, another 11 companies merged or were acquired before or during the period of data collection (i.e. to 
April 2006), namely Celltech, Pharmagene, PowderJect, Xenova, Galen, British Biotech, AST A Medica, Jenapharm, 
Rotta Research, Formenti and Rottapkarm. However, contrary to the aforementioned companies, I could obtain data 
for the latter firms because o f one of the following two reasons. Either the merger/acquisition only constituted a 
formal change o f  shareholder majorities without entailing major changes in the firm’s organizational structure, 
and/or the merger/acquisition was completed after my interview with the firm in question.
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In order to obtain a more homogenous case sample on the one hand, and to increase the 
number of cases on the other, I added both generics and biotech firms to the sample. In so doing, 
I made the utmost effort to proceed in a consistent way. With regard to generics producers, I 
added only those firms which can be said to be typically British, German or Italian in that firms 
have their headquarters in, and concentrate their (development) activities on the national 
territories of one of these three countries. Accordingly, I added 6 generics producers to the British 
sample (namely CP Pharmaceuticals1*, Generics (UK)29, Kent Pharmaceuticals, Sussex 
Pharmaceuticals, Tillomed Laboratories and Sterwin Medicines30), and 9 generics firms to the 
German sample (namely Aliud Pharma, Betapharm Arzneimittel31, CT Arzneimittel, H exat2, 
Lichtenstein Pharmazeutica33, Merck Dura, Ratiopharm, Azupharm34, and Stada Arzneimittel). It 
is important to note that it was difficult to add generics producers to the Italian sample. Due to the 
rather strict price floors imposed on pharmaceutical products by the Italian government, a 
genuine Italian generics industry does not exist (Magazzini et al. 2002; Wittner 2003: 130-134). 
Most generic drugs sold in Italy are imported by foreign generics producers (Orsenigo 2004; 
Wittner 2003:133-134). However, DOC Generici and Dorom35 constitute two exceptions as they 
have genuine Italian roots. Accordingly, I decided to incorporate them in the sample.
Since biotech firm s are already highly present in the British firm sample, I added only 
German and Italian biotech companies. Aiming to minimise the risk of bankruptcy, I included 
only particularly successful German and Italian biotech firms. Hence, I added the oldest, the 
largest (expressed in number of employees) and the most successful companies (measured in 
terms of annual turnover). In so doing, the German firm sample was enlarged by 3 firms (namely
28 While CP Pharmaceuticals was acquired by Wockkardt in 2003, the original structure was still intact at the time of 
my interviews.
29 Generics (UK) was acquired by Merck KGaA in 1994. However, this acquisition lead only to a change in 
shareholder majorities and had no major effects on the company’s organisation. Accordingly, the ‘typically British’ 
modus operandi remained in place.
30 While Sterwin Medicines was renamed Winthrop Pharmaceuticals in December 2004, this did not entail any major 
restructuring. Hence, the original structure was still intact at the moment of data collection.
31 It should be noted that Betapharm  was acquired by a group of investors, 3i, in March 2004. However, this 
acquisition merely constituted a change o f shareholder majorities, and Betapharm’s structure was (still) unchanged 
when I carried out interviews.
32 In 2005, Hexal was acquired by Novartis. Importantly, though, I could collect data and cany out interviews before 
that time.
33 While Lichtenstein Pharmazeutica was transformed into Winthrop Arzneimittel in January 2005, it continued to 
operate as an independent business unit Hence, the former, ‘typically German* modus operandi was still in place 
when I interviewed representatives.
34 In January 2004, Azupharm  merged with Biochemie Pharma to form the Sandoz GmbH. Despite this merger, Ex- 
Azupharm  continued to operate as an independent business unit. Consequently, the former, ‘typically German’ 
modus operandi was still in place when I interviewed representatives o f this company.
35 Although Teva acquired Dorom  in 2004, this acquisition only led to minor restructuring processes, and the 
organisational structure was (still) intact when I interviewed representatives.
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DeveloGen, Ingenium Pharmaceuticals, and Sirenade ), while the Italian sample was increased 
by 8 companies (namely Axxam, BioXell, Newron Pharmaceuticals, Nikem Research, 
Novuspharma , Primm, Shar.dna, and Siena Biotech). In contrast to generics firms, whose 
competitive strategy consists by definition of LCP, the competitive strategy of biotech companies 
is more difficult to identify because many, although not all, pursue an RPI strategy. I therefore 
identified the competitive strategy of each biotech firm added on the basis of four different 
sources, namely their classification as worked out by (1) Ernst and Young on the one hand 
(Emst&Young 2002: 15-19)38, and (2) by Knut Lange on the other (Lange 2006)39. Furthermore,
I consulted (3) the firms’ web-pages about their business strategies, and (4) I asked my contact 
partners during interviews about their firm’s strategy.40
In so doing, I increased the 78 remaining cases of the initial sample to 106. It may be 
interesting to note that this firm sample has undergone some final modifications, as the 
competitive strategies of those 9 firms which were classified in chapter 1 (section 1.3.2.) as both 
RPIs and DQPs had to be clarified. For four firms (ASTA Medica, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bracco 
and Menarini), I could obtain separate data for the respective RPI and DQP business units. 
Accordingly, I considered each of the two business units as a single case. In the five other cases | 
(Astra Zeneca, Bayer, GlaxoSmithKline, Schering, and Shire), I could only obtain data for one I 
business unit. Hence, I assigned just one strategy on the basis of the interviews I carried out with ! 
firm representatives. This, in turn, left me with a final sample of 110 cases. |
Admittedly, the above explanations might read ponderously. However, the patient reader \ 
will, hopefully, benefit from understanding how the sample is ultimately composed, because the 
latter will serve as the basis for all furthur analyses -  on finance, labour qualifications and 
component standards alike. For the following analyses on how finance impacts competitive 
strategy, I was able to obtain balance sheet data for 74 cases. Let us therefore finally try and shed 
light on our initial question: does empirical evidence support the hypothesis that each competitive | 
strategy relies on specific types of finance? \
36 At the time o f  my interview, the future acquisition o f Sirenade by Crelux in 2005 was already decided. However, a 
possible restructuring process had not yet started.
7 Although Novuspharma became a wholly owned subsidy o f Cell Therapeutics in 2003, it continued to operate as 
an independent business unit. Hence, the ‘typical Italian’ way o f organising business was (still) intact when I 
interviewed firm representatives.
381 am grateful to Julia Schuler for forwarding the list o f  biotech firms which have been classified by Emst&Young 
as ‘TechProduct Companies’ on the one hand, and as ‘Product Companies’ on the other (Emst&Young 2 0 0 2 :15ff.). 
39 I wish to thank Knut Lange for the fruitful discussions about the British and German biotech industry in general, 
and about the classification o f  biotech firms as RPIs or DQPs in particular.
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23 .1 . Some Tentative Observations
When looking at a firm’s balance sheet, we see that -  apart from debt finance and share 
capital -  the firm can use three other sources o f finance. Firstly, it can resort to retained earnings. 
At the end of each accounting period, a firm’s shareholders must decide what to do with the 
profits of that period. Shareholders have two options: either they can choose to distribute their 
profits, or they can decide to retain them in the company as a reserve for financing future 
activities41. Hence, retained earnings constitute that amount of profits (or losses) which a firm’s 
shareholders decided to retain over past accounting periods. Secondly, a firm can use short-term 
liabilities. Short-term liabilities constitute those liabilities with a duration of less than 1 year 
which arise from a firm’s daily business. Examples are supplier credits, taxes and social 
expenditure to be paid, as well as short-term debt (resulting for example from the overdraft of a 
company’s current accounts) . Finally, a firm can resort to so-called other non-current liabilities. 
This term denominates those funds which a company keeps aside whenever it is concerned that it 
may have to pay an outstanding amount of money in the future. Pension provisions, provisions 
for doubtful debts, provisions for outstanding claims, and deferred taxes constitute some of the 
most prominent examples.
If the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature hold true, we should find that -  of the 
five financial resources (share capital, long-term debt, retained earnings, short-term liabilities, 
and other non-current liabilities) -  Radical Product Innovators use a comparatively high level of 
share capital (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 40; CPB Netherlands 1997: 
354-355; see CPB Netherlands 1997: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55), while Low Cost 
Producers rely on a rather high amount of long-term debt (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 
1997: 353-354). Diversified Quality Producers, in turn, should use a comparatively high amount 
of both share capital and long-term debt (Vitols 2001: 350; 352; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; 355-356; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; see 
Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). More precisely, the following 
analyses should show that Radical Product Innovators (RPIs) use roughly the same amount of
40 Based on these insights, I classified DeveloGen, Ingenium Pharmaceuticals, Sirenade, BioXell, Newron 
Pharmaceuticals, Novuspkarma, Shar.dna, and Siena Biotech as RPIs. By contrast, Axxam, Nikem Research, and 
Prim m  were classified as DQPs.
41 O f  course, shareholders can decide to do both; distribute one part of the profits and retain the other as a reserve.
42 It should be noted that debt finance consists of both short-term debt (i.e. loans to be repaid within less than one 
year) and long-term debt (i.e. loans to be repaid within more than one year). Yet, the hypotheses o f  the 
competitiveness literature regarding the impact o f debt finance on competitive strategy refer only to long-term debt 
(see section 2.2.). The reason for this is that creditors do usually not make an in-depth assessment of a firm’s 
activities (and, hence, o f its competitive strategy) before granting a short-term loan. Therefore, I included all short­
term debt in the firm’s short-term liabilities, while I considered only long-term debt as debt finance.
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share capital as Diversified Quality Producers (DQPs). Yet both RPIs and DQPs should use 
significantly more share capital than Low Cost Producers (LCPs). Similarly, DQPs should rely on 
long-term debt to roughly the same extent as LCPs. However, both DQPs and LCPs should use 
more long-term debt than RPIs.
To reveal the extent to which firms rely on different sources of finance, I subdivided the 
debit side of each of the 74 available balance sheets into their five financial components. In order 
to control for temporary peaks, I determined all figures as an average of the last five available 
years (usually 1999 -  2003). In so doing, I determined what percentage of a firm’s overall capital 
is made up o f share capital, retained earnings, long-term debt, other non-current liabilities and 
short-term liabilities. Table 2.2. presents an overview of the capital composition of the various 
subgroups of the 74 companies. While the sum of share capital and retained earnings constitutes a 
company’s equity capital (Eigenkapital), the sum of long-term debt, other non-current liabilities 
and short-term liabilities represents a firm’s borrowed capital (Fremdkapital).
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Table 2.2.: Capital Composition of Diverse Groups of Pharmaceutical Firms
G roup o f Firms Nb. of 
Cases









A verage RPIs UK 10 254% -200 % 18% 2% 26%
A verage DQPs UK 12 44% 11% 8% 6% 31%
A verage LCPs UK 7 1% 41% 4% 4% 50%
Average Biotechs UK 15 195% -136% 14% 4% 23%
Average Tr.Phannas UK 8 21 % 23% 8% 5% 43%
Average Generics UK 6 1% 42% 4% 5% 48%
A verage RPIs Ger. 5 103 % -38 % 10% 11% 14%
A verage DQPs Ger 8 13% 34% 8% 24% 21 %
A verage LCPs Ger 4 6% 28% 14% 13% 39%
Average Biotechs Dtl. 4 123 % -55 % 11 % 9% 12%
Average Tr.Phannas Dtl. 9 14% 33% 8% 24% 21%
Average Generics Dtl. 4 6% 28% 14% 13% 39%
A verage RPIs It. 8 45% -1% 18% 4% 34%
A verage DQPs It. 13 12% 29% 7% 8% 44%
A verage LCPs It. 7 5% 11% 7% 14% 63%
Average Biotechs It. 9 39% 6% 11 % 5% 39%
Average Tr.Phannas I t 17 11 % 20% 11 % 8% 50%
Average Generics It. 2 6% 29% 6% 27% 32%
O verall Average RPIs 23 149 % -96 % 16% 5% 26%
O verall Average RPIs 33 24% 23% 8% 12% 33%
O verall Average RPIs 18 4% 26% 7% 10% 53%
Overall Average Biotechs 28 134% -79 % 13% 5% 27%
Overall Average Tr.Phar. 34 14% 24% 9% 12% 41 %
Overall Average Generics 12 3% 36% 8% 11 % 42%
Table 2.2. points to two trends which are of particular interest for all further analyses. 
Firstly, variations in the extent to which firms rely on different sources of finance are strikingly 
homogenous for the strategy and industry subgroups of firms. In other words, firms which pursue 
a specific strategy, and firms which are active in a specific industry, show very similar attitudes 
with regard to the financial resources on which they rely most heavily. This suggests that a firm’s 
competitive strategy and its industry have a fairly similar impact upon its financial decisions.
Secondly, while country-specific variations in the absolute use of specific financial means 
can be observed, both Radical Product Innovators and Low Cost Producers rely on one type of 
finance relatively more than on any of the other financial sources -  irrespective of the country in 
which they are based. Accordingly, share capital constitutes the most important source of finance
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for the pursuit of an RPI strategy in the UK, in Germany, and in Italy alike. Similarly, British, 
German and Italian Low Cost Producers use short-term liabilities more than any other type of 
finance. This suggests that different competitive strategies do indeed rely on different types of 
finance.
At first sight, Diversified Quality Production seems to constitute an exception to this rule, 
because it depends on the country whether firms use share capital, retained earnings, or short­
term liabilities as their most important means of finance. Does this indicate that a DQP strategy 
can be pursued irrespective of the specific type of finance? To avoid confusion, I want to point 
out here what the following analyses will reveal: akin to RPI and LCP, a DQP strategy is also 
facilitated by a specific means of finance. However, this trend does not emerge clearly from table
2.2. because of different accounting rules used in the UK and Italy on the one hand (namely the 
IAS, and sometimes the US-GAAP), and in Germany on the other (namely accounting rules 
according to the HGB). While the accounting system according to HGB obliges firms to report 
the full amount of pension provisions in their balance sheets, the IAS and the US-GAAP allow 
the outsourcing of pension provisions to individual pension funds (Schneck 1998: 551-552). 
Accordingly, table 2.2. shows that other long-term liabilities, which include a firm’s pension 
provisions, constitute a particularly important means of finance for German firms in general, and 
for German DQPs in particular. The reason for this is that DQPs are significantly older than LCPs 
and RPIs (see section 2.3.2.2.). Therefore, DQPs in Germany have often accumulated a 
substantial amount o f pension provisions, which is reflected by table 2.2. in that it shows other 
long-term liabilities to be the second most important source of finance for German DQPs. The 
relative importance o f long-term liabilities for German DQPs obscures the overall picture. Since ! 
the five means of finance add up to 100% of a firm’s capital, they deprive each other of their 
relative explanatory power because an increase in one item of the balance sheet necessarily leads ' 
to a relative decrease on the other items.
It should be noted that all the trends revealed in table 2.2. -  regarding the three 
competitive strategies in general and DQP in particular -  are speculative to the extent that they 
are grounded on average observations rather than on quantitative analyses. To assess whether 
trends are empirically significant, diverse quantitative analyses need to be carried out. I will 
present the results o f these analyses in the course of the following sections. Will empirical j 
evidence confirm the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature that share capital facilitates RPI 
and DQP, whereas debt finance is essential for the pursuit of LCP and DQP (Vitols 2001: 350; 
352; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; 355-356; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 628; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55)?
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23.2. CONTROLLING FOR PREDICTORS OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES OTHER THAN FINANCE.
To test the importance of specific types of finance for a firm’s strategy, we must first 
assess to what extent rival explanatory factors exist. If one (or more) other factors) further(s) a 
competitive strategy more than specific financial input factors, an entrepreneur will tend to 
choose the former in order to pursue the strategy in question. In other words, it can only be 
claimed legitimately that specific types of finance are indispensable for a competitive strategy if 
they have a more decisive impact on this than any rival explanator. Needless to say, a large 
number o f factors exist which may have some impact on a firm’s strategy. Apart from the three 
input factors retained to be decisive by the competitiveness literature (see in particular Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 
1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20), three other factors can be 
assumed to be of particular importance, namely: (1) the country in which a firm is based, (2) the 
industry in which a firm is active, and (3) a firm’s age.
As laid out in chapter 1 (section 1.1.), it is a central claim of the competitiveness literature 
that the country in which a firm is based determines its choice of competitive strategy because 
national institutions limit the range of available input factors (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; 
Sinn 2005; Porter 1990; Freeman 1992; Lindgaard Christensen 1992; Nelson 1993; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 
2001: 174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455). The introductory chapter suggests 
this argument to be wrong: we have seen that firms in different economies resemble each other in 
their choices of competitive strategy (see also chapter 5). However, since this claim is central to 
the competitiveness literature, I will test to what extent a firm’s strategy correlates with the 
country in which it is located. If the literature is right, we should find that entrepreneurs choose a 
certain country rather than a certain type of finance to pursue the strategy in question.
Furthermore, table 2.2. suggests that the industry in which a firm is active has a 
pronounced impact on the means of finance a company prefers to use. Hence, it should also be 
assessed to what extent the industry within which a firm is active impacts on its strategy. If an 
industry facilitates the pursuit of a given strategy more than a firm’s financial means, the former 
should be more strongly correlated with competitive strategy than the latter. Hence, a firm’s 
industry constitutes another factor for which the financial data needs to be controlled.
Finally, as mentioned in the introductory chapter (section 1.3.3.), Abernathy and 
Utterback show that radically new innovations do often not come from incumbent firms. They are 
instead proposed by small and comparatively young (start-up) companies which are outsiders to 
an industry (Utterback 1994: 90-101). The reason for this is that radical innovation often makes
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existing products obsolete. Incumbent firms therefore hold little interest in pursuing a strategy 
which accelerates the decline of their own products (Utterback 1994: 160-165). Thus, young 
firm-age facilitates RPI because young companies usually have few or no product(s) that risk 
becoming obsolete if a radically new innovation is made. If this argument holds true, we should 
find that firm-age is more strongly correlated with competitive strategy than any of the finance 
variables. I will therefore assess the importance of firm-age as a third potential predictor of 
competitive strategy.
Ideally, all potential predictors of competitive strategy would be tested in one model. If 
possible, regression analyses would correlate a firm’s country, industry, age, share capital, 
retained earnings, long-term debt, other non-current liabilities and short-term liabilities 
(independent variables) with competitive strategy (dependent variable). However, such analyses 
would hardly provide any instructive outcome. On the one hand, the independent variables under 
consideration are too numerous to produce any significant result. This is particularly true as the 
overall number of cases is rather low, namely 74. On the other hand, several independent 
variables presumably co-vary. This is, in particular, the case for the five financial indicators: 
given that they always add up to 100% of a company’s capital, a decrease in one financial 
indicator necessarily entails an increase in one or more others. Hence, the more financial 
variables are included in a regression model, the more they deprive each other of their respective 
explanatory power. To circumvent these problems and to filter the most important predictors of 
competitive strategy, I will cany out two analytical steps. In the remaining parts of section 2.3.2.,
I will, firstly, identify the strongest rival hypothesis for the pursuit of a competitive strategy. | 
Secondly, I will assess in section 2.3.3. whether this rival hypothesis explains the choice of I 
competitive strategy better than specific financial input factors. !
2.3.2.1. I n d u s t r y  a n d  C o m p e t it iv e  S t r a t e g y : Two Proxies for the Same Concept
It is the aim of the following two sections to identify the strongest explanatory factor for 
the pursuit of a competitive strategy apart from finance. Accordingly, I test how the three 
abovementioned predictors (country, industry and firm-age) impact on competitive strategy. To 
this end, I carried out twelve logistic regression analyses. To begin, I ran six binary logistic 
regressions. These analyses resembled each other in the choice of country, industry, and firm-age 
as independent variables. However, they differed with regard to the employed regression method,
and with regard to the way in which the dependent variable, competitive strategy, was coded.43 
Furthermore, I carried out six multi-nominal logistic regressions. In line with the binary analyses, 
these multi-nominal regressions were similar in the choice of independent variables {country, 
industry and firm-age), and differed with regard to both the regression method employed, and the 
competitive strategy used as a reference category.44
Interestingly, these twelve analyses show that the best predictor o f competitive strategy is 
the industry in which a firm is active. This finding is in line with the first observation made on the 
basis o f table 2.2. (see section 2.3.1.). The latter showed that variations in the financial data are 
strikingly homogenous for the data-split along the lines of the firms’ competitive strategy, as well 
as the data-split along the lines of the firms’ industry. This, in turn, indicates that the strategy and 
the industry variable are highly correlated. Indeed, two different types of analyses provide 
empirical support for this finding. Firstly, the results of the aforementioned multi-nominal 
analyses are always preceded by the warning that ‘there is possibly a quasi-complete separation 
in the data’. Secondly, the results of a simple correlation analysis show that the strategy and the 
industry variable are strongly correlated (R = 0.802; p < 0.01). How can we make sense of this 
finding?
Let us recall that the dimension which underlies and therefore enables the distinction 
between different competitive strategies is a firm’s technology intensity. Compared to Radical 
Product Innovation which is highly technology-intensive, Diversified Quality Production is less 
technology-intensive. The technology intensity of LCP, in turn, is even more limited. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that a firm’s technology intensity also constitutes the 
dimension which allows us to distinguish between different industries, i.e. between biotech firms, 
pharmaceutical companies, and generics producers. While biotech firms are highly technology­
intensive, the technology intensity of pharmaceutical firms is reduced, whereas generics firms are 
not technology-intensive at all (see chapter 1; sections 1.3.1. and 1.3.2.). Furthermore, a firm’s 
industry was even used as a measure to determine the competitive strategy of those companies 
which did not emerge as unambiguous RPIs or DQPs from sampling the PHID database (see 
chapter 1 : section 1.3.2.). In other words, it seems that competitive strategy and industry are two
431 used both the ‘Enter* and a ‘Stepwise* method (Forward: LR). Furthermore, I coded competitive strategies in 
three different ways: (1.) as PRIness (all RPIs were coded 1, whilst all DQPs and LCPs were coded 0), (2.) as
DQPness (all DQPs were coded 1, whereas all RPIs and LCPs were coded 0), and (3.) as LCPness (all LCPs were 
coded 1 while all RPIs and DQPs were coded 0). By combining the 2 regression methods with the 3 ways of coding 
the competitive strategy, I carried out 6 binary regression analyses.
44 Again, I used both the ‘Enter’ and a ‘Stepwise’ method (Forward Entry). While I chose RPI as reference category 
for the first pair of analyses, DQP constituted the reference category o f the second regression-pair. Finally, I used 
LCP as reference category for the third pair of analyses. By combining the 2 regression methods with the 3 reference 
categories, I carried out 6 multi-nominal regression analyses.
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different measures o f  the same concept, nam ely technology intensity. This idea is empirically 
supported by a reliability test which shows a firm’s competitive strategy and its industry to be 
highly reliable measures of the same dimension: technology intensity (raw Alpha Cronbach -
0.889; standardised Alpha Cronbach = 0.890).
This finding suggests that a firm’s industry constitutes an alternative dependent variable, 
rather than a predictor of competitive strategy. Accordingly, the question to be asked is not: does 
a firm’s industry have a significant impact on competitive strategy? Instead, it is to be found out 
whether a firm relies on certain sources of finance as a result of its competitive strategy, or as a 
result of the industry in which it is active? In other words, we want to make sure that we do not 
explain which input factors are required by firms in a certain industry, but by firms which pursue 
a specific competitive strategy.
A MANOVA analysis is most adequate for testing whether different means of finance are 
required for the pursuit of different competitive strategies, or instead for being active in different 
industries. Accordingly, I carried out three MANOVA analyses, correlating several combinations 
of finance variables (as the models’ independent variables) with competitive strategy and 
industry (as the models’ dependent variables)45. At first sight, the results of all three analyses are 
consistent in that the respective independent variables seem to predict the firms’ industry slightly 
better than the firms’ competitive strategy. However, none of the industry-related results is 
significant at a 0.1 significance level. The only results which are significant at this level show that 
different financial decisions (with regard to the amount of short-term liabilities employed) predict 
a firm’s competitive strategy better than a firm’s industry. This finding is reassuring, as it can be 
interpreted as confirming that firms resort to certain sources of finance because they pursue a 
certain competitive strategy, not because they are active in a specific industry.
2.3.2.2. Firm -Age and Country: One Significant and One Insignificant Factor for 
Competitive Strategy
Having shown that a firm’s choice of finance allows us to predict its strategy better than 
its industry, the industry variable can be excluded from all further analyses. Since this variable 
was strongly correlated with the strategy variable, it emerged not only as the strongest predictor
45 More precisely, I assessed the impact o f  three combinations of those (financial) variables which the following 
sections will reveal to be the strongest predictors o f  competitive strategy. Hence, MANOVA1 used share capital, 
retained earnings, long-term debt, and short-term liabilities as independent variables, whereas MANOVA2 
regressed share capital, retained earnings, and short-term liabilities. In addition to the three strongest financial 
predictors o f competitive strategy {share capital, retained earnings, and short-term liabilities), MANOVA3 also 
included firm -age as a fourth independent variable, since the latter turned out to be the strongest non-financial 
predictor o f  competitive strategy (see section 2.3.2.2.). In each MANOVA analysis, I correlated the respective 
independent variables with the two dependent variables, competitive strategy and industry.
of competitive strategy from the previous regression analyses, but also, presumably, reduced the 
explanatory power of the two other rival predictors. Hence, the twelve logistic regression 
analyses carried out in section 2.3.2.1. must be run again, with the difference that industry is 
removed as an independent variable from the various models. Thereby, only the explanatory 
power of country and firm-age is assessed.
Interestingly, the results of these analyses agree on two points. Firstly and for the aim of 
my study most importantly, they show without exception that the country in which a firm is based 
does not constitute a significant determinant of its competitive strategy. In none of the twelve 
analyses does the firms’ country qualify as a significant strategy-predictor -  not even at a 
significance level of 0.1. These results confirm the findings of the introductory chapter: firms 
pursue different strategies irrespective of the country in which they are based. This finding also 
indicates that the availability of input factors is not exclusively determined by national 
institutions in general, and corporate-governance regulations in particular. Since I will elaborate 
on this argument in section 2.5., suffice it to say here that entrepreneurs seem to have more 
freedom with regard to their choice of input factors than suggested by the competitiveness 
literature. Having found a firm’s location not to have any significant impact on its strategy, I 
exclude the country variable from all further analyses.
Secondly, the results obtained also show that firm-age qualifies as a significant 
determinant of competitive strategy in almost all analyses. This result confirms Abernathy and 
Utterback’s finding that radically innovative companies are younger than firms pursuing a DQP 
or an LCP strategy. As pointed out previously, these authors suggest that incumbent firms have 
difficulties in pursuing an RPI strategy because radical innovation often renders existing products 
obsolete (Utterback 1994: 160-165). Hence, incumbent firms have little interest in pursuing a 
strategy which accelerates the decline of their own products. In line with my quantitative 
findings, I conclude that firm-age facilitates RPI because young companies usually have few, or 
no product(s) that could become obsolete if a radically new innovation were to be made.
In sum, the previous analyses have shown firm-age to be the strongest predictor of 
competitive strategy. Consequently, and contrary to a firm’s industry or country, I retain firm-age 
as a potential independent variable in order to assess, in the following analyses, whether it 
predicts a firm’s strategy better than different types of finance.
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2 3 3 .  How Specific Sources of Finance further Specific Competitive Strategies
The above analyses found empirical support for the argument that Radical Product 
Innovation is facilitated by a young firm-age (see Utterback 1994: 90-101; 160-165). 
Consequently, the question arises whether this finding can be reconciled with the argument of the 
competitiveness literature that specific means of finance further the pursuit of specific 
competitive strategies (Vitols 2001: 350-352; 359-360; Bronk 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 
39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 
55). In other words, is a firm’s competitive strategy facilitated by different financial means more 
than by its age? To answer this question, I run various binary and multi-nominal logistic 
regression analyses.
Before presenting these results, three technical remarks should be made. Firstly, let us 
recall that share capital, retained earnings, long-term debt, other non-current liabilities and 
short-term liabilities add up to 100% of a firm’s capital. Consequently, at the very most four 
financial indicators can be introduced into one regression model as a predictor of competitive 
strategy. Otherwise the measurement is no longer independent. To allow for independent 
measurement, it was most advisable to exclude other non-current liabilities from the following 
analyses, for three reasons. First, as table 2.2. shows, other long-term liabilities do overall not 
only constitute the least important means of finance. The variation in the extent to which firms 
pursuing different strategies use this type of finance is also very narrow. This suggests that other 
long-term liabilities do not have a facilitative impact on any competitive strategy. Several multi- 
nominal logistic regression analyses confirmed that neither an RPI, nor a DQP, nor an LCP 
strategy requires this type of finance46. Second, let us recall our previous observation that German 
firms in general, and German DQPs in particular, employ more ‘other non-current liabilities’ than 
firms in Italy and the UK (see table 2.2. in section 2.3.1.). The reason for this is that German 
accounting rules according to HGB oblige firms to report pension provisions in their balance 
sheets. By excluding other non-current liabilities from the following analyses, this country- 
specific difference in accounting rules was given less weight. Finally, the competitiveness
46 More precisely, I earned out three multi-nominal logistic regressions for each o f  the five financial indicators 
{share capital, retained earnings, long-term debt, other non-current liabilities, and short-term liabilities). Thereby, 
the first analysis o f  each trio used RPI, the second DQP, and the third LCP as a reference category. In each trio of 
analyses, I assessed the impacts of the respective financial indicator and firm -age as the strongest rival explanator 
upon competitive strategy. I always used a stepwise method (‘Forward Entry*). Interestingly, the results agree in that 
the respective financial indicator is retained as significant, and mostly as stronger determinant o f competitive strategy 
than firm-age. The only exception to this rule is constituted by the three analyses on other non-current liabilities: The 
latter do not even qualify as a statistically insignificant determinant o f competitive strategy, leaving firm-age as the 
only predictor o f competitive strategy. This, in turn, confirms the observation made on the basis o f table 2.2.: other 
non-current liabilities do not constitute a necessary source o f finance for any of the three competitive strategies.
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literature does not propose any hypothesis about the impact of other non-current liabilities on 
competitive strategy. The reason, simply, is that this type of finance is not provided by external 
financiers; it is an internally generated source of finance. Consequently, the exclusion of other 
non-current liabilities from the following analyses did not hinder the assessment of the 
hypotheses elaborated in section 2.2..
The second technical remark I wish to make also concerns the fact that the five financial 
indicators add up to 100% of a firm’s capital. As a result, they co-vary to the extent that an 
increase in one financial indicator necessarily entails a relative decrease in the other indicators, 
and vice-versa. To determine the individual explanatory power of each type of finance, it is most 
instructive to use a ‘stepwise forward’ regression-method. I therefore employed the ‘Forward 
(LR)’ method in all the following binary logistic regressions, whereas I used the ‘Forward Entry’ 
method for all multi-nominal logistic analyses (see Field 2000:168-170).
Thirdly, it is possible that one type of finance alone has no significant impact on 
competitive strategy, but in combination with another source of finance qualifies as an important 
predictor. For example, long-term debt on its own may not further the pursuit of a DQP strategy, 
but in combination with short-term liabilities does. To test the impact of financial combinations 
on competitive strategy, I created six financial interaction terms47.1  added these six interaction 
terms in a second step to all the binary logistic regression analyses in section 2.3.3.1.. That said, 
let us finally turn to assess whether specific sources of finance facilitate the pursuit of specific 
competitive strategies.
2.3.3.1. How F ir m s  f in a n c e  RPI, DQP, a n d  LCP S t r a t e g ie s : C o m p a r in g  E a c h  St r a t e g y  
w it h  t h e  Two O t h e r s
If  the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature hold true, we should find that Radical 
Product Innovators finance their activities mostly from share capital (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 40; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-355; see CPB Netherlands 1997: 146- 
147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55), whereas Low Cost Producers use long-term debt (see Vitols 2001: 
352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354). Diversified Quality Producers, in turn, should make great 
use o f both share capital and long-term debt in order to finance their activities (Vitols 2001: 350; 
352; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; 355-356; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 628; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992:146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). To 
test these hypotheses, I proceeded in two steps. In the present section (section 2.3.3.1.), I present
47 These six interaction terms constitute all logically possible combinations of the four finance indicators: (1) share 
capital * retained earnings, (2) share capital * long-term debt, (3) share capital * short-term liabilities, (4) retained 
earnings * long-term debt, (5) retained earnings * short-term liabilities, (6) long-term debt * short-term liabilities.
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binary logistic regression analyses which reveal the extent to which each strategy relies on 
specific financial means in comparison to the two other strategies combined. In section 2.3.3.2., I 
carried out multi-nominal logistic regression analyses in order to assess the impact of finance by 
comparing each strategy to the two other strategies separately.
Let us begin by testing the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature on the basis of 
binary logistic regression analyses. In essence, I carried out two regressions for each competitive 
strategy. The first analysis assessed the impact of share capital, retained earnings, long-term 
debt, and short-term liabilities (independent variables) on the respective competitive strategies,
i.e. first on RPf*, then on DQP49, and finally on LCP50 (dependent variable). The second analysis 
tested the relative importance of the competitiveness literature’s hypotheses and the argument of 
the innovation literature on firm-age. It therefore correlated share capital, retained earnings, 
long-term debt, short-term liabilities, and firm-age (independent variables) with the respective 
competitive strategies, i.e. first with RPI, then with DQP, and finally with LCP (dependent 
variable). In addition, I wanted to assess whether country-specific variations exist in the extent to 
which each competitive strategy relies on a specific means of finance. To this end, I repeated the 
two aforementioned analyses for each country separately.51
Table 2.3.: Impact of Finance and Firm-Age on Radical Product Innovation
(Res ults of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses: Unstandardised B)
Analysis 1
(ShCap, RetEar, LtDebt, StLiab ^  RPI)
Analysis 2







jnificiLnce levels: *  < 0.10 ** < 0.05 *** < 0.01
481 obtained the RPI variable from assigning a score o f  1 to all firms which pursue an RPI strategy, whereas I 
attributed a score o f 0 to all firms that pursue a DQP or an LCP strategy.
49 I obtained the DQP variable from assigning a score o f  1 to all firms that pursue a DQP strategy, whereas I 
attributed a score of 0 to all firms which pursue an RPI or an LCP strategy.
501 obtained the LCP variable from assigning a score o f  1 to all firms which pursue an LCP strategy, whereas I 
attributed a score of 0 to all firms that pursue an RPI or a DQP strategy.
S1 As mentioned in the introduction to section 2.33., all 6 financial interaction effects were added in a second model 




Table 2.3. reports the results of the two analyses of Radical Product Innovation. Since 
country-specific variations cannot be observed, the results obtained for the overall firm sample 
are reported. Interestingly, table 2.3. confirms the competitiveness-literature hypothesis that 
Radical Product Innovation is facilitated by share capital (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 40; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-355; see CPB Netherlands 1997: 146-147; 162; 
Ohlin 1933: 7; 55): Radical Product Innovators rely on this financial means significantly more 
than Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers. Accordingly, step 1 of both 
regression analyses reveals that share capital is the best predictor of an RPI strategy. 
Interestingly, though, step 2 of both analyses disproves the idea of the competitiveness literature 
that debt finance hampers the pursuit of an RPI strategy, but furthers DQP and LCP (see Vitols 
2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Hollingsworth 2000: 628). On the contrary, firms 
pursuing an RPI strategy rely on long-term debt significantly more than firms pursuing a DQP or 
an LCP strategy. Furthermore, long-term debt exerts a fairly strong influence on RPI because the 
explanatory power of the stepl-model (R2 -  .555) increases by 12.9% when long-term debt is 
included as a second predictor of RPI in step2 (R2 = .684). In sum, the competitiveness literature 
seems right in suggesting that share capital facilitates Radical Product Innovation, whereas it 
seems mistaken in perceiving long-term debt as a stumbling block to the pursuit of an RPI 
strategy.52
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the results obtained are stable in two respects: on 
the one hand, the results of analysis 1 remain unchanged when firm-age is introduced in analysis 
2 as an additional explanatory variable. The outcome of analysis 2 is therefore identical to the 
outcome of analysis 1. On the other hand, the results are also stable to the extent that country- 
specific variations cannot be observed. While the overall number of cases is sometimes too 
narrow to provide significant results at a .10 significance level, share capital and long-term debt 
always emerge as the strongest predictors of RPI. In none of the country-specific analysis is firm- 
age retained as an explanator of an RPI strategy -  not even as a statistically insignificant 
explanator.
Finally, I want to draw attention to the finding that both share capital and long-term debt 
constitute better predictors of RPI than firm-age. This finding can be inteipreted to the effect that 
the arguments of the competitiveness literature provide a better explanation of Radical Product 
Innovation than the arguments of Abernathy and Utterback (1994). In other words, specific types 
of finance can be said to constitute necessary, and more important input factors for the pursuit of
52 It should also be noted that none o f the financial interaction effects, which I added to each regression analysis in a 
second model, exerts a significant influence on RPI.
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an RPI strategy than young firm-age. Having revealed share capital and long-term debt to be 
crucial for Radical Product Innovation, let us study whether Diversified Quality Production is 
also facilitated by specific types of finance.
Table 2.4.: Impact of Finance and Firm-Age on Diversified Quality Production 
(Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses: Unstandardised B)
Independent variables, 
retained in each step
Analysis 1
(ShCap., RetEar, U D ebt, 
StLiab DQP)
Independent variables, 
retained in each step
Analysis 2
(SbCap., RetEar, LtDebt, 
StLiab, Age*> DQP)
Step 1: Retained Earnings 1.768*** Step 1: Firm-Age 024***
Step 2: - - Step 2: Retained Earnings 1.347**
Firm-Age .017**
Step 3: - - Step 3: Shareholder-Cap. 2.640**
Retained Earnings 3.961***
Finn-Age .022***
| n 74 N 74
■ R2 “Nagclkerke Step 1 .234 R 2 Nagelkerke Step 1 .248
Step 2 - Step 2 .344
Step 3 - Step 3 .406
■ Significance levels: * < 0.10 ** < 0.05 *** < 0.01
Table 2.4. reports the outcome of the two binary logistic analyses of Diversified Quality 
Production. As with Radical Product Innovation, noteworthy country-specific deviations from the 
overall results cannot be observed. Therefore, table 2.4. reproduces the outcome which I obtained 
from analysing the overall sample. In line with our previous findings on RPI, table 2.4. does not 
provide empirical support for the hypothesis that long-term debt constitutes an important source 
of finance for the pursuit o f a DQP strategy (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353- 
354; Hollingsworth 2000: 628). In neither the first nor the second analysis does long-term debt 
qualify as a predictor of DQP. Since Diversified Quality Producers do not make significant use of 
long-term debt to finance their activities, debt finance does not seem to facilitate the pursuit of 
his strategy.53
While the competitiveness-literature hypothesis on the facilitative impact of long-term 
lebt lacks empirical support, the above results support the hypothesis on share capital (Vitols 
tOOl: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 355-356; see
1 It should also be noted that none o f the interaction terms, which 1 added to each analysis in a second model, 
ualifies as a predictor o f DQP.
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Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). The outcome of analysis 2 (step 
3) suggests that share capital is an important financial source for DQP. However, the results of 
both analysis 1 and analysis 2 also show that retained earnings constitute an even more important 
means of finance. Accordingly, retained earnings qualify as the strongest predictor of DQP in 
analysis 1. Similarly, analysis 2 shows that Diversified Quality Producers resort to retained 
earnings more than any other source of finance. Yet, analysis 2 also reveals that, as soon as firm- 
age is included as an independent variable, it is a stronger predictor o f Diversified Quality 
Production than any financial means. Does this finding indicate that a firm needs to have reached 
a certain age rather than acquired specific financial means in order to be able to pursue a DQP 
strategy?
To make sense of the findings on Diversified Quality Production, it is important to note 
that the outcome of analysis 1 is much more stable than the outcome o f analysis 2: no other 
source of finance qualifies as a predictor of DQP in the second step of analysisl. Furthermore, all 
country-specific analyses -  regressing the four financial variables on DQP -  keep retained 
earnings as the only significant explanator of Diversified Quality Production. As soon as firm- 
age is included as an additional independent variable, country-specific analyses produce differing 
outcomes. That is, the Italian analysis continues to identify retained earnings as the only and 
strongly significant predictor of DQP, whereas the British analysis retains firm-age as the only 
but less significant determinant. The German analysis, in contrast, does not identify any 
independent variable strong enough to qualify as an explanator of DQP.
Bearing this in mind, it is useful to recall the second observation we made on the basis of 
table 2.2. (section 2.3.1.). Country-specific accounting rules blur the overall picture of DQP in 
that the comparatively high amount of other non-current liabilities used by German DQPs takes 
up the explanatory power of the other financial indicators. In addition to this, not only retained 
earnings but also share capital constitutes an important source of finance for Diversified Quality 
Production (see step 3 of analysis 2). These two financial variables further deprive each other of 
their respective explanatory power. Overall, this has two consequences: on the one hand, firm-age 
emerges as the strongest determinant of DQP in analysis 2. On the other hand, the results of 
analysis 2 are less stable than the results of analysis 1.
In sum, the results on the DQP strategy are best summarised as follows: While table 2.4. 
indicates that Diversified Quality Production requires specific types of finance (namely retained 
earnings and share capital), additional analyses need to be carried out in order to understand 
whether a mature firm-age constitutes an even more important factor. Having found the 
competitiveness literature right in suggesting that share capital facilitates the pursuit of a DQP
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strategy but wrong in assuming that debt finance has a facilitative impact, let us turn to the 
analyses of Low Cost Production. Does empirical evidence support the hypotheses that an LCP 
strategy is facilitated by a comparatively high amount of debt finance (see Vitols 2001:352; CPB 
Netherlands 1997; 353-354), and by a limited use of share capital (see Bronk 1998:14; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 39; Mayer 1998:159-160; CPB Netherlands 1997: 348)?
Table 2.5.: Impact of Finance and Firm-Age on Low Cost Production
(Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses: Unstandardised B)
Independent variables, Analysis 1 Analysis 2
retained in each step (ShCap., RetEar, U D eb t, StLiab *  LCP) (ShC ap., RetEar, LtDebt, StLiab, Age ^LCP)
Step 1: Short-term Liabilities 4.618 *** 4.618 ***
Step 2: Share capital -19.644 *** -19.644 ***
Short-term Liabilities 1.561 1.561
Step 3: Share capital -21.762 *** -21.762 ***
N 74 74
• R 2 Nagellcerke Step 1. .247 .247
Step 2: .541 .541
Step 3: .528 .528
: Significance levels: * < 0.10 ** < 0.05 *** < 0.01
Table 2.5. provides various insights into how finance impacts on Low Cost Production. In 
So doing, the table presents the outcome obtained from the analysis of the entire firm sample, as 
noteworthy country-specific deviations from these results were not observed. In line with the 
analyses on RPI and DQP, table 2.5. refutes the competitiveness-literature hypothesis that debt 
Hnance furthers LCP (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354). In neither 
malysisl nor analysis 2 does long-term debt qualify as a predictor of Low Cost Production, In 
)ther words, Low Cost Producers do not incur debt any more than Radical Product Innovators 
md Diversified Quality Producers in order to finance their activities. This finding can be I 
nterpreted to the effect that debts do not constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit of an 
CP strategy.
While empirical evidence contradicts the competitiveness-literature hypothesis on debt 
nance, table 2.5. provides empirical support for the argument that share capital hampers Low 
ost Production (see Bronk 1998: 14; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39; Mayer 1998: 159-160; CPB 
etherlands 1997: 348). Accordingly, steps 2 and 3 of both analyses illustrate that Low Cost |
li
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Producers use significantly less share capital than Radical Product Innovators and Diversified 
Quality Producers. The reduced use of share capital by Low Cost Producers is so pronounced that 
this type of finance even qualifies as the sole predictor of an LCP strategy in step 3 of both 
analyses.
Considering that firms do not finance Low Cost Production from debt or share capital, to 
which financial means do they resort? Table 2.5. allows us to answer this question 
unambiguously: short-term liabilities constitute the most important source of finance for Low 
Cost Production. Accordingly, short-term liabilities are retained as the most significant means of 
finance in step 1 of both analyses54. Interestingly, Low Cost Producers rely on short-term 
liabilities and abstain from using share capital to the extent that results do not change if  firm-age 
is added as a rival explanator. Consequently, the outcome of analysis 2 is identical to the outcome 
of analysis 1. This, in turn, indicates that a firm’s competitive strategy can be predicted more 
accurately by the financial means employed than by its age. We can therefore deduce that the 
argument of Abernathy and Utterback on the importance of firm-age (see Utterback 1994: 90- 
101; 160-165) is a worse explanation for competitive strategy than the arguments of the 
competitiveness literature on financial input factors (see Bronk 1998: 14; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 39; Mayer 1998:159-160; CPB Netherlands 1997: 348).
Let us conclude the comments on these analyses with the following summary. Overall, the 
section has shown that Radical Product Innovators finance their activities mostly from share 
capital and to a lesser extent from debt. Diversified Quality Producers, in turn, tend to use 
retained earnings and some share capital. Low Cost Producers, on the other hand, refuse to 
finance their activities from share capital relying substantially on short-term liabilities. These 
findings confirm the hypotheses of the competitiveness literature regarding the importance of 
share capital for RPI on the one hand, and DQP on the other (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 
146-147; 162; Heckscher 1919: 7; 55). Yet they also fail to support the hypothesis that debt 
finance constitutes an important input factor for Diversified Quality Production and Low Cost 
Production alike (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Hollingsworth 2000: 
628). On the contrary, I found that only Radical Product Innovators use this type of finance. 
Finally, we have seen that specific financial means often, but not always, constitute a more 
important input factor for the pursuit of a specific strategy than a firm’s age. In order to cross­
check the findings on finance, and to assess the respective importance of finance and firm-age for
54 It should also be noted that none o f the interaction terms, added to each analysis in a second model, qualifies as a 
predictor of Low Cost Production.
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the pursuit o f a specific strategy, it is useful to carry out multi-nominal logistic regression 
analyses. Section 2.3.3.2. presents their results.
2.3.3.2. How F ir m s  f in a n c e  RPI, DQP, a n d  LCP S t r a t e g ie s : C o m p a r in g  E a c h  St r a t e g y  
S e p a r a t e l y
Let us recall that the findings of section 2.3.3.1. were obtained from binary logistic 
regression analyses which compare all firms that pursue the same strategy to all firms that do not 
pursue this strategy. However, it may be possible that the strategy in question is facilitated by a 
factor which has an opposite effect on the two other strategies. This factor may not qualify as a 
predictor because its impact is neutralised by the fact that the two other strategies are grouped in 
the same category. For example, Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers may rely 
on a high amount of retained earnings, whereas Radical Product Innovators may not. Hence, 
retained earnings may not qualify as a predictor of LCP because the RPI- and the DQP-cases 
combined neutralise the explanatory power of retained earnings. Similarly, the explanatory power 
of firm-age may be neutralised because two strategies on which firm-age exerts the opposite 
effect are grouped in the same category.
It is therefore useful to determine the impact of the respective independent variables on 
each strategy individually. To this end, multi-nominal regression analyses are most suited. 
Overall, I carried out 6 regression analyses. In the first 5 regressions, I correlated each of the four 
financial variables and firm-age alone with competitive strategy in order to assess the individual 
explanatory power of each indicator. In the sixth analysis, I assessed the relative explanatory 
power of the five indicators by correlating them together with competitive strategy. Each of these 
6 regression analyses contains 3 models, as the first model uses RPI, the second model DQP, and 
the third model LCP as reference category.
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Table 2.6.: Individual and Joint Impact of Finance & Firm-Age on Competitive Strategy









DQP LCP RPI LCP RPI DOP
1. S.holder Capital 
Exp (B)
R Nagelkerke
-2.308 *** -23.680 *** 2.308 *** -21.372 *** 23.680 *** 21.372 ***
.619
2. Ret. Earnings 
Exp (B)
R Nagelkerke
3.601 *** 4.091 *** -3,601 *** .490 -4.091 *** -.490
.461
3. L .term  Debt 
Exp (B)
R Nagelkerke
-5.601 ** -5.959 * 5.601 ** -.358 5.959 * .358
.105
4. S.term Liabilities 
Exp (B)
R Nagelkerke





.043 *** .029 ** -.043 *** -.014 * -.029 ** .014 *
.277
6.1. S.holder Capital 
Exp (B) Step 1 
Step 2
















6.2. L .term  Debt 
Exp (B) Step 2 
R Nagelkerke Step 2
-13.119 *** -8.502 * 13.119*** 4.617 8.502 * -4.617
.697
Significance levels: *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01
Table 2.6. provides an overview of the outcomes of the various analyses. What do these 
results teach us? To begin with, it is particularly interesting that the three competitive strategies 
differ most notably from each other in how far they rely on financial means provided by external 
investors. Analysis 6 identifies share capital and long-term debt as the most important 
determinants of competitive strategy. Neither retained earnings nor short-term liabilities are 
retained in analysis 6, because competitive strategies do not vary significantly enough in how far 
they rely on these internally generated means of finance. This finding can be interpreted in favour 
of the competitiveness literature’s argument that the input factors decisive for a competitive 
strategy’s success cannot be provided by a firm on its own, but only following the solution of a 
coordination problem with external economic actors (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6- 
7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 91-92; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20).
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Table 2.6. provides empirical support for the hypotheses o f  the competitiveness literature 
that share capital facilitates the pursuit of both an RPI and a DQP strategy (Vitols 2001: 350; 
359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; see Lindgaard 
Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55), while hampering the pursuit o f an LCP 
strategy (see Brorik 1998: 14; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39; Mayer 1998: 159-160; CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 348). More precisely, a linear correlation exists between the technology 
intensity of a competitive strategy and the amount of share capital employed (see analysis 1 and 
6.1.): While Radical Product Innovators use a particularly high amount of this financial resource, 
Diversified Quality Producers rely on a significant but more limited amount of share capital. Low 
Cost Producers, in turn, do not finance their activities from this source of finance. j
Contrary to the hypothesis on share capital, empirical evidence does not support the | 
hypothesis of the competitiveness literature on debt finance. While empirical evidence shows ! 
long-term debt to be an important means of finance (see analysis 6.2. and analysis 3.), it is not I 
true that Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers incur more debts than Radical \ 
Product Innovators. On the contrary, the opposite can be observed: firms which pursue an RPI 
strategy are significantly more in debt than DQPs and LCPs alike. From this we can deduce that 
the competitiveness literature wrongly suggests debt finance to facilitate the pursuit of a DQP and | 
an LCP strategy (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Hollingsworth 2000: \ 
628).
Let us furthermore recall our findings from the previous binary regressions on Diversified 
Quality Production and Low Cost Production. These analyses showed retained earnings to be an 
important means of finance for DQP, and short-term liabilities to be a significant financial 
resource for LCP. Yet neither retained earnings nor short-term liabilities qualify as predictors of 
competitive strategy in analysis 6 under the present multi-nominal regressions. How can we make j 
sense of this?
In essence, the reason for which neither retained earnings nor short-term liabilities are j 
retained in analysis 6 is that the three strategies do not vary significantly enough in the extent to j
which they use these two financial means. While it is true that Diversified Quality Producers use l
significantly more retained earnings than Radical Product Innovators, Low Cost Producers also 
rely on this financial resource significantly more than Radical Product Innovators (see analysis 2: 
model 1). In other words, both DQPs and LCPs finance their activities from retained earnings to 1
roughly the same extent (see analysis 2: model 2 and 3). The same holds true for short-term |
liabilities. While Low Cost Producers employ significantly more short-terni liabilities than !
Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers (see analysis 4: model 3), the latter
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two use this financial resource to a similar extent (see analysis 4: model 1 and 2). It therefore 
depends on the type of analysis whether retained earnings and short-term liabilities qualify as 
significant financial instruments.
These insights allow us to draw the following conclusion: While retained earnings 
constitute an important means of finance for a DQP strategy, as do short-term liabilities for an 
LCP strategy, the extent to which firms rely on share capital and long-term debt has a more 
significant impact on the respective competitive strategies. Hence, contrary to internally 
generated finance (namely retained earnings and short-term liabilities), finance provided by 
external financiers (i.e. share capital and debt finance) decisively facilitates a firm’s competitive 
strategy.
This conclusion also holds trae for the impact of firm-age on competitive strategy: Model 
1 o f analysis 5 shows that Radical Product Innovators are significantly younger than Diversified 
Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers, whereas DQPs are older than LCPs (see analysis 5: 
model 3). However, these differences are not pronounced enough for firm-age to qualify as a 
predictor of competitive strategy in analysis 6. Therefore, share capital and long-term debt have a 
more decisive impact on competitive strategy than a firm’s age. Consequently, we can deduce 
that — rather than a firm’s age -  externally provided means of finance decisively facilitate the 
pursuit of specific competitive strategies. Thus, the arguments of the competitiveness literature 
(Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997:354-356; 
see Bronk 1998: 14; Mayer 1998:159-160; CPB Netherlands 1997: 348; Lindgaard Christensen 
1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55) provide a better explanation of competitive strategy than 
the argument of Abernathy and Utterback (see Utterback 1994:90-101; 160-165).
2*4. Testing the Hypotheses on Share capital: Do Specific Strategies 
require Specific Types of Share capital?
Section 2.3. has essentially shown three things. Firstly, we found the competitiveness 
literature right in suggesting that finances provided by external investors are of decisive 
importance for the pursuit of specific competitive strategies. Neither a firm ’s age, constituting the 
strongest rival explanation for a firm’s strategy, nor internally generated financial means have an 
equally facilitative impact on competitive strategy as share capital and debt finance. That said, 
we found, secondly, the competitiveness literature wrong in suggesting that Diversified Quality 
Producers and Low Cost Producers rely on debt finance, while Radical Product Innovators have 
difficulties in obtaining such financial means because creditors are risk-averse (see Vitols 2001: 
352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Hollingsworth 2000: 628). On the contrary, we discovered
71
that firms pursuing an RPI strategy incur significant debts, whereas firms pursuing a DQP or an 
LCP strategy abstain from doing so.
The latter finding suggests that the competitiveness literature overestimates the extent to 
which creditors make their investment decisions dependent upon a firm’s strategy. It cannot be 
denied that creditors are risk-averse. However, mainstream finance theory teaches us that 
creditors decide on the basis of a variety of grounds whether to invest in a company or not. While 
a firm’s strategy may play a role in the assessment of its credit-worthiness, creditors are more 
interested in available securities which would become their property if  the firm goes bankrupt 
(Schneck 1998: 438; 436-437). Hence, as long as firms possess securities, they will be granted a 
loan -  irrespective of the competitive strategy they pursue. Since Radical Product Innovators are 
often young (start-up) companies (see section 2.3.2.2.), they have comparatively high funding 
requirements without the possibility of relying on internally generated means of finance. It is 
therefore rather unsurprising that firms pursuing an RPI strategy go into debt more substantially 
than firms pursuing a DQP or an LCP strategy.
Thirdly, contrary to their propositions on debt finance, we found proponents of the 
competitiveness literature right in suggesting that share capital facilitates both an RPI and a DQP 
strategy, whereas it hampers Low Cost Production (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; see Bronk 1998: 14; Mayer 1998: 159-160; 
CPB Netherlands 1997: 348; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). 
Accordingly, we saw that Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers use 
substantially more share capital than Low Cost Producers. Let us, however, remind ourselves that 
these findings are only preliminary requirements in order to assess the central claim of the 
competitiveness literature. Essentially, the literature does not argue that both an RPI and a DQP 
strategy are facilitated by share capital per se, but that each strategy is facilitated by a different 
type of share capital. While outsider share capital is said to further RPI, insider share capital is 
held to promote DQP (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 354-356; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). 
This claim, in turn, is the basis of the competitiveness literature’s argument that firms in insider 
corporate-governance systems specialise in the pursuit of DQP, whereas firms in outsider 
corporate-governance systems engage instead in RPI (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-40; Vitols 
2001: 350-352; Bronk 1998: 15; CPB Netherlands 1997: 355-356; Mayer 1998: 159-160; 162; 
Ohlin 1933:7; 55; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; Hollingsworth 2000: 628).
It is the aim this section to test the hypothesis on specific types of share capital in order to 
understand whether national corporate-governance institutions actually have an impact on a
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firm’s competitive strategy. In so doing, section 2.4.1. finds the competitiveness literature wrong 
in hypothesising that insider share capital facilitates Diversified Quality Production, while 
outsider shareholder finance presumably promotes Radical Production Innovation. Yet section
2.4.2. provides an alternative explanation as I show that an RPI strategy is facilitated by 
institutional share capital, whereas DQP is promoted by private shareholder funds. Importantly, 
this finding does not only explain how firms in the same economy can pursue the same variety of 
competitive strategies. Section 2.4.3. illustrates that this finding also allows us to understand how 
entrepreneurs secure institutional share capital in institutionally suboptimal economies.
2.4.1. F a l s if y in g  t h e  H y p o t h e s is  o n  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  I n s id e r  a n d  O u t s id e r  S h a r e  
c a p it a l
Let us briefly recall the reasoning of the competitiveness literature (see also section 2.2.). 
In essence, specific types of share capital are said to promote specific strategies depending on the 
control rights of shareholders in insider and outsider corporate-governance systems respectively. 
Since shareholders in outsider systems can only monitor the performance of their investment via 
publicly available accounting indicators, they are said to exit a firm as soon as its shareholder 
value declines. Accordingly, managers in outsider systems have to focus on the maximisation of 
shareholder profits. They are therefore said to pursue a high-risk, high-retum RPI strategy 
because the latter potentially provides the highest shareholder value (CPB Netherlands 1997: 346; 
348-350; Vitols 2001: 350-352). The opposite holds true for shareholders in insider systems, who 
are granted an important say in how their funds are used (CPB Netherlands 1997:350-351). Since 
shareholders understand whether a decline in their shares’ value results from mismanagement, or 
from investment in projects that will become profitable in the future, they are assumed to prefer a 
DQP strategy. Although the latter potentially provides lower returns, these returns are more 
certain to materialise because incremental innovation is comparatively less risky (CPB 
Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Vitols 2001: 350-352). It is interesting to note that this reasoning 
tacitly assumes shareholders in outsider systems to have other risk-return preferences than 
shareholders in insider systems. That is, outsider shareholders are assumed to prefer high-retum, 
high-risk strategies, whereas the opposite holds true for insider shareholders. I will elaborate on 
this argument in section 2.4.2..
So, is it true that outsider share capital facilitates the pursuit of an RPI strategy, whilst 
insider shareholder finance promotes DQP? To answer this question, it has to be stressed that the 
control rights of shareholders are usually determined by national legislation. In most Western 
economies, corporate-governance systems are therefore homogenous throughout the country. 
Both Germany and the UK are examples of this ‘one country, one type of corporate governance’-
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rule. On the one hand, Germany is an ideal-typical example of the insider corporate-governance 
system as shareholders of joint-stock companies (taking the form of an AG or a GmbH) enjoy 
considerable consultation and participation rights (CPB Netherlands 1997: 357-359; Vitols 2001: 
337-345; Bronk 1998: 11-12). On the other hand, the UK provides an ideal-typical example of an 
outsider corporate-governance system as all shareholders of a joint-stock company (taking the 
form of a Pic. or a Ltd.) have limited consultation rights (Vitols 2001: 337-345; Bronk 1998: 5- 
7).
Interestingly, Italy constitutes an exception to this rule of ‘one country, one system of 
corporate governance*. Until June 2003, Italian corporate-governance regulation also foresaw just 
one system of corporate control for joint-stock companies. This traditional system — also referred 
to as sistema dualistico orizzontale (Fiori, Tiscini, and Di Donato 2004: 60) -  is similar to an 
insider system in that shareholders do not only elect the firm’s management, i.e. the Board of 
Directors (Consiglio di Amministrazione). They also elect a Board of Auditors (Collegio 
Sindacale) which has to ensure that the company’s management complies with the law, the 
articles o f association, and the principles of good administration and management. Furthermore, 
the Board of Auditors controls the adequacy of all corporate financial issues (De Vecchi and 
Roussey 2003: 8). However, unlike the Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat) of Germany’s insider 
system, the Italian Board of Auditors (Collegio Sindacale) does not oversee the efficiency of 
managerial decisions. It merely controls the legitimacy of the management’s actions (Fiori et al. 
2004: 56). That said, shareholders of Italian joint-stock companies often enjoy de facto important 
participation rights because they typically hold a large part of shares. As a result, these block 
shareholders are often members of the firm’s Board of Directors, or entertain very close 
relationships with the firm’s management (Aguilera 1998: 77-82; see also Fiori et al. 2004: 56). 
Interestingly, this is also true for almost all Italian firms included in the case sample (see 
introduction to section 2.3.). Hence, the traditional Italian corporate-governance system de lege 
and de facto grants insider control rights to shareholders.
The Italian system of corporate governance was recently reformed by legislative decree 
No. 6 of 17th January 2003 (decreto legislative 6/2003). Most importantly, the decree ended 
Italy’s single corporate-governance system, as it added two new systems: namely an insider- 
control system (also referred to as sistema dualistico verticale), and an outsider-control system 
(also termed sistema monistico). Interestingly, these two systems are an explicit imitation of the 
German system of insider governance on the one hand, and the Anglo-Saxon system of outsider 
governance on the other (De Vecchi and Roussey 2003: 4; Fiori et al. 2004: 60). Consequently, 
Italian firms now have the choice between three different models of corporate governance.
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Despite this choice, they have so far been rather hesitant to change their models of corporate 
control. Accordingly, the vast majority of Italian firms, and all Italian companies included in the 
case sample, continue to operate under the traditional system which, as described above, grants 
insider control rights to shareholders (see Fiori et al. 2004:61-68).
That said, let us return to the initial question of whether insider share capital promotes a 
DQP strategy, while outsider share capital facilitates the pursuit of RPI. We can now answer this 
question, without resorting to quantitative analyses, as this hypothesis obviously lacks empirical 
support. Let us recapitulate that shareholders in German and Italian joint-stock companies 
provide insider capital, whilst their counterparts in British joint-stock companies deliver outsider 
capital. Consequently, the hypothesis of the competitiveness literature would be confirmed if 
those German and Italian firms, which substantially finance their activities from share capital, 
pursued a DQP strategy. Similarly, British firms, using shareholder funds as an important means 
of finance, should specialise in the pursuit of an RPI strategy. Our case sample clearly shows that 
this is not true. British, German, and Italian companies financing their activities mostly from 
share capital pursue an RPI and a DQP strategy alike. Similarly, no empirical evidence exists to 
suggest that Italian firms have adopted that model of corporate governance which the 
competitiveness literature perceives as most conducive to their strategy. Instead, companies in 
Italy continue to use the traditional corporate governance system, irrespective of the strategy they 
pursue. Thus, empirical evidence contradicts the hypothesis of the competitiveness literature that 
insider share capital facilitates Diversified Quality Production, wheareas outsider shareholder 
funds promotes Radical Product Innovation (Vitols 2001: 350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; 162; 
Ohlin 1933:7; 55).
2.4.2. Verifying the Hypothesis on the Importance of Institutional and Private 
Share capital
While empirical evidence does not support the literature’s hypothesis on insider and 
outsider share capital (see section 2.4.1.), the shareholder structure of Italian firms suggests an 
alternative hypothesis on how specific types of share capital might facilitate specific competitive 
strategies. Interestingly, most shareholders in Italian firms included in the sample are block 
shareholders, with substantial insight into how the company is run. Nevertheless, one striking 
difference seems to exist between shareholders in Diversified Quality Producers on the one hand, 
and Radical Product Innovators on the other. Block shareholders in Diversified Quality Producers 
are often members of the founding family, i.e. private investors. Block shareholders of Radical 
Product Innovators, by contrast, tend to be institutional investors, i.e. venture capitalists, other
75
firms, or investment funds. Thus, it seems that a comparatively large amount of institutional 
share capital facilitates the pursuit of an RPI strategy, whereas a high amount of private 
shareholder finance is conducive to a DQP strategy.
Before asking about the reasons for this, let us find out whether empirical evidence 
supports this hypothesis. To test whether institutional share capital facilitates Radical Product 
Innovation, while private shareholder funds promote Diversified Quality Production, I divided 
the overall share capital of RPIs and DQPs into their institutional and private components. In so 
doing, I counted all shares held by venture-capitalist firms, business angels55, companies, banks, 
and investment funds as institutional share capital. On the other hand, I considered all shares 
held by the firm’s founders, managers, employees, and private investors to be the firm’s private 
share capital. Overall, I obtained data for 40 cases. Table 2.9. provides an overview of the extent 
to which institutional and private investors hold shares in firms pursuing an RPI strategy on the 
one hand, and a DQP strategy on the other.
Table 2.7.: Ownership Structure of RPIs and DQPs






(N =  17)
Italy
(N =  11)
All 3 Countries
(N = 40)
Inst. Private Inst. Private Inst. Private Inst. Private
O RPIs 83% 17% 61% 39% 67% 33% 70% 30%
0  DQPs 69% 31% 43% 57% 15% 85% 41 % 59%
Overall 0 77% 23% 51 % 49% 39% 61% 56% 44%
Interestingly, the empirical evidence presented in table 2.7. confirms the idea that 
institutional shareholders invest in Radical Product Innovators, whilst private shareholders prefer 
investing in Diversified Quality Producers. If  we look at the average results for all three 
countries, we find that institutional investors hold 70% of shares in radically innovative firms, but 
only 41% in incrementally innovative companies. The opposite relationship can be observed for 
private investors who hold 30% of shares in RPIs, but 59% in DQPs. Regarding the overall 
average of all three countries, we see that the extent of institutional (56%) and private (44%)
55 While business angels are mostly private investors, I count diem here as institutional shareholders because they 
presumably have the same risk-return preferences as institutional investors (see below). The reason for this is that 
business angels have substantial knowledge about investment projects in a given industry in general, and about the 
specific firms in this industry in particular.
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shareholdings is roughly the same.56 That said, it is interesting that the overall distribution of 
institutional and private shareholdings varies from one country to another. British firms hold 
77%, German companies 51%, and Italian firms only 39% of institutional share capital. Of 
course, the opposite applies to private shareholdings which amount to 23% in British, 49% in 
German, and as much as 61% in Italian firms. As I will argue in section 2.4.3., these country- 
specific variations reflect the extent to which private pension and insurance systems promote the 
emergence of institutional shareholders. That said, it is striking that Radical Product Innovators 
in the UK, Germany, and Italy alike rely on higher amounts of institutional share capital than the 
average firm in each respective country. Similarly, Diversified Quality Producers in each 
economy resort to more private share capital than the average national firm. This, in turn, 
supports my idea that capital from institutional investors furthers RPI, whereas capital from 
private investors promotes DQP.
In order to test the robustness of these observations, I carried out several quantitative 
analyses. First, I correlated a firm’s institutional (and respectively private) share capital with the 
pursuit of an RPI (and respectively a DQP) strategy. The outcome of these analyses shows that a 
strong correlation exists between a firm’s ownership structure and its competitive strategy: the 
higher the proportion of institutional shareholders, the higher the probability that a firm pursues 
an RPI strategy (R=.407; R^.170; p < 0.01 (2-tailed)). Of course, the opposite statement also 
applies: the more shares are held by private investors, the more a firm is likely to pursue a DQP 
strategy (R=.407; R*=.170; p < 0.01 (2-tailed)).57
In line with sections 2.3.3.1 and 2.3.3.2,1 also run both binary and multi-nominal logistic 
regressions so as to analyse the relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and its strategy. 
Since these analyses test the impact of just one independent variable on competitive strategy, 
binary and multi-nominal logistic regressions provide exactly the same results. Howeve, the 
outcomes of multi-nominal analyses may be easier to read. Therefore, I report the results obtained 
from two multi-nominal regressions in table 2.8.. While I assessed the impact of institutional
56 It is important to note that these relative figures do not tell us about the absolute funds which are provided by 
institutional and private shareholders respectively. In other words, the observation that shares are overall held 
roughly to the same extent by institutional (56%) and private (44%) investors does not imply that institutional and 
private investors provide roughly the same amounts o f money to firms.
57 It should be noted that I also ran the respective correlation analyses for each country individually. Importantly, 
country-specific results do not show any major deviations from the overall results. While the number o f cases per 
country is sometimes not large enough to provide statistically significant outcomes, the relationship between a firm’s 
ownership structure and its strategy is always positive and fairly strong: In line with the results o f table 2.7., I find 
that Radical Product Innovators in the UK (R=.231; R^.OSS; p<.25 (1-tailed)), in Germany (R=.303; R^.092; 
p<.12 (1-tailed)), and in Italy (R=.670; R2=.449; p<.05 (2-tailed)) use comparatively more institutional share 
capital. Similarly, Diversified Quality Producers in the UK (R=.231; R^.053; p<.25 (1-tailed)), in Germany 
(R=.303; R2s=.092; p<.12 (1-tailed)), and in Italy (R=.670; R2=.449; p<.05 (2-tailed)) employ more private share 
capital to finance their activities.
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share capital on competitive strategy in the first analysis, I regressed private share capital on a 
firm’s strategy in the second analysis. In so doing, I used Diversified Quality Production as
(A
reference category in both analyses.
Table 2.$.: Impact of Institutional & Private Share Capital on Competitive Strategy 
(Results o f Multi-Nominal Logistic Regression Analyses: Standardised B)
Independent Variable Analysis 1
Institutional Sh Cap. Co.Str. 
Reference Category: DQP
Independent Variable Analysis 2
Private Sh.Cap. ■> Co.Str. 
Reference Category: DQP
Institutional ShCapital 1.026** Private Sh. Capital .975**
N 40 N 40
R 2 Nagelkerke .213 R 2 Nagel kerke .213
Significance levels: *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01
Table 2.8. confirms the previous result that Radical Product Innovators finance their 
activities from institutional share capital to a significantly higher degree than Diversified Quality 
Producers (analysis 1). Conversely, firms pursuing a DQP strategy use significantly more private 
share capital than firms pursuing an RPI strategy (analyses 2). In sum, we find broad empirical 
support for the idea that Radical Product Innovators are substantially financed by institutional 
investors, whereas private investors provide funds to Diversified Quality Producers. This, in turn, 
can be interpreted in favour of my hypothesis that institutional shareholder finance facilitates 
RPI, whilst private share capital promotes DQP.
Having found empirical support for my hypothesis, it is time to turn to the question of 
causal mechanisms. Why does institutional share capital facilitate Radical Product Innovation, 
whilst private share capital is conducive to Diversified Quality Production? The key to this 
answer was provided to me when I learned about the shareholder strategy of the Deutsche 
Telekom AG. When the latter went public in 1997, it was ‘the declared aim of the Deutsche 
Telekom AG (...) to have as many individual investors as possible because they were considered 
to be long-term shareholders. (...) [Institutional] investors with a more speculative orientation 
should be not considered.’ (Borsch 2003: 201).
58 As in the previous correlation analyses, I also carried out both multi-value regressions for each country 
individually. Importantly, country-specific deviations from the overall results cannot be observed. Similarly to the 
aforementioned correlation analyses, the number o f cases per country is sometimes too limited to provide statistically
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Importantly, this statement points to the different risk-return preferences of institutional 
investors on the one hand, and private investors on the other. Let us recall the argument of the 
competitiveness literature on the impact of insider and outsider share capital (see introduction to 
section 2.4.1.). This reasoning is essentially grounded on the tacit assumption that insider 
shareholders have a preference for low-risk, low-return strategies, whereas outsider shareholders 
prefer high-risk, high-return strategies. While it is highly plausible that shareholders with 
different risk-return preferences exist, it is difficult to understand why such preferences should 
vary according to the economy’s corporate-governance system. Instead, it seems more credible 
that shareholders with diverse preferences can be found within each economy. It was precisely 
this reasoning which led me to understand why institutional shareholder capital facilitate Radical 
Product Innovation, whilst private shareholder capital promote Diversified Quality Production.
Let me begin by elaborating on the risk-return preferences of private investors. Private 
shareholders, such as founders, managers, or employees, have a personal interest in the survival 
of ‘their’ firm. Accordingly, they prefer the latter to engage in Diversified Quality Production -  
not because this strategy provides comparatively low returns, but because it involves a reduced 
risk o f  failure. A similar argument applies to private investors who acquire shares on the stock 
exchange without entertaining a personal relationship with a firm. Such investors usually lack 
both the in-depth knowledge and the time to constantly monitor the development of shareholder 
value, and to compare the latter with returns from alternative investment projects. Individual 
investors therefore prefer the comparatively small but stable returns which tend to result from the 
pursuit of a DQP strategy. In sum, given that a reduced risk of failure is essential to private 
investors, they are disposed to accept lower returns. Therefore, a high amount of private share 
capital facilitates the pursuit of a DQP strategy because private investors urge the firm’s 
management to pursue a low-risk, low-return strategy.
The opposite holds true for institutional investors like venture capitalists, banks, and 
funds. Since it is the predominant concern of these investors to realise high returns on investment, 
they are more willing to accept a high risk of failure. Dedicating important resources to learn 
about the risk-return ratios of a large variety of investment projects, institutional investors have 
the necessary in-depth knowledge to choose the most promising projects. In so doing, they prefer 
investing in radically innovative firms because the latter potentially promise the highest returns 
(see CPB Netherlands 1997: 346; 348-350; Vitols 2001: 350-352). In other words, institutional 
investors only provide funds to firms if  the latter pursue a high-risk, high-return strategy, because
significant results. However, all results are strong and, even more importantly, have the predicted direction o f 
correlation.
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these shareholders are not interested in low-retum projects, even if  their risk of failure is reduced.
In sum, a high amount o f institutional share capital facilitates Radical Product Innovation because 
institutional investors urge a firm’s management to pursue a high-risk, high-retum strategy.
Anecdotal evidence, obtained from interviewing the CEO o f a biotech film in February 
2005, provides further empirical support for my argument. For reasons of confidentiality, I will 
call the firm in question BTF-21. Until recently, BTF-21 pursued a low-risk, low-retum DQP 
strategy in that it carried out contract research for other biotech and pharmaceutical companies.
As did many other biotech firms, BTF-21 became aware that using its knowledge for the 
development of its own drugs was more profitable than offering research services to other 
companies. Hence, BTF-21 decided to try and develop a particularly promising discovery, for 
which it holds all patents, into a pharmaceutical product on its own. In order to finance the shift 
from a low-risk, low-retum to a high-risk, high-retum strategy, BTF-21 considered several 
financial alternatives. At the time of my interview, the large majority of BTF-21’s shares were I
held by private investors, namely founders and managers. But the latter were unable to cover the j
amount o f finance required for the RPI-project in question. Furthermore, returns from the hitherto 
pursued low-risk strategy had not yielded enough to finance a high-risk project BTF-21 therefore 
turned to institutional shareholders, i.e. venture capitalists, in order to ask for seed finance. 
Interestingly, the latter agreed to provide funds as soon as BTF-21 had embarked fully on an RPI 
strategy! But as long as BTF-21 continued to concentrate on the pursuit of a low-risk, low-retum 
strategy, venture capitalists were not interested in providing finance. The reason, simply, is that 
returns from  this strategy were considered stable but too smalll In sum, the experience of BTF- 
21 illustrates that institutional share capital promotes the pursuit of an RPI strategy because 
institutional investors urge managers to engage in high-retum, high-risk projects. |
t
2.43. acquiring  Institutional Share capital in Countries w ith  Public Pension and I 
Insurance Systems |
In the introduction to this chapter, I pointed out that my research aims at studying the link |
between corporate-governance systems, financial input factors, and competitive strategies. j
Approaching the end of this chapter, I am stunned by the amount o f analyses required to identify |
those financial means which actually facilitate the pursuit of a competitive strategy, while little !
has been said about how institutions provide these means. Importantly, though, I showed that |
neither insider nor outsider share capital facilitates the pursuit of a specific strategy (see section (
2.4.1.). It is therefore unnecessary to study the extent to which these types of finance are provided j
by specific regimes of corporate-governance regulation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask which 1
institutions provide those financial means that we found to significantly facilitate a specific 
strategy. This is essential for understanding whether the competitiveness literature rightly 
suggests that (only) country-specific institutions enable the provision of specific financial means 
(see e.g. Vitols 2001: 350-352; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 27-29; CPB Netherlands 1997: 351- 
354; Bronk 1998: 5-8; Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; Ohlin 1933: 55). Should this turn 
out to be the case, it is also interesting to understand how entrepreneurs in different economies 
secure the required financial means. Accordingly, it is the aim of this section to study the link 
between institutions and the provision of financial input factors more closely.
Let us recapitulate that we found three types of finance to have a particularly conducive 
impact on specific strategies, namely debt finance, private share capital and institutional share 
capital. While debt finance and institutional shareholder finance are required for the pursuit of an 
RPI strategy, private share capital promotes Diversified Quality Production. Consequently, the 
question arises to what extent these three types of finance are provided by specific national 
institutions. The answer to this question is straight-forward for debt finance on the one hand, and 
private share capital on the other: neither the finance nor the competitiveness literature, nor any 
other source of information points to country-specific institutions that would further the provision 
of debt finance. This is particularly true in that the process of disintermediation means that firms 
increasingly obtain credits from economic actors other than banks (see e.g. Schneck 1998: 174- 
175). Similarly, country-specific institutions which promote the provision ofprivate share capital 
do not seem to exist. Instead, it is presumably most plausible that private investors willing to buy 
a firm’s shares can be found in all economies to the same extent.
Contrary to debt finance and private share capital, national institutions seem to have an 
impact on the provision of institutional shareholder finance. As Aguilera points out, 
“institutional investors play a minor role in countries where pensions are provided by the state” 
(Aguilera 1998: 89). The reason for this is that those funds destined for paying (future) pensions 
are administered by the state in economies with a public pension system. In private pension 
systems, however, employees tend to lay out an important part of their salaries to pension funds 
and other pension-scheme providers which re-invest these sums. Consequently, the number of 
institutional (re-)investors is higher in economies with private pension systems than in countries 
where pensions are administered by the state. The same reasoning applies to economies with 
private insurance systems. In sum, private pension and insurance systems lead to a more 
abundant provision of institutional share capital, whereas public pension and insurance systems 
entail the scare availability of such financial means. The competitiveness literature is thus far
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right in suggesting that country-specific institutions have an impact on the provision of specific 
input factors.
For our case sample, these insights mean that firms should find it rather easy to acquire 
institutional share capital in the UK, where the government provides only very basic pension and 
insurance schemes so as to encourage private arrangements (see Stiglitz and Driffill 2000: 369- 
371). In that, it is useful to remember the results presented in table 2.7. (section 2.4.2.). 
Interestingly, this table showed that British firms in general, and British RPIs in particular, indeed 
rely on a particularly high amount of institutional share capital. Yet, table 2.7. also illustrated that 
German and Italian RPIs finance their activities to a great extent from institutional share capital 
as well -  albeit to a lesser extent than their British counterparts. Hence, the question arises of how 
Radical Product Innovators in Germany and Italy acquire institutional shareholder finance, given 
that both countries have a public pension and insurance system. To put it more generally: given 
that a substantial number of firms pursue an RPI strategy in countries with public pension and 
insurance systems, how can these firms secure the required share capital considering that 
institutions lead to its comparatively scarce provision? ■:>
Before trying to support my argument empirically, let me briefly answer this question. 
Entrepreneurs circumvent national institutions by importing the required financial means from 
abroad! Instead of merely relying on funds provided by national investors, Radical Product 
Innovators in Germany and Italy simply turn to foreign investors. Importing finance in this way is 
essentially possible due to the existence of international institutions, namely open financial 
markets. Hence, firms in developed capitalist economies are not at all constrained to the extent 
that they can only use those types of share capital provided by national institutions. Instead, they 
avoid the constraints resulting from national pension and insurance systems by drawing on 
international institutions which give them access to shareholder finance provided in other 
economies.59
It would be time consuming and not particularly representative to try and support this 
claim empirically by tracing to what extent the German and Italian RPIs of my case sample are 
financed by foreign and national institutional shareholders respectively. However, aggregate 
statistics for the German biotech industry provide representative empirical evidence (see
59 One might wish to argue that circumventing national institutions though importation is better described as factor 
provision through foreign national institutions, because firms import those financial means which emerge from the 
pension and insurance systems o f other economies. However, such factor transfer is only possible in open financial 
markets. Hence, it is international financial-market regulations rather than foreign pension systems which enables 
companies to secure input factors from abroad. The best example is provided by the European Community where the 
free circulation o f capital, goods, services and people has been guaranteed since the Single European Act of 1986.
Emst&Young 2004: 92)60. This data shows that the German biotech industry is greatly financed 
by foreign venture capitalists. More precisely, 42% of venture capitalists which provided finance 
to German biotech companies in 2003 were foreign investors. Foreign investment is even more 
important in rounds of financing of more than €5 million. Here, the share of foreign venture 
capitalists (65%) largely exceeded the share of German venture capitalists (35%) in 2003 
(Emst&Young 2004: 92). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the importance of foreign 
venture capital is particularly pronounced in the Italian case. Since Italian venture capital is at the 
moment virtually inexistent, all venture capitalists investing in Italian biotech firms are foreign 
investors (Barbanti 2005; see also Breschi, Lissom, and Orsenigo 2003: 154). In sum, an 
important part of German biotech firms, and virtually all Italian biotech companies, have 
acquired institutional share capital required for the pursuit of an RPI strategy from foreign 
institutional investors.
What do these insights teach us about the link between national institutions, the provision 
of input factors, and the pursuit of specific competitive strategies? In essence, we find the 
competitiveness literature right in suggesting that national institutions facilitate a specific 
strategy to the extent that they provide specific types of share capital. Even though the literature 
wrongly suggests national corporate-governance systems to facilitate Radical Product Innovation 
(Vitols 2001: 350-352; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 27-29; CPB Netherlands 1997: 351-354; 
Bronk 1998: 5-8; see Lindgaard Christensen 1992: 146-147; Ohlin 1933: 55), we found private 
pension and insurance systems to further this strategy in that they entail the abundant availability 
of institutional shareholder finance. More importantly, though, we also find the competitiveness 
literature wrong in their exclusive analytical focus on national institutions, which entails a 
perception of entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers (see Hall and Soskice 2001b in general; and 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56 in particular; see also Porter 1990, chapter 3; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). 
This, in turn, prevents the competitiveness literature from explaining how firms can pursue 
different competitive strategies within a unilaterally facilitative environment. My analyses have 
revealed that the competitiveness literature is fundamentally wrong in ignoring the extent to 
which international institutions enable entrepreneurs to secure required input factors. I have 
illustrated how entrepreneurs actively circumvent national institutions whenever the latter hamper 
the pursuit of their chosen competitive strategy. I therefore argue that a Schumpeterian perception
This makes it easier for Radical Product Innovators to secure institutional share capital from EU- rather than non-EU 
investors.
60 While not all biotech firms pursue an RPI strategy, I found a strong correlation between a firm’s industry and its 
competitive strategy (see section 2.3.2.1.). Accordingly, a large majority o f biotech companies engage in Radical 
Product Innovation which, in turn, makes it plausible to consider the data on German biotech companies as 
representative for firms pursuing an RPI strategy in Germany.
83
of entrepreneurs as independent innovators (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4) is more 
instructive for understanding how firms gain international competitiveness, even where national 
institutions are hostile to the pursued strategy.
2.5. Concluding Interpretation
In the present chapter, I studied the extent to which national institutions facilitate an RPI, 
a DQP, and an LCP strategy respectively by providing specific means of finance. The results 
obtained from these analyses shed light on the arguments of the competitiveness literature in 
general, and on the importance of institutions and input factors for the pursuit of diverse 
competitive strategies in particular. I will conclude my analyses by summarising and interpreting 
my findings.
To begin with, we found empirical support for two assumptions which are central to my 
research project. Let us remember that firms can finance their activities from externally provided 
resources (namely share capital and debts), as well as from internally generated means (i.e. 
retained earnings, current liabilities, and other non-current liabilities). Interestingly, we have seen 
that firms pursuing different competitive strategies vary most notably in the extent to which they 
use externally provided means of finance. On the one hand, this finding justifies the assumption 
of the competitiveness literature that three input factors (finance, labour qualifications, and 
component standards) are crucial for the pursuit of any strategy, because a firm cannot provide 
them on its own but only in collaboration with external economic actors (see in particular Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 
1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). Following this reasoning, I 
decided to limit my analyses to these three input factors. The finding that financial means 
provided by external investors, but not internally generated resources, significantly facilitate 
specific strategies supports both the argument o f the competitiveness literature and my analytical 
focus.
On the other hand, this finding also sustains my assumption that firms can in essence 
pursue three competitive strategies. I based the assumption that a distinction between RPI, DQP 
and LCP is both necessary and sufficient on two grounds: deductive reasoning, and insights 
gained from the competitiveness literature (see e.g. Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Lundvall 
1992b: 11-12; 57-59; Freeman 1992: 182; Porter 1990: 10; 37; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-39; 
Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 148-149; 174-175; Casper 2001: 398-400). Given that these three 
strategies vary significantly in the extent to which they require specific financial means, each 
strategy seems to follow a different entrepreneurial logic. In other words, a conceptual correlation
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does not, presumably, exist between Radical Product Innovation, Diversified Quality Production, 
and Low Cost Production. In that, my decision to distinguish between three strategies is 
empirically justified.
But what have we learned about the link between institutions, the provision of specific 
financial means, and their impact on competitive strategies? In essence, we found that debt 
finance on the one hand, and share capital on the other are decisive for the pursuit of specific 
strategies: Neither a firm’s industry, nor its country, its age, or internally generated means of 
finance facilitate competitive strategies as significantly as these externally provided means of 
finance. More precisely, we found that an RPI strategy is facilitated by both debt finance and 
institutional share capital, whereas a DQP strategy is furthered by private shareholder funds. 
Interestingly, an LCP strategy is autonomous of the provision of specific financial means.
These findings shed light on the arguments of the competitiveness literature in various 
respects. While the literature rightly points out that debt finance and share capital have a 
facilitative impact, we have found the literature wrong in its detailed hypotheses. On the one 
hand, we did not find empirical support for the argument that Diversified Quality Producers and 
Low Cost Producers finance their activities from debt, whereas Radical Product Innovators 
abstain from doing so (see Vitols 2001: 352; CPB Netherlands 1997: 353-354; Hollingsworth 
2000: 628). In fact, the opposite holds true, as RPIs rely on debt finance more significantly than 
both DQPs and LCPs. In my view, this misinterpretation springs from an overestimation of the 
extent to which creditors make their investment decisions dependent on a firm’s strategy. While 
creditors may take a firm’s strategy into account when assessing its credit-worthiness, they are 
more interested in available securities (Schneck 1998: 438; 436-437). Thus, as long as firms 
possess securities, they will be granted a loan, irrespective o f the competitive strategy they 
pursue. Since Radical Product Innovators are often young (start-up) companies (see section
2.3.2.2.), they have comparatively high funding requirements without the possibility of 
accumulating internal finances. This explains why firms pursuing an RPI strategy go further into 
debt than firms pursuing a DQP or an LCP strategy.
On the other hand, we also found the competitiveness literature wrong in suggesting that 
outsider share capital facilitates RPI, whereas insider share capital furthers DQP (Vitols 2001: 
350; 359-360; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 39-41; CPB Netherlands 1997: 354-356; see 
Lindgaard Christensen 1992:146-147; 162; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). Instead, we have seen that private 
shareholdings are conducive to Diversified Quality Production, whilst institutional shareholdings 
promote Radical Product Innovation (see section 2.4.2.). I have argued that this positive 
relationship is explained by the diverse risk-return preferences of private investors on the one
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hand, and institutional investors on the other. In essence, private investors have a predominant 
interest in a low risk of company failure which makes them willing to accept comparatively low 
returns. Consequently, a high amount of private share capital facilitates Diversified Quality 
Production because private investors urge managers to pursue a low-risk, low-return strategy. 
Unlike private shareholders, institutional investors are particularly interested in realising high 
returns on their investment. Accordingly, they do not only dedicate important resources to the 
achievement of this aim, they are also willing to accept a comparatively high risk of failure. 
Hence, a high amount of institutional share capital facilitates Radical Product Innovation because 
institutional investors urge managers to pursue a high-return, high-risk strategy. I
The identification of those financial means which actually facilitate specific strategies j 
finally allowed me to study which institutions provide these means. Since institutions furthering j
the provision of debt finance and private share capital do not exist, I focused on how national |
institutions affect the provision of institutional share capital. In that, I found private pension and I
insurance systems to be particularly conducive to the pursuit of an RPI strategy, because they j
entail an affluence of institutional pension-scheme providers. The opposite holds true for public |
pension and insurance systems, where the state administers the sums invested in pension and | 
insurance schemes. Consequently, I sought to understand how Radical Product Innovators in 
public pension and insurance systems can secure institutional share capital. My findings on this 
question are straight-forward: firms circumvent national institutions by importing the required 
financial means from abroad. Instead of relying mostly on funds provided by national investors, 
Radical Product Innovators in public pension and insurance systems acquire institutional share | 
capital from foreign investors. Importing finance is essentially possible due to open financial I 
markets, which give firms access to the means o f finance provided in other economies. I
It is precisely this finding which leads me to criticise the competitiveness literature for its | 
exclusive focus on national institutions, since the latter entails a perception of entrepreneurs as ( 
mere institution-takers (see Hall and Soskice 2001b in general; and Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56 in I 
particular; see also Porter 1990, chapter 3; Ohlin 1933: 7; 55). This, in turn, renders the j
competitiveness literature unable to explain how firms can pursue different competitive strategies [
within the same institutional environment. Therefore, I find a Schumpeterian perception of '
entrepreneurs more helpful in understanding how firms can gain international competitiveness by |
pursuing different strategies within the same economy. Perceiving entrepreneurs as independent 1
and inventive actors, Schumpeter suggests that the former relentlessly secure all factors required 
for innovation in order to gain a competitive advantage (in the form of a temporary monopoly)
(see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106). This is precisely what firms in
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Germany and Italy do when they turn to foreign investors in order to acquire institutional share 
capital. I therefore conclude that firms in the same economy can pursue different competitive 
strategies because entrepreneurs are independent innovators, not constrained institution-takers.
87
3. On the Link between Institutions, the Provision of New 
Component Standards, and Their Impact on Competitive 
Strategies*
3.1. E n t r e p r e n e u r s : C o nstra in ed  I n st it u t io n -T a k e r s  o r  V o lu n ta ristic  
I n n o v a t o r s?
‘[SJtandards are one of the leading challenges in contemporary capitalism* (Tate 
2001: 446) because ‘[f]irms [can] use standards to reduce internal and external 
transaction costs; to drive down prices from suppliers; to block or circumvent 
competitors; to lock in quasi-monopoly profits through control of a proprietary 
standard (...); and to set baselines for subsequent rounds of innovation/ (Tate 
2001: 442)
This introduction to Tate’s study of standards and their impact on competitive strategies 
illustrates the importance of standards for a firm’s daily business. Given this importance, it is 
interesting that neither the establishment of, nor compliance with standards is de lege compulsory 
-  unless explicitly specified in a contract. Firms are entirely free to determine and comply with 
all sorts of norms. However, de facto compliance becomes compelling as soon as more than one 
firm is involved in a production process, because the standards of semi-finished goods supplied 
by one firm have to fit those of the processing company. This enables firms to use standards 
either as a means of large-scale cooperation or as a method for excluding unwarranted 
competitors. Accordingly, the way in which new component standards are elaborated constitutes 
an important competitive tool.
The fact that producers need to coordinate with their suppliers in order to elaborate new 
component standards is the very reason I decided to focus on how this input factor impacts on a 
firm’s competitive strategy61. Various strands of the competitiveness literature agree that the
My special thanks go to Andreas Mangel for providing me with precious information about standardisation 
processes in the pharmaceutical industry, and for facilitating contacts with numerous interview partners. I am also 
grateful to Barbara Jentges who patiently explained to me how new Pharmacopoeia standards are elaborated both at 
the national and the European level. Furthermore, I wish to thank Marco Caremi, Sibylle Gaisser, Giuseppe Giardina, 
Nigel Halls, Udo Klomann, Mike Murray, Thomas Reiss, Alvise Sagramoso, David Selby, Gaia Sorrone, Stefano 
Svetoni, Itala Turco, and Leonardo Vingiani for their support in establishing contacts with interview partners. 
Finally, I am grateful to the numerous interviewees who did not merely answer my questions, but who also provided 
me with precious background information, literature, and documentation about national and international 
standardisation procedures.
61 As pointed out previously (see chapter 1: section 1.4.), a large number o f input factors exist which could 
potentially facilitate the pursuit o f a firm’s competitive strategy (see e.g. Porter 1985: 85-86; 122; 343-350). 
However, the competitiveness literature assumes three factors to be decisive for the success of any strategy, namely 
(1) financial means, (2) labour qualifications, and (3) new component standards. The reason for this is that a firm 
cannot secure these factors on its own but only following the successful solution o f a coordination problem with 
other economic actors (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen
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nature o f supplier-producer relations are decisive for a firm’s competitiveness (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 7; 39-41; Tate 2001; Lundvall 1992b: 13-14; chapter 3; Andersen 1992: 69; 82-91; 
Gelsing 1992; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Porter 1990: 71-72; 100-107). Accordingly, the 
literature acknowledges that ‘user-producer relationships are necessary prerequisites for product 
innovations.’ (Lundvall 1992c: 54; see also Lundvall 1992c: 14). In line with their arguments on 
finance (see chapter 2) and labour qualifications (see chapter 4), proponents of the 
competitiveness literature suggest that specific types of inter-finn relations determine a firm’s 
innovative capacities (Lundvall 1992c: 57-58; Gelsing 1992:121-123; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446) and, hence, its product-market strategy 
(Andersen 1992: 87-88; Tate 2001:445-446; Casper 2001:404-407; Teubner 2001:433-435).
Given this general agreement about the importance of supplier-producer relations, it is all 
the more astonishing that the literature remains extremely vague about the causal mechanisms 
which link supplier-producer relations to product-market strategies. To give some examples, 
“ subjective’ elements in user-producer relationships’ (Lundvall 1992c: 58) and ‘information-rich 
seller-buyer relationships’ (Andersen 1992: 83) are found to be important for radical innovation 
(see also Gelsing 1992:119; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Porter 1990:103). Similarly, ‘stable user- 
producer relationships’ (Lundvall 1992c: 57) are said to develop as a result of incremental 
innovation (see also Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Porter 1990: 103). Finally, low-cost or ‘mass- 
production’ (Andersen 1992: 83) -  associated with ‘a high degree of standardisation’ (Lundvall 
1992c: 57) and ‘information-poor seller-buyer relationships’ (Andersen 1992: 82) -  is said to 
enable ‘communication between a user and a producer (...) over long distances’ (Lundvall 1992c: 
57; see also Gelsing 1992: 119).
Interestingly, none of these statements provides an explicit reason for why and how 
specific inter-firm relations are required for specific strategies. While some authors point out that 
differing supplier-producer relations facilitate different types of interactive learning (Lundvall 
1992c: 57; Andersen 1992: 82-83) and knowledge accumulation (Andersen 1992: 83-84), the 
causal mechanisms remain unclear. Furthermore, most strands of the competitiveness literature 
are confusing not only with regard to causal mechanisms, but also regarding causal directions: are 
specific supplier-producer relations ‘necessary prerequisites for product’-market strategies 
(Lundvall 1992c: 54), or do the former ‘develop’ as a result of the latter (Lundvall 1992c: 57)?
1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). In line with this 
reasoning, I decided to limit my analyses to these three input factors. The provision o f component standards, around 
which the analyses of this chapter are centred, depends on the successful solution o f a hold-up problem  between a 
firm and its suppliers (see Tate 2001: 442-443; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; Rogerson 1992: 777; 
Malcomson 1997: 1916-1917). In section 3.2., I will elaborate on this coordination problem and illustrate how its 
diverse solutions provide different types o f standards.
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The only strand of the competitiveness literature which allows us to derive 
straightforward statements about how supplier-producer relations facilitate competitive strategies 
is the literature on ‘varieties of capitalism* (henceforth VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001a; Tate 2001; 
Casper 2001; Teubner 2001). As illustrated in the introduction to this section, the VoC literature 
suggests standards to be the causal mechanism which links inter-firm relations to competitive 
strategies. More precisely, the literature argues that different institutional solutions to the hold-up 
problem, which emerges whenever suppliers and producers seek to elaborate new component 
standards, translates into different types of standards (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26; 31; Tate 2001: 
443-446; see Teubner 2001: 433-435). Different standards, in turn, are said to facilitate different 
competitive strategies (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; see Casper 
2001:404-407; Teubner 2001:433-435).
Given that the VoC literature proposes the most straightforward statements about the links 
between institutions , the provision of new component standards, and their impact on 
competitive strategies, I will explicitly address this literature and test its hypotheses in the 
remaining parts of the chapter. In line with chapter 2 and 4 ,1 will therefore ask:
1. is it true that RPI, DQP, and LCP strategies respectively 63 require a specific type of new 
component standards (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; see 
Casper 2001: 404-407; Teubner 2001: 433-435)? Should this turn out to be the case, I will 
continue by asking:
2. is it true that each of the required standards only emerges from specific institutions, i.e. 
national antitrust regulations (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26; 31; Tate 2001: 443-446; 
Teubner 2001: 433-435)?
The answers to these questions will not only illustrate how national antitrust regulations facilitate 
the provision of the specific component standards required for the pursuit of specific strategies, 
they will also shed light on the causal direction of the relationship between supplier-producer 
relations and competitive strategies (see Lundvall 1992c: 57-58; Andersen 1992: 82-84; Gelsing 
1992:119; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Porter 1990:103).
62 In line with Steeck and Thelen (2005:9-16), I understand institutions as ‘formalized rules that may be enforced by 
calling upon a third party’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005:10).
631 took the decision to distinguish between three competitive strategies on the grounds o f deductive reasoning, and 
an in-depth review o f  the competitiveness literature (see e.g. Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Lundvall 1992b: 11- 
12; 57-59; Freeman 1992: 182; Porter 1990: 10; 37; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-39; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 148- 
149; 174-175; Casper 2001: 398-400). My assumption that a distinction between three strategies is both sufficient 
and necessary was empirically confirmed ex post by the fact that I could attribute one strategy to each firm o f the 
sample (see chapter 1; section 1.3.2.). Furthermore, operational differences between the three groups of firms turned 
out to be statistically significant in that each strategy actually requires specific input factors. Thus, the decision to 
distinguish between three strategies is justifiable both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
90
In attempting to shed light on the link between institutions, standards and strategies, the 
remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 3.2. illustrates the VoC 
hypotheses on how institutions resolve the hold-up problem related to the elaboration o f 
standards, and how these solutions provide different standards for competitive strategies. In 
section 3.3., I test the first set of the VoC hypotheses in that I ask which types of standards are 
actually required for each strategy. In so doing, I find that a firm’s strategy determines its 
standardisation approach. However, section 3.4. makes it explicit that standards do not constitute 
a necessary input factor. Instead, a firm’s standardisation behaviour is found to result from the 
pursuit o f a particular strategy. Therefore, section 3.4. proceeds by questioning the role played by 
institutions as providers of standards. Interestingly, these analyses lead to the same conclusion 
reached in chapter 2 .1 will present this conclusion together with a summary of research findings 
in section 3.5..
3.2 , T h e  V oC H y po t h e s e s : H o w  D if f e r e n t  An t it r u s t  L e g is l a t io n  
p r o v id e s  Standards f o r  D iffe r e n t  C o m p é t it iv e  St r a t e g ie s
The reason for why the competitiveness literature in general, and the VoC literature in 
particular, assume standards to be decisive for the competitive success of any company is 
straightforward: a firm cannot simply determine new standards on its own, but only in 
collaboration with other firms (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6-7). Hence, a 
coordination problem arises whenever suppliers and producers need to agree on the standard for a 
new product’s component(s), since firms have often diverging interests about what this standard 
should look like. Accordingly, they may find it difficult, or even impossible, to agree on it. Such 
coordination difficulties are described in the political economy literature as a hold-up problem. A 
hold-up problem arises whenever two or more parties seek to cooperate with the aim of realising 
a common goal for the future -  in our case with the aim of elaborating a new component 
standard. However, not all aspects of cooperation are contractible. Therefore, certain aspects o f 
the initial contract may have to be revised in the course of the joint project. At that stage, 
however, one party has often invested more (money) in achieving the common goal and, 
therefore, faces higher sunk costs than the other party(s). Since the party with lower sunk costs 
has comparatively less to gain from continuing cooperation, it may seek to extract advantageous 
concessions in exchange for its agreement to continue the collaboration. In other words, one party 




Various contributors to the VoC literature (Tate 2001: 443-444; Teubner 2001: 433-435; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27) point out that such situations of deadlock are prevented or 
overcome by the extent to which national institutions encourage inter-firm collaboration in 
standard-setting processes. More precisely, two ways are identified by which national legal 
systems in general, and antitrust legislation in particular, solve or prevent the aforementioned 
hold-up problem.
In countries with code-based (‘continental’) legal regimes, hold-up is overcome by the 
large-scale coordination of firms. In code-based law systems, antitrust legislation is said to be less 
stringent in that it incorporates ‘a producer-oriented tolerance for sectoral (...) cartels’ (Tate 2001: 
443). Combined with a fault-based approach to product liability, which is based on the 
recognition of the bona fides principle, firms are encouraged to determine new component 
standards in encompassing industry associations (Teubner 2001: 433-434; Tate 2001:443). Such 
associations are characterised by a large number o f members, all paying rather low membership 
fees. Whenever new component standards are determined, all those concerned parties enjoy the 
same right to participate in the standardisation process. Hence, both large and small firms have 
the same say in the design of a new standard (Büthe and Witte 2004: 17-22; see also Tate 2001: 
453-454). Thus, hold-up problems are prevented or solved by majoritarian decision processes and 
an increased propensity to make compromises (see Büthe and Witte 2004: 12). As a result, new 
component standards are of a coordinated nature.
The opposite holds true for countries with a common-law tradition, where deadlock is 
overcome by small-scale competition between firms. In common-law countries, rigorous antitrust 
legislation and an open, case-based approach towards product liability is said to discourage large- 
scale firm-cooperation (Tate 2001: 443-444; see also Teubner 2001: 433-435). Instead of 
coordinating their interests in encompassing associations, firms set new standards in one of two 
ways: firstly, they determine them alone by winning a market race. In so doing, firms diffuse 
their own standard so widely that suppliers and even competitors have to conform if they want to 
market a decent number of products (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31). Secondly, firms may come 
together in small consortia where they elaborate new standards on a contractual basis (idem). 
Such consortia differ from encompassing associations in that they admit only a limited number of 
members, which have to pay high membership fees. Furthermore, consortium members often do 
not have an equal voice in standard-setting processes (Tate 2001: 466-467). ‘Big contributors 
might receive director seats, special voting privileges, earlier technical access, and greater access 
to any resulting licences; smaller firms might join, if  at all, only as observers with highly 
restricted rights.’ (Tate 2001: 466-467). Since consortium-associates do not have the same say in
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the elaboration of new standards, deadlock is overcome by powerful members dictating their 
interests to less powerful members. Consequently, new component standards are of a competitive 
nature.
But how do these two types of standards facilitate the pursuit of different competitive 
strategies? Various contributors to the VoC literature (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Tate 2001: 
445-446; see also Teubner 2001: 433-435) argue that coordinated standards, resulting from 
large-scale firm-coordination, promote the pursuit of a DQP strategy. The reason for this is that 
large-scale standardisation encourages all interested firms to contribute their know-how in order 
to elaborate high-level standards ‘that weed out technically inferior outcomes’ (Tate 2001: 446). 
This, in turn, encourages firms to ‘focus on product differentiation and niche production’ (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 27).
Similarly, the aforementioned scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 30-31; Tate 2001: 445; 
468) argue that competitive standards, being the result of a market-race or of small-scale firm- 
collaboration, facilitate the pursuit of an RPI strategy. Large-scale standardisation entails the 
widespread diffusion of substantial knowledge about product or process features. This, in turn, 
may pose a problem for the protection of property rights (Tate 2001: 455) which is said to be 
crucial for the pursuit of an RPI strategy: Radical Product Innovators have little to gain from 
developing a new product if the underlying know-how is then diffused widely during the 
standardisation process without providing any financial compensation (see Casper 2001: 405). 
Thus, competitive standardisation furthers Radical Product Innovation in that the winner of a 
market race has the exclusive right to grant licences. This not only compensates the (financial) 
efforts o f the radical innovator, it also enables the latter to control the extent of knowledge 
diffusion (see Tate 2001: 468).
In sum, coordinated standards are said to further the pursuit of a DQP strategy, whereas 
competitive standards are held to promote an RPI strategy. But does such a dichotomous 
framework allow us to develop hypotheses on the pursuit of an LCP strategy? It should be noted 
that the above-mentioned VoC authors do not make any explicit suggestions on how specific 
standards facilitate an LCP strategy. However, Tate’s contribution (Tate 2001) allows us to 
derive several hypotheses. As Tate points out, ‘[German mass producers and customized 
producers alike] could (...) use the ready-made standards framework to include a widening array 
of suppliers. [Accordingly, they] enjoyed an integrated standardisation framework for the entire 
economy that set high-level base-lines, whether for mass-market goods or more specialised 
products’ (Tate 2001: 454).
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This suggests that the use of coordinated standards can be beneficial for both an LCP and ' 
a DQP strategy, because large-scale standardisation provides producers with high numbers of 
suppliers that can deliver the respective standards. Thereby, Low Cost Producers presumably use
i
the broad availability of coordinated standards in a different way to Diversified Quality 
Producers. As Hall & Soskice (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27) point out, coordinated standards , 
can be used as a means to foster long-term and trust-based relations between suppliers and ,
producers if  they decide to collaborate closely, e.g. on quality controls for semi-finished goods I
(see Casper 2001: 399-400; 406-407; see also Teubner 2001: 433). Thus, if producers use I
coordinated standards in a cooperative way with their suppliers, they presumably facilitate I
Diversified Quality Production. J
However, Tate also indicates that coordinated standards can be used to promote an LCP | 
strategy. Low Cost Producers can use the large pool of coordinated-standard suppliers as a means !
to increase price competition because they can shift quickly from one supplier to another as soon I
as the latter offers cheaper prices. This means that suppliers may be unable or reluctant to fulfil j
producer requirements which go beyond the formally established standards. Hence, it can be |
hypothesised that Low Cost Producers prefer to use coordinated standards in a formal way, while |
Diversified Quality Producers prefer to use coordinated standards in a cooperative way with their I
suppliers. Consequently, the use of formally coordinated standards can be said to facilitate an I
LCP strategy because it increases price competition among suppliers. The use of cooperatively |
coordinated standards, by contrast, presumably promotes a DQP strategy in that it facilitates the |
joint quality control of semi-finished goods. 1
While the use of formally coordinated standards seems to further Low Cost Production, 
the elaboration of standards presumably hinders this strategy. As Tate points out, the elaboration | 
of standards is costly (Tate 2001: 467). This is particularly true for small-scale standardisation | 
processes where consortium members often have to pay high membership fees (idem). Yet the I 
large-scale elaboration of coordinated standards also requires a substantial investment in terms of ' 
time and money (Tate 2001: 446; see also Buthe and Witte 2004: 12). This, in turn, militates j 
against the pursuit of a price-based LCP strategy. In sum, the elaboration of any type of standard 
is probably too expensive for Low Cost Producers, whereas the use o f formally coordinated 
standards may facilitate the pursuit of an LCP strategy. Coming back to the aforementioned hold­
up problem, the latter is circumvented by Low Cost Producers in that they simply do not engage 
in the elaboration of standards.64
M Of course, Low Cost Producers can only free-ride on the use of coordinated standards if  a critical mass o f firms 
exists to elaborate this standard-type in order to pursue a DQP strategy. Since the introductory chapter has shown this
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The above reasoning allows us to propose three sets of testable hypotheses on the link 
between standards and competitive strategies. Firstly, regarding the elaboration o f standards, it 
can be hypothesised that Radical Product Innovators (henceforth RPIs) determine competitive 
standards, whereas Diversified Quality Producers (henceforth DQPs) elaborate coordinated 
standards. Low Cost Producers (henceforth LCPs) abstain from elaborating standards. Secondly, 
concerning the use o f standards, RPIs should mostly employ competitive standards, whilst both 
DQPs and LCPs rather rely on coordinated standards. Finally, regarding the use o f coordinated 
standards, DQPs presumably use cooperatively coordinated standards fostering close 
relationships with suppliers, whereas LCPs merely use formally coordinated standards to 
increase price competition among suppliers. Table 3.1. provides an overview of these three sets 
o f hypotheses. It will be the aim of section 3.3. to test these hypotheses.
Table 3.1.: Hypothetical Relationships between Standards and Competitive Strategies
H y p o th eses: C om petitive S trategies: R P I D Q P L C P
H I :  E la b o ra tio n  of...
...com petitive standards X
...coordinated standards X
...no standards X
H 2: U se of...
...com petitive standards X
...coordinated standards X X
H 3: U se o f  coord ina ted  s ta n d a rd s  in...
...a cooperative way =  cooperatively coordinated standards X
...a form al w ay = formally coordinated standards X
Source: Own Illustration
critical mass of firms to exist in all the countries studied, the assumption that Low Cost Producers firee-ride on large- 
scale standardisation processes o f Diversified Quality Producers can be accepted.
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33* T e s t in g  t h e  H y po t h e se s  (I): Do Sp e c if ic  St r a t e g ie s  r e q u ir e  Specific  
St a n d a r d is a t io n )?
In this section, I will empirically test the first set of hypotheses derived from the VoC 
literature on the link between component standards and competitive strategies. To this end, three 
methodological issues need to be addressed. Firstly, how should we operationalise the notion of 
{competitive or coordinated) component standards used in pharmaceutical products? It should be 
noted that the VoC scholars ground their arguments on studies o f less technology-intense 
industries, for the most part metal-work (see e.g. Tate 2001). For the products of these industries, 
the term component standard refers to all the characteristics o f semi-finished goods which make 
up the final product. Accordingly, the component standard of pharmaceutical products can be 
defined as the characteristics o f all those active and excipient substances which make up a drug.
Let us furthermore recall that competitive standards result from small-scale collaboration 
between firms on a contractual basis. Consequently, I will refer to the standard for an active or 
excipient ingredient as competitive whenever it was determined by a small number o f companies 
on a contractual basis. Coordinated standards, on the other hand, result from large-scale 
collaboration between firms in encompassing industry associations. For industrial goods, the 
large-scale coordination of component standards takes place in national and international 
associations such as the Deutsches Institut fur Normung (DIN), the British Standards Institution 
(BSI), or the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) (see e.g. Tate 2001).
But do comparable associations exist in the pharmaceutical industry, which coordinate the 
standardisation of new pharmaceutical ingredients on a large scale? Interestingly, this question 
can be answered with a clear-cut 'yes’. Standard-setting associations exist at both the national 
and the international level. At the European level, these standardisation processes take place 
within the European Pharmacopoeia Commission. In addition, national Pharmacopoeia 
Commissions exist which determine standards for pharmaceutical ingredients in those areas that 
are not covered by the European Pharmacopoeia. Like other large-scale associations, it is the task 
of these Commissions to form and coordinate expert committees and working groups within 
which new monographs are elaborated. A monograph determines the standards for a 
pharmaceutical ingredient by describing both its characteristics and preparation. All these 
monographs together form the European (or respectively British, German, Italian etc.) 
Pharmacopoeia. Apart from the European and national Pharmacopoeia Commissions, a few other 
associations exist which coordinate large-scale standardisation, e.g. the German Pharmaceutical 
Codex (Deutscher Arzneittel-Codex). However, these associations are of minor importance as
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they only elaborate pharmaceutical standards in those few areas that are not covered by the 
European or national Pharmacopoeia (BfArM 2004).
Whenever a new (Pharmacopoeia) monograph is elaborated, all interested parties -  e.g. 
firms, laboratories, experts etc. -  are free to participate in the standardisation process. While other 
procedures exist, interested firms can propose an experienced employee as a member of a newly 
established working group. For single-source active substances, it may also occur that the 
Pharmacopoeia Commission turns to the firm which developed the substance in question in order 
to request its collaboration in elaborating a new monograph. Accordingly, I will refer to a 
standard for an active or excipient ingredient as coordinated whenever it was determined by the 
European or a national Pharmacopoeia, or by a comparable large-scale standardisation 
association.
The second methodological point concerns the empirical basis on which the subsequent 
analyses are grounded. In the following, I will test the hypotheses of the VoC literature on the 
basis of quantitative analyses. I gathered the data for these analyses by carrying out structured 
interviews with representatives of pharmaceutical firms65. While the majority of questions were 
closed, I also posed several open questions whose answers provided me with precious qualitative 
insights66. The sample of firms, whose representatives I sought to interview, is described in detail 
in chapter 2 (see introduction to section 2.3.). Of the 110 pharmaceutical firms included in the 
overall sample, I was granted interviews or obtained information from 65 companies. In small 
firms, I often interviewed senior managers, i.e. the company’s CEO or comparable employee. In 
large firms, representatives of the company’s Quality Assurance department were usually the 
most adequate interview partners to answer my questions. Apart from quantitative data, these 
interviews also provided me with important qualitative insights into how different types of 
standards impact on competitive strategies. It was these insights that enabled me to structure and 
interpret the subsequent quantitative analyses. Thus, the following analyses are a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative information.
Finally, it should be noted that I always tested for possible country-specific variations. Let 
us remember that the VoC literature argues that national institutions have a decisive impact on 
how standards are determined and used in different economies (Tate 2001: 443-444; Teubner 
2001: 433-435; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31). In order to assess the stability of the 
results I obtained from analysing the overall case sample, I cross-checked my findings by re-
65 As discussed in chapter 1 (section 1.3.1.) I use the term pharmaceutical firm  as a generic term for all types o f 
companies which are active in the drug industry, i.e. for biotech-, traditional pharmaceutical-, and generics firms 
alike.
66 The questionnaire I used during these interviews is reproduced in the appendix.
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running the respective analyses for each country individually. Interestingly, these country- 
specific analyses agree in one point: while the number of cases is sometimes too small to provide 
statistically significant results, all country-specific results are perfectly in line with the outcome 
resulting from the overall sample. This, in turn, confirms my suspicion that national institutions 
are far less constraining than is suggested by the competitiveness literature in general, and the 
VoC literature in particular. Since I will elaborate on this argument in section 3.4., suffice it to 
say here that noteworthy country-specific deviations from the overall results cannot be observed.
That said, let us finally turn to test the three sets of hypotheses on the link between 
standards and competitive strategy. In line with the trilogy proposed in section 3.2., I test the 
respective hypotheses in three steps: In section 3.3.1., I assess the impact of the elaboration of a 
standard on competitive strategies, whereas I test the extent to which different strategies use 
specific types of standards in 3.3.2.. In section 3.3.3., I analyses the way in which producers use 
coordinated standards in order to build formal, or cooperative relations with their suppliers. 
Section 3.3.4. concludes by summarising and interpreting the respective findings.
33.1. How C o m p e t i t iv e  S t r a t e g ie s  d e t e r m in e  t h e  E l a b o r a t io n  o f  S t a n d a r d s
If the initial hypotheses on the elaboration of pharmaceutical standards hold trae, we 
should find that Radical Product Innovators determine new pharmaceutical standards either on 
their own, or on a contractual basis in collaboration with a small number of other firms or 
research organisations (see Casper 2001: 405; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31; Tate 2001: 445; 468). J 
In contrast, Diversified Quality Producers should actively participate in large-scale j 
standardisation processes coordinated by the Pharmacopoeia Commission or comparable I
associations (see Tate 2001: 446; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27). Low Cost Producers, in turn, can 
be expected to abstain from standardisation processes per se (see Tate 2001:467; 446; Büthe and I 
Witte 2004:12). 1
In order to assess the extent to which firms elaborate diverse types of standards, I asked | 
interviewees whether their firm’s products contained any ingredients subject to competitive | 
standards. In so doing, I defined a competitive standard as those pharmaceutical ingredients  ̂
whose features are only known to the firm in question, or to a small number of 
companies/research organisations. If this was the case, I invited the interviewee to specify what 
percentage of pharmaceutical ingredients with a competitive standard were elaborated by the firm 
acting alone, or on a contractual basis with other companies and research organisations. 
Furthermore, I asked the interviewee whether employees of his/her firm are/were members of a 
working group/expert committee of the Pharmacopoeia Commission, or of a comparable
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standardisation association67. Table 3.2. provides an overview of the answers I obtained from 
interviewees from Radical Product Innovators, Diversified Quality Producers, and Low Cost 
Producers.
Interestingly, the answers to my three questions follow different patterns for different 
competitive strategies. This pattern is most straightforward for firm s which pursue an LCP 
strategy. As predicted by the VoC hypotheses, table 3.2. shows that Low Cost Producers do not 
engage in any standardisation processes: none of the firms interviewed sends or had sent 
employees to participate in working groups of a Pharmacopoeia Commission, or a comparable 
standardisation association. Similarly, Low Cost Producers do not elaborate competitive 
standards alone or with a small number of other firms/research institutes. When asking 
interviewees why this was, they repeatedly pointed out that their firm does not engage in R&D, 
but imitates pharmaceutical products developed by others. Accordingly, there is no need to 
elaborate standards for pharmaceutical ingredients, given that the respective active and excipient 
substances can simply be imitated upon patent expiry68. In sum, empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis derived from Tate’s contribution (see Tate 2001: 467; 446; Buthe and Witte 2004: 
12): Low Cost Producers circumvent the hold-up problem related to the elaboration of new 
pharmaceutical standards by abstaining from any kind of standardisation.
67 For the exact phrasing o f these questions, please see questions 4.2.1., 4.2.2. and 4.2.4. o f the questionnaire 
reproduced in the appendix.
68 Some interviewees pointed out that it is occasionally difficult to obtain information about the features o f a recently 
developed active substance for which a Pharmacopoeia (or comparable) monograph does not yet exist. The 
occasional difficulty in obtaining information on pharmaceutical standards does not, however, entail the necessity of 
developing alternative standards on a large- or small-scale basis. Instead, Low Cost Producers seek information from 
sources such as the DIMDI database (see DIMDI 2005), patents and publications, as well as leaflets included in the 
packets of the original drug. Information obtained from these sources enables employees experienced in the field of 
galenics to build copies o f  the original drug’s ingredients.
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Table 3.2.: Elaboration of Competitive and Coordinated Standards by RPIs, DQPs and LCPs
%  of Firm s w hich... R PIs DQPs LCPs
...elaborate competitive standards 
alone or on contractual basis 
with few other firms or PROs
100 % 100% 0%
...do not elaborate competitive standards
alone or on contractual basis 
with few other firms or PROs
0 % 0% 100 %
%  of Competitive S tandards developed...
.. .by firm alone 37.4% 67.2 % not applicable
.. .in collaboration w ith few others 62.6% 32.8 % not applicable
%  of F irm s w h ich ...
...elaborate coordinated standards
i.e. send employee(s) to (Pharmacopoeia) 
working-group(s)
6.2 % 43.3 % 0%
...do not elaborate coordinated standards 
i.e. do not send employee(s) to 
(Pharmacopoeia) working-group(s)
93.8 % 56.7% 100%
Source: Own illustration, evaluating questions 4.2.1., 4.2.2. and 4.2.4. (see appendix for questionnaire)
For firm s that pursue a DQP or an R P I strategy, table 3.2. reveals more complex 
standardisation patterns. Contrary to the hypotheses of the VoC literature, we do not find 
Diversified Quality Producers to elaborate only coordinated (Pharmacopoeia) standards, while j 
Radical Product Innovators focus exclusively on the elaboration of competitive standards (see j 
Casper 2001:405; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 31; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468). Interestingly, table
3.2. shows that any firm which is active in R&D elaborates competitive standards, either on its 
own or in collaboration with other firms/research organisations. When asking interviewees why 
this was, it turned out that innovators -  whether radical or incremental — do not gain from 
diffusing the features of a newly elaborated pharmaceutical ingredient through large-scale 
standardisation. While this supports the argument that competitive standardisation helps to 
protect a firm’s property rights (Tate 2001: 445; 468; see also Casper 2001: 405), this argument 
applies to Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers alike. Consequently, the , 
hypotheses on the predominant importance of competitive standardisation for RPI is shown to 
lack empirical support (see Casper 2001: 405; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 31; Tate 2001: 445- 
446; 468).
Interestingly, however, a difference can be observed in the extent to which Diversified 
Quality Producers and Radical Product Innovators elaborate competitive standards alone, and 
respectively in collaboration with a small number o f other firms or research organisations. Table
100
3.2. shows that radically innovative firms elaborate on average 37.4% of competitive 
pharmaceutical standards alone, and 62.6% in collaboration with others. Incrementally innovative 
firms, by contrast, elaborate 67.2% of competitive standards alone and only 32.8% in 
collaboration with other firms/research organisations. Does this finding suggest that competitive 
standards elaborated with few  others are relatively more important for the pursuit of an RPI 
strategy, whereas competitive standards elaborated by a firm alone are relatively more central to 
the pursuit of a DQP strategy? And if  so, why would this be the case?
When thinking about possible reasons, I came across the following web-page statement of 
Henderson-Morley, one of the pharmaceutical firms contained in my case sample: ‘As a drug 
discovery company, Henderson Morley does not have the infrastructure to take projects through 
the clinical trial process without a commercial partner* (Henderson Morley 2005). We have seen 
in the introductory chapter that Radical Product Innovators tend to focus on the discovery and 
early clinical development of pharmaceutical projects. As suggested by Henderson Morley, this 
means that radically innovative firms need to elaborate new pharmaceutical ingredients in 
cooperation with other companies or research organisations because they lack the required 
development and production facilities -  such as (access to) animal houses and trial patients, 
production plants, and expertise in legal requirements. In other words, the pursuit of an RPI 
strategy makes it difficult for a firm to elaborate competitive standards on its own due to its focus 
on early value-chain activities.
However, Henderson Morley* s statement also suggests a rival hypothesis. The need to 
elaborate competitive standards with others could simply be the result of a firm’s number of 
employees. Irrespective of a firm’s competitive strategy, smaller firms are more likely to have 
difficulty in elaborating competitive standards on their own, because they lack the necessary 
expertise in different areas of various value-chain activities. Hence, the Tack of infrastructure* 
could be narrowed down to a firm’s number of employees.
To assess whether a firm’s competitive strategy or its number o f employees is a better 
explanation of competitive standardisation with others, simple linear regression analyses are the 
most instructive. More precisely, I carried out three regressions. To determine the single impact 
of an RPI strategy69 on the one hand (analysis 1), and the number of employees on the other 
(analysis 2), I first correlated each variable individually with the extent to which a firm elaborates 
competitive standards with others. In order to assess their relative explanatory power, I then
69 I created the RPI-variable by assigning a score o f ‘ V  to all firms pursuing an RPI strategy, whereas I attributed a 
score of 0 to all firms pursuing a DQP strategy. All Low Cost Producers were excluded from the analyses as none of 
them engage in competitive standardisation.
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regressed the strategy and the employee variable jointly on competitive standardisation (analysis 
3). Table 3.3. provides an overview of the results obtained.
Table 33,: How an RPI Strategy and a Firm’s Number o f Employees impact on Competitive 
Standardisation with Others




(RPI ■> CompStds with Others)
A nalysis 2





RPI Strategy .386 *** — .425 ***
Number o f Employees — .061 .163
N 46 46 46
Adjusted R2 .130 -.019 .136
Significance levels: * < 0 .10  **< 0 .05  ***<0.01
In essence, table 3.3. illustrates two points: Firstly, the extent to which a firm engages in 
competitive standardisation with others does not at all depend on its number of employees: 
Analyses 2 and 3 reveal a very weak and statistically insignificant relationship between the 
number of employees of a firm and its efforts to elaborate competitive standards with others. 
Secondly, and contrary to the previous finding, analyses 1 and 3 show that the pursuit of an RPI 
strategy has a strong and statistically highly significant impact on competitive standardisation.
This indicates that the extent to which a firm elaborates competitive pharmaceutical standards 
with other companies/research organisations is importantly influenced by the competitive strategy j 
it pursues. We can interpret these findings to the effect that, while both RPIs and DQPs elaborate I 
competitive standards, competitive standardisation with others is comparatively more important 
for Radical Product Innovators than for Diversified Quality Producers. The reason for this is that 
the focus of Radical Product Innovators on early value-chain activities makes it necessary to 
compensate for missing infrastructures through joint standardisation projects.
Before I continue to assess how the elaboration of specific standards impacts on |
competitive strategies, I want to draw attention to another finding that results from the previous |
analyses. Remember that Low Cost Producers had to be excluded from these analyses as they do  ̂
not engage in competitive standardisation. Consequently, the results of table 3.3. do not only tell f 
us that the pursuit of an RPI strategy makes a firm elaborate competitive standards together with 1 
other companies and research organisations. We also learn that firms pursuing a DQP strategy
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show a high propensity to elaborate competitive standards on their own. Since I will discuss this 
finding in extenso in section 3.3.2., suffice it to say here that competitive standardisation by a 
firm acting alone seems to be important for the pursuit of a DQP strategy.
Having assessed the link between competitive standardisation and an RPI strategy, let us 
test whether coordinated standardisation is central to the pursuit of a DQP strategy. To this end, 
we should remember that coordinated standardisation is said to facilitate Diversified Quality 
Production because high-level standards are determined ‘that weed out technically inferior 
outcomes* (Tate 2001: 446). This, in turn, encourages firms to ‘focus on product differentiation 
and niche production’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; see also Tate 2001: 446). When looking at 
the summary results o f table 3.2., this hypothesis seems to be confirmed. While not all firms 
pursuing a DQP strategy engage in coordinated standardisation (43.3%), the majority of 
Diversified Quality Producers (56.7%) send employees to participate in Pharmacopoeia (or 
comparable) working groups. This stands in stark contrast to Radical Product Innovators which 
almost entirely abstain from coordinated standardisation (93.8 %).
This finding should not, however, lead us to draw premature conclusions. When I asked 
interviewees why their firm did not participate in coordinated standardisation, representatives of 
smaller companies often pointed out that their firm simply did not have the necessary human 
resources. Hence, it could also be possible that the extent to which a firm participates in the 
elaboration of coordinated (Pharamcopoeia) standards is not related to the pursuit of a DQP 
strategy. Instead, it could merely depend upon the number of a firm’s employees. Accordingly, 
the following rival hypothesis can be formulated: irrespective of its competitive strategy, a 
company with many employees finds it less costly than a firm with few employees to send these 
to a (Pharmacopoeia) working group (see Büthe and Witte 2004:19-20).
In order to test whether a DQP strategy or a firm’s number o f employees constitutes a 
better explanation of coordinated standardisation, binary logistic regression analyses are most 
instructive. Overall, I carried out three analyses. In the first analysis, I assessed the individual 
impact of a DQP strategy on coordinated standardisation. Similarly, I tested the importance of a 
firm’s number of employees for coordinated standardisation in the second analysis. In order to 
determine the relative explanatory power o f a DQP strategy and the number of employees, I 
regressed both variables jointly on coordinated standardisation in the third analysis. The outcome 
of these three analyses are reported in table 3.4..
70 I obtained the DQP-variable from assigning a score o f T* to all firms pursuing a DQP strategy, and o f *0’ to all 
firms pursuing an RPI strategy. All Low Cost Producers were excluded from the analyses as none o f the latter engage 
in coordinated standardisation.
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Table 3.4.: How a DQP Strategy and a Firm ’s Number o f Employees impact on Coordinated 
Standardisation
(Results of Binary Logistic Regression Analyses: Unstandardised B)
Independent variables Analysis 1




(DQP, NbEees Elab.Coor Stds.)
DQP Strategy 2.440** — 1.796
Number o f  Employees — .001** .000*
N 46 46 46
R 2 Nagetkerke .226 .311 .388




Contrary to the expectations of the VoC contributors (Tate 2001: 446; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 26-27), the results presented in table 3.4. contradict the hypothesis on the importance of 
coordinated standards for the pursuit of a DQP strategy. At first sight, the outcome of analysis 1 
seems to provide empirical support for the idea that Diversified Quality Producers engage in 
coordinated standardisation more than Radical Product Innovators, as a strong positive 
correlation can be observed (B = 2.440; R2Nagdkerkc= .226; p < .05). However, analysis 2 reveals 
an even stronger relationship between a firm’s number o f employees and the extent to which a 
company participates in the elaboration of coordinated standards (B = .001; R2Nageik«ice= .311; p 
< .05). Overall, this means that only the number of employees qualifies as a significant predictor 
in analysis 3: the pursuit of a DQP strategy does not have any significant impact on the 
elaboration of coordinated standards71.
These findings suggest that coordinated standardisation does not help to ‘weed out 
technically inferior outcomes* (Tate 2001: 446). Instead, the advantage of coordinated 
standardisation seems to be of a different nature: coordinated standards are particularly important 
in the pharmaceutical industry because legislation is very demanding with regard to drugs’ purity 
standards. Whenever a pharmaceutical company seeks to register a new product, it must 
demonstrate that all contained actives and excipients are adequately pure. Thereby, the European 
and national Pharmacopoeia (as well as comparable sources o f coordinated standards) serve as
71 Presumably the number o f employees o f a company has an even stronger impact on coordinated standardisation 
than portrayed in table 3.4.. The reason for this is that, in the present analyses, I only considered whether a firm sends 
employees to Pharmacopoeia working groups. I did not consider how many people are sent However, my interviews 
show that large pharmaceutical companies often send several employees to participate in coordinated 
(Pharmacopoeia) standardisation, whereas smaller firms tend to send just one representative. This confirms the idea 
that a firm’s human resources are actually crucial for the extent to which a firm engages in coordinated 
standardisation -  irrespective o f its competitive strategy.
important benchmarks. Whenever a coordinated (Pharmacopoeia) monograph is elaborated, 
pharmaceutical companies are free to determine standards that go beyond these quality 
requirements. But as soon as a monograph exists, a marketing authorisation will only be granted 
if  all the ingredients of a pharmaceutical product fulfil at least the monograph’s standards. While 
it is certainly costly to send an employee to participate in a Pharmacopoeia (or comparable) 
working group, participating firms can make sure that the new monograph is in line with their 
needs and capacities (e.g. their manufacturing procedures). As a result, the approval and renewal 
o f a pharmaceutical product can be obtained more easily (BfArM 2004). While this advantage is 
potentially equally beneficial for radically and incrementally innovative firms, only larger 
companies have the human resources necessary to participate in coordinated standardisation.
To conclude, what have we learned from the previous analyses of the elaboration of 
different standards? Most importantly, we found that the pursuit of a specific competitive strategy 
determines a firm’s standardisation behaviour -  although in a different manner than that predicted 
by VoC scholars (see Casper 2001: 405; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27; 31; Tate 2001: 445-446; 
467-468). Interestingly, a firm’s standardisation approach differs most notably between non- 
innovative companies (LCPs) and innovative firms (RPIs and DQPs). We have seen that Low 
Cost Producers abstain from  both competitive and coordinated standardisation. This, in turn, 
confirms the hypothesis derived from the VoC literature (see Tate 2001: 467; 446; Büthe and 
Witte 2004: 12): LCPs simply circumvent the hold-up problem related to the elaboration of new 
component standards.
In contrast to Low Cost Producers, we found both radically and incrementally innovative 
firms to engage in competitive standardisation in order to protect their innovative efforts (see 
Casper 2001: 405). This finding contradicts the VoC hypothesis that competitive standardisation 
only facilitates an RPI strategy. Similarly, we found the VoC literature wrong in that it 
overestimates the importance of coordinated standardisation for the pursuit of a DQP strategy 
(Tate 2001: 446; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27). While coordinated standardisation is beneficial 
for radically and incrementally innovative firms alike, as it facilitates the (re-)approval of 
pharmaceutical products, only large firms have the manpower to participate in coordinated 
standardisation. We can therefore conclude that radically innovative firms do not resolve the 
hold-up problem related to the elaboration of new component standards through competitive 
standardisation, whereas incrementally innovative firms resort to coordinated standardisation. 
Instead, depending on their (human) resources, RPIs and DQPs use both solutions to remedy the 
problem of hold-up.
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33.2. How C o m p e t it iv e  S t r a t e g ie s  d e t e r m in e  t h e  U s e  o f  S t a n d a r d s
Having tested the VoC hypotheses on the elaboration o f standards, let us now turn to 
analyse whether the use of specific standards furthers the pursuit o f specific strategies. If the VoC 
scholars are right (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; 454; 468; 
see also Teubner 2001: 433-435), we should find that Radical Product Innovators rely almost 
exclusively on competitive standards, whereas both Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost 
Producers use coordinated standards. More precisely, the active and excipient components of the 
pharmaceutical products of radically innovative firms should be based on individual standards 
which are not described in the (European) Pharmacopoeia. Incrementally innovative firms and 
Low Cost Producers, instead, should base their active and excipient components on 
Pharmacopoeia standards.
To assess how the use of diverse standards impacts on competitive strategy, I posed 5 
questions to my interviewees. To begin with, I asked (la) to what extent pharmaceutical 
ingredients contained in the firm’s products are based on (coordinated) Pharmacopoeia standards, 
and respectively (lb) on (competitive) individual standards which are not described in the 
Pharmacopoeia. If a firm’s products contained competitive (individual) component standards, I 
invited the interviewee to specify (2) to what extent these standards are patent-protected; and (3) 
to what extent standards are individual because a Pharmacopoeia monograph does not (yet) exist. 
If the latter question revealed that a firm uses individual specifications even though a 
Pharmacopoeia monograph exists, I enquired (4) about the reasons for which the firm does not 
use the respective Pharmacopoeia monograph. Finally, whenever a firm’s products contained 
pharmaceutical ingredients based on Pharmacopoeia standards, I asked the interviewee (5) why 
their firm makes (important) use of such coordinated standards.72
Table 3.5. provides an overview of the interviewees’ responses to the first three questions. 
Interestingly, the table indicates that firms pursuing different strategies vary in the extent to 
which they use specific standards; but these variations are not as pronounced as predicted by the 
initial hypotheses. Most importantly, no competitive strategy seems to require the exclusive use 
of coordinated or competitive standards. Instead, Radical Product Innovators, Diversified Quality 
Producers, and Low Cost Producers alike employ both coordinated and competitive standards. 
Hence, the question arises of in what respect and, even more importantly, why empirical evidence 
deviates from the hypotheses of the VoC scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; 
Tate 2001:445-446; 454; 468; see also Teubner 2001:433-435).
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Table 3.5«: Use of Competitive and Coordinated Standards by RPIs, DQPs and LCPs
%  o f Actives and E xcipients... RPIs DQPs L C Ps
...based on Coordinated Standards
i.e. on specifications defined in Pharmacopoeia 42.7 % 78.4 % 90.9 %
...based on Competitive Standards 
i.e. on specifications which are not defined as 
such in Pharmacopoeia
57.3 % 21.6% 9.1 %
%  o f  Com petitive S tandards which a re .. .
. . .  patent-protected 82.5 % 37.0% 0 %
...  n o t patent-protected 17.5% 63.0 % 100%
%  o f  Com petitive S tandards for w hich...
. . .  a Pharmacopoeia-Equivalent does not exist 99.2 % 80.1 % 91.7%
. . .  a Pharmacopoeia-Equivalent exists. 0.8% 19.9 % 8.3 %
Source: Own illustration, evaluating questions 4.1.1. -  4.1.3. (see appendix for questionnaire)
In line with the findings of section 3.3.1., table 3.5. indicates that Low Cost Producers 
follow the predicted patterns most closely. The vast majority (namely 90.9%) of active and 
excipient substances contained in the pharmaceuticals of Low Cost Producers are based on 
coordinated standards as specified in the Pharmacopoeia (or comparable). When I asked 
interviewees about the nature of the few (i.e. 9.1%) competitive standards, it turned out that the 
latter are not included in the Pharmacopoeia because they are imitations of recent inventions 
whose patent protection has only just expired. Accordingly, the inventor of the original 
pharmaceutical ingredient has not yet had the time to -  or maybe no interest in -  diffusing her 
invention through coordinated standardisation. In other words, the few competitive standards 
used by Low Cost Producers are still competitive as they are not yet included in the 
Pharmacopoeia. Therefore, firms pursuing an LCP strategy do not hold patents for any of the 
competitive standards contained in their drugs. This explains why none of the competitive 
pharmaceutical ingredients used by Low Cost Producers are patent-protected (see table 3.5.).
But how to explain the result that Low Cost Producers use 8.3% of competitive standards 
for which a Pharmacopoeia equivalent exists? The answer to this question is particularly 
interesting, as we will see below that it is also relevant to the pursuit of a DQP strategy. Several 
interviewees pointed out that their firm occasionally needs to use competitive standards whose
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quality features go beyond an existing Pharmacopoeia standard because the responsible 
approving authority asks them to do so. This, in turn, indicates that the inventor of the original 
competitive standard has improved an existing Pharmacopoeia monograph in such a way that the 
approving authority no longer accepts the use of the original Pharmacopoeia standard. Instead, 
the authority asks for the use of the improved and therefore competitive standard.
In sum, we find empirical support for the hypothesis derived from Tate’s contribution to 
the VoC literature (Tate 2001: 454), which states that the use of coordinated standards is 
particularly important for Low Cost Production. We have seen that Low Cost Producers resort to 
Pharmacopoeia standards whenever possible. While they would wish to use coordinated 
standards exclusively, firms pursuing an LCP strategy occasionally have to employ competitive 
standards. The reasons for this are either that a Pharmacopoeia monograph does not yet exist, or 
that a monograph exists but additional requirements need to be fulfilled in order to obtain a 
marketing authorisation.
Having found empirical support for the importance of coordinated standards for Low Cost 
Producers, let us test whether Radical Product Innovators use mostly competitive standards, while 
Diversified Quality Producers rely chiefly on coordinated standards (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; see also Teubner 2001: 433-435). In line with the 
findings o f section 3.3.1., table 3.5. shows at a glance that these hypotheses do not hold. Firms 
which pursue an RPI strategy, as well as their counterparts pursuing a DQP strategy, rely i 
substantially on both coordinated and competitive standards. Nevertheless, table 3.5. also reveals j 
that Radical Product Innovators use more competitive (57.3%) than coordinated (42.7%) 
standards, whereas Diversified Quality Producers rely more on coordinated Pharmacopoeia 
monographs (78.4%) than on competitive specifications (21.6%).
This suggests that, even though no empirical evidence can be found for the absolute 
importance of competitive or coordinated standards, the two standard types might be of relative 
importance for the pursuit of RPI and DQP strategies respectively. Two simple correlation 
analyses allow us to assess whether Radical Product Innovators use significantly more 
competitive standards than Diversified Quality Producers -  and vice versa. Indeed, these analyses 
show that a strong positive and statistically significant relationship not only exists between the 
pursuit o f a DQP strategy and the extent to which a firm uses coordinated standards (R pcaison -  
.201; R2 = .041; p < 0.10 (1-tailed test)); a positive and even stronger correlation can also be
appendix).
108
observed between an RPI strategy and the use of competitive standards (R person = -596; R2 = 
.355; p < 0.01 (2-tailed test))73. These findings make it tempting to accept the initial hypotheses.
However, before drawing premature conclusions, let us delve into these results in order to 
get to the bottom of the reasoning proposed by the VoC scholars (see Tate 2001: 445; 468; 
Casper 2001: 405; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 30-31). In section 3.3.1., we found the VoC literature 
wrong in suggesting that Diversified Quality Producers substantially rely on coordinated 
standards because they 'weed out technically inferior outcomes' (Tate 2001: 446). Instead, we 
saw that both Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers elaborate 
coordinated standards whenever they have the human resources necessary in order to do so. We 
have also seen in sections 3.3.1. and 3.3.2. that firms pursuing an RPI and a DQP strategy 
elaborate and use competitive standards. So far, we have simply accepted the VoC reasoning that 
firms rely on competitive standards because the latter make it easier to protect innovations from  
imitation (see Casper 2001:405; Tate 2001: 445; 468; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31). It will be the 
aim of the remaining part of section 3.3.2. to assess the validity of this reasoning.
So, how to explain that Radical Product Innovators make a relatively high use of 
competitive standards? To answer this question, table 3.5. provides precious insights as it shows 
that firms pursuing different strategies vary notably in the extent to which their competitive 
standards are patent-protected. The fact that a new pharmaceutical ingredient can be protected 
from unwarranted imitation not only through competitive standardisation but also through patents 
allows us to test the reasoning of the VoC scholars (see Casper 2001: 405; Tate 2001: 445; 468; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31). Accordingly, we can formulate the following hypothesis: ifitis true  
that firms use competitive standards in order to protect their innovations, we should find that 
those companies whose products contain a comparatively low share of patent-protected 
ingredients should make a more pronounced use of competitive standards in order to shelter the 
non patent-protected ingredients from imitation.
To assess the relative explanatory power of this hypothesis, the following rival hypothesis 
can be formulated. Remember the finding of section 3.3.1 that the focus on specific value-chain 
activities constitutes an important explanation of the extent to which firms elaborate competitive 
standards on their own or in collaboration with others. In line with this reasoning, we can 
hypothesise that Radical Product Innovators use comparatively more competitive standards 
because of their focus on early value-chain activities: the discovery of new chemical entities is,
73 It should be noted that I run the two correlation analyses on the basis of the overall firm sample including Low 
Cost Producers. When excluding all Low Cost Producers from the sample, the correlation between an RPI/DQP 
strategy and the extent to which a firm uses competitive/coardinated standards is equally strong for RPI and, 
accordingly, significantly stronger for DQP (R Pcireoil = .544; RJ = .296; p < 0.01 (2-tailed test)).
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simply, the raison d’être of radically innovative firms; it is the core business of Radical Product 
Innovation. Low Cost Producers, on the other hand, hardly use any competitive standards, as they 
abstain from R&D due to their focus on downstream value-chain activities. Accordingly, 
Diversified Quality Producers are presumably situated in between these two.
In order to assess whether the extent to which firms use competitive standards is better 
explained by the necessity to protect innovations or by their focus on specific value-chain 
activities, I carried out three simple linear regression analyses. In the first two analyses, I tested 
the absolute explanatory power of (1) the need to protect innovations (taking the extent o f patent- 
protected standards as a proxy), and of (2) a firm’s focus on specific value-chain activities (using 
competitive strategy as proxy). In the third analysis, I determined the relative importance of the 
two explanations by regressing them jointly on the use of coordinated standards.74 Table 3.6. 
summarises the results obtained from these analyses.
Table 3.6.: How the Necessity to Protect Innovations and the Value-Chain Focus impact on 
the Use o f Competitive Standards
(Results of Simple Linear Regression Analyses: Standardised Beta)
Independent variables Analysis 1





Patent-Protection .359** — -,102
Competitive Strategy — .588*** .660***
N 49 53 49
R2 .129 .346 .352
Significance levels: * < 0.10 **< 0 .05  ***< 0 .01  (2-tailed test)
At first sight, table 3.6. seems to provide empirical support for the reasoning of the VoC 
scholars (see Casper 2001: 405; Tate 2001: 445; 468; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31). Analysis 1 
reveals a strong and statistically significant correlation between the use of patent-protected and 
competitive standards (R Peuson = .359; R2 = .129; p < 0.05 (2-tailed test)). Importantly, 
however, this correlation is positive, not negative as predicted by the VoC scholars. In other 
words, the more a finn uses competitive standards, the more the latter are patent-protected. 
Furthermore, analysis 2 shows that a firm’s competitive strategy provides an even stronger
explanation for why a company uses competitive standards (R peareon -  -596; R2 = .355; p < 0.01 
(2-tailed test)). As it is perfectly in line with the previous correlation analyses, this outcome can 
be interpreted to the effect that firms use competitive standards as a function of their focus on 
specific value-chain activities. Overall, this explanation appear as so much better than any other 
argument related to (patent) protection of innovations, that only a firm’s strategy qualifies as a 
strong and statistically significant predictor in analysis 3.
So, what do these results teach us about the use of competitive standards on the one hand, 
and the possibilities to protect innovations from unwarranted imitations on the other? To begin 
with, we find that the two are unrelated. Contrary to the predictions of the VoC scholars (see 
Casper 2001: 405; Tate 2001: 445; 468; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31), firms do not use 
competitive standards to protect innovations from imitation. Instead, firms use competitive 
standards according to the value-chain focus of their competitive strategy: while the search for 
new chemical entities and, hence, the focus on upstream activities makes the use of competitive 
standards more central to the business of Radical Product Innovators, the opposite holds true for 
Low Cost Producers, whereas Diversified Quality Producers are situated in between. 
Furthermore, we have seen that the more a firm uses competitive standards, the more they are 
patent-protected (analysis 1 of table 3.6.). Combined with the previous finding, this indicates that 
radical innovations can be patent-protected more easily than incremental innovations. 
Interestingly, this interpretation also emerges from table 3.5., which shows that Radical Product 
Innovators patent-protect to a greater extent than Diversified Quality Producers. This allows us to 
conclude that incremental innovations are sometimes not innovative enough to obtain patent 
protection.
As a corollary of the VoC reasoning (see Casper 2001:405; Tate 2001:445; 468; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 31), these findings raise an interesting question which I wish to address before 
summarising the results of this section. Given that firms do not use competitive standards to 
protect innovations from imitation, and given that incremental innovations are sometimes not 
innovative enough to obtain patent protection, how do Diversified Quality Producers protect their 
incremental innovations from unwarranted imitation? In the course of my interviews, I 
discovered that, essentially, two ways exist in which Diversified Quality Producers try to protect 
incremental innovations for which patent protection cannot be obtained from imitation. On the 
one hand, they elaborate new pharmaceutical standards on their own. Remember the finding of 
section 3.3.1. that, contrary to Radical Product Innovators, Diversified Quality Producers show a
74 In line with the precedent correlation analyses, I run these analyses on the basis of the overall firm sample 
including Low Cost Producers. Interestingly, the results obtained are so stable that they do not significantly change if
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significant propensity to elaborate competitive standards on their own. In so doing, they minimise 
the risk that potential imitators learn about their innovative efforts.
Secondly, Diversified Quality Producers also seem to use the improvement of existing 
Pharmacopoeia standards as a ‘sheltered’ source of incremental innovation. Looking at table 3.5., 
we find that firms pursuing a DQP strategy use almost 20% of competitive standards for which a 
Pharmacopoeia standard exists. This stands in stark contrast to Radical Product Innovators (0.8%) 
and Low Cost Producers (8.3%) alike. When I asked interviewees of DQPs why their firm uses 
competitive standards even though coordinated Pharmacopoeia standards could be employed, it 
turned out that Pharmacopoeia monographs constitute a source of ‘sheltered* incremental 
innovation. In 2004, a European Medicines Agency guideline was adopted which invites 
pharmaceutical firms to develop an in-house monograph whenever the (quality-) requirements of 
a Pharmacopoeia monograph are insufficient (EMEA 2004). In accordance with this guideline, 
Diversified Quality Producers regularly propose incremental improvements to existing 
Pharmacopoeia monographs.
These incrementally improved standards are fairly difficult to imitate. Once a company 
obtains a marketing authorisation for a pharmaceutical product based on an improved 
Pharmacopoeia standard, the latter automatically becomes the new de facto benchmark for all 
firms that want to use this standard in the future. That is, every imitator which uses the original 
Pharmacopoeia standard will only be granted a marketing authorisation if the quality level of the 
improved in-house standard is reached. Remember our previous finding that LCPs use an average 
of 8.3% competitive standards for which a Pharmacopoeia equivalent exists because the 
approving authority asks them to do so. However, the fact that incremental improvements of 
Pharmacopoeia standards are usually not patent-protected makes it difficult for imitators to 
understand how the respective improvements have been achieved. The reason for this is that, 
unlike patents, the registration documents o f a pharmaceutical product cannot be accessed by 
other pharmaceutical firms. Therefore, incremental improvements o f coordinated Pharmacopoeia 
standards cannot be imitated easily. In that, they constitute a source of sheltered incremental 
innovation and, hence, of competitive advantage for Diversified Quality Producers.75
Low Cost Producers are excluded from the sample.
75 Admittedly, it is impossible to verify such qualitative reasoning through quantitative analyses. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that empirical evidence supports my argument that Diversified Quality Producers use 
Pharmacopeia standards as a source o f incremental and ‘imitation-protected* innovation. A correlation analysis 
reveals a strong positive and statistically significant relationship between the pursuit of a DQP strategy and the extent 
to which firms use competitive standards for which a Pharmacopoeia equivalent exists. This is true whether Low 
Cost Producers are included (R peâ on = .337; R2 =  .114; p < 0.05 (2-tailed test)), or excluded from the analyses (R 
re™  = .403; R2 = .162; p <  0.01 (2-tailed test».
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To conclude, what do the above findings teach us about the validity of the VoC 
hypotheses on the use of different standards (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 
2001: 445-446; 454; 468; see also Teubner 2001: 433-435)? In line with the previous section, we 
find that differences in the extent to which firms use specific types of standards are most 
pronounced between non-innovative firms (LCPs) and innovative companies (RPIs and DQPs).
While Low Cost Producers occasionally find themselves obliged to use competitive standards, 
they resort to coordinated standards wherever possible. On the one hand, this finding verifies the 
hypothesis derived from Tate’s contribution to the VoC literature (see Tate 2001: 454). On the 
other hand, it also confirms our conclusion of the previous section that Low Cost Producers 
circumvent the hold-up problem related to the elaboration of standards by free-riding the 1
coordinated standardisation system.
Contrary to the findings on Low Cost Production, the hypotheses of the VoC literature on 
the importance of competitive standards for Radical Product Innovation, and of coordinated I
standards for Diversified Quality Production standards must be rejected (see Hall and Soskice !
2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; see also Teubner 2001: 433-435). To j
begin with, we did not find empirical support for the absolute importance of !
competitive/coordinated standards for the pursuit of an RPI/DQP strategy. Yet we have seen that 
competitive standards are relatively more important for Radical Product Innovation , whereas 
coordinated standards are relatively more important for Diversified Quality Production. While it 
is tempting to interpret this finding in favour of the VoC hypotheses, we found the latter to be j
wrong in that they misunderstand the underlying causal mechanisms (see Casper 2001: 405; Tate j
2001: 445; 468; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31): radically innovative firms do not use relatively 
more competitive standards with the aim of protecting their innovative efforts from imitation.
i
Instead, we found that the extent to which firms use competitive standards instead depends on i
their competitive strategy, as the latter determines a firm’s focus on specific value-chain j
activities. In line with section 3.3.1., we can therefore conclude that Radical Product Innovators /
and Diversified Quality Producers alike solve the hold-up problem related to standardisation in ;




33.3. How C o m p e t it iv e  S t r a t e g ie s  d e t e r m in e  t h e  U s e  o f  C o o r d in a t e d  S t a n d a r d s  j
The previous section demonstrated that both Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost i
Producers use coordinated standards. While they do not employ coordinated standards j
exclusively, both strategies rely on them substantially (see table 3.5.). In section 3.2., we derived I
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the hypothesis from various VoC contributions that coordinated standards facilitate the pursuit of 
a DQP strategy if producers employ them in a cooperative way with suppliers in order to 
establish long-term and trust-based relations (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Casper 2001: 
399-400; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433). On the other hand, we also hypothesised that the use of 
coordinated standards can promote an LCP strategy if producers use them in a formal way with 
their suppliers in order to increase price competition (see Tate 2001: 454). The aim of section 
3.3.3. will be to assess whether the use o f cooperatively coordinated standards promotes 
Diversified Quality Production, whereas the use o f formally coordinated standards furthers Low 
Cost Production.
If these hypotheses hold true, we should find that Low Cost Producers change their 
suppliers more often than Diversified Quality Producers. Furthermore, the relationship between 
producer and suppliers should be of a collaborative nature where the former pursues a DQP 
strategy. On the other hand, the relationship may be presumed to be strained where the producer 
pursues an LCP strategy. To test these hypotheses, I posed three questions to interviewees76. 
Firstly, they were invited to specify the number of years for which their firm had collaborated 
with its three most important suppliers. Secondly, I asked about the period for which the average 
supplier works for the interviewee's company. In the third question, I invited interviewees to 
specify the quality o f their firm’s relationship with its three most important suppliers. Table 3.7. 
summarises the answers given by interviewees from Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost 
Producers.
Table 3.7.: Supplier-Producer Relations of DQPs and LCPs
DQPs LCPs
Average time of collaboration with 3 most 
important suppliers (in years) 11.6 years 11.1 years
Years for which a supplier works for producer 
on average 8.3 years 8.5 years
Relationship between suppliers and producer
(1 - very strained; 5 - very collaborative) 4.1 3.4
Source: Own illustration, evaluating questions 4.3 . 1. -  4.3.3. (see appendix for questionnaire)
In a word, the empirical evidence reported in table 3.7. does not provide clear-cut support 
for the hypothesis that Diversified Quality Producers use coordinated standards as a means to
76 For the exact phrasing o f these questions, please consult questions 4.3.1. -  4.3.3. of the questionnaire (see 
appendix).
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foster close relationships with suppliers, whereas Low Cost Producers use them as a means to 
increase price competition (see Tate 2001: 454; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Casper 2001: 
399-400; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433). On the one hand, Diversified Quality Producers 
collaborate for roughly the same amounts of time with their three most important suppliers as 
Low Cost Producers, as well as with their average supplier. On the other hand, however, 
interviewees from DQPs characterised the relationship with their firm’s suppliers as more 
collaborative than interviewees from LCPs.
So, let us resort to quantitative analyses in order to analyse whether the summary results 
o f table 3.7. are statistically significant. In so doing, let us begin with testing the duration and 
quality of supplier-producer relations on the basis of three simple correlation analyses. As 
indicated by table 3.7., the first analysis shows that no statistically significant correlation exists 
between a firm’s competitive strategy and the period for which it collaborates with its 3 most 
important suppliers (R peaison — -038; R2 = .001; p > 0.10 (2-tailed test)). The same finding 
emerges from the second analysis, which reveals that no significant correlation can be observed 
between a company’s strategy and the duration o f collaboration with its average supplier (R 
peareon - --027; R2 = .001; p>  0.10 (2-tailed test)).
Before presenting the results of the third correlation analysis, let me add a qualitative note 
to these quantitative findings. As pointed out previously, legislation is very demanding with 
regard to a drug’s purity standards. Whenever a pharmaceutical company seeks to register a new 
product, it must document that all its ingredients are adequately pure. To this end, a firm must 
also demonstrate that its suppliers, and the ingredients they deliver, comply with the so-called 
‘GMP’ (General Manufacturing Praxis) standards. These legal requirements make it both difficult 
and costly for any pharmaceutical firm to change suppliers -  irrespective of its competitive 
strategy. The reason for this is that any change requires an audit of the new suppliers and, 
sometimes, even the explicit approval on the part of the responsible authorities. The costs related 
to these administrative procedures mean that pharmaceutical firms usually seek long-lasting 
collaborations with their suppliers. This, in turn, seems to be the reason why, overall, no 
significant correlation can be seen between a firm’s competitive strategy and the period for which 
it collaborates with its suppliers.
Interestingly, though, the duration of collaboration does not seem to influence the quality 
o f supplier-producer relations. In line with table 3.7., the third correlation analysis shows that 
firms which pursue a DQP strategy entertain more collaborative relationships with their suppliers 
than firms pursing an LCP strategy (R Peaison = .413; R2 = .170; p < 0.05 (2-tailed test)). This 
outcome seems to support the initial hypothesis that Diversified Quality Producers use
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coordinated standards as a means to foster trust-based relations with their suppliers (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Casper 2001: 399-400; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433), whereas Low Cost 
Producers increase price competition among suppliers (see Tate 2001:454).
To assess the relative importance of this VoC argument, it is useful to cross-check its 
explanatory strength with its strongest rival explanation. In section 3.3.1. we found a firm’s size 
to be an important determinant of a company’s propensity to collaborate with other firms and 
research organisations when elaborating new standards. Accordingly, company-size might also 
determine the quality of collaboration between a firm and its suppliers. The reason is that large 
firms tend to have more bargaining power over their suppliers than small firms. Accordingly, the 
former find it easier to dictate prices which, in turn, may lead to strained supplier-producer 
relations. This reasoning suggests the following rival hypothesis: the larger a producer, the 
stronger its bargaining power towards its suppliers, the more strained their relationship.
So, let us test whether a firm’s competitive strategy or its size is a better explanation for 
the quality of supplier-producer relations. To this end, I carried out three simple linear regression 
analyses. In the first analysis, I assessed the individual impact of competitive strategy (using a 
DQP strategy as proxy) on the quality o f supplier-producer relations. Similarly, the second 
analysis tested the single impact of firm-size (measured in number of employees). In analysis 3 ,1 
determined the relative explanatory power o f the two variables by regressing them jointly on the 
quality o f supplier-producer relations. Since the aim is to seek to assess whether the quality of 
relationships varies between Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers, I excluded 
all Radical Product Innovators from the analyses. Table 3.8. provides an overview of the results.
Table 3.8: How a DQP Strategy and Firm-Size impact on the Quality o f  Supplier-Producer
Relations





(NbEees •>  Supplier-Producer 
Relations)
Analysis 3






Signifies ] i ce levels: * 1 - 0.10 ** < 0.05 ***<0.01 (1 -tailed test)
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Overall, table 3.8. provides empirical support for the hypothesis that Diversified Quality 
Producers use coordinated standards in a cooperative way with their suppliers (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Casper 2001: 399-400; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433), whereas Low Cost 
Producers use them in a formal way (see Tate 2001: 454). Accordingly, analysis 1 repeats the 
strong correlation already discovered between a firm’s competitive strategy and its relationships 
with suppliers. While a firm’s size qualifies as a significant predictor of supplier-producer 
relations in analysis 2, it should be noted that the correlation is positive. Contrary to our initial 
predictions, this indicates that larger films entertain more collaborative relations with their 
suppliers than smaller firms. This finding does not only contradict our hypothesis; from a 
statistical point o f view, it is also fairly weak. Firm-size constitutes such a weak explanation for 
the quality of supplier-producer relations that competitive strategy qualifies as the only 
significant predictor in analysis 3. This outcome provides empirical support for the hypotheses 
we derived from the VoC literature: Diversified Quality Producers do indeed tend to use 
coordinated standards as a means to foster trust-based relations with their suppliers (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 26-27; Casper 2001: 399-400; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433). Low Cost 
Producers, on the other hand, seem to employ coordinated standards with the aim of increasing 
price competition among suppliers (see Tate 2001:454).
Before summarising the findings of section 3.3.3., I wish to point out that the previous 
quantitative findings are supported by several qualitative observations made when carrying out 
interviews. When I asked my interview partners why their firm (did not) change(d) its suppliers 
frequently, interviewees from Diversified Quality Producers often considered quality (resulting 
from collaborative relationships with suppliers) as more important than low purchase prices 
(being the result of tough price negotiations). As a German DQP-interviewee put it: “Wir sind 
kein Generika-Hersteller, der die ganze Zeit auf den Preis schauen muss!” (We are not a generics 
firm that constantly has to be concerned about prices). Similarly, an interviewee from a British 
Diversified Quality Producer described how close collaboration with one supplier made it 
possible to improve the quality of delivered ingredients: regular analysis of the deliveries’ purity 
patterns had shown that the respective supplier occasionally provided ingredients of a (still 
sufficient, but) inferior quality. Due to their close collaboration, the two companies combined 
their know-how and discovered an occasional but systematic flaw in the supplier’s manufacturing 
process. Had the latter not been eliminated, this flaw would -  in the long run -  have led to the 
production of ingredients of insufficient quality.
In contrast to their DQP-counterparts, interviewees from Low Cost Producers regularly 
stressed the importance of obtaining low purchase prices -  inter alia by (threatening to)
117
K
change(ing) suppliers. I argued above that stringent legal requirements make it difficult for 
pharmaceutical producers to change suppliers. Yet it is not impossible to do so. Accordingly, an 
LCP-interviewee pointed out that his company regularly weighs the costs of supplier change 
against the savings resulting from less expensive pharmaceutical ingredients: “Wir mussen da 
jedesmal ganz genau rechnen.” (Every time we consider a change, we need to make meticulous 
calculations.). Interestingly, the possibility to change suppliers seems to give threats of Low Cost 
Producers the necessary credibility in price negotiations.
In sum, what have we learned about how different competitive strategies translate into 
different supplier-producer relations? In a word, we found empirical support for the hypothesis 
that Diversified Quality Producers use coordinated standards for developing collaborative 
relationships with their suppliers (see Tate 2001: 454), while (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 
Casper 2001: 399-400; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433)Low Cost Producers tend to use coordinated 
standards with the aim of furthering price competition among suppliers (see Tate 2001: 454). 
These findings do not speak directly to the solution of the initially described hold-up problem 
because the nature of the standards employed is already defined: they are coordinated. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Diversified Quality Producers use these standards to 
more cooperative ends, whereas Low Cost Producers employ them as a competitive means.
I
3 3 .4 .  C o n c l u d in g  I n t e r p r e t a t io n  j
To conclude, what do the previous findings teach us about the link between standards and J 
competitive strategies? Shall we reject or accept our initial hypotheses (see section 3.2.)? We |
have seen that the answer to this question differs for innovative firms on the one hand, and for I
non-innovative companies on the other. Regarding the standardisation behaviour of non- j
innovative Low Cost Producers, we found empirical support for our initial hypotheses regarding |
both the use and elaboration of standards. In trying to abstain from using competitive standards I 
whenever possible, Low Cost Producers employ almost exclusively coordinated standards. In so 
doing, they use coordinated standards as a means to increase price competition among suppliers. 
This, in turn, verifies the hypothesis we derived from the VoC literature on how Low Cost 
Producers make use of coordinated standards (see Tate 2001:454). Similarly, we found empirical 
support for the hypothesis that pursuing an LCP strategy makes firms abstain from elaborating 
competitive and coordinated standards alike (see Tate 2001: 467; 446; Buthe and Witte 2004:
12). In a word, Low Cost Producers circumvent the hold-up problem related to the elaboration of 
standards by free-riding both competitive and coordinated standardisation processes.
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That said, we should remember that the VoC scholars are not explicitly concerned with 
the standardisation behaviour of Low Cost Producers. Instead, it is their central claim that 
radically innovative firms differ in their standardisation policies from incrementally innovative 
companies (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 2001:445-446; 468; Casper 2001: 
404-405; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433-435). However, our analyses did not provide empirical 
support for this idea. Instead, we found that both Radical Product Innovators and Diversified 
Quality Producers use and elaborate coordinated standards. In that, we also saw that Diversified 
Quality Producers do not elaborate more coordinated standards than Radical Product Innovators 
in order to ‘weed out technically inferior outcomes’ (Tate 2001: 446). Instead, those firms 
engaged in DQP are simply larger, and have the human resources necessary for participating in 
coordinated standardisation. Similarly, we saw that both Radical Product Innovators and 
Diversified Quality Producers use and elaborate competitive standards. In line with our finding 
on coordinated standards, we found the reasoning of the VoC literature to be wrong: Radical 
Product Innovators do not rely more on competitive standards compared to Diversified Quality 
Producers in order to protect their innovations from imitation (see Casper 2001: 405; Tate 2001: 
445; 468; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 31). Instead, we found that the propensity to elaborate and use 
competitive standards is determined by the value-chain focus of a firm’s competitive strategy. In 
sum, we did not find empirical support for the argument that RPIs show more competitive 
standardisation behaviour, whereas DQPs tend to adopt cooperative standardisation approaches 
(Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; Casper 2001: 404-405; 
406-407; Teubner 2001: 433-435).
If anything, we found the opposite to be true. Let us recall that Diversified Quality 
Producers tend to use coordinated standards as a source of incremental innovation in a rather 
secret way: unlike radically innovative firms, incrementally innovative companies develop a part 
o f their competitive pharmaceutical ingredients by improving already existing Pharmacopoeia 
standards and registering the latter with the responsible approving authority. As a result, 
approving authorities will thenceforward require all pharmaceutical firms wanting to use the 
Pharmacopoeia standard in question to conform to this new (quality-) standard. Yet such 
incremental innovations are often not patent-protected. Consequently, other firms meet with 
difficulties in understanding how the respective improvement has been achieved, because 
registration documents are not accessible. The standardisation behaviour of DQPs is thus less 
transparent than the standardisation praxis of RPIs, which elaborate radically new standards on a 
contractual basis with other firms. This finding can be interpreted to the effect that Diversified
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Quality Producers pursue a more competitive standardisation policy than Radical Product 
Innovators. ;
3.4. T e s t in g  t h e  H y po t h e se s  II: D o (es) s p e c if ic  St a n d a r d is a t io n )
REQUIRE SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS?
3.4.1. On the Causal Links between Standards and Competitive Strategy
The previous analyses revealed that competitive strategies and (the elaboration/use of 
different types of) standards are strongly interrelated. More precisely, empirical evidence has 
shown that a specific strategy entails specific standardisation behaviour: Low Cost Producers do 
not elaborate standards. They merely use coordinated standards to increase price competition 
among their suppliers. Diversified Quality Producers elaborate and use both coordinated and | 
competitive standards. While they use coordinated standards to foster collaborative relationships | 
with their suppliers, they elaborate competitive standards in a more secret way than Radial I 
Product Innovators. The latter, in turn, focus on the elaboration of competitive standards on a | 
contractual basis with other firms, but also use coordinated standards. In sum, all the analyses | 
carried out have assessed the absolute and relative explanatory power o f competitive strategy for | 
standardisation). ^
Importantly, though, we have not tested whether different types of standards are necessary |
input factors fo r  the pursuit of a certain strategy. That is, we have not assessed the explanatory |
power o f standardisation) for competitive strategy! This is interesting to the extent that VoC I
scholars claim different standard(i)s(ation) facilitate different strategies (see Hall and Soskice j
2001a: 26-27; 39-41; Tate 2001: 446; Casper 2001: 398-400; Teubner 2001: 433). To cite just j
one example, Hall and Soskice argue that ‘German institutions support forms of relational |
contracting and technology transfer (...) [which] encourage corporate strategies that focus on I
product differentiation and niche production.’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27). However, the j
reasons provided by the VoC scholars suggest the opposite causal relationship, i.e. that specific 
competitive strategies determine a firm’s standardisation behaviour (see Tate 2001: 445; Casper I 
2001:404-407). j
So, let us test whether specific standardisation) translate(s) into the pursuit of specific 
competitive strategies, or vice-versa. To this end, it is instructive to determine the relative 
explanatory strengths of different standard types for competitive strategies. While such 
quantitative assessments do not tell us anything about causal mechanisms, they show whether 
standards constitute a better explanation for a firm’s strategy than any rival explanation. If we
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find this to be the case, we can deduce that standards constitute a necessary input factor to the 
extent that firms rely on them substantially more than on any other factor in order to pursue their 
chosen strategy. But should the rival factor turn out to be a better explanation of competitive 
strategy, we can conclude that a firm’s standardisation behaviour does not constitute a necessary 
input factor, resulting instead from the pursuit of a competitive strategy.
In chapter 2 (section 2.3.2.), we found that a firm ’s age constitutes the strongest rival 
explanation for the pursuit of a particular competitive strategy. The reason for this is that radical 
innovation often makes existing products obsolete. Hence, incumbent firms have little interest in 
pursuing a strategy which accelerates the decline of their own products (Utterback 1994: 160- 
165). A young firm-age thus seems to facilitate an RPI strategy as young companies usually have 
few or no product(s) which would become obsolete were a radically new innovation to be made. 
In line with this reasoning, a strong and statistically significant relationship can indeed be 
observed between a firm’s age and its competitive strategy (R peaison = .302; R2 -  .091 ; p < 0.05 
(2-tailed test)). But, is the impact of age on strategy stronger than the impact of standards?
To shed light on this question, I carried out several multi-nominal and binary logistic 
regression analyses. In each analysis, I assessed the explanatory power of firm-age in 
combination with one standard-variable for competitive strategy. More precisely, I jointly 
regressed firm-age and the three standard-elaboration variables (see section 3.3.1.) on 
competitive strategy in a first set of analyses77. In a second set of analyses, I tested the extent to 
which the use o f different standards (see section 3.3.2.) explains a firm’s strategy better than its 
age. Finally, in a last set of correlation analyses, I assessed whether a company’s age or its 
supplier-producer relations (see section 3.3.3.) are a better explanation of its pursued strategy .
In order not to annoy the patient reader with reproductions of quantitative analyses which 
all carry the same message, I will confine myself to the following summary. Interestingly, the 
results of all but three analyses agree in one central point: a firm’s age not only constitutes the 
better, but also the only significant explanation of competitive strategy. Compared to fiim-age, 
the elaboration and use of diverse standards is an explanation so weak that the respective 
standard(isation)-variable does not qualify as a significant predictor of competitive strategy (p > 
.10). The only exception to this rule is constituted by three analyses. Accordingly, we find (1) the 
use of competitive standards, (2) the use of coordinated standards, and (3) collaborative supplier- 
producer relations to be of significant importance for the pursuit of (1) Radical Product
77 Since Low Cost Producers elaborate neither competitive nor coordinated standards, I had to exclude them from 
this first set of analyses.
78 In line with section 3.3.3., I excluded Radical Product Innovators from these analyses because we did not derive 
any hypotheses on how they use standards so as to foster specific supplier-producer relations.
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Innovations and, respectively, of (2,3) Diversified Quality Production. Importantly, though, a 
firm’s age qualifies as an equally significant explanation of competitive strategy in all three 
analyses. Thereby, the explanatory power o f firm-age, and of the respective standard are so 
similar that both variables are retained as significant predictors in (different steps of) the same 
analysis, even if a stepwise forward method is employed. But in none of the three analyses does 
the standard-variable emerge as the significantly stronger explanation of competitive strategy 
than firm-age!
These results unanimously indicate that standards do not constitute a necessary input 
factor for the pursuit of a certain strategy because a firm’s age is more or, at least, equally 
facilitative to a firm’s strategy. Consequently, a specific standardisation behaviour does not 
facilitate a specific competitive strategy. Instead, it is a result of the latter! This finding is 
particularly interesting to the extent that it contrasts with the overall findings of our finance 
analyses (see chapter 2). Remember that we found externally provided finance in general, and I
shareholder capital in particular, to be of decisive importance for a firm’s competitive strategy. .
The reason for this is that shareholders (only provide money if  they can) make sure that a firm 
pursues the strategy which is in line with their risk-return preferences. In so doing, shareholders I 
exert notable external pressure on a company’s management which, in turn, decisively facilitates 
the pursuit of a specific strategy (see section 2.4.2.). i
Yet this seems to be different for standards. While producers definitely need to agree with | 
their suppliers on the type of standards they wish to use, suppliers do not seem to be able to exert I
any pressure that would facilitate the pursuit of a specific strategy. The reason for this seems to j
be that pharmaceutical firms can free-ride the coordinated standardisation system, presumably |
because the latter is highly international (see section 3.4.2.). Furthermore, producers can and do |
elaborate competitive standards on their own. Overall this means that, contrary to (individual) I
financiers, individual suppliers have a more limited influence on the competitive strategies of ,
processors. Therefore, coordinated and competitive standardisation) do(es) not promote 
competitive strategies, but vice-versa.
3.4.2. O n  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  N a t io n a l  I n s t it u t io n s
Given that we find a firm’s standardisation approach to be a function of its competitive 
strategy but not a necessary input factor, how do institutions fit into the picture? Remember our 
finding of chapter 2 that national pension and insurance systems have a notable impact on the 
provision of institutional shareholder capital. Bearing this in mind, it is useful to remember that 
the VoC literature argues national antitrust regulations to facilitate the provision of specific
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standard types. To cite one of the most explicit examples, Hall and Soskice claim that ‘German 
institutions support forms of relational contracting and technology transfer (...) [which] 
encourage corporate strategies that focus on product differentiation and niche production.’ (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 26-27). So, to what extent are institutions important for the pursuit of specific 
competitive strategies in that they facilitate the provision of specific standards (Tate 2001: 443- 
446; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; see also Teubner 2001: 433-435; Casper 
2001: 404-407)? To answer this question in a word: they are not! Since a firm’s competitive 
strategy determines its standardisation policy, not vice-versa, the extent to which antitrust 
regulation provides specific standards has no impact on the pursuit of a specific strategy.
That said, it is nevertheless interesting to apply the insights we gained from studying 
(international standardisation processes in order to try and qualify the VoC arguments on the 
importance of national institutions. To this end, it is most instructive to delve into the argument 
on coordinated standardisation processes. Remember that one of the central VoC claims is that 
firms in countries with a common-law tradition find it difficult to elaborate coordinated standards 
because rigorous antitrust legislation and an open, case-based approach towards product liability 
discourage large-scale firm collaboration (Tate 2001: 443-446; see also Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
26-27; 30-31; Teubner 2001: 433-435). If this reasoning holds true, firms in common-law 
countries should find it inherently difficult -  if  not impossible -  to elaborate coordinated 
standards. But neither quantitative nor qualitative evidence supports this idea. As I pointed out in 
the introduction to section 3.3., no country-specific variations can be observed regarding the 
extent to which firms in different economies elaborate and use specific standards. This is also true 
for the extent to which British companies participate in the elaboration of coordinated 
(Pharmacopoeia) monographs: they are just as active as their counterparts in economies with a 
code-based law tradition.
What does the ease with which firms in common-law countries elaborate coordinated 
standards tell us about the claims of the VoC scholars (Tate 2001: 443-446; see also Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; Teubner 2001: 433-435)? In essence, it teaches us that their 
arguments suffer from two flaws: firstly, in line with chapter 2, we find that the VoC scholars 
tend to overestimate the stringency of national institutions. Neither allegedly rigorous antitrust 
legislation, nor a case-based approach towards product liability (see Tate 2001:443-444; Teubner 
2001: 433-435) discourages British companies from participating in the elaboration of 
coordinated (Pharmacopoeia) monographs. The reason for this seems to be grounded in our 
finding of section 3.3.1.: the extent to which firms participate in coordinated standardisation is, 
simply, a function of their human resources levels, not of their country’s institutional framework.
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Indeed, for many years the German Kartellamt was more restrictive in accepting inter-firm 
collaboration than its British counterpart (see Welteke 1976, section D). This speaks against the 
importance which Tate, Teubner, as well as Hall and Soskice attach to national institutions in 
general, and to antitrust regulation in particular (Tate 2001: 443-446; see also Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 26-27; 30-31; Teubner 2001:433-435).
Secondly, we see that the VoC contributors underestimate the international dimension of 
firms’ activities. Today, the coordinated elaboration of new pharmaceutical standards takes place 
most importantly at a supranational, namely the European level. Standardisation at the national 
level is far less important than is assumed by the VoC scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001a; Tate 
2001; Teubner 2001; Casper 2001). Furthermore, firms can free-ride the coordinated 
standardisation system both at the European and the national level: while several disadvantages 
arise from not participating in coordinated standardisation, a company can simply use 
coordinated standards developed by others.
Overall, these insights entail the same conclusion as reached in chapter 2. Given that 
institutions do not constrain firms to elaborate coordinated standards in line with national 
antitrust regulation, entrepreneurs are more than mere institution-takers. On the contrary, we 
found that -  depending on the requirements of their firm’s strategy -  entrepreneurs deliberately 
collaborate at the (international level, or free-ride coordinated standardisation processes. Thus, 
entrepreneurs are not only less constrained by national institutions than assumed by the VoC 
scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001a; Tate 2001; Teubner 2001; Casper 2001); they are also more 
inventive. I therefore conclude that a Schumpeterian perception of entrepreneurs as independent 
and innovative actors is most instructive to understand how firms gain international 
competitiveness (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106).
3.5. C o n c l u d in g  I n t e r p r e t a t io n
What have we learned from studying the link between institutions, the provision of 
standards, and their importance for different competitive strategies? To begin with, we found that 
specific standards do not constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit of a specific strategy. 
That is, standards do not facilitate a firm’s competitive strategy. Instead, we observed the 
opposite causal relationship, in that each strategy determines a firm’s standardisation policy. 
More precisely, we found that the standardisation behaviour of firms differs most notably 
between non-innovative Low Cost Producers on the one hand, and (radically and incrementally) 
innovative firms on the other. Accordingly, Low Cost Producers neither elaborate nor use 
competitive standards. Similarly, they do not elaborate coordinated standards. Instead, they free-
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ride the coordinated standardisation system, and use the standards developed by others to the end 
of increasing price competition among suppliers. These findings confirm the hypotheses we 
derived from the VoC contributors (see Tate 2001:454; 467; 446; see also Büthe and Witte 2004: 
12).
Importantly, though, the central argument of the VoC literature does not concern non- 
innovative Low Cost Producers. But the VoC scholars argue that radically innovative firms 
organise their activities in a more competitive and less coordinated way than incrementally 
innovative firms (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; Casper 
2001: 404-405; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433-435). However, our analyses did not provide 
empirical support for this idea. We found instead that Diversified Quality Producers compete in a 
less transparent way as they show a tendency to elaborate competitive standards on their own, 
and to use coordinated Pharmacopoeia standards as a source of incremental innovation not 
available to other firms. These insights can be interpreted to the effect that Diversified Quality 
Producers show a more competitive standardisation behaviour than Radical Product Innovators, 
which tend to elaborate standards on a contractual basis with other firms. This, in turn, 
contradicts the hypothesis of the VoC scholars that Diversified Quality Producers compete in a 
more cooperative way than Radical Product Innovators (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 
39-41 ; Tate 2001: 445-446; 468; Casper 2001:404-405; 406-407; Teubner 2001: 433-435).
The finding on the causal relationship between a firm’s strategy and its standardisation 
behaviour is particularly instructive in two respects. Firstly, it sheds light on the arguments of the 
broader competitiveness literature. Remember that the latter agreed on the importance of specific 
supplier-producer relations for a company’s competitiveness (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 7; 39-41; 
Tate 2001; Lundvall 1992b: 13-14; chapter 3; Andersen 1992: 69; 82-91; Gelsing 1992; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Porter 1990: 71-72; 100-107). However, the literature was not clear 
about causal mechanisms or causal directions (Lundvall 1992c: 57-58; Andersen 1992: 82-84; see 
also Gelsing 1992: 119; Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Porter 1990: 103). Are specific types of 
supplier-producer relations ‘necessary prerequisites for product’-market strategies (Lundvall 
1992c: 54), or do the former ‘develop’ as a result of the latter (Lundvall 1992c: 57)? We can now 
answer this question: specific supplier-producer relations develop as a result o f a firm’s 
competitive strategy, depending on the extent to which its value-chain focus renders it preferable 
to use and elaborate specific standards.
Secondly, the finding on the causal relationship between a firm’s competitive strategy and 
its standardisation policy also sheds light on the importance of standards as allegedly 
indispensable input factors. Remember that I decided to focus on how finance, standards, and
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labour qualifications impact on a finn’s strategy, since the competitiveness literature argues these 
three input factors to be decisive for the pursuit of any competitive strategy (see in particular Hal] 
and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel andPavitt 
1994: 91*92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). The reasoning behind this is 
that these factors cannot be secured by a firm working alone but only in collaboration with other 
economic actors -  following the solution of a coordination problem (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6). 
Interestingly, this reasoning seems to be erroneous with regard to standards. Given that we find 
standards to result from competitive strategy, the former do not constitute a necessary input 
factor for the pursuit of any strategy. Consequently, it may have been sufficient to limit my 
analyses to two input factors: finance and labour skills.
Interestingly, the analyses contained in the present chapter lead to the same conclusions 
reached in chapter 2. Remember the ease with which firms in common-law countries elaborate 
coordinated standards both at the national and, even more importantly, at the European level. 
This finding indicates that the arguments of the VoC literature (Tate 2001: 443-446; see also Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; Teubner 2001: 433-435) are grounded on two central 
misconceptions: on the one hand, the VoC scholars overestimate the stringency of national 
institutions. A country’s legal tradition in general, and its antitrust regulation in particular, 
determine neither the type of standards which a firm elaborates, nor the level at which | 
standardisation takes place. On the other hand, the VoC scholars underestimate the inventiveness 
of entrepreneurs. We have seen that entrepreneurs elaborate competitive standards with other 
firms, or on their own; that they make the resulting knowledge accessible to others, or keep it to 
themselves; and that they collaborate and compete at both the national and international level -  
depending on the requirements o f their competitive strategy! I therefore argue that a 
Schumpeterian perception of entrepreneurs as independent and inventive creators (see e.g. 
Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106) is more instructive to explain 
(international firm competitiveness than the VoC understanding of entrepreneurs as mere 
institution-takers (see e.g. Tate 2001: 443-446; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 26-27; 30-31; 39-41; 
Teubner 2001:433-435).
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4. On the Link between Institutions, the Provision of Labour 
Qualifications, and Their Impact on Competitive Strategies*
4.1. Entrepreneurs: Constrained Institution-Takers or Voluntaristic 
Innovators?
It is difficult to imagine how a firm could operate without a labour force. Accordingly, the 
competitiveness literature concurs that ‘labour* constitutes a necessary input factor for the pursuit 
of any competitive strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-27; 29-30; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; 
Porter 1990: 74-76; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Freeman 1992; Patel and Pavitt 1994; 
Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005). Yet the literature is also concerned with the question of 
whether certain types o f labour qualifications are required for the pursuit of certain competitive 
strategies. In that, different strands of the literature focus on diverse groups of employees. While 
the strategic management literature (Porter 1990: 73-75; Porter 1985: 121-122; 127) and the 
literature on ‘varieties o f capitalism* (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-27; 
29-30; 39-44) propose arguments about the overall labour force o f a company, the innovation 
literature tends to focus on the knowledge base of a film’s scientists (Hollingsworth 2000: 627- 
629; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223-224; Freeman 1992: 170-171; Nelson 1993: 
511; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 90-92). Neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher 1919: 57; 55; Ohlin 
1933: 7; 50-54) and neoliberal economic theory (Sinn 2005), in turn, study how labour costs 
determine a firm’s competitiveness in general, and its competitive strategy in particular.
Despite their different foci, the aforementioned strands of the competitiveness literature 
agree in two central claims. Firstly, different types of labour qualifications are said to facilitate 
different competitive strategies (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39- 
44; Porter 1985: 121-122; 127; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 
2000: 223-224; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-51; Sinn 2005: 18-19). 
Secondly, the literature agrees that national institutions differ in the extent to which they provide 
a labour force with certain types of qualifications (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145; 150-155; Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 24-27; 29-30; Porter 1990: 73-75; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Freeman
'  M y special thanks go to Sibylle Gaisser for providing me with precious documentation, and for giving me access to 
labour force data on German pharmaceutical firms. I also wish to thank her and Michael Nusser for their in-depth 
feedback on my questionnaire. Furthermore, I am grateful to Paolo Barbanti, Lorenzo Chiriatti and Leonardo Frezza 
who so patiently advised me about labour-market regulation in Italy. Furthermore, I wish to thank Marco Caremi, 
Giuseppe Giardina, Zoe Halliday, Udo Klomann, Luigi Orsenigo, Thomas Reiss, Alvise Sagramoso, Gaia Sorrone, 
Stefano Svetoni, Itala Turco, and Leonardo Vingiani for their support in establishing contacts with interview 
partners. Finally, I am grateful to the numerous interviewees who did not merely answer my questions, but who also
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1992: 170-171; 182; Dahim, Johnson, and Lundvall 1992: 303; Nelson 1993: 511; Patel and 
Pavitt 1994: 90-92; Ohlin 1933: 7; 52-54). More precisely, flexible labour markets are said to 
provide employees and scientists with rather general qualifications. Rigid labour markets, in 
contrast, are said to allow employees and scientists to acquire highly specific qualifications. 
Taken together, these two claims lead to the central argument o f the competitiveness literature I 
that firms in the same labour-market economy are provided with the same type of skills which, in j 
turn, makes firms specialise in the pursuit of the same competitive strategy (see in particular | 
Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44; Porter 1990; Hollingsworth 2000: 627- 
629; Freeman 1992:170-171; 182; Heckscher 1919:57; 55; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54; Sinn 2005).
The introductory chapter has proven this argument to be wrong: pharmaceutical firms in 
the UK, Germany and Italy alike pursue strategies of Radical Product Innovation (henceforth 
RPI), of Diversified Quality Production (henceforth DQP), and of Low Cost Production I 
(henceforth LCP)79. The slight strategy-specialisation patterns observed turned out to be  ̂
statistically insignificant (see chapter 1). This finding left us with the following puzzle to be  ̂
explained: How can firms in the same economy pursue different competitive strategies despite | 
the fact that institutions provide just one set of input factors, which presumably facilitate just one I
competitive strategy? To shed light on this question, my research studies the link between J
on
institutions , the extent to which they provide certain input factors (namely finance, component \
standards, and labour qualifications8I), and the impact of the latter on competitive strategies. I
provided me with precious background information, literature and documentation about the importance o f labour 
qualifications for competitive strategies.
791 took the decision to distinguish between three competitive strategies on the grounds of deductive reasoning, and 
an in-depth review o f the competitiveness literature (see e.g. Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Lundvall 1992b: 11- 
12; 57-59; Freeman 1992: 182; Porter 1990: 10; 37; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-39; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 148- 
149; 174-175; Casper 2001: 398-400). My assumption that a distinction between three strategies is both sufficient 
and necessary was empirically confirmed ex post by the fact that I could attribute one strategy to each firm of the 
sample (see chapter 1; section 1.3.2.). Furthermore, operational differences between the three groups o f  firms turned 
out to be statistically significant in that each strategy actually requires specific input factors. Thus, the decision to 
distinguish between three strategies is justifiable from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
80 In line with Steeck and Thelen (2005: 9-16), I understand institutions as ‘formalized rules that may be enforced by 
calling upon a third party’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 10).
81 As pointed out previously (see chapter 1: section 1.4.), a large number o f input factors exist which could 
potentially facilitate the pursuit of a competitive strategy (see e.g. Porter 1985: 85-86; 122; 343-350). To limit the 
scope of my research endeavour, I decided to focus on those three factors which the competitiveness literature sees 
as decisive for the success o f any competitive strategy, namely (1) financial means, (2) new component standards, 
and (3) labour qualifications. The reason for which these factors are said to be decisive is that a firm cannot secure 
them on its own. Instead, they are only provided following the successful solution o f a coordination problem between 
a firm and other economic actors (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; 
Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). The 
provision o f labour qualifications, around which the analyses of this chapter are centred, depends on the successful 
solution o f a free-riding problem  on the one hand, and o f a hold-up problem  on the other. I will elaborate on these 
coordination problems in sections 4.2.1. and 4.3.1. in order to illustrate how. diverse institutional solutions provide 
different types o f labour qualifications.
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Having studied the importance of finance (see chapter 2) and standards (see chapter 3), I will 
focus in  the present chapter on the impact of the third input factor: labour qualifications82.
In aiming to reveal how firms in different labour-market economies are able to pursue the 
same variety of strategies, I test the two sets of hypotheses proposed in the competitiveness 
literature. Accordingly, I proceed in two steps. In order to understand whether and, if so, which 
labour qualifications are of significant importance for competitive strategies, I ask firstly:
1. is it true that an RPI, a DQP and, respectively, an LCP strategy requires certain types of labour 
qualifications (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:174-176; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-44; Porter 1985: 
121-122; 127; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223- 
224; Freeman 1992:170-171; 182; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-51; Sinn 2005: 18-19)? Should this turn 
out to be the case, the second step consists in understanding the importance of labour-market 
institutions as providers of these qualifications. I therefore continue my analyses by asking:
2. is it true that each required qualification is only provided by country-specific labour-market 
institutions (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145; 150-155; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-27; 29-30; 
Porter 1990: 73-75; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Dalum et al. 
1992: 303; Nelson 1993: 511; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 90-92; Ohlin 1933: 7; 52-54)?
Overall, the answers to these questions are in line with the findings of chapters 2 and 3. 
Contrary to chapter 3, but not to chapter 2, the present chapter reveals that certain qualifications 
constitute a necessary input factor. More precisely, Radical Product Innovation requires 
employees with field-specific skills and scientists with heterogeneous knowledge. Diversified 
Quality Production, in turn, necessitates a workforce with firm-specific skills as well as scientists 
with homogeneous knowledge. Low Cost Producers, in contrast, require neither employees with 
specific skill profiles nor scientists with particular knowledge diversity. Accordingly, an LCP 
strategy can be pursued irrespective of the extent to which national institutions provide certain 
labour qualifications, while this is not the case for either Radical Product Innovators or 
Diversified Quality Producers. In that, I find both national labour-market institutions and research 
systems to facilitate the provision of those labour qualifications which are required for an RPI 
strategy on the one hand, and a DQP strategy on the other.
But what do these findings teach us about the strategy-specialisation argument of the 
competitiveness literature? In line with chapter 2, I find that the literature falls short in that it 
grounds its central argument on two fundamental misconceptions. Firstly, it overestimates the
It is interesting to note that labour qualifications constitute a particularly comprehensive input factor in that they 
incorporate many factors which are considered separately in other strands o f the competitiveness literature. To give 
an example, factors like technology-access, marketing-capacities, or knowledge about market-structures ultimately 
depend on a firm's capacity to secure employees with adequate qualifications.
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stringency of national institutions (see in particular Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 36-44; Porter 1990: 126-130; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Ohlin 1933: 7; 52-54; Sian 
2005: e.g. 68-69; 75-76; 142-143). Whenever firms are not provided with the necessary labour 
qualifications by national institutions, we find entrepreneurs to circumvent these institutions by |
*improvising ’ on a contractual basis and by ‘importing’ skills from  abroad. Hence, entrepreneurs I
use or develop institutional equivalents in order to secure an adequately skilled labour force. As a j 
corollary, secondly, I find the competitiveness literature to fall short in underestimating the 
inventiveness of entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs are not mere institution-takers (ibid). On the 
contrary, we see that they are highly inventive in exploiting existing, and in creating new 
institutional pathways to gain international competitiveness. I therefore conclude that 
Schumpeter’s perception of entrepreneurs as independent creators (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, 
chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106) is more instructive for understanding how firms are able to I 
pursue different strategies within the same institutional contexts. '
To illustrate these points, the remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. 
Given that different strands of the competitiveness literature focus on different labour-force 
groups, I test their hypotheses in two separate blocks. In section 4.2., I focus on the hypotheses of 
the Varieties of capitalism* (henceforth VoC) literature about the skill types of a firm’s entire 
workforce (Hall and Soskice 2001a; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). In so doing, I show that different 
skill profiles constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit o f diverse strategies. Different skill 
levels y by contrast, are per se of no importance, because a balance exists between the level of 
education and labour productivity. Interestingly, these findings also shed light on the arguments 
of neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher 1919: 57; 55; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54) and neoliberal 
economic theory (Sinn 2005) regarding the importance of labour costs for a firm’s competitive 
strategy. Section 4.2. concludes with an illustration of how entrepreneurs circumvent rigid and, 
respectively, flexible labour-market institutions in order to secure their required skill profiles. In 
parallel with section 4.2., section 4.3. presents and tests the hypotheses of the innovation 
literature on the knowledge base of a firm’s scientists (Hollingsworth 2000; Hollingsworth and 
Hollingsworth 2000; Lundvall 1992b). In so doing, the section reveals that each competitive 
strategy actually requires certain scientific knowledge -  in addition to specific skill profiles (see 
section 4.2.). To illustrate how such knowledge is provided in countries with different research 
systems, section 4.3. concludes by describing the various ways in which entrepreneurs 
circumvent national institutions. Section 4.4. summarises and interprets the various findings.
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4*2. T h e  Hypotheses of the VoC Literature on Skill Levels and Skill 
Pr o fil e s
Contrary to the scarcity of studies on standards (see chapter 3), diverse strands o f the 
competitiveness literature stress that ‘in a modem economy, skills are essential for firms to 
compete in international markets’ (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 181). In so doing, both the strategic 
management literature (Porter 1990: 73-75; 126-130; Porter 1985: 121-122; 127) and the VoC 
literature (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-27; 29-30; 39-44; King and 
W ood 1999: 376) propose arguments about how national institutions provide a firm’s entire 
workforce with different skill types which, in turn, are said to be needed for the pursuit of 
different competitive strategies. It is the aim of this section to test these hypotheses. A further set 
o f  hypotheses can be derived from the innovation literature about how institutions provide 
scientists with diverse knowledge, which is said to be required for specific strategies 
(Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223-224; Freeman 1992: 
170-171 ; 182). The assessment of the latter hypotheses will be carried out in section 4.3..
That said, let us test the arguments about the skill types of a firm’s entire workforce. In so 
doing, I will focus on the hypotheses proposed in the VoC literature, since the latter are well 
developed, whereas the hypotheses of the strategic management literature remain at a rather 
general level. Interestingly, the findings resulting from this assessment also shed light on the 
importance of labour costs for a firm’s competitiveness in general, and for its choice o f 
competitive strategy in particular. These findings speak to the central arguments of neoclassical 
trade theory (Heckscher 1919: 57; 55; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54) on the one hand, and neoliberal 
economic theory (Sinn 2005) on the other (see sections 4.2.2.3. and 4.2.33.).
4.2.1. The VoC Hypotheses: How Different Labour-Market Institutions provide 
Employee Skills for Different Competitive Strategies
As mentioned in the introduction, I decided to limit my analyses to three input factors 
because the competitiveness literature claims that (1) finance, (2) component standards, and (3) 
labour qualifications crucially determine the competitive capacities of any firm (see in particular 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6-7; see also Lundvall 1992a: 13-15; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Patel and 
Pavitt 1994: 91-92; Hollingsworth 2000: 627-628; 632; Porter 1990: 20). The reason for this is 
that a firm cannot secure these input factors on its own. Instead, their provision depends on the 
solution of a coordination problem between a company and external economic actors (Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 6). With regard to employee skills, a coordination problem arises which the 
literature describes as the free-riding problem related to the professional education and training of
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employees (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 25-26; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145; Culpepper 2001: 
278-281; Le Gales and Voelzkow 2001:4-5). Employers, so the argument goes, are not willing to 
invest in sophisticated training programs if they fear that competitors will free-ride their 
educational efforts by poaching trained employees without investing in training programs 
themselves. In a similar vein, employees are not interested in acquiring highly specific skills if the 
risk of being dismissed at short notice is high, since firm-specific skills are often of little use 
within the context of another firm and are therefore remunerated rather badly by the latter. Thus, 
whenever employees have to look for a new job, which occurs regularly in flexible labour 
markets, firm-specific skills are less desirable. In sum, as long as no mechanism exists that 
assures employers against the risk of poaching, and employees against the risk of dismissal at 
short notice, they are both reluctant to invest in highly specific skills (see Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 29-30; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145).
Several contributors to the VoC literature point out that this free-riding problem can be 
resolved in two different ways: by long-term oriented labour-market regulation on the one hand, 
and by flexible labour-market regulation on the other (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; 29-30; 
Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145; 150-155). If labour-market institutions promote long-term I 
employment, both employers and employees are willing to engage in sophisticated training 
programs, because they are assured that this investment will pay off. Long job tenures result from i
wage-bargaining centralisation, powerful works councils, long notice periods, and a stark use of |
competition clauses. In centralised bargaining systems, wage levels are homogeneous because 
employees with equivalent skills are paid equivalent wages. Homogenous wage levels assure ,
employers that highly skilled workers - once trained - are unlikely to leave their company, as |
financial incentives are limited. Furthermore, homogeneous wages also assure employees ‘that I
they are receiving the highest feasible rates of pay in return for’ their commitment to invest in '
specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 25). In a similar vein, works councils with authority over ,
layoffs, as well as long notice periods and competition clauses, tie employees to the firm. Since |
such rigid labour-market institutions make frequent changes o f employment disadvantageous, 1
employers are willing to offer sophisticated training which, in turn, provides their workforce with |
high and firm-specific skills83 (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; see also Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: |
150-155). I
83 In line with Becker (Becker 1975: 26-27), I define firm -specific skills as those skills which are useful only within 
the context o f one firm because they are based on the knowledge of how the firm operates. Accordingly, firm- 
specific training ‘increases the future marginal productivity of workers [only] in the firm providing it' (Becker 1975: 
19). The ability to use highly sophisticated machines, an in-depth knowledge o f  the firm's production process, or 
insights into the preferences of key customers are examples of firm-specific skills.
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On the other hand, flexible labour-market institutions solve the abovementioned free­
riding problem in that they deter employers and employees from investing in sophisticated 
training (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29-30; see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 150-155). Typically, a 
flexible labour market is characterised by wage-bargaining decentralisation, weak works 
councils, short notice periods and a limited use of competition clauses. These labour-market 
institutions have the opposite effect of the abovementioned long-term oriented institutions: they 
lead to short job tenures as they facilitate hiring and firing at will. Since employers in flexible 
labour markets are not assured against the risk of poaching, they are unlikely to provide elaborate 
training programs. Accordingly, the costs of further (secondary and tertiary) education are 
entirely passed on to potential employees (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29-30). Once they have 
finished primary education, employees therefore have to take a decision. They may decide not to 
continue education but to start working. This decision means they end up with low skill levels 
(see King and Wood 1999: 376). Alternatively, potential employees can, of course, decide to 
engage in secondary or tertiary education so as to acquire further skills. However, the VoC 
literature stresses that employees in flexible labour markets are unlikely to acquire firm-specific 
skills because the latter are only useful for, and rewarded adequately by only one finn. So, 
whenever job tenures are short, employees are better advised to acquire field-specific skills which 
they can use in the context of different firms84. Thus, employees who decide to continue 
education and training in a flexible labour market gain high and field-specific skills (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 30; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:146).
But how are these three types of labour skills related to competitive strategies? In a word, 
the aforementioned contributors to the VoC literature claim that high and firm-specific skills 
promote Diversified Quality Production, whereas high and field-specific skills facilitate Radical 
Product Innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-41; 44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-175). Low 
skills, in turn, are said to favour Low Cost Production (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 175-176).(see 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 44; see also King and Wood 1999: 376) Let us briefly outline the 
reasons underlying these hypotheses.
Hall and Soskice argue that employees with high and firm-specific skills are crucial for 
the success of a DQP strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39). On the one hand, high skill levels are
84 In line with Becker (Becker 1975: 19-20), I refer to field-specific skills as those skills which employees can use 
within the context o f all firms -  be they active in the same or another industry -  in which a certain business function 
is required. Hence, ‘general training increases the marginal productivity of trainees by exactly the same amount in 
the firms providing the training as in other firms’ (Becker 1975: 26). A marketing manager’s ability to carry out a 
market analysis, the capacity of an assembly-line worker to report dysfunctions in the production process in a 




essential for Diversified Quality Production because workers have to use and maintain 
sophisticated machines and perform rather complex (assembly-) tasks. Firm-specific skills, on the 
other hand, are crucial for the success of a DQP strategy because an in-depth knowledge of the 
company, its market, suppliers and customers enables employees to continuously improve 
products and production processes, and to adopt products to the specific needs of customers. 
Furthermore employees with an in-depth understanding of how a firm operates are able to work 
autonomously and to take on responsibility. They know, for example, how to rectify mistakes 
occurring during the production process which, in turn, contributes to maintaining a high level of 
product quality (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39).
On the other hand, several contributors to the VoC literature claim that high and field- 
specific skills facilitate the pursuit of an RPI strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 40-41; Estevez- 
Abe et al. 2001: 174-175). It is important to note that these scholars are not explicit as to why 
field-specific skills (resulting from flexible labour-market regulation) promote an RPI strategy. 
Instead, they repeatedly point out that flexible labour-market institutions directly facilitate an RPI 
strategy because ‘companies interested in developing an entirely new product line can hire in 
personnel with the requisite expertise, knowing they can release them if the project proves 
unprofitable.’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 40; see also Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-175). Yet this 
reasoning allows us to deduce the following line of argument: to come up with entirely new 
ideas, employees need to be highly skilled as they should have an in-depth understanding of how 
certain technologies or industrial processes work. Furthermore, field-specific skills are required 
for an RPI strategy because employees can adapt more easily to a new environment. To put it 
differently, employees who have worked within the context of the same firm for a long time may 
be so used to this environment that they have difficulties in understanding and adapting to an 
entirely new reality. Accordingly, high and field-specific labour skills arising from frequent 
changes of employment may further the pursuit of an RPI strategy (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
40-41; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:174-175).
Finally, from various contributions to the VoC literature we may deduce the hypothesis 
that the successful pursuit of an LCP strategy relies on low skilled employees because they are 
comparatively inexpensive (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 175-176; see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 44; 
see also King and Wood 1999: 376). In contrast to Diversified Quality Production, low skill 
levels do not hamper the success o f Low Cost Production. Since low skilled employees are often 
unable to work autonomously or to assume responsibility, they cannot rectify mistakes occurring 
during the production process without precise instructions on the part of their superiors. While 
this hinders the production of high-quality goods, it does not constitute an obstacle to an LCP
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strategy in that Low Cost Producers compete on the basis of price rather than quality. 
Accordingly, low but ‘inexpensive* skills facilitate the pursuit o f an LCP strategy.
In sum, the VoC literature argues that the pursuit of a DQP strategy requires employees 
w ith high and firm-specific skills, whereas the pursuit of an RPI strategy relies on employees 
w ith high and field-specific skills. An LCP strategy, by contrast, is said to rely on employees with 
low skill levels (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-41; 44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; see also 
K ing and Wood 1999:376). Table 4.1. provides a schematic overview of these hypotheses.










1. R ad ica l Product Innovation X
2. Diversified Quality Production X
3. L ow  Cost Production X
Source: Own Illustration
4.2.2. Falsifying the VoC Hypotheses on Skill Levels
Having presented the hypotheses of the VoC contributors, I analyse in the remaining parts 
o f  section 4.2. whether any empirical evidence exists to support their arguments. To this end, I 
first test the hypotheses on skill levels in section 4.2.2., leaving the assessment of the hypotheses 
on skill profiles to section 4.2.3.. Before beginning these assessments, however, it is useful to 
make two methodological remarks. Firstly, it should be noted that the following analyses are 
based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative insights. I obtained the data for the 
subsequent quantitative analyses from carrying out structured interviews with representatives of 
pharmaceutical firms85. While asking mainly closed questions, I also posed several open
OjC
questions whose answers provided me with precious qualitative insights . As described in the 
introduction to section 2.3. (see chapter 2), the overall firm sample contains 110 pharmaceutical
85 As discussed in chapter 1 (section 1.3.1.) I use the term pharmaceutical firm  as a generic term for all types of 
companies which are active in the drug industry, i.e. for biotech-, traditional pharmaceutical-, and generics firms 
alike.
86 The questionnaire which I used as a basis for these interviews is reproduced in the appendix.
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firms. I was able to carry out 69 interviews which, in turn, equals a coverage rate of roughly 60%. 
In small firms, I often interviewed senior managers (the CEO or comparable). In large firms, 
representatives of the Human Resources department were the most adequate interview partners to 
answer my questions. Importantly, these interviews did not merely provide me with quantitative 
data. They also offered precious qualitative insights into how different types of labour 
qualifications impact on competitive strategies. These qualitative insights were crucial for 
structuring and interpreting the following quantitative analyses.
Secondly, I always tested for country-specific variations. It is important to note that I 
obtained the results, presented in the remainder of section 4.2., from analysing the overall dataset 
of 69 pharmaceutical firms. However, in order to cross-check these results, I re-ran all analyses 
for each country separately. In so doing, I occasionally observed slight country-specific variations 
in the absolute extent to which firms rely on specific skill types. Furthermore, the number of 
cases per county was sometimes too small to provide statistically significant results. Interestingly, 
though, I found all country-specific results to be in line with the overall outcome in that specific 
competitive strategies relied equally on specific skill types in relative terms. Thus, country- 
specific analyses do not contradict any of the arguments I present in the following section, based 
on studies of the overall case sample. That said, let us finally turn to test the VoC hypotheses on 
the importance of skill levels for competitive strategies.
4.2.2.1. TESTING THE VoC HYPOTHESES ON SKILL LEVELS
If the hypotheses of the VoC contributors hold true, we should find that Radical Product 
Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers rely on highly skilled employees (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 39; 40-44; see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-175), whereas Low Cost Producers employ 
low skilled labour forces (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 175-176; see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 44; 
King and Wood 1999: 376). To reveal differences in skill levels, I asked Human Resources 
managers to specify the percentage of employees with primary87, secondary88, and tertiary89 
education. Table 4.2. provides an overview of the answers obtained, detailing them by 
competitive strategy and country.
87 As specified in the questionnaire (see appendix: question 2 A) 2.1.1.), I defined employees with primary education 
as employees who left education after compulsory school attendance.
88 As detailed in the questionnaire (see appendix: question 2 A) 2.1.1.), I defined employees with secondary education 
as employees who completed education with a certificate in vocational training.
89 As specified in the questionnaire (see appendix: question 2A) 2.1.1.), I defined employees with tertiary education 
as employees who completed education with a university degree or comparable higher education.
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Table 4.2.: Percentage of Employees with lary, 2ary and 3ary Education, detailed by 
Country and Competitive Strategy




S eco n d ary
E d u ca tio n
T ertia ry
E ducation
A verage RPIs UK 7 12,2 14,7 73,1
A verage DQPs UK S 29,2 17,8 53,0
A verage LCPs UK 4 43,7 25,8 30,5
O verall Average UK (all UK Firms) 19 26,0 18,3 55,7
A verage RPIs Germany 6 4,5 23,7 71,8
A verage DQPs Germany 11 4,5 59,4 36,1
A verage LCPs Germany 9 5,6 62,1 32,3
O verall Average Germany (all German Firms) 26 4,9 52,1 43,0
A verage RPIs Italy 7 11,9 31,6 56,5
A verage DQPs Italy 10 13,2 37,0 49,8
A verage LCPs Italy 4 6,3 40,0 53,7
O verall Average Italy (all Italian Firms) 21 11.4 35,8 52,8
O verall Average RPIs 20 9,8 23,3 66,9
O verall Average DQPs 29 143 403 45,5
O verall Average LCPs 17 14,7 48,4 36,9
O verall Average (All Firms) 66 13,0 37,2 49,8
Source: Own illustration, evaluating question 2A )2.1.1. (see appendix for questionnaire)
Two particularly noteworthy observations can be made on the basis of table 4.2.. Firstly, 
country-specific variations can be observed in the absolute extent to which firms pursuing a given 
strategy employ specific skill levels. Interestingly, these variations seem to depend on a country’s 
vocational-training system. In Germany, with its highly sophisticated industry-wide system, firms 
tend to rely more on employees with secondary education than companies in the UK, where such 
a system is absent. Vocational-training programs exist in Italy; but they are less deeply embedded 
in firms than in Germany. As a result, Italian firms rely on employees with secondary education 
to a medium extent.
Secondly, despite these country-specific variations in absolute skill levels, certain levels 
seem to be relatively more important for some strategies than for others. Contrary to the 
predictions of the VoC scholars, table 4.2. suggests that no pronounced distinction in the use of 
different skill levels occurs between LCPs and Non-LCPs, but occurs instead between RPIs and 
Non-RPIs. That is, Radical Product Innovators seem to employ considerably more people with 
tertiary education than both Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers. Apart from
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using less employees with tertiary education, DQPs and LCPs also pursue a similar employment 1 
policy in that they rely on roughly the same amounts of workers with primary and secondary ' 
education. Finally, it is interesting to note that people with primary education constitute the least | 
important group of employees, irrespective o f a firm’s strategy. It almost seems as if Radical | 
Product Innovators, Diversified Quality Producers, and Low Cost Producers try to avoid I 
employing people from this education group. In sum, while differences in the employment of 1 
specific skill levels can he observed, these observations do not suggest that Low Cost Producers | 
rely on low skilled employees whereas Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality 
Producers employ high-skilled labour (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 39-44).
Nevertheless, let us test the statistical stability of these observations with the aid of 
quantitative analyses. To this end, the question arises of how to define low and high skill levels. I 
Are employees only low skilled if  they have primary education, or are they also low skilled if 1 
they have not received more than secondary education? It should be noted that Hall and Soskice j 
repeatedly point out that the German vocational training system provides employees with high | 
and firm-specific skills (see e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001a: 25-26; Soskice 1999: 108). This I 
suggests that low skills should be understood as primary education only. However, as indicated 
by table 4.2., no significant correlation can be seen between employees with primary education i 
and the pursuit of an LCP strategy. In other words, Low Cost Producers do not use significantly I 
more employees with primary education than Diversified Quality Producers or Radical Product ' 
Innovators (R peareon = .061; R2 = .004; p > 0.10 (2-tailed test)). Interestingly, though, a 
correlation analysis between employees with primary or secondary education and the pursuit of ( 
an LCP strategy provides significant results. So, if we use the broader definition of low skill 
levels, LCPs are found to employ more low skilled labour than Non-LCPs (R Pcâ on -  -329; R2 = '
.108; p < 0.01 (2-tailed test)).
Does this mean that the VoC hypothesis on skill levels holds true if low skills are defined 
in a broader manner? In other words, do Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality 
Producers rely on highly skilled employees with tertiary education, whereas Low Cost Producers 
employ low skilled workers with primary or secondary education? At first sight, this hypothesis 
seems to be confirmed by an analysis correlating employees with tertiary education and the 
pursuit of an RPJ strategy (R peaison= -492; R2 = .242; p < 0.01 (2-tailed tests)). However, no 
positive correlation can be found between employees with tertiary education and the pursuit of a 
DQP strategy (R pearson - -1 6 5 ;  R2 = .027; p > 0.10 (2-tailed test)).
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How can these results be explained? Let us recall our observation of table 4.2. that firms 
pursuing an RPI strategy employ notably more people with tertiary education than firms which 
pursue a DQP or an LCP strategy. Yet Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers do 
not only employ a comparatively less skilled workforce, they also employ about the same extent 
o f  workers with primary and secondary education. The fact that Diversified Quality Producers 
and Low Cost Producers pursue similar employment policies seems to be the reason for which 
the correlation between tertiary education and an RPI strategy leads to a significant positive 
result, whereas the correlation between tertiary education and a DQP strategy produces a weak 
negative outcome.
To rule out any further doubt, it is most useful to resort to multi-nominal logistic 
regression analyses. Overall, I carried out three analyses in order to assess the individual impact 
o f  primary, secondary, and respectively tertiary education on competitive strategy. To provide a 
complete picture, I used each competitive strategy as a reference category in a separate model, 
meaning that each regression analysis contains three models. Table 4.3. summarises the results. 
In so doing, table 4.3. does not only report the individual impact of each education level on 
competitive strategy; it also allows us to deduce the impact of the education levels on the strategy 
in question. For example, the first regression analysis does not only teach us that Radical Product 
Innovators rely significantly more on employees with tertiary education than Diversified Quality 
Producers on the one hand (Exp (B) = +1.048; p < 0.01), and Low Cost Producers on the other 
(Exp (B) = +1.073; p < 0.01). These results also allow us to deduce that Radical Product 
Innovators employ less low-skilled workers with primary or secondary education than 
Diversified Quality Producers (deduced Exp (B) = - 1.048; p < 0.01) and, respectively, Low 
Cost Producers (deduced Exp (B) = - 1.073; p < 0.01).
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Table 4.3.: Impact of lary, 2ary and 3ary Education on Competitive Strategy
Results of Multi-Nominal Logistic Regression Analyses (Standardised B)
In dependen t
V ariab le :
M odel 1:
Dep. V a riab le : C o.S tr. 
(Reference Category: RPI)
M o d el 2:
D ep . V ariab le : C o .S tr. 
(Reference Category: DQP)
M odel 3:
D ep. V ariab le : C o.S tr. 
(Reference Category: LCP)
DQP LCP R PI LCP RPI DQP
3 a ry  E ducation  
Exp (B)
R Nagelkerioe
.954*** .932*** 1.048*** .977 1.073*** 1.024
.284 .284 .284
1 2 a ry  E ducation  
Exp (B)
R Nagelkerke
1.042** 1.061*** .960** 1.018 .943*** .982
.210 .210 .210
l a r y  E ducation  
Exp (B)
R Nagetkerke
1.020 1.022 .980 1.001 .979 .999
.022 .022 .022
Significance levels: * < 0 .1 0  * * < 0 .0 5  * * * < 0 .0 1
In a word, the results reported in table 4.3. confirm the observations of table 4.2.: contrary 
to the VoC predictions, Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers pursue highly 
similar employment policies. They do not only rely less on employees with tertiary university 
education than Radical Product Innovators, they also employ roughly the same amounts of people 
with secondary and primary education. Furthermore, the results obtained from the analyses on 
primary education are particularly interesting to the extent that neither RPIs, nor DQPs, nor LCPs 
make significant use of this skill category. This, in turn, supports our previous observation that 
firms avoid the employment of workers with primary education irrespective of their competitive 
strategy. Overall, these results contradict the VoC hypothesis that Low Cost Producers rely 
mostly on low skilled employees, whereas both Radical Product Innovators and Diversified 
Quality Producers employ highly skilled labour (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 39-44). Albeit not in line with the VoC hypotheses, our findings also indicate that 
certain strategies require specific skill types more than others. It will be the aim of the following 
sections to reveal to what extent and why systematic variations can be observed in the skill levels 
employed.
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4.2.2.2. S k il l  L e v e l s : N e c e s s a r y  In p u t  F a c t o r , o r  C o n se q u e n c e  o f  C o m pe t it iv e  
S t r a t e g y ?
Before I set out to interpret the previous findings, it is necessary to test the relative 
importance of skills for competitive strategies. The two previous chapters have shown that 
specific types of finance and standards do not automatically constitute necessary input factors for 
the pursuit of a competitive strategy. Let us recall that finance turned out to have a facilitative 
impact on strategy (see chapter 2), whereas standards were found to emerge as a result o f a firm’s 
strategy (see chapter 3). With regard to labour skills we have, so far, only seen that significant 
covariation exists between skill levels and competitive strategy. But do skill levels (most notably 
employees with tertiary education) actually constitute a necessary input factor fo r  the pursuit of 
an (RPI) strategy? Or are employees (with tertiary education) hired as a result o f a firm’s choice 
to pursue an (RPI) strategy?
While arguments on causal relationships should and will not be based merely on 
quantitative analyses, we would find empirical support for the idea that skill levels constitute a 
necessary input factor i f  they have a stronger impact on competitive strategy than any rival 
explanatory factor. In chapter 2 (section 2.3.2.), we saw that, of all potential rival explanators, a 
firm 's  age has the strongest facilitative impact on the pursuit of a competitive strategy. 
Consequently, I re-ran all the multi-nominal regression analyses described in section 4.2.2.1. (see 
table 4.3.) with firm-age as a second independent variable in each analysis so as to test the 
relative importance of skill levels for competitive strategy. In order not to annoy the patient reader 
with repetitive information, suffice it to say here that skill levels qualified unambiguously as 
more important for the pursuit of a competitive strategy than a company’s age90. When I used a 
stepwise method (forward entry) instead of the enter method, results were identical to those 
presented in table 4.3.91. This allows us to conclude that different skill levels in general, and 
tertiary education in particular, constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit of a competitive 
strategy.
Having found skill levels to be o f decisive importance fo r  competitive strategies, we 
should also test whether people with a specific educational degree are employed as a result o f a 
firm’s strategy. Should we find that a firm’s strategy is a better exlplanator than the strongest
90 It will not come as a surprise that the analyses on primary education constitute an exception to this rule. In line 
with our finding that firms avoid the employment o f  people with primary education, irrespective of their competitive 
strategy, a firm’s age qualified as the better strategy-predictor than primary education. Nevertheless, we can conclude 
that skill levels are overall more important for the pursuit of a firm’s strategy than its age.
91 In line with the previous footnote, this statement applies to all analyses on tertiary and secondary education, 
whereas firm-age qualified as the stronger predictor in the analyses on primary education. Yet, also as mentioned in 
the previous footnote, this does not change our overall finding that specific skill levels constitute a better explanation 
for competitive strategy than firm-age.
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rival hypothesis on why certain skill levels are employed, we may deduce that skill levels do not 
only constitute an important input factor, but that a film’s employment policy is also determined 
by its strategy92. So, do skill levels ‘only* constitute a necessary input factor, or are they also the 
result of the competitive strategy pursued? To this end, a rival hypothesis for the employment of 
skill levels is required. When I tested the explanatory strength of potential rival explanators93, a 
firm’s number o f employees emerged as the strongest predictor of skill levels. Accordingly, I 
formulated the following rival hypothesis for the employment of people with higher education: 
small firms are more likely to rely on a workforce with tertiary education because employees are 
confronted with a larger variety of tasks than tends to be the case in big companies. Highly 
skilled employees seem more prepared to meet this challenge and cope with a variety of 
responsibilities than employees with primary or secondary education.
To assess whether the employed skill levels are a function of a firm’s size rather than of 
its competitive strategy, I carried out several linear regression analyses94. Interestingly, these 
analyses show that a firm’s strategy constitutes a significant explanation for the extent to which a 
workforce with higher (namely tertiary and, even more importantly, secondary) education is 
employed. However, the skill profile of employees is even better explained by a company’s size.
A firm’s strategy does not qualify as the stronger explanation for the skill levels employed in any 
of the analyses. These results indicate that a firm’s employment policy is not determined by its 
competitive strategy. Accordingly, we can conclude that certain skill levels in general, and 
employees with tertiary skills in particular, constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit of an j 
(RPI) strategy, rather than being the consequence of it. !
4.22.3. Su m m a r is in g  a n d  In t e r p r e t in g  t h e  F in d in g s  o n  S k il l  L e v e l s
To conclude our study on skill levels, let me summarise and interpret the previous ! 
findings. In so doing, I will combine qualitative insights obtained in the course of my interviews j 
with findings resulting from the previous quantitative analyses. Overall, we found the VoC i 
contributors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; King and Wood j
1999: 376) wrong in suggesting that Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality |
i
!
92 Should this turn out to be the case, diachronic analyses would become necessary to assess over time whether 
certain skill levels are employed fo r , or respectively as a function o f a firm’s strategy.
93 More precisely, I assessed the explanatory strength of a firm’s country, its age and its number o f  employees for the 
employment o f skill levels by correlating each indicator individually with tertiary education.
94 To be precise, I carried out six linear regression analyses, all of which tested the impact o f a firm’s number o f 
employees and its competitive strategy on one skill level (i.e. firstly on tertiary, then on secondary and finally on 
primary education). In so doing, I run each o f  these three analyses initially on the basis o f the enter method, and then 
on the basis o f a stepwise (namely the forward entry) method.
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Producers require highly skilled employees, whereas Low Cost Producers tend to employ low 
skilled labour forces. Instead, we have seen that firms pursuing an RPI strategy rely on a highly 
skilled workforce with tertiary education, whereas firms pursuing a DQP or an LCP strategy 
resemble each other in that they recruit many employees with secondary education. Low skilled 
employees with primary education are hardly employed by RPIs, DQPs or LCPs. That said, it 
should be remembered that country-specific variations could be observed: in the UK, where no 
national vocational-training system exists, employers find it more difficult to recruit employees 
with secondary education than in Germany with its well developed vocational training system. 
Italy, in turn, is situated in between.
What do these findings teach us? It is rather unsurprising that companies specialising in 
research and development activities require a high number of scientists who, usually, hold 
university degrees. Hence, it is easily understandable that Radical Product Innovators focusing on 
early value-chain activities substantially rely on employees with tertiary education. Contrary to 
Radical Product Innovators, Diversified Quality Producers do not concentrate on research and 
development activities. They are also active in downstream activities such as production, 
marketing and sales. Accordingly, it is also understandable that Diversified Quality Producers 
employ scientists, managers, and department heads with tertiary education, as well as production 
and sales employees with secondary and, occasionally, primary education.
But why do (most notably German and Italian) Low Cost Producers with a focus on 
production, marketing and sales activities not employ more ‘inexpensive’ workers with primary 
education? Two explanations may help us to understand this seeming paradox: firstly, a 
regulatory aspect. Since health risks related to the administration of drugs are high, European 
legislation imposes strict conditions on the purity of pharmaceutical products. More precisely, 
European legislation requires every pharmaceutical company to respect the EU Guidelines of 
Good Manufacturing Practice (henceforth GMP). Otherwise, a firm is not granted product 
approval. With regard to employee skills, the GMP guideline stipulates that ‘[t]he manufacturer 
should have an adequate number of personnel with the necessary qualifications and practical 
experience’ (EudraLex 2003: chapter 2). Depending on how this stipulation is implemented in 
national law, it means that pharmaceutical companies are only allowed to employ people below a 
certain age limit if the latter have completed at least secondary education. This partly explains 
why the sales force, and even production workers of Low Cost Producers are rather highly 
skilled.
Yet, there is a second and, in the eyes of my interviewees, even more important 
explanation for the high skill levels of pharmaceutical employees: highly skilled employees are
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highly productive! If it were true that low labour costs were crucial for successful low-cost 
production, we would find Low Cost Producers relocating their (production) facilities to low- 
wage countries. Yet this is not the case. It is well documented that the pharmaceutical industry is 
particularly dynamic due to its technology intensity. This means that consolidation (most notably 
mergers and acquisitions) is the order of the day (see Wittner 2005). But such phenomena are 
common to all countries. And, even more importantly, relocation from high- to low-wage 
countries cannot be observed. Thus, the consolidation of pharmaceutical firms in general, and of 
Low Cost Producers in particular, results from the need to achieve economies of scale rather than 
from reduced competitiveness due to excessively high wages (see Erdmann and Gabriel 2005 in 
general and p.44 in particular).
This is interesting in that strands of neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher 1919: 57; 55; 
Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54) and neoliberal economic theory (Sinn 2005) claim that Low Cost 
Producers are not competitive in high-wage economies. However, our findings show these claims 
to be wrong: Low Cost Producers in high-wage countries do not show any sign of being less 
competitive because they (are forced to) employ ‘excessively expensive’ labour. Interestingly, the 
predominant focus of neoclassical and neoliberal arguments on labour costs leads them ignore the 
importance of labour productivity as related to wages (in particular Sinn 2005: 30-32). From an 
economic perspective, wages are nothing but the compensation o f employees for their productive 
contribution to a company. Hence, companies -  including Low Cost Producers -  can very well 
afford to pay employees high wages if they are highly productive. And employees are highly 
productive if they are highly skilled.
Indeed, when asking HR managers from German and Italian Low Cost Producers whether 
a workforce with high education would constitute an undesirable cost burden, their answers 
pointed in the opposite direction: skilled and ‘expensive’ employees were perceived as highly 
beneficial because they are able to work autonomously, thereby being more productive than 
employees with low skill levels who require constant supervision. Interestingly, this idea was also 
confirmed by HR managers from British Low Cost Producers. Instead of perceiving a low-skilled 
workforce as beneficial for the pursuit of an LCP strategy, HR managers repeatedly lamented the 
general skill shortage in those occupational groups which, in Germany and Italy, typically 
undergo vocational training. In so doing, British HR managers agreed that they were more than 
willing to pay higher wages for employees with higher skills since the latter were more 
productive. It is also interesting to note that these insights confirm our previous observation: 
firms prefer to avoid employing people with primary education irrespective of the competitive 
strategy they pursue.
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In sum, country-specific variations in the employment of workers with secondary and 
primary education suggest that a balance exists between the educational level of employees and 
their productivity on the one hand, and their wage levels on the other. The longer employees are 
in education, the more they are productive, the higher the wages they can duly claim. This 
balance seems to be the reason why different skill levels do not have a significant impact on the 
pursuit of a DQP and an LCP strategy. But, if  the balance between skill levels and labour 
productivity means that levels of education are irrelevant for the pursuit of a DQP and an LCP 
strategy, then why do Radical Product Innovators rely so much on employees with tertiary 
education? It is the aim of section 4.2.3. in general, and section 4.2.3.2. in particular, to address 
this question.
4 .23 . Verifying the VoC Hypotheses on Skill Profiles
4.23.1. Testing the VoC Hypotheses on Skill Profiles
Having seen that the VoC hypotheses on skill levels lack empirical support, this section 
assesses the VoC hypotheses on skill profiles. If the latter hold true, we should find that 
Diversified Quality Producers rely on a workforce with firm-specific skills, because an in-depth 
knowledge of their company enables employees to improve and adopt products to the specific 
needs of customers, and to rectify mistakes autonomously (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39). 
Furthermore, we should find that Radical Product Innovators rely on employees with field- 
specific skills as the latter are more able to adapt to new challenges (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
40; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174). Although the VoC literature remains silent on the importance 
of firm- or field-specific skills for an LCP strategy, I include Low Cost Producers in the 
following analyses because they constitute an important control group.
But how to measure firm- and, respectively, field-specific skills? Let us recall that I 
defined firm-specific skills as those skills that are useful only within the context of one firm 
because they are based on the knowledge of how a firm operates (see Becker 1975: 26-27). In 
contrast to this, I defined field-specific skills as that type of skills which can be used in all firms 
requiring a certain business function (see Becker 1975: 19-20). The VoC scholars (Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 27; 41; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:145; 150-151) repeatedly point to the importance 
of long employment tenures as a means of providing employees with firm-specific skills. Short 
employment tenures, by contrast, are said to make employees acquire field-specific skills (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 30). Vocational training is described as a further possibility of endowing 
(future) employees with firm-specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 25). Accordingly, the 
absence of vocational training is held to make (future) employees invest in field-specific skills
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(Hall and Soskice 2001a: 30). Finally, firm- and, respectively, field-specific skills can result from 
the on-the-job training of employees. Depending on the types of courses offered, employees can 
acquire in-depth insights into how their firm operates; or they can learn more about their business 
function and, hence, their field of activity.
To measure whether a firm relies on employees with firm- or field-specific skills, I 
created a firm-specificness and a field-specificness indicator. These indicators reflect the extent to 
which skills are firm- (field-) specific due to long (short) employment tenure, to (no) vocational 
training, and to the type of on-the job  training offered to employees. Since the field-specificness 
indicator takes the reciprocal value of the firm-specificness indicator, suffice it to describe how 
the firm-specificness indicator is composed. Overall, I assigned up to 5 points to a company 
according to the following three aspects: I attributed up to 2 points according to the average job I 
tenure of employees95. Whenever job tenure was lower than 3.9 years, I awarded 0 points, ' 
because employees presumably have field- rather than firm-specific skills. 1 point was assigned i 
for job tenure between 4 and 7.9 years, and 2 points were allocated to firms with average job I 
tenure of more than 8 years because in the course of such a long employment period employees 
are likely to gain an in-depth understanding of how their firm operates96. Secondly, I used the 
extent to which companies employ former trainees as a further benchmark for evaluating the 
firm-specificness of employee skills. In so doing, I allocated no points to firms which did not 
offer (vocational) training to young people still in education. Similarly, I did not attribute a point I 
where a company offers (vocational) training to people without aiming at employing them at the j 
end of their educational program. The reason for this is that, in the latter case, firms use trainees |
as a source of inexpensive labour rather than as an opportunity for training future employees in '
firm-specific skills. Consequently, I attributed 1 point to firms whenever they employed former J 
trainees at the end of their (vocational) education period97. Thirdly, I considered the extent to I 
which a company provides annual on-the-job training courses. Whenever less than 50% of a 1 
firm’s employees received on-the-job training, or whenever more than 50% participated in on- 
the-job training courses which provided them mostly with general skills, 0 points were assigned.
1 point was given if at least 50% of a firm’s employees received on-the-job training for acquiring , 
mostly industry-specific skills. Finally, I allocated 2 points to those companies where at least 50%
95 For the literal phrasing o f die question on average job tenure, consult question 2A)2.1.2. o f the questionnaire (see 
appendix).
96 The reason for which I chose 4 and 8 years as thresholds is that the first and second promotions usually takes place 
within these time spans, and an employee’s decision to change company is highly influenced by a firm’s attitude 
towards promotion. However, interviews also revealed that the longer employees work for one firm, the less likely 
they are to change. It is for this reason that I did not introduce any further thresholds (e.g. 12 years).
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o f the workforce participated in on-the-job training courses providing them with firm-specific 
skills 98.
Table 4.4.: Firm*, and Field-Specificness of Employee Skills on a Scale from 0 to 5, 
detailed by Country and Competitive Strategy
G ro u p  o f  F irm s
No. o f 
Cases
Firm -Specificness
(the higher the score, the 
more firm-specific the skills)
F ield-Specificness
(the higher the score, the 
more field-specific the skills)
Average RPIs UK 7 1,4 3,6
Average DQPs UK 8 3,4 1,6
Average LCPs UK • 4 2,0 3,0
O verall Average UK (all UK Firms) 19 2.4 2.6
Average RPIs Germany 7 1,7 3,3
Average DQPs Germany 12 3,7 U
Average LCPs Germany 9 3,1 1,9
O verall Average Germany (all German Firms) 28 3.0 2.0
Average RPIs Italy 7 1,7 3,3
Average DQPs Italy 10 3,7 13
Average LCPs Italy 4 2,3 2,7
O verall Average Italy (all Italian Firms) 21 2.8 2.2
Overall Average RPIs 21 1,6 3,4
Overall Average DQPs 30 3,6 1,4
Overall Average LCPs 17 2,6 2,4
Overall Average (All Firms) 68 2.7 2.3
Source: Own illustration, evaluating questions 2A)2.1.2, 2A)2.2. and 2A)2.3. (see appendix for questionnaire)
Table 4.4. provides an overview of the extent to which different competitive strategies 
rely on employees with firm- or, respectively, field-specific skills. Interestingly, and contrary to 
table 4.2., table 4.4. does not report noteworthy country-specific variations in the extent to which 
RPIs, DQPs and LCPs rely on employees with different skill profiles. Furthermore, the results 
reported in table 4.4. are very much in line with the hypotheses proposed by the contributors to 
the VoC literature (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 39-41; 44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174). Radical 
Product Innovators significantly rely on employees with field-specific skills, whereas Diversified
97 For the literal phrasing of the questions on vocational training, consult question 2A)2.2. of the questionnaire (see 
appendix).
9® For the 1 
appendix).
6 literal phrasing of the questions on vocational training, consult question 2A)2.3. of the questionnaire (see
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Quality Producers employ workforces with firm-specific skills. Interestingly, Low Cost 
Producers are situated in-between the two, as they recruit employees who have neither 
pronounced firm- nor field-specific skills. Accordingly,, the average scores of Low Cost 
Producers on the firm- and field-specificness index are very similar to the average national 
scores.
To assess whether these variations actually result from a systematic correlation between 
skill profiles and competitive strategies rather than from an unfortunate influence of outlier cases, 
I ran multi-nominal logistic regression analyses. In accordance with section 4.2.2.1., I carried out 
two multi-nominal regressions in which I tested the impact o f firm- and field-specific skills on 
competitive strategy. In so doing, I used each competitive strategy as a reference category in a 
separate model. Hence, each regression analysis is composed o f three models. Table 4.5. reports 
the results of these analyses. Since the firm-specificness indicator takes the reciprocal value of 
the field-specificness indicator, it will come as no surprise that the results of the two analyses 
coincide, depending on the competitive strategy used as reference category.
Table 4.5.: Impact of Field- and Firm-Specific Skills on Competitive Strategy
Results of Multi-Nominal Logistic Regression Analyses (Standardised B)
Ind ep en d en t
V ariab le :
M odel 1:
D ep. V ariab le: C o .S tr. 
(Reference Category: RPI)
M odel 2:
D ep. V ariab le : C o .S tr . 
(Reference Category: DOP)
M odel 3:
D ep. V ariab le : C o.S tr. 
(Reference Category: LCP)









10.696*** 3.113*** .093*** 2 9 1 * * * 321*** 3.436***
.529 .529 .529
Significance levels: *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01
In a word, table 4.5. confirms the results reported in table 4.4.. Most importantly, we find 
that the three competitive strategies differ significantly from each other in the extent to which 
they rely on employees with specific skill profiles. As suggested by the VoC scholars (Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 39-41; 44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174), an RPI strategy relies heavily on 
employees with field-specific skills, whereas a DQP strategy is based on employees with firm- 
specific skills. Furthermore, it is important to note that Low Cost Producers diverge from both 
Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers in that their employees have
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neither firm- nor field-specific skills. While I will discuss the reliability of the skill-level and the 
skill-profile measure in section 4.2.3.2., it is important to recall here that Diversified Quality 
Producers and Low Cost Producers resembled each other in the extent to which they employed a 
workforce with a certain level of education (see section 4.2.2.1.). Interestingly, though, they differ 
significantly in the extent to which they rely on employees with specific skill profiles.
To complete our analyses, it is necessary to assess the relative importance of skill profiles 
for competitive strategies. Such an assessment is revealing to the extent that skill profiles do not 
automatically constitute a necessary input factor; they can just as well result from the pursuit of a 
competitive strategy (see section 4.2.2.2.). So, let us begin by assessing whether skill profiles can 
be said to constitute a necessary input factor. This would be the case if they were to have a 
stronger impact on competitive strategy than any rival factor. Drawing on the findings of section 
4.2.2.2., we retain a firm’s age as the strongest rival explanation for the pursuit of a competitive 
strategy. Accordingly, I carried out four multi-value logistic regression analyses assessing the 
relative explanatory power of skill profiles and firm-age for competitive strategy. In parallel with 
section 4.2.2.2., these analyses first tested the impact of firm-age and field-specific skills, and 
secondly the impact of firm-age and firm-specific skills on a firm’s strategy. In so doing, each 
analysis initially used the enter method, and then a stepwise (forward) method. Interestingly, skill 
profiles unambiguously qualified as the better predictor for a firm’s strategy than its age". These 
results can be interpreted to the effect that specific skill profiles actually constitute a necessary 
input factor.
This idea is confirmed by an assessment of the extent to which specific skill levels are 
employed as a result o f the pursued strategy. Remember that the employment o f skill profiles 
would not only constitute a necessary input factor for, but also a result of a firm’s strategy, were 
we to find the latter to be a better predictor of skill levels than the strongest rival determinant. 
Aiming at identifying the strongest explanation for why specific skill profiles are employed, I 
carried out three correlation analyses. Correlations between skill profiles and a firm’s country, its 
number o f employees, and its age revealed the latter to be the best rival predictor. This, in turn, 
suggests the following hypothesis: the older a firm, the more likely its employees are to have 
firm-specific skills. The reason for this is presumably that incumbent companies can offer both 
trainees and employees better opportunities than young firms to acquire firm-specific skills 
through intra-firm promotion and sophisticated training programs. When testing the relative 
importance of a firm’s competitive strategy and its age for the workforce’s skill profiles, I found
149
both factors to qualify as significant explanators. Nevertheless, a firm’s number of employees has 
a significantly more important impact on skill profiles than the strategy pursued. These findings 
can be interpreted to the effect that employees with firm- (or field-) specific skills constitute a 
necessary input factor for the pursuit o f a competitive strategy, rather than resulting from the 
latter.
4 2 3 .2 . The Relative Importance of Skill Levels and Skill Profiles for Competitive 
Strategies
Let us recapitulate our findings so far. We have seen that Radical Product Innovators rely 
on employees with certain skill levels (namely tertiary education) and with specific skill profiles 
(namely field-specific skills). Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers pursue a 
similar ‘skill-level policy* as they both rely on employees with secondary education. In this, 
Diversified Quality Producers require a workforce with a distinct profile (namely with firm- 
specific skills), whereas the employees o f Low Cost Producers do not need either pronounced 
firm- or field-specific skills.
Thus far I have treated an employee’s skill level and his skill profile as two independent 
and additional measures in all analyses. However, the more interviews I carried out, the more I 
doubted the independence and additionality of the two measures. When I asked HR managers 
whether some occupational groups leave their company more often than others, it turned out that 
employees with tertiary education found it easier to change due to the versatility of their 
qualifications. Employees with secondary (or primary) education, on the other hand, were said to 
have more difficulties in finding employment elsewhere as their qualifications were particularly 
adapted to the company. To put it differently, employees with tertiary education find it easier to 
leave due to the field-specificness of their skills, whereas employees with secondary education 
have more difficulties in doing so because of their firm-specific skills.
This, in turn, suggests that education levels measure two different concepts. On the one 
hand, the level o f education describes the educational trajectory of an employee. In section 
4.2.2.3., I argued that educational trajectory has an important impact on labour productivity. The 
longer an employee is in education, the more he is productive. This means that a balance exists 
between educational trajectories and labour productivity. Yet this balance also means that 
educational trajectory per se is not related to any competitive strategy. I argued this to be the 
reason for which a significant difference in the employment policies of Diversified Quality
99 Indeed, when regressing firm -age and firm - (or respectively field-)specific skills on competitive strategy using a 
stepwise (forward entry) method, exactly the same results are obtained as reported in table 4.5. because f i rm-age is 
excluded as the less significant predictor.
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Producers and Low Cost Producers could not be uncovered100. In sum, whenever educational 
levels reflect educational trajectories, no significant correlation can be observed between skill 
levels and competitive strategies.
On the other hand, the level o f education also seems to measure the skill profile o f 
employees. Let us recapitulate that tertiary (i.e. university) education teaches rather field-specific 
skills which can be used in the context of all firms requiring the respective business function. 
Secondary (i.e. vocational) education, on the other hand, provides more firm-specific skills to 
trainees, who often undertake an industrial placement in a company as part of their degree. This, 
in turn, seems to be the reason why a systematic variation between RPIs and non-RPIs was noted 
in section 4.2.2.1.. Accordingly, this variation does not tell us that firms need employees who 
have completed a certain educational trajectory. That is, Radical Product Innovators do not 
require employees with tertiary education. Instead, the variation tells us that firms require 
employees with specific skill profiles. In other words, Radical Product Innovators need 
employees with field-specific (university) skills, whereas Diversified Quality Producers require a 
workforce with firm-specific (vocational) training. Yet this finding does not emerge clearly 
because the inclusion of primary education, which provides neither firm- nor field-specific skills, 
blurs the picture101.
Let us use quantitative analyses in order to test whether skill levels and profiles actually 
measure the same concept, namely skill specificity. To this end, I composed a ‘2ary-ness’ and, 
respectively, a ‘3ary-ness’ index. These indices exclude the distorting impact of primary 
education by expressing the extent of employees with secondary (tertiary) education as a share of 
the overall workforce with secondary and tertiary education:
2ary-ness
% o f employees with 2ary education
% o f  employees with 2aiy education + % of employees with 3ary education
3ary-ness
% o f employees with 3ary education
%  o f  employees with 2ary education + % of employees with 3ary education
100 More precisely, I found that HR managers from both DQPs and LCPs have a preference for employing more 
skilled and more productive workers with secondary education. Yet, whenever the absence of an industry-wide 
vocational training system led to a scarce availability of employees with secondary education, DQPs and even more 
so LCPs resorted to employees with primary education as a second-best solution.
101 Since Low Cost Producers have a distorting impact on the extent to which skill levels describe the skill specificity 
o f employees, I exclude them from all following analyses on the operational independence of the still-level and still- 
profile indicator. For the same reason, I will also exclude Low Cost Producers from all analyses on the operational 
independence o f the still-profile and scientific-knowledge indicator (see section 4.3.2.2.).
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This standardisation means that the 2ary-ness index takes the reciprocal value of the 3aiy-ness 
index. If it is true that the skill-level and skill-profile indicators measure the same concept 
(namely skill specificity), they should be strongly correlated. And, indeed, a correlation analysis 
provides empirical support for this: R peaison = -650; R2 = .423; p < 0.01 (2-tailed test). The idea 
that the skill-level and skill-profile indices capture the same concept is confirmed by a reliability 
test between these two measures (standardised Alpha Cronbach = .788) .
Apart from correlation analyses and a reliability test, logistic regressions provide further 
insights. If a competitive strategy requires employees with a certain education level who also 
need to have a specific skill profile, the interaction effect of the two indicators should qualify as a 
better predictor than any of the two indicators individually. In other words, if it is true that the 
2ary-/3ary-ness and the firm-/field-specificness indicators measure the same concept, their 
combined (interaction) effect should not explain a competitive strategy better than any single 
indicator.
To test the combined and individual impacts of skill levels and skill profiles, I ran two 
logistic regression analyses. In the first analysis, I introduced the 2ary-/3ary-ness index and the 
firm-/field-specificness indicator in a first model based on the ‘enter’ method. I then entered their 
interaction effect in a second model, using the stepwise (‘forward: LR’) method. Interestingly, the 
firm-/field-specificness indicator turned out to be such a strong predictor that education level 
became insignificant in the first model. Results for the second model are not provided, since the 
interaction effect is too weak as an explanator. Similar findings emerge from the second 
regression analysis in which I entered all three variables103 in a single model based on the 
stepwise (forward: LR) method. Again, the firm-/field-specificness indicator qualified as such a 
strong predictor that all other independent variables were excluded from the model. This, in turn, 
suggests that skill levels and skill profiles indeed measure the same concept of skill specificity, 
because the combination of the two skill types is less important for the pursuit of a competitive 
strategy than the skill profile alone.
In sum, quantitative analyses support the idea that skill levels and skill profiles measure a 
single concept. In so doing, the level of education constitutes the less valid measure as it 
comprises primary education which, in turn, is irrelevant for the provision of firm- and field- 
specific skills. We can therefore conclude that the only labour-skill factor which companies 
actually require for the pursuit of different competitive strategies are employees with firm- and, 
respectively, field-specific skills. While the pursuit of a DQP strategy relies on employees with
102 The comparatively low value o f the raw Alpha Cronbach (.379) results, firstly, from a nonstandard distribution of 
cases on the two indices and, secondly, from the different measurement scales on which these indices are based.
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firm-specific skills, employees with field-specific skills are necessary for an RPI strategy. The 
pursuit o f  an LCP strategy, in turn, requires neither firm- nor field-specific employee 
qualifications.
4.2.3.3. Summarising and Interpreting the Findings on Skill Profiles
Overall, the assessment of the VoC hypotheses (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001) has provided 
three noteworthy results. Firstly, education level per se is not related to the pursuit of any 
competitive strategy. The simple reason for this is that a balance exists between the educational 
level and the resulting productivity of employees. The longer employees are in education, the 
more they are productive. This finding addresses the concerns of neoclassical (Heckscher 1919: 
57; 55; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54) and neoliberal proponents (Sinn 2005) that Low Cost Producers are 
not competitive in high-wage countries. Our findings suggest these concerns to be irrelevant, 
because highly paid employees are highly productive due to the fact that they have completed 
higher education. This, in turn, explains not only why firms pursuing an LCP strategy can be 
found in Germany, Italy, and the UK alike (see chapter 1): it also explains why no noteworthy 
relocation of Low Cost Producers from high- to low-wage countries can be observed.
Secondly, educational trajectory has a facilitative impact on competitive strategy to the 
extent that it provides employees with specific skill profiles. While secondary, vocational training 
teaches firm-specific skills to future employees, tertiary university education provides future 
employees with field-specific skills. The fact that education level also captures the firm-/field- 
specificness of employee skills makes it an alternative measure for skill profiles. However, since 
primary education provides neither firm- nor field-specific skills, the inclusion of this education 
level distorts the extent to which the education-level indicator reports skill profiles. Therefore, the 
indicator which evaluates skill profiles on the basis of job tenure rates, vocational training 
efforts, and on-the-job training courses constitutes a better measure for skill profiles than the 
educational trajectory of employees.
Finally, and as a corollary of the two previous findings, we have seen that different skill 
profiles constitute a necessary input factor for the pursuit of different competitive 
strategies.While Radical Product Innovators require employees with field-specific skills, 
Diversified Quality Producers need a workforce with firm-specific skills. Low Cost Producers, in 
turn, differ significantly from both radically and incrementally innovative firms in that they can 
operate without firm- or field-specific employee skills. Interestingly, the finding that different
103 i.e. the 2ary-/3ary-ness index, the firm-/field-specificness index, and their interaction effect.
competitive strategies require different skill profiles raises a new question: given the claim of the 
VoC scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; 29-30; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145; 150-155) 
that national institutions differ notably in the extent to which they provide firm- and field-specific 
skills, how do Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers secure the required 
skill profiles in different institutional environments? It will be the aim of section 4.2.4. to shed 
light on this question.
4.2.4. Institutions and Institutional Equivalents providing Specific Skill Profiles
The previous analyses showed that radically innovative firms require employees with 
field-specific skills, whereas incrementally innovative companies need employees with firm- 
specific skills. Yet the contributors to the VoC literature (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; 29-30; 
Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 145; 150-155) argue that flexible (and, respectively, rigid) labour 
markets notably limit the extent to which employers and employees are willing to invest in firm- 
(field-) specific skills. Hence, the question arises of how the required skill profiles are provided in 
different institutional environments. That is, how can Radical Product Innovators in rigid labour- 
market economies secure employees with field-specific skills? And how do Diversified Quality 
Producers in flexible labour-markets economies acquire employees with firm-specific skills?
Let us start by addressing the first question by analysing how field-specific skills are 
provided to firms in Germany and Italy, both of which constitute ideal-typical examples of rigid 
labour-market economies. It should be remembered that the labour-market institutions which are 
said to further the provision of firm-specific skills and, consequently, to militate against the 
provision of field-specific skills are the four following ones: a centralised wage-bargaining 
system which leads to equal wage levels for equal qualifications. This, in turn, may make it 
difficult to incite and reward employees with outstanding qualifications through extraordinary 
salaries. Furthermore, works councils with strong authority over layoffs complicate dismissal, as 
do long notice periods, and the pronounced use o f competition clauses. Since these labour-market 
institutions tie employees to one firm, they make frequent job changes difficult with the result 
that employees acquire firm- rather than field-specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; see 
also Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:150-155). j
But do these labour market institutions actually constitute obstacles to the provision of | 
field-specific skills? When asking HR managers from German and Italian RPIs whether a j 
centralised wage-bargaining system was important to their wage-setting policy, they usually \ 
denied this to be the case. In Germany, the broad majority of RPIs (namely 86% of all RPIs 1 
interviewed) are not tarifgebunden. Instead of paying their workforce according to salary levels
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determined in industry-wide collective agreements, German RPIs set wages on an individual 
basis with employees. In Italy, by contrast, all firms in an industry must pay their employees at 
least the salary determined in the Contralto Collettivo Nazionale di Lavoro (henceforth CCNL). 
However, the CCNL only determines the minimum remuneration that has to be disbursed. 
Employers can, and do, pay wages above the CCNL wage floor. Accordingly, the majority of 
Italian RPIs (namely 57% of all interviewed RPIs) also negotiate wages on an individual basis 
with their employees instead of paying company-wide wage top-ups. It is interesting to note that, 
in order to determine adequate salary levels, both German and Italian RPIs draw substantially on 
the insights of industry-wide salary surveys -  as do RPIs in the UK. Overall, these insights 
suggest that a centralised wage-bargaining system does not hinder employers in rigid labour 
markets from setting wages according to their company’s needs.
In a similar vein, the constraints deriving from labour-market regulation on works- 
councils, notice periods and competition clauses are also reduced. With regard to the latter, 
interviews revealed that the use of competition clauses is more widespread in the UK than in 
Germany and Italy. And, of course, no rule obliges German and Italian RPIs to tie employees to 
their company by writing competition clauses into employment contracts. Likewise, HR 
managers in Germany and Italy did not perceive long notice periods to be an obstacle when 
wanting to lay off employees. Instead, the limited number of reasons for which employees in 
Germany and Italy can lawfully be dismissed was sometimes considered a constraint. This is 
particularly true since German and Italian works councils have an important say in dismissal. 
Accordingly, they can make sure that these reasons are respected meticulously.
That said, it is important to note that only a limited number of the German Radical 
Product Innovators interviewed (14%) actually have a works council. In the majority of Italian 
RPIs, in contrast, a works council is in place (71%), since the latter is said to constitute an 
important means of communication between employers and employees. Overall we find that 
communication between managers and subordinates is often so well-developed in smaller RPIs 
that employees have never asked for a works council to be installed. But even in those cases 
where larger RPIs have (to have) a works council, and want to dismiss employees for reasons not 
acknowledged by law104, works councils are hardly perceived as a constraint. The reason for this 
is that in such cases it is in the common interests of employers and employees alike to find a 
compromise, because law suits are costly, tedious, and potentially harmful to both the firm’s and 
the employee’s reputation. Depending on the individual relationship between managers and the
104 i.e. for reasons other than serious economic constraints, or the wilful misconduct o f  an employee.
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works council, the latter is often perceived as a benefit rather than a constraint, because it acts as 
a mediator.
In sum, interviews with HR managers from German and Italian RPIs suggest that the VoC 
scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24-26; see also Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:150-155) overestimate 
the stringency of rigid labour-market regulations. A centralised wage-bargaining system, 
competition clauses, and long notice periods do not force RPI-employers to offer long job tenure. 
While it is true that limited possibilities for dismissal, in combination with strong works councils, 
de jure militate against short job tenure, they do not de facto oblige RPIs to retain an employee 
against their will.
In addition to this, the interviews also show that the VoC contributors (ibid) underestimate 
the creativeness with which Radical Product Innovators in rigid labour markets secure employees 
with field-specific skills. On the one hand, RPIs teach their employees field-specific skills by 
offering on-the-job training courses, e.g. in regulatory affairs, in specific research areas, or in the 
field of corporate finance (etc.). On the other hand, given that rigid labour-market regulations 
complicate the employment of temporary workers, both German and Italian RPIs find a variety of 
ways to secure temporary collaborators. Most importantly, German and Italian RPIs cooperate 
closely with universities and public research institutes: They offer PhD- or post-doc opportunities 
to young academics, and they also commission research projects from university professors and 
their assistants. In so doing, Radical Product Innovators gain highly qualified people with field- 
specific skills to work on their research projects for a limited period of time105. In sum, we find 
that RPIs in rigid labour markets circumvent national institutions through what I will call in the 
following improvisation on a contractual basis: Instead of relying on national institutions, they 
conclude contracts with the aim of securing project collaborators or providing their employees 
with field-specific skills.
103 It is interesting to note that project collaboration (collaborazione a progetto) has even been institutionalised in 
Italy. Since 1973, the Italian government has launched several initiatives which grant tax relief to firms for 
employing so-called collaboratori a progetto (see DPR 597 1973). These collaborators work on a company’s 
(research) project for a maximum period o f three years. Afterwards, firms are expected, but not obliged, to offer 
open-ended employment to collaborators. But, since recruitment is not compulsory, Italian RPIs often prefer to 
employ new collaborators instead of retaining the former ones. In other words, Radical Product Innovators (mis)use 
government subsidies as a means o f securing field-specific skills, rather than as an opportunity to endow future 
employees with firm-specific skills.
These insights suggest that the rigid German and Italian labour market even constitutes an advantage for providing 
Radical Product Innovators with field-specific skills. In the UK, young academics are more easily absorbed by the 
labour market because their dismissal is less complicated. Compared to their British counterparts, German and 
particularly Italian graduates have more difficulties in finding a first job. On the one hand, this makes that the 
number o f young academics willing to gain a first work experience as (management) trainees, collaboratori, or 
assistants to university professors is relatively high. Consequently, German and Italian RPIs can temporarily utilize 
highly skilled graduates by paying very low remunerations. On the other hand, the large pool of recent graduates 
looking for a job also stimulates government initiatives which subsidise firms for offering a first job experience.
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Overall, these findings suggest that the VoC scholars have an overly deterministic 
perception of entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers. The variety of ways in which Radical 
Product Innovators in rigid labour-market economies secure employees with field-specific skills 
shows that entrepreneurs are less institutionally determined, and more creative than assumed by 
the VoC literature. This, in turn, indicates that Schumpeter’s perception of entrepreneurs as 
independent innovators is more helpful in understanding how firms gain competitiveness in 
different institutional environments (see Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4). As Schumpeter points out, 
entrepreneurs must be highly inventive in order to realise a business idea which entails the 
competitive advantage of a temporary monopoly in a (new) product market (see Schumpeter 
1942: 81-106). This is precisely what we find when studying how entrepreneurs secure required 
input factors in different institutional environments: They are by no means constrained in that 
they (have to) pursue the strategy most facilitated by national institutions. Instead, entrepreneurs 
circumvent those institutions that hinder them in realising their preferred business strategy.
Similar arguments result from the study of how Diversified Quality Producers secure 
employees with firm-specific skills in flexible labour markets. The VoC contributors point out 
that a flexible labour market deters both employers and employees from investing in firm-specific 
training. The reason for this is that wage-bargaining decentralisation, weak works councils, short 
notice periods and a limited use of competition clauses do not assure employers against the risk 
of poaching, whereas employees are exposed to hire and fire at will (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29- 
30; see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 150-155). So, how do British DQPs secure employees with firm- 
specific skills?
When interviewing HR managers from British DQPs, I asked about the importance o f the 
aforementioned labour-market institutions for providing firm-specific skills. Interestingly, it 
turned out that neither competition clauses, nor notice periods or works councils played a 
significant role. Even though the use of competition clauses is more common in Britain than in 
Germany and Italy, they do not de facto constitute an important means of tying employees to a 
firm. The reason for this is that in case of a lawsuit, judges tend to defend the position of the 
weaker party, i.e. of the employee who wishes to change job. Hence, competition clauses do not 
assure employers of British DQPs against the risk of poaching. Similarly, weak works councils, 
short notice periods, and a variety of legally admitted causes of dismissal actually expose the 
employees of British DQPs to the risk of layoff.
Nevertheless, Diversified Quality Producers in the UK endow their employees with firm- 
specific skills in a variety of ways. Firstly, they offer attractive long-term career paths. To give an 
example, employees are offered the opportunity to participate in on-the-job training courses
157
which prepare them for intra-fum promotion. Some British DQPs also provide pension schemes 
which only become attractive in the long run. Secondly, Diversified Quality Producers in the UK i 
invest massively in firm-specific training courses. Finally, they also invest in the education of I 
(future) employees. More precisely, they offer young people the opportunity to do an internship, 
or to undertake an (industrial) placement as a part of their degree. In so doing, it is the stated aim 
of Diversified Quality Producers to recruit well performing trainees at the end of their educational 
program106. Furthermore, British DQPs encourage talented employees to enrol in higher 
education, e.g. to do an MSc in a field which is key to the company’s activities. The tuition fees 
of these programs are usually covered by the company. Obviously, employees are encouraged to 
obtain such degrees because the firm wishes to retain them upon completion of the program. 
Before enrolling in higher education, employees of Diversified Quality Producers therefore 
usually sign a contract with their employer which stipulates that they have to pay back the tuition 
fees if they change firm upon completion of their degree. In sum, we once again find that firms 
circumvent national institutions by securing their required skill profiles through improvisation on 
a contractual basis.
These insights again suggest that the VoC contributors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 29-30; 
see also Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 150-155) overestimate the stringency of labour-market 
regulation. The fact that Diversified Quality Producers in flexible labour markets can dismiss 
employees at short notice does not mean that they must do so. Furthermore, the verve with which 
British DQPs provide employees with firm-specific skills indicates that the VoC contributors also 
underestimate the creativeness of entrepreneurs.
Considering the efforts of British DQPs to provide employees with firm-specific skills, 
and the willingness of British employees to acquire such skills, two final questions remain. 
Firstly, why do DQP employers invest in firm-specific training if a flexible labour market entails 
the risk that skilled employees are poached by competitors? When posing this question to HR 
managers, they were amazed by my reasoning: why should employees leave a firm which 
actively cares about their education? On the contrary, HR managers pointed out that the more a 
company invests in skills, the less employees are likely to leave. According to my interviewees, 
the reason for this is that employees feel their qualifications to be appreciated, which - in turn - 
raises reasonable hopes that the company will continue to invest in their career. Apart from these
106 It is interesting to note that the British government is considering institutionalising such training efforts. In 2003, 
a pilot project was launched which mimics the German vocational training system in that trainees are educated in 
close collaboration with one company. More precisely, companies offer the opportunity to undertake a one year 
industrial placement as part of their, overall, three-year training course. While it is still unclear to what extent joint 
vocational training will be institutionalised, HR managers from British DQPs were very positive about this initiative.
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rather practical considerations, another more theoretical reason seems to apply. As pointed out by 
Becker (Becker 1975: 26-27), firm-specific skills are only useful within the context o f one firm. 
By definition, competitors will not therefore be interested in poaching employees with firm- 
specific skills because the latter are simply useless to them. Thus, it is rational for Diversified 
Quality Producers to invest in firm-specific training, irrespective of whether they are based in 
rigid or in flexible labour market economies.107
But why do the employees of Diversified Quality Producers in the UK invest in firm- 
specific skills if they face the constant risk o f overnight dismissal? Let us recall that in flexible 
labour-market economies the cost of further education is entirely passed on to potential 
employees (see section 4.2.1.). This means that employees who do not want to, or cannot make 
the investment of enrolling in higher education are left with primary education levels and no 
specific skill profile. Viewing this situation in the light of the opportunity of receiving firm- 
specific training, the latter option is definitely more attractive. Even if  the employee were to lose 
their job, they would presumably be better off if  they had received (firm-specific) training than if 
they remained without. Furthermore, the risk of dismissal seems to be less acute for DQP 
employees than for those of RPIs because the pursuit of a DQP strategy is comparatively less 
risky. The risk of total failure is reduced. And considering that Diversified Quality Producers rely 
heavily on and invest in the skills of their workforce, the latter is unlikely to be dismissed 
overnight. It is therefore rational for employees to invest in firm-specific skills -  even if  the 
company which provides such skills is based in a flexible labour-market economy. In sum, apart 
from its overly deterministic understanding of entrepreneurs and its excessively constraining 
view o f institutions, the VoC literature can be criticised for overestimating the risk of overnight 
dismissal related to the pursuit of a DQP strategy, and the opportunities related to teaching and 
acquiring firm-specific skills in flexible labour-market economies.
107 In line with this reasoning, it is interesting to note that companies actually seek to retain their employees 
whenever the latter acquire firm-, and/or field-specific skills due to firm-sponsored training. This is particularly true 
for employees who are encouraged to do a degree in higher education which is paid by the company. In these cases, 
employees usually have to pay (a part of) their tuition fees back if they wish to leave the firm upon completion of 
their degree.
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43. T h e  H y po t h e s e s  o f  t h e  I n n o v a t io n  L it e r a t u r e  on  Scientific 
K n o w led g e  D iv e r s it y
As already mentioned in the introduction to section 4.2., different strands of the 
competitiveness literature propose different hypotheses on the link between institutions, labour 
qualifications, and their importance for competitive strategies. In section 4.2., I tested the 
hypotheses proposed by the VoC literature (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24- 
27; 29-30; 39-44). The findings resulting from these analyses also called the arguments of 
neoclassical (Heckscher 1919: 57; 55; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54) and neoliberal proponents (Sinn 
2005) into question, in that these scholars assert that low labour costs are decisive for a firm’s 
competitiveness in general, and for its choice of competitive strategy in particular.
In addition to the VoC literature, the innovation literature proposes another set of 
hypotheses about how national institutions facilitate the provision of labour qualifications 
required for different competitive strategies (Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Hollingsworth and 
Hollingsworth 2000: 223-224; Freeman 1992: 170-171; 182; Dalum et al. 1992: 303; Nelson 
1993: 511; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 90-92). Yet the innovation literature focuses on the knowledge 
base of a firm’s scientists rather than on the skill types of its entire workforce. It will be the aim 
of section 4.3. to present and test these hypotheses. In that, I focus on the arguments of 
Hollingsworth (2000), as he proposes the most developed hypotheses within the innovation 
literature. So, let us turn to assess whether institutions provide scientists with diverse knowledge 
which, in turn, is required for the pursuit of specific competitive strategies.
43,1. The Innovation Literature’s Hypotheses: How Different Research Systems 
provide Scientific Knowledge for Different Competitive Strategies
Similar to the provision of adequate labour skills, a coordination problem arises whenever 
a firm seeks to secure scientists with an adequate knowledge base. More precisely, firms are 
vulnerable to the ‘hold up’ problem (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 24). While this problem 
potentially applies to a firm’s entire workforce, it is particularly acute with regard to scientists, as 
the latter are key to the innovation potential of a company. Since the concept of hold-up has 
already been discussed in chapter 3 (see section 3.2.), suffice it to say here that a research project 
on which several scientists collaborate risks being held up if the latter do not agree on how to 
proceed. Given the high chance element inherent in R&D activities, scientists may find it difficult 




Given the risk of hold-up related to R&D activities, companies have two possibilities: 
They can, simply, decide not to employ scientists and not to engage in research and 
development which, in turn, eliminates the hold-up problem. However, if  companies decide to 
engage in research and development, the innovation literature suggests that two institutional 
solutions to this problem exist, which depend on how national research systems are organised. In 
-  what I call in line with previous terminology -  rigid research systems, scientists tend to follow 
a career in close collaboration with one university or research institute. While opportunities are 
limited and it takes a long time for scientists to obtain tenure, those scientists who secure tenure 
positions become civil servants and enjoy noteworthy autonomy regarding the research they wish 
to pursue. In that, senior scientists not only design their own research projects, they also choose 
their collaborators. Since the careers of junior scientists depend on the support of their 
Doktorvater, the former entertain long-lasting employment relationships with their supervisor 
(see Hollingsworth 2000: 629). Overall, this means that the knowledge o f scientists working in 
one area of research is fairly homogenous because senior scientists rarely change their research 
focus, while junior scientists collaborate closely and for a long-time with them. Homogeneous 
scientific knowledge, in turn, leads to hold-up problems being solved in a cooperative way. Hold­
up is already less likely to occur because scientists have a very similar perception of how to do 
research. Furthermore, scientists are used and willing to compromise because rigid research 
systems make it disadvantageous to leave the team in the case o f a disagreement. In sum, 
scientists employed by companies in rigid research systems have rather homogeneous knowledge 
which, in turn, means that a hold-up problem -  if it occurs -  is solved in a cooperative way.
The opposite holds true for -  what I call -  flexile research systems. In such systems, 
senior scientists are not civil servants, nor do they enjoy unilateral decision-making power 
regarding the projects they wish to pursue and the collaborators they want to employ. Instead, 
only the most promising and rewarding research projects are funded, and the best performing 
scientists recruited. Since these scientists often come from different universities, countries, and 
disciplines, research teams are often made up of scientists with very heterogeneous knowledge 
(see Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223-224). This, in turn, means that hold-up 
problems are resolved in a competitive way. In flexible research systems, disagreement and -  
hence -  hold-up problems are more likely to occur due to the diversity o f ways in which scientists 
are used to think about solutions to problems. However, in flexible research systems, scientists 
who disagree can move on to another university without harming their career. Thus, hold-up 
problems are solved in a competitive way as the necessity to compromise is reduced so that the 





in flexible research systems have rather heterogeneous knowledge which implies that hold-up | 
problems are solved in a competitive way. |
But how are differences in the knowledge base o f a firm’s scientists linked to the pursuit I 
of different competitive strategies? Deductive reasoning suggests that the decision to prevent a 
hold-up problem by not engaging in R&D activities furthers the pursuit of an LCP strategy. Since 
Low Cost Producers imitate the inventions of others, they simply do not require scientists who 
search for innovations. This is different for both Radical Product Innovators and Diversified 
Quality Producers whose competitive success depends on radical and, respectively, on 
incremental innovation. Accordingly, both RPIs and DQPs need to employ scientists. In so doing, 
the employment o f heterogeneous scientific knowledge seems to facilitate the pursuit of an RPI 
strategy. As contributors to the innovation literature point out, ‘it might take an enormous 
intellectual effort or an extremely creative mind, to identify a potential new combination.’ 
(Lundvall 1992a: 8; see also Johnson 1992: 29). In addition, scientists who have worked in 
diverse environments collaborating with researchers from different universities, countries and 
disciplines are more likely to have the necessary innovative potential. That is, scientists with 
heterogeneous knowledge are more likely to be radically innovative because of their high 
imaginative capacities. Therefore, heterogeneous scientific knowledge arguably facilitates the 
pursuit o f an RPI strategy (see Hollingsworth 2000: 628; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 
223-224).
In accordance with this line of argument, homogeneous scientific knowledge seems to 
promote the pursuit o f a DQP strategy. On the one hand, scientists with homogeneous knowledge | 
have worked within the same field of research and the same team for a long time. Accordingly, I 
they not only have an in-depth understanding of the technological opportunities in this area, they 
are also so used to one environment that they presumably have difficulty imagining an entirely 
new reality. Scientists with homogeneous knowledge therefore seem to lack the creative capacity 
to come up with radically new ideas. On the other hand, these scientists are also used to 
cooperating, and to combining their insights in order to develop discovered technologies into 
incremental innovations. Overall, this means that homogenous scientific knowledge facilitates 
DQP (see Hollingsworth 2000: 627; 628-629).
In sum, the innovation literature suggests that no scientific knowledge promotes the 
pursuit of an LCP strategy, whereas homogeneous scientific knowledge is behind a DQP strategy.
An RPI strategy, in turn, seems to be facilitated by heterogeneous scientific skills. Table 4.6. 
provides an overview of these hypotheses.
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Table 4.6: Hypothetical Relationships between Scientific Knowledge and Competitive Strategies




Production Strategy H om ogeneous 
Scientific K now ledge
H eterogeneous 
Scientific K now ledge
1. R ad ica l Product Innovation X
2. D iversified Quality Production X
3. L o w  Cost Production X
Source: Own Illustration
43 .2 . Verifying the Innovation Literature’s Hypotheses on the Diversity of 
Scientific Knowledge
Before testing the aforementioned hypotheses, I want to repeat the two methodological 
remarks made in the introduction to section 4.2.2.. Firstly, it is important to note that the 
following analyses are grounded on a combination of qualitative insights and quantitative 
analyses. As mentioned previously, I obtained the data on which the subsequent quantitative 
analyses are based from carrying out in-depth interviews with Human Resources managers from 
69 pharmaceutical companies. These interviews not only allowed me to accumulate quantitative 
data, they also provided precious insights into the importance of diverse labour qualifications for 
competitive strategies. These qualitative insights were crucial for structuring and interpreting the 
following quantitative analyses. Secondly, the quantitative results reported in section 4.3.2. are 
derived from the overall dataset. It should however be noted that I cross-checked these results by 
rerunning all analyses for each country separately. Importantly, these country-specific results did 
not reveal any significant deviations from the overall outcome. That said, let us turn to test the 
hypotheses of the innovation literature on the importance of scientific knowledge for different 
competitive strategies.
4.3.2.1. T estin g  t h e  In n o v a t io n  L iter a tu re’s Hypotheses on Scien tific  Kn o w led g e
To being with, the hypothesis on the pursuit of an LCP strategy is verified without further 
ado. None of the Low Cost Producers whose representatives I interviewed employed scientists 
with the aim of discovering and developing radical or incremental innovations. Instead, scientists 
focus on imitating the inventions of others. Hence, they have clear instructions regarding the 
purpose of their work, and the means and methods to be employed. This means that the risk of 
hold-up is eliminated because the outcome of each scientific collaboration is defined from the 
outset.
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This is different for Radical Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers alike, 
both of which employ scientists with the aim of discovering and developing incrementally or !
radically new technologies. Since the outcomes of such scientific efforts cannot be specified from ^
the beginning, the hold-up problem is acute. But, is it true that Diversified Quality Producers j 
prevent this problem through scientific knowledge homogeneity, whereas Radical Product | 
Innovators solve it through scientific knowledge heterogeneity? To test this hypothesis, I created 
a ‘knowledge-diversity index'. While the measurement o f knowledge diversity is not without its 
problems108, the index describes how often the scientists employed by one firm come from a 
different background. To determine this knowledge diversity, I asked HR managers to indicate 
from how many different disciplines, countries and universities their researchers originated109.1 
took the average of these three figures as an indicator for the frequency with which scientists 
have a dissimilar background.110
Table 4.7. provides an overview o f the results obtained. The figures should be read as I 
follows: on average, every 11th researcher has a dissimilar background in that s/he comes from a 
different discipline, country or university. Hence, the higher the figure, the more homogeneous 
the knowledge of scientists. If the hypotheses derived from the innovation literature hold true (see 
Hollingsworth 2000: 627; 628-629; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223-224; Lundvall 
1992a: 8; Johnson 1992: 29), Diversified Quality Producers should score higher on the 
knowledge-diversity index than Radical Product Innovators. Table 4.7., indeed, shows that 
British, German, and Italian RPIs always achieve scores below the national average, whereas 
British, German and Italian DQPs score above average. It is furthermore interesting to note that
108 The reasons for which the elaboration of a knowledge-diversity index is difficult are manifold. Yet, two questions 
are of particular prominence. Firstly, firms often work on radical or incremental innovations in collaboration with 
other companies or research institutes. Hence, the question arises o f whether the knowledge diversity o f external 
researchers, being employed by others but working on the research projects o f  the interviewed company, should also 
be taken into account. In perceiving collaborations with others as a functional equivalent that allows to make up for 
missing scientific competences inside the own firm (see section 4.3.3.), I decided to consider only the knowledge 
diversity o f those scientists who are actually employed by the company interviewed.
Secondly, it is difficult to judge the relative importance of diverse knowledge. Does knowledge diversity already 
increase i f  only one researcher comes from a different background (country, discipline, university), or is a minimum 
number o f  researchers required? While I retained the first approach for SMEs, I took the second approach in the case 
o f large companies with more than 500 employees. Similarly, the question arises whether the knowledge background 
o f superiors (i.e. senior scientists) leads to stronger knowledge diversity than the knowledge background of 
subordinates (i.e. junior scientists)? Since the answer most probably varies from one company to the other, I assumed 
that the background o f scientists has the same impact on knowledge diversity irrespective of the position a scientist 
holds.
109 For the literal phrasing of these questions, see questions 2B)2., 2B)3. and 2B)4. of the questionnaire reproduced in 
the appendix.
110 For more clarity, consider the following example: a company employs 60 researchers who come from 15 different 
universities, 6 different countries and 3 different disciplines. This means that every 4* (= 60/15) scientist comes from 
a different university, every 10th (= 60/6) scientist comes from a different country, and every 20th (= 60/3) scientist 
comes from a different discipline. Thus, on average, every 11th (= (4+10+20) / 3 ) researcher has a dissimilar 
background.
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the absolute scores of Radical Product Innovators on the one hand, and Diversified Quality 
Producers on the other, do not indicate any noteworthy country-specific variations.
Table 4.7: Diversity of Scientific Knowledge by Country and Competitive Strategy
(Frequency w ith w hich scientists come from  different backgrounds)
G r o u p  o f  F irm s
No. o f  
Cases
D iversity  of S cien tific  K now ledge
Absolute Figures 
(Every n-th scientist com es 
from a different background)
% of National Average
Average RPIs UK 5 3rd 18%
A verage DQPs UK 8 25“ 147%
O verall Average UK (all UK Firms) 13 Ï71 100%
Average RPIs Germany 6 6“ 17%
Average DQPs Germany 10
53H 147%
O verall Average Germany (all German Firms) 16 36“ 10 0%
Average RPIs Italy 7 10“ 38%
Average DQPs Italy 10 37“ 142%
O verall Average Italy (all Italian Finns) 17 26s 10 0%
Overall Average RPIs 18 7“ 26%
Overall Average DQPs 28 39“ 144%
O verall Average (All Firms) 46 27“ 10 0%
Source: Own illustration, evaluating questions 2B)2., 2B)3. and 2B)4. (see appendix for questionnaire)
While table 4.7. suggests that Diversified Quality Producers need homogeneous scientific 
knowledge whereas Radical Product Innovators require scientists with heterogeneous knowledge, 
it is necessary to test the robustness of these findings with the aid of quantitative analyses. A 
correlation analysis shows that the knowledge diversity of a company’s scientists strongly 
correlates with the firm’s competitive strategy (R peaison -  .555; R2 = .308; p < 0.01 (2-tailed 
test)). Needless to say, a logistic regression analysis testing the impact of knowledge diversity on 
the pursuit of competitive strategy confirms this result because Low Cost Producers cannot be 
used as a control category111.
It is therefore opportune to assess the relative importance of knowledge diversity by 
including a rival explanator for a firm’s strategy into the regression analyses. This will also 
provide insights into the extent to which diverse scientific knowledge constitutes a necessary
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input factor. Previous analyses revealed a firm’s age to be the strongest alternative explanation 
for which a firm pursues a certain strategy (see sections 2.3.2.). Consequently, I carried out two 
logistic regressions in which I tested the joint impact of a firm’s age and the knowledge ' 
heterogeneity of its scientists on an RPI strategy. In so doing, I used the enter method in the first | 
analysis, and a stepwise (forward: LR) method in the second. As mentioned previously, Low Cost | 
Producers were excluded from these analyses, as they do not employ scientists for R&D I 
activities. The results obtained are summarised in table 4.8.. Interestingly, they indicate that the 
knowledge diversity of a firm’s scientists actually constitutes a necessary input factor for the 
pursuit of a competitive strategy: the heterogeneity index qualifies as the only significant, as well 
as much stronger predictor of an RPI strategy in the first analysis. Given the weak explanatory 
power of firm-age compared to scientific knowledge heterogeneity, the latter is retained as the 
only significant explanator of a firm’s strategy in analysis 2UZ. These results confimi the 
hypothesis that homogeneous scientific knowledge is required for the pursuit of a DQP strategy, 
whereas heterogeneous scientific knowledge is necessary for an RPI strategy.
Table 4.8.: Impact of Scientific Knowledge Diversity and Firm*Age on Comp. Strategy
Results of Nominal Logistic Regression Analysis (Standardised B)
Independent V ariab les
D ependent V ariable: Radical Product Innovation






R Nagelkerke .725 .722
Significance levels: *<0.10 **<0.05 ***<0.01
But does scientific knowledge diversity ‘only’ constitute a necessary input factor for a 
given strategy, or does the employment of scientists with diverse knowledge also result from the 
strategy pursued? To shed light on this question, a rival explanation for the employment of I
111 The reason for this is that Low Cost Producers do not employ scientists for R&D activities. This absence of 
scientific knowledge leads to a perfect split between LCPs and non-LCPs which, in turn, does not produce instructive 
quantitative results.
112 Since the scientific-heterogeneity index constitutes the reciprocal value of the scientific-homogeneity index, 
identical results are obtained from regressing the latter together with firm -age on the pursuit of a DQP strategy.
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scientific knowledge is required. Various correlation analyses113 reveal that a firm’s age provides 
the best rival hypothesis: the younger a company, the more heterogeneous scientific knowledge is 
required. The reason for this is, presumably, that the variety of tasks to be performed by one 
person is higher in younger than in incumbent firms, and scientists from different backgrounds 
are m ore qualified to meet this challenge. A simple linear regression analysis, testing the relative 
impact o f firm-age and RPI strategy on the basis of the enter method, shows that both predictors 
constitute important explanations for the employment of heterogeneous scientific skills. However, 
as soon as a forward stepwise method is used, a firm’s age qualifies as the better explanation for 
the scientific knowledge employed. These findings allow us to conclude that the innovation 
literature (see Hollingsworth 2000: 627; 628-629; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223- 
224; Lundvall 1992a: 8; Johnson 1992: 29) is right in suggesting that diverse scientific 
knowledge (only) constitutes a necessary input factor: while Diversified Quality Producers need 
scientists with homogeneous knowledge, Radical Product Innovators require scientists with 
heterogeneous knowledge.
4 3 .2 .2 . T h e  R e l a t iv e  Im po r ta n c e  o f  Sk ill  SPEcmcnY a n d  Sc ien tific  Kn o w l e d g e  
D iv e r s i t y  f o r  C o m p e t it iv e  Strategy
In section 4.2.3.2. we found skill levels and skill profiles to be two different indicators of 
the same concept, namely skill specificity. This finding raises doubts about whether specific 
employee skills and scientific knowledge diversity actually measure two different concepts. The 
knowledge-diversity indicator could simply be an alternative measure of skill specificity. To be 
more concrete, the question arises as to whether Diversified Quality Producers actually require 
employees with firm-specific skills as well as scientists with homogeneous knowledge? Or, is it 
sufficient for a DQP strategy that employees have firm-specific skills, with knowledge 
homogeneity indicating that scientists are endowed with such skills? It could, for example, be 
imagined that scientists have acquired firm-specific skills by working for a long time in the same 
company, where they also obtained homogeneous knowledge. Then, firm-specific skills and 
homogeneous scientific knowledge would merely constitute different measures of the same 
concept. Obviously, the opposite line of argument applies to the pursuit of an RPI strategy.
So, let us test whether skill specificity and knowledge diversity are two indicators of the 
same concept114. At first sight, a correlation analysis suggests this to be the case, as the skill-
113 More precisely, I carried out 3 correlation analyses between scientific knowledge diversity and (1 ) a firm’s 
country, (2) its number o f employees and (3) its age.
114 In line with section 4.2.3.2., I had to exclude Low Cost Producers from all subsequent analyses. The reason for 
this is that Low Cost Producers do not employ scientists for R&D activities. The absence of scientific knowledge
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profile and knowledge-diversity index co-vary strongly (R Peareon = .512; R2 = .262; p < 0.01 (2- 
tailed test)). However, a reliability test casts doubt on this idea: while the standardised Alpha 
Cronbach (.678) is comparatively high, the raw Alpha Cronbach (.088) is extremely close to 0.
Yet, the low score of the raw Alpha Cronbach could still be the result of an abnormal distribution 
of cases and differences in the measurement scale on which the two indices are composed.
It is therefore opportune to resort to logistic regression analyses in order to test whether ( 
skill specificity and knowledge diversity measure the same concept. As in section 4.23.2., I 
carried out two logistic regressions. I ran the first analysis with two models: the first assessed the 
importance of firm-/field-specific skills and homogeneous/heterogeneous knowledge for 
competitive strategy on the basis of the enter method. The second model added the interaction 
effects of these two variables and employed a stepwise (forward: LR) method. Interestingly, the 
results suggest that skill specificity and knowledge diversity measure two different concepts  ̂
because -  contrary to section 4.23.2. -  both variables are retained as highly significant predictors | 
in the first model (pskiii specificity ̂  0.05, pknowledge diveisity ^  0.05). Results for the second model are j 
not provided. In other words, none of the three variables qualifies as a sufficiently significant | 
predictor for competitive strategy if (only) skill specificity and knowledge diversity are tested as I 
main effects. These results indicate that scientists with diverse knowledge do not merely form a | 
sub-group of employees with specific skill profiles. They are required in addition to the latter. |
The second logistic regression analysis confirms these findings: as in section 4.23.2., I I 
tested the explanatory power of specific employee skills, diverse scientific knowledge and the j 
interaction term of these two variables in a single model using a stepwise (forward: LR) method. | 
The results obtained are noteworthy in that they contrast with the results of section 4.23,2.: I
neither the skill-profile nor the knowledge-diversity index is retained as the strongest predictor.  ̂
Instead, the interaction effect -  now treated as an additional main effect -  qualifies as the | 
strongest predictor of competitive strategy. This suggests that a competitive strategy not only j 
requires employees with specific skills and, if possible, scientists with diverse knowledge, j
Instead, the strategy in question can only be pursued if both of these factors are present I
Accordingly, Diversified Quality Producers need firm-specific employee skills in combination | 
with homogeneous scientific knowledge, whereas Radical Product Innovators require field- 
specific employee skills combined with heterogeneous scientific knowledge. We can therefore
leads to a perfect split between LCPs and non-LCPs. This, in turn, would have distorted the following analyses on 
the operational independence of the skill-profile and scientific-knowledge indicator.
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conclude that the skill-profile and knowledge-diversity indicator do not constitute two measures 
for the same concept.115
4.3.2.3. Summarising and Interpreting the Findings on Scientific Knowledge
The findings on scientific knowledge diversity are straight-forward. In a word, the 
hypotheses derived from the innovation literature (see Hollingsworth 2000: 627; 628-629; 
Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000: 223-224; Lundvall 1992a: 8; Johnson 1992: 29) have 
proven correct. Since Low Cost Producers imitate the discoveries of others in order to sell at the 
most competitive prices, they abstain from all R&D activities. Accordingly, they do not need to 
employ scientists who search for new technologies.
This is different for both Diversified Quality Producers and Radical Product Innovators 
whose competitive strategies rely on incremental and, respectively, radical innovation. The above 
analyses have shown that Diversified Quality Producers require scientists with homogenous 
knowledge. The latter emerges from long-lasting employment relations with scientists from the 
same or similar disciplines, universities, and countries. The pursuit of an RPI strategy, in contrast, 
relies on scientists with heterogeneous knowledge which, in turn, materialises due to the diversity 
o f backgrounds from which researchers emanate. What is more, the above analyses have shown 
that the pursuit of a DQP or RPI strategy not only requires diverse scientific knowledge, but also 
requires employees with specific skill profiles. Thus, Diversified Quality Producers need 
scientists with homogeneous knowledge as well as employees with firm-specific skills, whereas 
Radical Product Innovators require scientists with heterogeneous knowledge in addition to 
employees with field-specific skills. Low Cost Producers, in turn, can operate without specific 
employee skills and without diverse scientific knowledge.
The finding that employee skills and scientific knowledge diversity constitute two 
independent concepts is noteworthy: it shows that the VoC literature on the one hand (see e.g. 
Hall and Soskice 2001a; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001), and the innovation literature on the other (see 
e.g. Hollingsworth 2000),(Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 2000; Lundvall 1992b) actually 
propose different arguments. Even though both literatures study the importance of labour
115 It should be noted that I cross-checked the results reported in this section according to the following reasoning. If 
it is true that the skill-level and the skill-profile index measure the same concept (namely skill specificity), whereas 
the skill-profile and the knowledge-diversity indicator measure different concepts, then the skill-level and the 
knowledge-diversity index should also measure different concepts. Similarly to the above section and to section 
4.2.3.2., I carried out a correlation analysis and a reliability test, as well as two logistic regression analyses. As 
expected, the respective results confirmed that the skill-level and knowledge-diversity indicator describe two 
different types o f labour qualifications. Thus, they do not constitute proxies for the same concept I therefore 
conclude that the pursuit o f a competitive strategy requires both employees with specific skills types, as well as 
scientists with diverse knowledge.
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qualifications for competitive strategies, they differ in their research foci. As mentioned 
previously, the VoC literature considers the firm as a whole and analyses how the qualification 
levels of the entire workforce impact on the firm’s innovative potential. The innovation literature 
focuses instead on those employees who are key to innovation, namely scientists. In so doing, it 
studies how scientists are able to come up with radical or incremental inventions. Due to their 
diverse analytical foci, these two strands o f the competitiveness literature do not describe the 
same phenomenon from different research perspectives. Instead, they propose two additional 
arguments.
4 3 3 . I n s t it u t io n s  a n d  I n s t it u t io n a l  E q u iv a l e n t s  p r o v i d in g  S c ie n t if ic  K n o w l e d g e
Like section 4.2., section 4.3. has shown that the pursuit of a DQP and an RPI strategy 
requires scientists with special qualifications. While Diversified Quality Producers need scientists 
with homogeneous knowledge, Radical Product Innovators require scientists with heterogeneous 
knowledge. The pursuit of an LCP strategy instead does not necessitate the employment of 
scientists because Low Cost Producers do not engage in research and development. Accordingly, 
firms pursuing an LCP strategy are not affected by institutions regulating national research 
systems.
This is not the case for Diversified Quality Producers and Radical Product Innovators. In 
rigid research systems, the concentration o f decision-making power in senior scientists means 
that researchers acquire homogeneous skills. Hence, the pursuit of an RPI strategy seems 
inherently difficult in such systems. In flexible research systems, in contrast, senior scientists are 
less autonomous in their decisions, and researchers acquire a more heterogeneous body of 
knowledge. This, in turn, seems to militate against the pursuit o f a DQP strategy.
So, what do RPIs in Germany and Italy do in order to secure scientists with heterogeneous 
knowledge, given that these two countries constitute ideal-typical examples of rigid research 
systems? When talking to HR managers from German and Italian RPIs, I discovered that the 
latter essentially resort to two functional equivalents in rigid research systems. Firstly, they resort 
to -  what I called in chapter 2 (section 2.4.3.) -  importation in that they hire scientists from 
abroad. The fact that the German and Italian research systems endow scientists with 
homogeneous knowledge does not oblige companies to employ them. Instead, it is not 
uncommon that key positions in German and Italian RPIs are held by foreign scientists. Such 
importation of scientific knowledge is possible due to open labour markets. Hence, firms avoid
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the constraints resulting from national research systems by drawing on international institutions 
which give them access to input factors provided in other economies.116
Secondly, Radical Product Innovators in rigid research systems also circumvent national 
institutions through what I called in section 4.2.4. improvisation on a contractual basis. On the 
one hand, RPIs increase the knowledge heterogeneity of their scientists by collaborating closely 
with other (international companies and research institutes. As mentioned in chapter 3 (section
3.3.1.), Radical Product Innovators have a general tendency to carry out research projects in 
collaboration with others. Interestingly, this tendency is particularly pronounced among Radical 
Product Innovators in Germany and Italy, which use joint research projects as a means to 
diversify the knowledge backgrounds of their scientists. On the other hand, German and Italian 
RPIs expose their scientists to heterogeneous knowledge by encouraging them to publish their 
research findings, and to present them at (international conferences. Such exposure of ideas to 
peer review provides scientists with a variety o f suggestions on how they could proceed with 
their work. These examples of entrepreneurial improvisation also illustrate the remarkable 
inventiveness of German and Italian entrepreneurs when securing scientists with adequate 
knowledge profiles.
But what about entrepreneurs in flexible research systems? How do British Diversified 
Quality Producers secure scientists with homogeneous knowledge, considering that the UK 
constitutes an ideal-typical example of a flexible research system? In a word, my interviews with 
HR managers from DQPs in the UK confirmed the previous findings: British Diversified Quality 
Producers circumvent national research systems, most notably by improvising on a contractual 
basis. Importantly, national research-system regulation is by no means constraining to the extent 
that companies must hire scientists with heterogeneous knowledge. Instead, firms can simply hire 
scientists who have graduated from the same university, work in the same discipline, and come 
from the same country. Anecdotal evidence illustrates this point. Until recently, a British biotech 
firm, which I will call BTF-41 for reasons of confidentiality, pursued an RPI strategy. In so 
doing, it hired British, Canadian, Polish, Hungarian and Indian scientists who had graduated in 3 
different disciplines, namely chemistry, biology and pharmacology. After having discovered a 
New Chemical Entity, BTF-41 changed its competitive strategy from RPI to DQP in order to
116 It is tempting to argue that circumventing national institutions though importation is better described as factor 
provision through foreign national institutions, because firms import scientific knowledge provided by the research 
systems o f other economies. Such factor transfer is, however, only possible in open labour markets. Hence, it is 
international labour-market regulation rather than foreign research systems which enables companies to secure input 
factors from abroad. The best example is provided by the European Community where the free circulation o f capital, 
goods, services and people has been guaranteed since the Single European Act o f 1986. This makes it easier for 
Radical Product Innovators to recruit scientists from EU- rather than from non-EU countries.
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develop the NCE into several marketable products. Since that time, BTF-41 has only hired British •
j
scientists who graduated in chemistry. This, in turn, demonstrates that national research-system 
regulation does not constitute a constraint: British companies are free to employ both scientists 
with heterogeneous, and scientists with homogeneous knowledge.
What is more, entrepreneurs from British DQPs show a noteworthy creativity to sustain, 
or even to intensify, the knowledge homogeneity of their scientists when improvising on a 
contractual basis. As pointed out above, scientists acquire homogenous knowledge whenever 
they share the same working environment for an extended period of time. Therefore, the 
organisation of the national research system plays an important role in endowing scientists with 
homogeneous knowledge. Yet, once scientists decide to leave academia, the working 
environment of a company can notably contribute to the cultivation of homogeneous scientific j 
knowledge. That is, the less scientists change company, the more their knowledge homogeneity is j
fostered. And, as pointed out in section 4.2.4., British DQPs are very inventive in their efforts to |
tie employees in general, and scientists in particular, to their company. On the one hand, they 
offer talented employees the opportunity o f intra-firm promotion. On the other hand, they also 
provide attractive pension schemes which, in turn, become financially interesting only if the j 
beneficiary stays with the company for an extended period of time. In sum, British entrepreneurs ;
j
resemble their German and Italian counterparts in their creativity to secure scientists with the 
required knowledge profiles. .
To conclude, these findings are interesting to the extent that they confirm our previous 
criticisms of the VoC literature (see section 4.2.4.). While it is true that national research systems ! 
provide diverse scientific knowledge, the innovation literature also merits criticism for its overly
I
deterministic perception of institutions (see Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; see also Lundvall 
1992c: 53; Andersen 1992: 75). We have seen that entrepreneurs are by no means obliged to 
exploit the scientific knowledge which emerges from national research systems. Instead, we have 
seen that entrepreneurs resort to two functionally equivalent institutions. On the one hand, they 
circumvent national research systems by drawing on open international labour markets so as to 
import the scientific knowledge they require. On the other hand, entrepreneurs circumvent
I
national institutions by improvising and concluding individual contracts with their scientists so as 
to secure the required knowledge base. Consequently, the innovation literature also needs to be 
criticised for perceiving firms as mere institution-takers. Contrary to this functionalist view, and 
in line with Schumpeter (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106), we 
have seen that entrepreneurs are remarkably independent and creative when acquiring necessary 
input factors. In sum, institutions are less constraining, and entrepreneurs more inventive, than
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portrayed by the innovation literature (see Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; see also Lundvall 
1992c: 53; Andersen 1992: 75).
4*4. C o n c lu d in g  I n terpreta tio n
So what have we learned about the link between institutions, labour qualifications and 
competitive strategies? To begin with, we have seen that different types of qualifications actually 
constitute necessary input factors. More precisely, the pursuit of an RPI strategy requires 
employees with field-specific skills and scientists with heterogeneous knowledge. A DQP 
strategy, in turn, relies on a workforce with firm-specific skills and on scientists with 
homogeneous knowledge. Low Cost Producers, by contrast, operate without requirements for 
specific skill profiles or scientific knowledge.
We have also seen that the educational trajectory of employees is per se not related to the 
pursuit of diverse strategies. Instead, a balance seems to exist between the level of education and 
labour productivity: the longer an employee has been educated, the more he is productive -  and, 
the higher are the wages he can duly claim! This finding is interesting to the extent that strands of 
neoclassical trade theory (Heckscher 1919: 57; 55; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-54) and neoliberal 
economic theory (Sinn 2005) claim that Low Cost Producers are not competitive in high-wage 
countries. Our analyses have shown this claim to be wrong: since more expensive workers are 
more productive because they are more educated, companies that wish to pursue an LCP strategy 
are equally competitive in low- and high-wage countries. This, in turn, sustains the finding of 
chapter 1 that Low Cost Producers can be found with (almost) the same frequency in high-wage 
Germany, and in low-wage Italy.
These insights suggest that, of the three competitive strategies, LCP is the least dependent 
on national regulation. But what about RPI and DQP? Considering that Radical Product 
Innovators require labour qualifications which are typically provided by flexible labour markets 
and research systems, how can they compete in Germany and Italy which both constitute ideal- 
typical examples of labour-market and research-system rigidity! And what do Diversified Quality 
Producers do in the UK, where the provision of the required qualifications seems to be hampered 
by national labour-market and research-system flexibility? Addressing these questions, we firstly 
found that institutional flexibility (rigidity) must not be confused with institutional functionalism. 
The fact that national regulation contributes to the provision of one type of qualifications does not 
mean that functionally equivalent institutions cannot provide different qualification types within 
the same economy. Secondly, we have seen that firms are amazingly inventive in using and 
generating institutional equivalents. More precisely, we found that entrepreneurs resort to two
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functional equivalents in order to circumvent national institutions: they import heterogeneous 
scientific knowledge by relying on open international labour markets, and they improvise on a 
contractual basis so as to make sure that their employees in general and their scientists in 
particular have adequate qualifications.
Accordingly, Radical Product Innovators in Germany and Italy secure their required skill 
profiles by providing on-the-job training courses which advise employees in field-specific skills. 
Furthermore, they offer young academics the opportunity to do a PhD or a post-doc in 
collaboration with their firm, and commission (research) projects from universities. In order to 
increase the knowledge heterogeneity o f their scientists, Radical Product Innovators hire key 
personnel from abroad. Furthermore, they collaborate intensely with other, often foreign, 
companies and research institutes. They also encourage scientists to publish their findings in 
order to present them at (international conferences.
In a similar vein, opposite measures are taken by Diversified Quality Producers in the UK. 
In order to provide their workforce with the required qualifications, DQPs tie employees in 
general, and scientists in particular, to their company by offering attractive long-term career 
opportunities. In so doing, Diversified Quality Producers invest massively in (firm-specific) 
training, e.g. in courses which prepare participants for intra-firm promotion, and they provide 
pension schemes which become profit-yielding only in the long run. Finally, they actively 
participate in the education of young people, e.g. by offering internships or industrial placements 
in order to retain the best performers upon completion of their degree.
It is interesting to note that the efforts of companies to provide their workforce with 
required qualifications are sometimes subsidised, or even institutionalised by national 
governments. Recent initiatives by the Italian and British governments provide telling examples. 
In 2003, the British government launched a pilot project mimicking the German vocational 
training system in that firms offered one year of industrial placement to trainees as a part of their 
overall three-year degree. While it is not yet clear whether this pilot project will translate into the 
establishment of a national vocational training system, Diversified Quality Producers are very 
positive about this initiative. In a similar vein, the Italian government has de facto 
institutionalised the efforts of Radical Product Innovators to secure temporary collaborators with 
field-specific skills. Since 1973, firms have received subsidies for recruiting recent graduates for 
a maximum period of three years (see DPR 597 1973).
With regard to the initiative of the Italian government, it is furthermore interesting to note 
that the same institution can be used for different ends. For Italian DQPs, the opportunity to 
employ subsidised collaboratori a progetto provides an important means for training future
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employees in fiim-specific skills. However, Italian RPIs instead use the government initiative as 
an opportunity to temporarily recruit employees with field-specific skills. Even though firms are 
expected to employ the collaboratori at the end of the three-year period, recruitment is not 
compulsory. This means that, at the end of the three years, RPIs tend to employ new collaborators 
instead of retaining the former ones.
These insights allow us to draw two major conclusions. Firstly, national regulation is less 
constraining than portrayed by various contributors to the competitiveness literature (see in 
particular Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44; Porter 1990: 126-130; 
Hollingsworth 2000: 627-629; Ohlin 1933: 7; 52-54; Sinn 2005: e.g. 68-69; 75-76; 142-143). 
Rather than being a constraint, national institutions constitute an opportunity because, if the 
labour qualifications provided are not required for the pursued competitive strategy, institutional 
equivalents allow entrepreneurs to make-up for this lack. Secondly, entrepreneurs are decisively 
more inventive than suggested by the competitiveness literature (ibid). Wherever national 
regulation fails to provide the required labour qualifications, entrepreneurs actively use or 
develop institutional equivalents. This, in turn, illustrates that entrepreneurs are decisively more 
than mere institution-takers. Therefore, I consider Schumpeter’s perception of entrepreneurs as 
independent and creative innovators (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81- 
106) most instructive for understanding how firms gain international competitiveness by pursuing 
different strategies in the same institutional environment.
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Chapter 5: Excursus -  Choice and Change of Competitive 
Strategy*
5.1. In t r o d u c tio n
The previous chapters illustrated that the competitiveness literature agrees on one central 
point: Firms within the same political economy are expected to specialise in the pursuit of same 
competitive strategy (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005; Porter 1990; Freeman 1992; 
Lindgaard Christensen 1992; Nelson 1993; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; see in particular Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 
442-455). The reason behind this is that national institutions — most notably financial-, and 
labour-market regulations -  are said to provide input factors which are required for one specific 
strategy. Seeking to exploit this institutional advantage, firms are expected to pursue this 
institutionally facilitated strategy. In sum, the competitiveness literature implicitly or explicitly 
argues that the majority of firms within the same economy (should) choose the same competitive 
strategy (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: e.g. 18-19; Andersen 1992: 68-69; 78; 
Dalum 1992: 191fi; 199; 203-207; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 82-86; Porter 1990; Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 36-44; 56; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:146)117.
The previous chapters have proven this claim to be wrong: most notably, I have shown in 
the introductory chapter that firms in diverse economies pursue the same variety of competitive j 
strategies. Identifying the crucial input factors and their providing institutions, I furthermore i 
illustrated in chapters 2 to 4 how firms compete. While these findings imply that a firm’s strategy 
choice cannot be determined by the extent to which national institutions provide specific input 
factors118, the question of why firms choose a certain strategy still remains unexplored. I will seek | 
to answer this question in the present chapter by analysing the causes which make a firm choose, |
and respectively change its strategy.119 !
I wish to thank Ruth Gbikpi-Nierre, Udo Klomann, Luis Leal, and Michiel Tegelaars for providing me with ' 
(information about) the data on which this chapter is based. '
117 This claim is spelled out most directly in the VOC literature. Accordingly, Hall and Soskice write: '(F]irms in [ 
[different developed capitalist economies] develop distinctive strategies (...) to capitalize on the institutions available 
for market or non-market coordination in the economy.* (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56). Estevez-Abe et al. are even 
more explicit when laying out the central arguments of their contribution to this literature: ‘The upshot of this chapter
is that the shape o f  [national institutions] has bearings on (...) choice o f  product market strategies*. (Estevez-Abe et 
al. 2001: 146). '
118 The reason for this is straight-forward: I f  a firm’s strategy choice was determined by the institutionalised 
provision of input factors, companies in the same economy should specialise in the pursuit o f  the institutionally 
favoured strategy -  given that each strategy actually relies on specific factors.
119 It should be noted that from an analytical point o f view, strategy choice and strategy change constitute 
synonymous events as they are determined by the same cause (see section 5.3.).
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It is important to note that these analyses are explorative to the extent that I did not collect 
data with the explicit aim of addressing the question of strategy choice. Having found that 
companies in diverse institutional environments pursue the same variety of strategies, it was my 
major concern to understand how firms compete. I therefore focused on the analysis of the status 
quo by collecting synchronic data: I asked interviewees about the input factors their firm 
required, and about the providing institutions. However, I did not enquire systematically about 
how these institutions developed, or whether they contributed to the firm’s choice of competitive 
strategy. Such diachronic data is, however, essential for understanding why a firm decides to 
pursue a specific strategy, because the moment of strategy choice necessarily dates back further 
than the interview. Nevertheless, the interviews did also provide me with some diachronic data 
because I asked many open questions about the reasons for which a company relies on specific 
input factors and institutions. The answers to these questions offered diachronic insights which 
allow me to address the question of strategy choice.
It will come as no surprise that these insights do not support the argument of the 
competitiveness literature that firms choose their strategies according to their institutional 
environment (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: e.g. 18-19; Andersen 1992: 68-69; 
78; Dalum 1992: 191f.; 199; 203-207; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 82-86; Porter 1990; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 36-44; 56; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 146). Instead, empirical evidence suggests 
that firms choose to pursue a strategy as a function of technological opportunities. To give an 
example, a group of university professors who discovered a new chemical entity which they wish 
to exploit commercially is more likely to set up a company that pursues an RPI or a DQP strategy 
than engage in Low Cost Production. Similarly, a galenicist with much experience in the reverse 
engineering of pharmaceutical products will tend to open his own LCP-firm rather than embark 
on Radical Product Innovation. I therefore argue that a firm’s choice of competitive strategy is 
not determined by national institutions, but by the extent to which entrepreneurs seize 
technological opportunities.
To illustrate this argument, the remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. 
Making a final attempt to verify the arguments of the competitiveness literature, I study in section
5.2. whether firms are less capable of surviving if they choose to pursue a competitive strategy 
which is not supported by national institutions. Since empirical evidence contradicts this idea, I 
propose an alternative explanation for strategy choice in section 5.3.. Examining three sets of 
most different firms, I illustrate how they all agree in one central aspect: they all chose, or 
changed their strategy on the basis of technological opportunities. Section 5.4. concludes with a 
summary and an interpretation of the various findings.
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5*2. T h e  A r g u m en t  o f  t h e  C o m p e t it iv e n e s s  L it e r a t u r e : National 
I n stitu tio n s  as D r iv er s  o f  St r a t e g y  c h o ic e ?
Before discussing alternative explanations, it is worthwhile and the aim of this section to 
explore the arguments of the competitiveness literature in-depth. Let us recapitulate that this 
literature suggests the institutionalised availability of input factors to be the major determinant of 
a firm’s strategy choice. The reason behind this, again, is that different strategies are said to rely 
on specific input factors. Since national institutions usually provide just one set of factors, all 
firms within the same economy are assumed to specialise in the same, institutionally facilitated 
strategy. Otherwise, firms are internationally less competitive. In a word, the competitiveness 
literature argues that a firm’s choice of competitive strategy is determined by national institutions 
(see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Porter 1990:67; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44).
In the introductory chapter, I showed this argument wrong by carrying out a synchronic 
analysis of British, German, and Italian pharmaceutical firms. More precisely, I classified the 
technology intensity of those research projects which firms had carried out between 1985 and 
2004, thereby identifying the underlying competitive strategy. In so doing, my analysis revealed 
that the technology patterns of research projects are very similar in Germany, Italy and the UK. In 
other words, pharmaceutical firms were found to pursue the same variety of strategies 
irrespective of the country in which they were based. This finding contradicts the argument of the | 
competitiveness literature: given that each strategy actually requires specific input factors (see  ̂
chapters 2 and 4), and given that national institutions provide just one type of factors (ibid), firms 
obviously do not base their strategy choice on the extent to which national institutions provide 
required factors (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933: 7; Sinn 2005: e.g. 18-19; Andersen 1992: 68- 
69; 78; Dalum 1992: 191f.; 199; 203-207; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 82-86; Porter 1990; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 36-44; 56; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001:146).
That said, there may be one -  and in my view final — possibility for the argument of the 
competitiveness literature to be proven right. Since the previous analyses are of a synchronic 
nature, they do not consider whether the pursued strategies are equally stable over time. 
Obviously, most firms do not take national institutions into consideration when choosing their 
strategy. Yet, it could be possible that firms which choose a non-conformist strategy are punished 
for their decision by failure in the long run. In other words, whenever a company does not exploit 
the advantage of pursuing the institutionally facilitated strategy, it is internationally less 




firm. In this case, the competitiveness literature would be right to the extent that firms are better 
o ff pursuing the same strategy within the same economy.
The reason such cases of failure do not emerge from the introductory analysis is that I 
evaluated the technology intensity of research projects from a synchronic perspective. As soon as 
a firm’s strategy from the last 20 years had been identified, the firm was included in the sample -  
irrespective of whether it still exists today. However, the results might look different if the 
historical development of a company is taken into account. One could imagine that 
pharmaceutical firms in the UK, Germany, and Italy started to engage in Radical Product 
Innovation, in Diversified Quality Production, and in Low Cost Production to the same extent 
between 1985 and 2004. But, at the end of this period, only those firms survived which pursued 
an RPI strategy in the UK, a DQP strategy in Germany, and an LCP strategy in Italy. All (or at 
least most) other companies failed because the pursued strategy was not supported by national 
institutions.
Consequently, the question arises of whether company success is in line with national 
institutions as predicted by the competitiveness literature (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933: 7; 
Sinn 2005: e.g. 18-19; Andersen 1992: 68-69; 78; Dalum 1992: 191f.; 199; 203-207; Patel and 
Pavitt 1994: 82-86; Porter 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44; 56; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 
146). To shed light on this question, the two following sections analyse the strategy failures of 
British, German and Italian pharmaceutical firms. In so doing, section 5.2.1. studies Radical 
Product Innovators, Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers together, whereas 
section 5.2.2. focuses on firms which pursue an RPI strategy.
5.2.1. S t r a t e g y  F a il u r e  in  t h e  UK, G e r m a n y ,  a n d  I t a l y
So let us assess whether the successful pursuit of competitive strategies is dependent on 
national institutions as predicted by the competitiveness literature (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 
2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36- 
44). When discussing the composition of the final case sample (see chapter 2: introduction to 
section 2.3.), I pointed out that various firms from the introductory sample (see chapter 1: section
1.3.2. ) no longer existed in 2004 in their original legal form. But is it true that company failure is 
particularly pronounced among DQPs and LCPs in Britain, among RPIs and LCPs in Germany, 
and among RPIs and DQPs in Italy? To answer this question, table 5.1. summarises how many 
firms from the overall sample have gone bankrupt, merged, or been acquired since 1985. In so 
doing, table 5.1. not only considers the 102 cases of the original sample. It also takes into
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consideration those 28 companies added to complete the original sample (see chapter 2: section 
2.3.)120.
Table 5.1. distinguishes between those firms that went bankrupt on the one hand, and 
those that merged or were acquired on the other121. The reason for this distinction is that mergers 
and acquisitions (henceforth M&As) do not necessarily constitute instances of company failure. 
On the contrary, only (financially) healthy firms become the objects of M&As. This is 
particularly true in the biotechnology industry where Venture Capitalists perceive the merger or 
acquisition of ‘their’ firm as an attractive exit opportunity. Contrary to M&As, bankruptcy 
incontrovertibly constitutes an instance of company failure. In order to provide an overall idea of 
strategy stability in the pharmaceutical industry, the last two columns of table 5.1. add up the 
respective instances of bankruptcy and M&As.
Table 5.1.: Instability of Competitive Strategies in the UK, Germany, and Italy
Country Strategy Total Bank­ruptcies






% of Change: 
in Leg. Status!
UK RPIs 19 1 5% 6 32% 7 37% 1
DQPs 17 1 6% 6 35% 7 41%
LCPs 10 2 20% 3 30% 5 50%
Germany RPIs 16 0 0% 2 13% 2 13%
DQPs 17 1 6% 2 12 % 3 18% i
LCPs 12 0 0% 5 42% 5 42% !
Italy RPIs 15 1 7% 2 13% 3 20%
DQPs 14 1 7% 0 0% 1 7% !
LCPs 10 1 10% 3 30% 4 40% i
Overall RPIs 50 2 4% 10 20% 12 24% |
DQPs 48 3 6% 8 17% 1 1 23% ;
LCPs 32 3 9% 11 34% 14 44%
Source: PHID database as sampled in chapter 1: section 1.3.2.
Irrespective of whether M&As are perceived as instances of firm success or failure, table 1
5.1. clearly shows that firms go bankrupt, are acquired, or merge irrespective of the competitive \ 
strategy they pursue within a given institutional environment. These insights indicate that the j 
competitiveness literature wrongly suggests strategy stability to be in line with national | 
institutions (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68-69; !
120 Consequently, 130 companies are considered in table 5.1., namely the 102 original plus 28 added firms.
121 It should be noted that 1 classified the few companies, which were included in the original case sample but not 
identifiable, as bankruptcy cases. The reasoning for this is straight-forward. A massive amount of information is 
available on the internet regarding mergers and acquisitions o f pharmaceutical firms in general, and regarding (the 
history of) my cases in particular. Thus, whenever I could not identify a firm despite intense internet research, I 
assumed that the latter went bankrupt some time ago. Otherwise, it would be mentioned in the records o f the 
acquiring company.
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Porter 1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44). This is particularly obvious for cases of 
company failure. While bankruptcy is generally rare, the only instance that can be observed in 
Germany concerns a firm which pursued a DQP strategy. In Italy, bankruptcy is -  in relative 
terms — most widely diffused among Low Cost Producers. Only Radical Product Innovators in 
the UK show some sign of strategy stability in line with the expectations of the competitiveness 
literature.
To assess whether differences in the stability of competitive strategies vary significantly 
between countries, I resorted to cross tabulation tests. Yet the overall number of firms is limited 
(N = 130). This is particularly true for those firms which went bankrupt, were acquired, or 
merged in the course of the last 20 years. To restrict the number of cases with an expected count 
below 5 ,1 distinguished between only 2 instances of ‘strategy status’, namely between strategy 
instability on the one hand, and strategy stability on the other. While I regrouped all firms that 
went bankrupt, were acquired, or merged into instances of strategy instability, all firms which 
still exist in their original legal form today were coded as instances of strategy stability. Table
5.2. reports the results of this cross tabs test.









RPI Count 7 12 19
Expected Count 7,8 1 1 ,2 19,0
DQP Count 7 10 17
Expected Count 7,0 10,0 17,0
LCP Count 5 5 10




RPI Count 2 14 16
Expected Count 3,6 12,4 16,0
DQP Count 3 14 17
Expected Count 3,8 13,2 17,0
LCP Count 5 7 12




RPI Count 3 12 15
Expected Count 3,1 11,9 15,0
DQP Count 1 13 14
Expected Count 2,9 1 1 , 1 14,0
LCP Count 4 6 10
Expected Count 2 ,1 7,9 10,0
a Chi Square = .468 (1 cells = 16.7 % with expected count less than 5); p > .10; Cramer’s V  = .101; p  > .10 
b Chi Square = 3.706 (3 cells = 50.0 %  with expected count less than 5); p >  .10; Cramer’s V = .287; p > .10 
c Chi Square -  3.866 (3 cells = 50.0 % with expected count less than 5); p  >  .10; Cramer’s V  = .315; p  > .10
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In a word, table 5.2. confirms the observations made on the basis of table 5.1.: country- 
specific differences in strategy stability are not statistically significant. Furthermore, Cramer’s V 
indicates that the associational strength between the pursuit of a given strategy, and the 
probability that it will fail, is weak and statistically insignificant in the UK, Germany and Italy 
alike. These quantitative results support our previous suspicions about the argument of the 
competitiveness literature that national institutions determine the success of a firm’s competitive 
strategy (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Porter 
1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44). It should be noted that I cross-checked these results by 
carrying out a second cross tabs test in which I distinguished between the 3 instances of strategy 
status, namely between bankruptcy, M&As> and status continuity. As pointed out previously, the 
problem with this test is that the number of cases with an expected count below 5 is rather high. 
Nevertheless, the results are interesting to the extent that they confirm the earlier findings: Chi- 
square values are statistically insignificant, while values for Cramer’s V turn out to be low.122
Having found that national institutions do not determine the (instability of specific j
competitive strategies, the empirical evidence of table 5.1. points to an alternative explanation for |
strategy (instability. The stability of any competitive strategy seems to be influenced by the |
extent to which national institutions facilitate the provision o f seed finance. More precisely, my I
studies suggest that the more institutions -  be they public pension and insurance systems (see ,
i
chapter 2: section 2.4.3.), or state-sponsored initiatives -  further the availability of seed finance, f
the laxer financiers become when scrutinising a firm’s business strategy, and the less stable the j
financed strategy is in the long run. j
Table 5.1. speaks in favour of this hypothesis as it shows British firms to be the most, and 
Italian firms least susceptible to change, irrespective of the strategy pursued. That is, British firms 
prove least stable as 41%123 of all studied companies changed their legal status in the course of 
the last 20 years. Status-changes in Italy occurred in only 22%124 of all considered firms. With a ,
122 The previous analyses have shown that no significant differences can be observed concerning the frequency with 
which RPIs, DQPs and LCPs in different economies go bankrupt, merge or are acquired. Importantly, however, these 
analyses do not say anything about the pace with which firms change their legal status. It could still be possible that, 
in the UK, Diversified Quality Producers and Low Cost Producers (have to) change their status more quickly than 
Radical Product Innovators. In Germany, by  contrast, RPIs and LCPs might be susceptible to change more rapidly 
than DQPs. Finally, Italian firms pursuing an RPI or a DQP strategy may foil more quickly than their counterparts 
pursuing an LCP strategy. Such findings would be in line with the competitiveness literature in that national 
institutions determine the pace of strategy instability. While this could be desirable for firms aiming at rapid M&As 
or IPOs, it would definitely constitute a disadvantage for all instances o f bankruptcy. In order to assess strategy 
instability over time, probit regression analyses are most instructive. However, the composition o f an adequate 
dataset requires both more information and time than available at the moment. I shall therefore leave these 
assessments to future research activities.
123 This figure is derived as follows: (7+7+5) /  (19+17+10) = 41%
124 This figure is derived as follows: (2+3+5) /  (16+17+12) = 22%
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12520% rate of change in legal status, German companies are situated in between. While these 
figures are approximate due to the relatively limited number of observations, it is interesting that 
strategy stability is in line with the amount of available starting capital in the respective countries. 
The relative abundance of seed finance in the UK, which inter alia results from private public 
and insurance systems (see chapter 2: section 2.4.3.), seems to make financiers less severe in their 
scrutiny before granting start-up capital. The opposite applies to Italy (see also Breschi et al. 
2003: 154; Pozzali 2004: 124), while Germany is once again situated in-between. In sum, 
business ideas presumably have to be particularly promising in countries where seed finance is 
comparatively scarce which, in turn, means that firms in these countries are also less susceptible 
to bankruptcy, or M&As -  irrespective of the competitive strategy they pursue! While a 
systematic exploration of my argument would go beyond the scope of this research project, I will 
provide further empirical support in section 5.2.2..
Another interesting observation can be made on the basis of table 5.1. in that Low Cost 
Production constitutes the least stable strategy in Germany, Italy and the UK alike. This 
instability reflects the present trend of global consolidation in the generics industry (see Wittner 
2005). Since Low Cost Producers in general and generics producers in particular do not engage in 
R&D, they are particularly vulnerable to M&As or even bankruptcy, for two reasons. On the one 
hand, the absence of radical or incremental innovation as a source of value-added means that 
profit margins are small, while price competition is high. Hence, as soon as Low Cost Producers 
come under financial pressure, they are particularly susceptible to take-over or bankruptcy 
because additional expenses cannot be covered by proportionate price increases (see Lasker 
2005). On the other hand, take-overs of Low Cost Producers are easier than take-overs of R&D- 
intense firms because the technological barriers are lower (see Schroder 2004). Thus, in order to 
achieve the necessary economies of scale, M&As are the order of the day in the generics industry. 
But, contrary to the expectations of the competitiveness literature, this phenomenon is not 
country-specific but of a global nature (see Wittner 2005).
In sum, analysing the firm sample on which I ground my research project, I did not find 
empirical support for the idea that national institutions determine the failure rate of specific 
competitive strategies (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 
68-69; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44). That said, it is important to note that the 
composition and, hence, the analysis of this sample suffers from two flaws. Firstly, the number of 
cases is comparatively small. Therefore, the figures constitute approximate indicators of general 
trends rather than confirmed numbers.
125 This figure is derived as follows: (3+1+4) /  (15+14+10) = 20%
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Secondly, the figures on the strategy instability of Diversified Quality Producers and Low 
Cost Producers are presumably more representative than those derived for Radical Product 
Innovators. The reason for this is related to age differences between British, German and Italian 
pharmaceutical companies. Due to the long-standing history of the traditional pharmaceutical 
industry, the introductory sample contained -  for the UK, Germany and Italy alike -  roughly the 
same number of Diversified Quality Producers on the one hand, and of traditional pharmaceutical 
companies on the other (see chapter 1: section 1.3.2.). Therefore, I had no need to add either 
Diversified Quality Producers or traditional pharmaceutical firms. This was different for Low 
Cost Producers because the abstinence of generics companies from R&D entailed that the latter 
were not included in the original sample (see chapter 2, introduction to section 2.3.). But only a 
very few genuinely British, German, or Italian generics firms still existed in 2003 (see Wittner 
2003 : 52-53; 70-73; 133-134). It was therefore possible to incorporate the entire population of 
truly 'national' generics firms into the final case sample. As a result, the findings on strategy 
stability are equally representative for DQPs and LCPs in Germany, Italy and the UK alike.
This is different for Radical Product Innovators because of the relative youth of the 
German, and particularly of the Italian biotech industry, which entailed that few biotech firms 
were included in the original case sample (see chapter 1: section 1.3.2.). To make up for this, I 
added 8 Italian and 3 German biotech firms (see chapter 2: introduction to section 2.3.). In so 
doing, I selected particularly successful firms in order to achieve optimum comparability. Since 
most of the biotech companies added pursue an RPI strategy, the stability of German and Italian 
RPIs may be unrepresentatively high. It is therefore opportune to cross-check the previous results 
on strategy stability for Radical Product Innovators. This shall be the aim of the following j 
section. I
I
5.2 .2 . S t r a t e g y  F a il u r e  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  G e r m a n ,  a n d  I t a l ia n  B i o t e c h  I n d u s t r ie s
To cross-check the stability o f British, German, and Italian RPIs, the ‘VentureXpert’ 
database of Thomson Financial offers precious insights (see Thomson Financial 2004). In a word, 
this database provides detailed information about all firms which have received venture capital j 
since the early 1980s (Bernard 2006). As firms can be sorted inter alia by industrial activity and j 
country, it is possible to isolate those biotech companies that have obtained venture capital in the j 
UK, Germany and Italy. These companies can be assumed to pursue an RPI strategy for two ! 
reasons. On the one hand, chapter 2 (section 2.3.2.I.) demonstrates that a firm’s industry j 
constitutes an alternative for measuring its competitive strategy. That is, firms which are active in 
the biotech industry tend to pursue an RPI strategy. On the other hand, chapter 2 (section 2.4.2.)
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also shows that institutional shareholders, such as venture capitalists, are particularly likely to 
invest in Radical Product Innovators. Thus, companies which are active in the biotech industry, 
and which have received venture capital are very likely to pursue an RPI strategy.
While the sample obtained from VentrueXpert is representative for both Germany and the 
UK, it needs to be completed for the Italian case. Since the Italian biotech industry only started to 
take off in the early years of the new millennium126, many firms were not yet included in the 
VentureXpert database when I sampled the latter in October 2004. To make up for this lack, I 
consulted the ‘Italian Biotech Database’ of Venture Valuation (see Venture Valuation 2006). This 
database provides the most complete list o f biotech firms which have received, or constitute 
attractive opportunities for venture investment. Like their British and German counterparts, these 
companies can be expected to pursue an RPI strategy for two reasons: they are active in the 
biotech industry and constitute (potential) venture-capital candidates. Yet, unlike VentureXpert, 
the Italian Biotech Database does not provide systematic information on bankruptcy, M&As, and 
firms that have gone public. I therefore consulted experts from the Italian biotech industry 
(Vingiani 2006), various reports (Chiesa 2004: 14-20; Fomasiero 2004; Muffatto and Giardina 
2003: 119) and the companies’ web pages in order to identify those firms that had gone bankrupt, 
or public, that had merged, or been acquired.
Table 5.2. provides an overview of the RPI sample finally obtained, and the extent to 
which firms have changed their legal status since the mid-1980s. In so doing, the upper part of 
table 5.2. gives more detailed insights into corporate changes, whereas the lower part regroups 
the respective events into successful, unsuccessful and ambiguous cases. More precisely, I 
regrouped all Radical Product Innovators that went public, that are still open for venture 
investment, or in the phase of registration as instances of strategy success. Furthermore, I 
categorised bankruptcy as strategy failure, whereas I classified mergers and acquisitions as 
ambiguous cases. It should be noted that this sample presumably conveys an overly optimistic 
impression of strategy stability because it only includes those cases that constitute (potential) 
venture-capital recipients. Having been subject to the scrutiny of venture capitalists, these 
companies are likely to be engaged in more promising research projects than the average biotech 
firm in Germany, Italy, or the UK. But, contrary to the sample analysed in table 5.1., this bias 
towards RPI stability is symmetric. While the extent of actual RPI failure is probably higher than 
illustrated in table 5.2., this flaw applies to British, German and Italian companies alike.




Table 5.3.: Instability of Radical Product Innovators in the UK, Germany, and Italy
UK Germany Italy 1
In Registration 1 0,8% 0 0,0% 0 0.0%
Active Investment 101 80,2% 140 90,9% 27 79,3°/-
Went Public 12 9,5% 4 2,6% 4 11,8%
Bankruptcy 1 0,8% 2 1,3% 0 0,0%
Acquisition 8 6,3% 2 1,3% 2 5.9%
Merger 3 2,4% 6 3,9% 1 3,0%
126 100,0% 154 100,0% 34 100,0%
Successful RPIs:
- Active Investment
- In Registration 
-W ent Public 114 90,5% 144 93,5% 31 91,2%
Unsuccessful RPIs:
Bankruptcy 1 0,8% 2 1,3% 0 0,0%
Ambiguous RPIs:
Mergers and Acquisions 11 8,7% 8 5,2% 3 8,8%
126 100,0% 154 100,0% 34 100,0%
Sources: VentureXpert and Italian Biotech Database as described in the text
iI
The presented figures are telling in many respects. Most importantly, however, they do 
not provide empirical support for the expectations of the competitiveness literature (see Ohlin 
1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 36-44). National institutions do not seem to determine the success of a firm’s 
strategy to the extent that Radical Product Innovators can only thrive in the UK. On the contrary, 
the aggregate figures on RPI success are strikingly similar for the UK, Germany and Italy alike.
To assess the statistical robustness of this observation, I carried out three correlation 
analyses. In the first analysis, I correlated a firm’s country with its investment status by assigning 
an individual score to each of the 6 investment states. The second analysis, in turn, assessed the 
correlation between the extent to which firms in each country fail in the pursuit of a given 
strategy. In so doing, I distinguished between (0) strategy success (in registration, active 
investment, went public), (1) neither success nor failure (M&As), and (2) strategy failure 
(bankruptcy). Finally, I correlated a firm’s country with strategy change, distinguishing between 
(0) instances of stability (in registration, active investment, went public), and (1) instances of 
change (M&As, bankruptcy). Interestingly, the results I obtained from these analyses agree in 
their central finding. They reveal an extremely weak and statistically insignificant relationship 
between a firm’s country and 1. its investment status (R = .028; p > .10), 2. the likelihood of
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strategy failure (R = -.028; p > .10), and 3. the probability of strategy change (R = -.030; p >
.10).127
Having found the competitiveness literature wrong in assuming that a country’s 
institutions have a significant impact on strategy stability, table 5.2. points to another noteworthy 
phenomenon. More precisely, it provides empirical support for the aforementioned idea that the 
stability o f any competitive strategy depends on national institutions to the extent that easy access 
to seed finance leads to higher strategy instability (see section 5.2.1.). Interestingly, the 
VentureXpert database includes more German than British biotech firms, namely 154 against 
126. What is more, Radical Product Innovators are least successful in Germany where 1.3% of all 
companies failed, and are the most successful in Italy where the failure-rate is 0%. While these 
figures may seem too similar to deserve closer attention, they point to a noteworthy difference in 
company instability between Germany, Italy and the UK.
To comprehend this difference, and to understand what drives corporate instability, it is 
necessary to review briefly how the German and the Italian biotech industry emerged. In contrast 
to Italy, the beginnings of Germany’s biotech industry were massively sponsored by the state. 
Aware that the biotech industry lagged behind other, mostly Anglo-Saxon economies, the 
German government launched the so-called ‘BioRegio* project in 1995/1996, and the 
‘BioProfile’ initiative in 1999. Providing start-up capital and structural support to entrepreneurs, 
it was the explicit aim of these initiatives to boost the formation of biotech fims. Successful in 
this intention, a large number of biotech start-ups were founded in Germany in the late 1990s 
(Emst&Young 2002: 92-98). This, in turn, explains the comparatively high number of German 
biotech companies included in the VentureXpert database. Yet public subsidies were only of a 
temporary nature. Furthermore, many newly established firms were university spin-offs with the 
result that their founders had little experience in (regulatory) issues concerning clinical 
development and product commercialisation. These factors constituted major stumbling blocks to 
the prosperity of Germany’s biotech industry because investment in general, and subsidies in 
particular, declined at the very moment that many start-ups sought to translate their discoveries 
into marketable products (Magenheim-Hormann 2005; Hofmann 2004b). As a result, the German 
biotech industry went through a period of consolidation which was most pronounced between 
2003 and 2005. While some companies succeeded in merging or going public, others had to file
127 It should be noted that I cross-checked the correlation results by running 3 cross tabs tests. In line with the 
previous correlation analyses, I assessed the associational strength between a firm’s country and 1 . its investment 
status, 2, the likelihood o f  strategy failure, and 3. the probability of strategy change. The outcome o f these tests 
agree in that neither Chi Square, nor Cramer’s V are statistically significant, whereby Cramer’s V also shows very 
low scores.
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for bankruptcy (Hofmann 2005; Hofmann 2004a). Since these developments are very recent, the 
extent of consolidation was not reflected in the VentureXpert database when I sampled the latte: 
in Oct. 2004.
At first sight, it may be tempting to interpret the German experience in favour of the 
competitiveness literature: that the pursuit of an RPI strategy is unsustainable in Germany on the 
long run. However, the development of the Italian biotech industry provides counter evidence 
which reveals the availability of starting capital to be the actual driver behind corporate 
instability. Since the Italian government did not provide any substantial (financial) support for the 
formation of a national biotech industry (Breschi et al. 2003: 145-146), the latter only began to 
take-off in the early years of the new millennium. At that time, several big pharmaceutical 
companies decided to close their Italian R&D facilities with the result that the scientists 
employed there risked losing their jobs. Faced with this situation, several scientists decided to try 
and set up their own businesses (Pozzali 2004: 122; Chiesa 2004: 9; Breschi et al. 2003: 150).
Yet seed finance was difficult to obtain as the Italian government did not provide (major) 
financial support, while national venture capitalists were virtually absent (see chapter 2: section 
2.4.3.). Hence, only those firms with the most promising business ideas succeeded in bearing 
critical scrutiny on the part of financiers, thereby attracting (share) capital (from abroad) (Breschi 
et al. 2003: 154; Pozzali 2004: 124). Unlike in Germany, the crystallisation of the Italian biotech 
industry was therefore characterised by a process of ‘Darwinian selection’ (Vingiani 2006). On 
the one hand, this explains why the number of Italian biotech firms is (still) very limited 1 
compared to Germany and the UK. On the other hand, this also explains why Italian biotech firms j 
have proven to be particularly stable. Since only the most attractive business ideas obtained start­
up capital, few firms have, so far, merged or been acquired, while no instances of bankruptcy are 
known (Vingiani 2006; Chiesa 2004:14-20; Muffatto and Giardina 2003:119; Fomasiero 2004).
In sum, the experiences of the German and Italian biotech industry teaches us that the 
stability of a specific strategy is not determined by the extent to which national institutions 
provide specific (financial) input factors. Instead, the stability of any competitive strategy is 
determined by the extent to which national institutions facilitate the provision of start-up capital. 
The more seed finance is available, the laxer the scrutiny of financiers, the less stable the 
financed strategy. But, contrary to the financial input factors analysed in chapter 2, seed finance I 
can take many forms: subsidies, institutional or private share capital, or bank loans. Since this j
finding applies equally to all three competitive strategies (see section 5.2.1.), a firm’s strategy 1
choice is definitely not driven by institutional considerations. But what is it then that makes a '
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firm choose to pursue one strategy rather than another? It will be the aim of the following section 
to answer this question.
53*  T echnological  O pportunities a s  Drivers of Strategy  choice
Having seen that a firm’s choice of competitive strategy is definitely not determined by 
the extent to which national institutions provide required input factors, I will propose an 
alternative explanation for strategy choice, and strategy change in this section. It should be noted 
that choice and change o f competitive strategy are synonymous events from an analytical point of 
view because they are determined by the same cause. The difference resides in the history of a 
firm. Whenever a company is set up from scratch, it has to choose the strategy it wishes to 
pursue. An established firm, by contrast, already pursues a strategy that it may wish to change at 
a certain point in time. Yet, the reason for which a newly founded firm chooses, and for which an 
already established company changes its strategy is the same. In the present section, I will discuss 
instances of strategy choice and change roughly to the same extent.
So what is it that makes a firm choose, or change its competitive strategy? In a word, I 
argue that strategy choice is determined by technological opportunities. By technological 
opportunities I understand all factors (like corporate facilities, past experience, or professional 
know-how) which raise expectations for a firm to develop discoveries into incremental or radical 
innovations, or dash its hopes of being innovative at all. To illustrate this argument, I will discuss 
several particularly revealing cases . I will present these cases in three groups, whereby each 
group is composed in such a way as the importance of technological opportunities becomes 
particularly evident. Accordingly, the first group consists of 3 firms that resemble each other in 
many respects but three, namely the institutional environment in which they are situated, their 
technological opportunities, and the pursued strategy. The second group, in contrast, includes 5 
firms which constitute prototypical examples of German, and Italian biotech companies. While 
these two sets of cases differ in a variety of ways, their only common feature consists in the 
extent to which technological opportunities influenced the firms* strategy choice. Finally, the 
third group is made up of 3 companies which have changed their strategy at one point in time. 
While the direction and moment of change, as well as the firms* institutional environment 
diverge, the determinant of strategy change is always the same: technological opportunities. So, 
let us examine these three groups of cases one by one.
128 While I cannot disclose the names of these companies for reasons of confidentiality, I will prove the correctness 
of ray statements to the scholars evaluating my work.
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5.3.1. Similar Firms, Choice of Different Competitive Strategies
One of the most telling examples, also from a methodological point of view, is provided 
by three biotech firms which are strikingly similar in many respects. Apart from all being active 
in the biotech industry, they are also active in the same therapeutic area. Albeit independent in 
their short- and medium-term decisions, all three firms are wholly owned by the same, US 
company. Furthermore, they are of a similar size as they employ roughly the same number of 
people. All have a fully integrated value-chain which includes an (R&)D-department, production 
facilities, marketing and sales structures, as well as administrative support functions. However, 
the three companies diverge in two crucial aspects: they are situated in three different institutional 
environments, namely in the UK, in Germany, and in Italy. Furthermore, they also diverge in the 
competitive strategies they pursue. While the German and British firms are engaged in 
Diversified Quality Production, the Italian company specialises in Radical Product Innovation.
Since this specialisation runs counter to the expectations of the competitiveness literature,
I asked HR managers from each firm about the reasons for their company’s strategy choice. 
Interestingly, the three interviewees agreed in their answer: the choice or change of competitive 
strategy was motivated by the technological capacities of each firm, and the extent to which these 
capacities gave rise to hopes for radical or for incremental innovation. When the US holding 
company bought the Italian affiliate in the early 1990s, the latter had a long-standing history in 
pharmaceutical research due to its extensive R&D facilities on the one hand, and due its links to 
internationally renowned research institutes on the other. These technological capacities had not | 
only produced several radical innovations, they also raised hopes for the discovery of further | 
radical inventions. Accordingly, the Italian affiliate continued to pursue a research-focused RPI 
strategy after its acquisition. This was different for both the German and the British affiliate. 
When these two firms were bought by the US holding company, their R&D-facilities as well as 
their academic networks promised incremental rather than radical innovations. Therefore, the 
German biotech firm continued to pursue a development-focused DQP strategy, whereas its 1 
British counterpart changed from a Radical Product Innovator into a Diversified Quality 
Producer.
53.2. Different Firms, Choice of Same Competitive Strategy
Further evidence that firms choose their strategies on the basis of technological 
opportunities is provided by the emergence of the German, and the Italian biotech industry in 
general, and by 2 German and 3 Italian biotech firms in particular. As pointed out in section 
5.2.2., the German and Italian biotech industry crystallised under very different circumstances.
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The firms I cite here as ideal-typical cases are not only examples of Germany’s and Italy’s most 
successful biotech firms today, they are also particularly representative examples o f their 
differences.
To begin with, the incentives to set up a biotech firm were diametrically opposed in 
Germany and Italy. While structural and financial support from the government provided positive 
incentives for company formation in Germany, the opposite was true for Italy where biotech 
firms were often founded as a response to downsizing measures by pharmaceutical companies. 
Furthermore, many German biotech firms were spin-offs from academic institutions, whereas 
almost all Italian biotech firms spun off from incumbent pharmaceutical companies. Finally, 
company foundation took place at different points in time. While many German biotech firms 
were founded in the mid- and late-1990s, most Italian biotech companies were set up at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Despite these discrepancies, German and Italian biotech firms in 
general, and the aforementioned examples in particular, agreed in their choice of competitive 
strategy. Aiming at the commercial development of those radical inventions that were made 
within the organisation from which the firms in question then spun off all newly founded 
companies decided to pursue an RPI strategy. This decision was obviously not affected by the 
extent to which national institutions provided those input factors required for Radical Product 
Innovation. Instead, the search for all necessary input factors followed the decision to establish an 
RPI company.
53.3. Strategy Change over Time
The previous body of anecdotal evidence will now be completed by three examples of 
strategy change. A German pharmaceutical firm, which I will name LCP-51 for reasons of 
confidentiality, constitutes the first example. Until the beginning of the new millennium, LCP-51 
was part of a larger pharmaceutical group within which it pursued a DQP strategy. When the 
increasing need for innovative performance and flexibility led to the splitting of this group, LCP- 
51 had to reconsider its strategic orientation. Following a prolonged period of reduced R&D 
efforts, LCP-51’s innovation record was bleak. Since its poor innovative performance dashed 
hopes for early innovation, LCP-51 decided to change its competitive strategy from Diversified 
Quality Production to Low Cost Production. This decision, in turn, demonstrates how 
technological opportunities influence strategy change, or better, determine which strategy had 
best be pursued.
A similar example is provided by an Italian pharmaceutical company which I will call 
LCP-52 in the following. Until the early 1990s, LCP-52 was a typical marketing specialist in that
191
it imitated, produced, registered and marketed the products o f  other pharmaceutical firms. While 
pursuing these activities, LCP-52 happened to discover a recombinant protein which raised hopes 
for the development of superior products and, hence, for incremental innovation. In an attempt to 
exploit this technological opportunity commercially, LCP-52 opened a small research centre and 
changed from an LCP to a DQP strategy. But, this change in general, and pharmaceutical 
development in particular were not without problems. While the R&D activities of LCP-52 
translated into several patents and international research collaborations, LCP-52 became aware 
that it lacked both the financial means and the technological expertise to develop its discovery 
into a marketable product. Consequently, LCP-52 decided to stop its R&D efforts, and closed the 
research centre in the early 21st century. In other words, LCP-52 changed from the pursuit of a 
DQP strategy back to the pursuit of an LCP strategy -  roughly 10 years after its first strategy 
change. Akin to the experience of LCP-51, the change (back) from Diversified Quality 
Production to Low Cost Production was caused by technological opportunities, namely the firm’s 
incapacity to develop a marketable product.
A last case of strategy change is provided by an Italian pharmaceutical firm which shall be 
named DQP-51 for reasons of confidentiality. Contrary to the two previous cases, DQP-51 
changes -  and re-changes -  its competitive strategy from Diversified Quality Production to 
Radical Product Innovation. To this end, it is important that the firm’s innovative activities take 
place at two levels. Having been among the first Italian firms to open their own R&D 
laboratories, the national research facilities of DQP-51 constitute the basis for the company’s | 
usual activities in incremental product innovation. Furthermore, DQP-51 is a long-standing 
member of an exclusive, international research network. While this research network was set up 
to support the firm’s DQP activities, it occasionally serves as a platform for the development of 
radical innovations. That is, even though DQP-51 traditionally aims at incremental product 
innovation, it occasionally happens to make radical discoveries while pursuing DQP activities. 
Seizing these technological opportunities, the firm temporarily changes its strategy from 
Diversified Quality Production to Radical Product Innovation by relying extensively on its | 
international research partners. Once the latter have helped to transform the radical discovery into J 
marketable patents, or even products, DQP-51 changes back to incremental innovation in order to | 
proceed with product improvements. |
In sum, what do these diachronic insights teach us? Overall, two noteworthy observations 
can be made, both of which point in the same direction. Firstly, all the firms studied in section
5.3. are similar in one feature: their choice and, respectively, change of competitive strategy was 
driven by technological opportunities. Admittedly, this argument is grounded on anecdotal
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evidence and, hence, on qualitative rather than quantitative analyses. Therefore, even though the 
spread of cases seems to be both regular and representative, a quantitative purist might question 
the extent to which this argument can be generalised.
Yet a second observation, based on all cases of strategy change, underlines the importance 
of technological opportunities (see section 5.3.3.). Interestingly, all ‘strategy changers’ chose a 
new strategy which was technologically close to the former one. That is, firms switched from an 
LCP to a DQP strategy, and vice-versa. They also changed back and forth from the pursuit of a 
DQP strategy to the pursuit of an RPI strategy. However, I did not observe a single instance of a 
firm switching from Radical Product Innovation to Low Cost Production, and vice-versa. The 
decision to change to a new strategy, (as) close (as possible) to the former technological expertise 
o f the respective firm, underlines how important technological considerations are for strategy 
decisions. While this observation is explorative to the extent that it is grounded on a rather 
limited number of cases, it supports the idea that a firm’s strategy choice is determined by 
technological opportunities rather than national institutions.
5.4. C o n c lu sio n
To complete my analyses of international firm competitiveness, I have attempted in the 
present chapter to provide a diachronic study of strategy choice. While I analysed in the previous 
chapters whether and how firms pursue different strategies in diverse institutional environments, I 
asked in the present chapter why they do so. In other words, I asked why firms choose one 
competitive strategy rather than another.
To answer this question, I first assessed the argument of the competitiveness literature that 
firms which pursue a strategy that is not supported by national institutions are comparatively less 
capable of surviving. The analyses of different data sets led to the same two results. Firstly, 
companies fail and succeed irrespective o f the competitive strategy they pursue within a given 
institutional environment. Secondly, the only difference in strategy stability seemed to be related 
to the ease with which entrepreneurs can acquire seed finance. The easier the acquisition of start­
up capital, the more likely the firms will change their legal status over time. The reason for this is 
presumably that firms in favourable seed-finance environments obtain start-up capital even if 
their business idea is comparatively unpromising.
Having found that the competitiveness literature again overestimates the stringency of 
national institutions (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68- 
69; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44), I proposed an alternative explanation for 
strategy choice. More precisely, I argued that firms choose their competitive strategy on the basis
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of technological opportunities. I empirically grounded my argument on studies of various 
companies which differ in many respects but one: they all chose, or changed, their competitive 
strategy in line with technological opportunities, namely in line with their expectations of 
developing discoveries into incremental or radical innovations, or respectively in line with their 
incapacity to be innovative.
To conclude, it is interesting to note that my findings leave room for speculation about the 
relationship between institutional constraints or incentives, technological opportunities and 
strategy choice. Let us recall the findings of chapter 1 (section 1.4.) that pharmaceutical firms in 
the UK, Germany, and Italy show a slight preference for specific competitive strategies. 
Compared to the average pharmaceutical company, British firms are 7.0% more likely to pursue 
an RPI strategy, German companies are 7.5% more disposed to pursue a DQP strategy, and 
Italian firms are 12.0% more likely to be engaged in an LCP strategy (see table 1.4.). Remember 
also that these strategy-specialisation patterns turned out to be statistically not significant. To put 
it in more statistical terms, the cross tabs test of section 1.4. revealed that the probability of 
observing strategy-specialisation patterns due to a sampling error is more than 10%; 19.9% to be 
precise. From a statistically conservative point of view, this probability is unacceptably high. We 
therefore refused the idea that strategy specialisation is of significant importance.
But let us for a moment take a less conservative stance, and accept a 20% significance 
level. Drawing on the findings of the present chapter, we can then conclude that strategy- 
specialisation patterns do not result from the extent to which national institutions provide input 
factors (see Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Sinn 2005; Porter 1990; Freeman 1992; Lindgaard |
Christensen 1992; Nelson 1993; Hollingsworth 2000: 626-630; see in particular Hall and Soskice j
2001a: 38-44; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 174-176; Vitols 2001: 350-360; Tate 2001: 442-455). |
Instead, we can conclude that strategy-specialisation patterns emerge as a result of the extent to 
which entrepreneurs seize technological opportunities. This entails the question of the factors 
which determine the frequency with which technological opportunities arise, and are seized by 
entrepreneurs. While a systematic answer to this question would go beyond the scope of my I 
research, I wish to acknowledge that the competitiveness literature might have a point in stressing 
the importance of institutions -  although it misunderstands the underlying causal mechanisms. 
Apart from a pure historical account, I can imagine two institutional explanations for which 
entrepreneurs in diverse economies seize technological opportunities with differing frequencies.
On the one hand, technological opportunities could to some extent arise as a function of the 
institutional environment. On the other hand, institutions could ‘modulate’ an entrepreneur’s 
reaction to technological opportunities. However, it must fall to future research to shed light on
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the extent to which technological opportunities are seized as a function of historical 
developments, or of institutional influences.
195
6. Concluding Interpretation
It is the aim of my research to understand how firms in different economies achieve 
international competitiveness. To this end, I have studied the competitive behaviour of more than 
140 pharmaceutical firms in the UK, Germany and Italy. I will now summarise and interpret the 
findings which I obtained from these analyses. In so doing, I proceed in three steps. In section 
6.1., I summarise my results and illustrate how they address the central claims of the 
competitiveness literature. In section 6.2., I focus on the - to date - most developed strand of the 
competitiveness literature, namely the literature on ‘varieties of capitalism* (henceforth VoC). 
Accordingly, I elaborate on the implications which result from my findings for VoC reasoning. In 
so doing, I criticise the three central arguments of this literature, finding them to be grounded on 
a one-sided perception of firms as central determinants of (economic) policy-making. Finally, I 
illustrate in section 6.3. what implications may be derived for institutional development in 
general, and for the leverage of national policy makers in designing competitiveness-enhancing 
institutions in particular.
6.1. Varieties w ithin Capitalism : Alternative Pathw ays to  
Com petitiveness
So, what do the analyses of the previous chapters teach us about the link between 
institutions, input factors and competitive strategies? Let us recall that the competitiveness 
literature agrees in one central point: firms in different economies specialise in the pursuit of 
different competitive strategies because national institutions provide diverse types of input 
factors. In other words, specialisation patterns in production and export are explained by the fact 
that they require specific types of input factors (Heckscher 1919: 56-58; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-55; 
Sinn 2005: 18-19; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 38-41). Since economies differ in the 
extent to which institutions provide these factors, institutional differences are identified as the 
main reason for different specialisation patterns (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 56-58; 
Nelson 1993; Andersen 1992: 68-69; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36-44). This 
claim is most explicit in the VoC literature. Accordingly, Hall and Soskice write:
“(...) firms are not essentially similar across nations. On the contrary, firms in LMEs and 
CMEs develop distinctive strategies and structures to capitalize on the institutions available 
for market or non-market coordination in the economy.” (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56)
The previous chapters have shown this claim of the competitiveness literature in general, and of 
the VoC literature in particular to be wrong in two respects.
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6.1.1. Strategy-Diversity within the Economy
Firstly, chapter 1 showed that the competitiveness literature is wrong in suggesting that 
firms in the same economy specialise in the pursuit of the same competitive strategy (Heckscher 
1919: 55-58; Ohlin 1924: 89; Sinn 2005:18-19; see Porter 1990:19; 67; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
36-44). On the contrary, firms within the same economy pursue different competitive strategies to 
the same extent. Accordingly, we found roughly the same percentage of firms in Germany, Italy 
and the UK to pursue an RPI, a DQP, and -  respectively -  an LCP strategy. This shows that 
companies do not ‘develop distinctive strategies’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56) according to the 
institutional environment in which they are based. Instead, as I argued in chapter 5, firms choose 
their competitive strategy according to technological opportunities: namely radical or incremental 
discoveries, or the opportunity for imitation.
But how is my finding that firms in different economies pursue the same varieties of 
competitive strategies compatible with the claim of the competitiveness literature that production 
and export patterns differ from one country to another? In essence, two differences in analytical 
approaches explain this discrepancy. On the one hand, different proxies are used to measure 
competitive strategy. The specialisation argument of the competitiveness literature is essentially 
based on macro-level analyses which point to differences in the development of entire industries 
(Dalum 1992; Fagerberg 1992; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990: 179-541; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 41- 
44). In other words, the competitiveness literature uses the technology intensity of industries as a 
proxy for competitive strategies. While it is trae that industries differ in their technology 
intensity, this constitutes a rather crude strategy measure. The reason behind this is that firms 
which are active in the same industry can differ notably in the extent to which they employ high- 
tech approaches. In other words, firms in the same industry can pursue different strategies. This is 
the very reason for which I decided to descend to the micro level and to use the technology 
intensity of individual firms as a proxy for competitive strategy.129
On the one hand, the time-span o f empirical observations differs. While I identified 
competitive strategies over a time-span of 20 years (see chapter 1: section 1.3.2.), the 
competitiveness literature shows a tendency for short-term and selective observations which 
neglect cyclical fluctuations overtime (see Porter 1990:481-541; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 41-44;
129 It should be noted that I occasionally relied on (the technology intensity of) industries to measure competitive 
strategies. Accordingly, I used the biotech industry as a proxy for Radical Product Innovation, whilst I employed the 
traditional pharmaceutical industry as an indicator for Diversified Quality Production, and the generics industry as a 
measure for Low Cost Production. However, the quantitative analyses o f chapters 2, 3, and 4 revealed that the 
technology intensity offirm s constitutes a better measure for competitive strategy than the technology intensity o f 
industries, because results turn out to be both stronger and more significant whenever strategies are measured at the 
company rather than at the industry level.
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Casper et al. 1999). Of course, it is tempting to argue that the majority of firms within the same 
economy pursue a technology-intense strategy because a comparatively large number of firms are 
active in high-tech industries. Interestingly, however, the competitiveness literature tends to 
ground this argument on short-term and selective studies which ignore the fact that strong 
specialisation patterns are often of a temporary nature. While it is true that specific high-tech 
industries are more developed in some countries than in others, such specialisation patterns are 
often the result o f age differences. That is, industries started to develop at different points in time, 
probably because technological opportunities arose at different moments (see chapter 5: section 
5.3.). However, countries lagging behind at a given moment can, and do catch up over time 
(Freeman 1992: 170-174; see also Freeman 1995). It is therefore risky to ground industry- 
specialisation arguments on short-term and selective observations (see Porter 1990:481-541; Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 41-44; Casper etal. 1999).
In sum, it depends both on the level and the time-span of the analysis as to whether 
strategy-specialisation patterns are found. While the competitiveness literature rightly points out 
that the extent to which companies in the same economy engage in diverse industries differs, it is 
erroneous to deduce from such observations that 'firms in [different economies] develop 
distinctive strategies' (Hall & Soskice 2001: 56). The micro-level and long-term studies on which 
I ground my research have shown this claim to be wrong.
I
6.1.2. Company-Similarity between Economies I
Secondly, we also found the competitiveness literature wrong in suggesting that “firms are 
not essentially similar across nations” (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56). On the contrary, firms which 
pursue the same strategy in different economies behave strikingly similarly. They not only 
ground their choice of competitive strategy on the same basic principle, namely technological 
opportunities (see chapter 5), they also require the same input factors to pursue that chosen 
strategy (see chapter 2, 3, and 4). Accordingly, we found that Radical Product Innovators require 
institutional share capital, employees with field-specific skills, and scientists with heterogeneous | 
knowledge. Diversified Quality Producers, by contrast, need private share capital, a workforce 
with firm-specific skills, and scientists with homogenous knowledge. Low Cost Producers are the | 
least demanding in terms of input factors as their strategy is financed from short-term liabilities, I 
and thus requires neither employees with specific skills nor scientists with particular knowledge. 
What is more, chapter 3 revealed that companies in different economies also resemble each other 
in their standardisation policies. Even though standards do not constitute a necessary input factor,
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firms in different countries develop and use the same types of standards depending on the 
competitive strategy they pursue.
Finally, chapters 2, 3, and 4 taught us that firms act in strikingly similar ways whenever it 
comes to securing necessary input factors. The competitiveness literature in general (Porter 1990: 
126-130; Patel and Pavitt 1994: 87-89; Andersen 1992: 69; Sinn 2005: 68; see Ohlin 1933: 52- 
53), and the VoC literature in particular (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-44), rightly point out that 
national institutions provide just one set of specific input factors. While a private pension and 
insurance system delivers the institutional share capital required for Radical Product Innovation, 
this type of finance is comparatively scarce in countries where pension and insurance schemes are 
administered by the state. Similarly, flexible labour-market institutions mean that employees in 
general, and scientists in particular acquire the qualifications needed for Radical Product 
Innovation, while lacking the skills necessary for Diversified Quality Production. The opposite is 
true for countries with rigid labour markets. Here, employees and scientists tend to have those 
qualifications which are at the basis of Diversified Quality Production, while they lack those 
skills required for the pursuit of an RPI strategy. But whenever national institutions do not 
provide (all) the required input factors, firms in the UK, Germany and Italy are strikingly similar 
in the extent to which they circumvent national institutions in order to make up for missing 
factors. In so doing, they demonstrate a remarkable inventiveness which is at odds with the 
competitiveness literature’s perception of firms as mere institution-takers (see section 6.1.4.).
In sum, contrary to Hall and Soskice (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56), we found that firms 
are essentially similar across nations in three respects: they choose their competitive strategy on 
the basis of technological opportunities, they require the same input factors for the pursuit of a 
given strategy, and they inventively compensate for lacking input factors.
That said, I wish to add a note of caution to my present and previous criticism of the 
competitiveness literature. Contrary to this literature, my findings -  that firms in different 
economies behave in a strikingly similar way, and that the institutional provision of input factors 
does not impact on their competitive behaviour -  are grounded on the study of just one 
production sector. I have only studied firms active in the pharmaceutical sector and its sub­
sectors: biotechnology, traditional pharmaceuticals, and the generics industry. While I hope that 
the results are transferable to other industries, I am aware that the technology intensity of the 
pharmaceutical sector constitutes a characteristic which may be peculiar to this particular 
industry. Thus, I acknowledge that my findings may be particularly, or only relevant for high- 
tech sectors in general, and for the pharmaceutical sector in particular. However, it must be the 
task of future research to find out whether the institutional provision of input factors determines
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the strategic behaviour of those firms which are active in other, more low-tech sectors (see 
Heckscher 1919: 56-58; Ohlin 1933: 7; 50-55; Sinn 2005: 18-19; Porter 1990: 67; Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 38-41).
6.13. Alternative Pathways to Competitiveness
It follows from the above that while firms resemble each other in their manner of 
competing alternative pathways to competitiveness exist. More precisely, I identified three 
pathways to international competitiveness through my research project. As illustrated by the 
competitiveness literature (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 68; Andersen 1992: 69; Patel and 
Pavitt 1994: 87-89; Porter 1990: 126-130; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-44), the first pathway 
consists in the provision of input factors through national institutions. That is, entrepreneurs 
simply use those factors which emerge from national financial and labour-market regulations. 
Accordingly, Radical Product Innovators in flexible labour markets are ‘automatically’ provided 
with field-specific employee skills and heterogeneous scientific knowledge. Diversified Quality 
Producers in rigid labour markets have no difficulties in recruiting a workforce with firm-specific 
skills, and scientists with homogeneous knowledge. Similarly, firms which pursue an RPI 
strategy in a private pension and insurance system find it comparatively easy to acquire 
institutional share capital.
Whenever national institutions do not provide (all) necessary input factors, firms often 
take the second pathway to competitiveness: they secure the factors they lack through 
improvisation on a contractual basis. In so doing, firms circumvent national institutions -  e.g. by 
simply not installing a works council, or by dropping out of national wage-bargaining 
agreements. The circumvention of national institutions allows firms to secure alternative input 
factors in an ‘improvisational’ way; usually by concluding contracts with other economic 
actors . Examples of such contractual factor provision are numerous (see chapter 4: sections
4.2.4. and 4.3.3.). To recall just a few, we have seen that Radical Product Innovators in rigid 
labour markets secure field-specific employee skills through temporary employment contracts. 
Research projects are outsourced to university researchers; and PhD students as well as recent 
graduates are employed for a limited time period during which they work on specific projects. 
Similarly, Radical Product Innovators in rigid labour markets secure scientists with
130 O f course, a company can only use a financial and labour-skill factor after the conclusion o f a financing, or 
respectively an employment contract However, what is important for a firm 's competitive success is not the use per 
se, but the potential availability and, hence, the provision o f required factors. Accordingly, the second pathway to 
competitiveness does not refer to how companies choose factors among possible alternatives, but to how they make 
sure that the required factors are provided.
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heterogeneous knowledge by exposing the latter to numerous stimuli -  be it by collaborating 
closely with other firms, or by encouraging scientists to publish and present their findings at 
conferences. On the other hand, Diversified Quality Producers in flexible labour markets 
conclude employment contracts which aim at tying employees to the company so as to provide 
them with firm-specific skills. This is done by offering long-term pension and insurance schemes 
to employees, as well as the opportunity of intra-firm promotion and of participating in 
sophisticated training programs.
The third and, in my view, final pathway to competitiveness consists in the provision of 
input factors through importation. Again, firms circumvent national institutions in that they do 
not employ those financial means and labour qualifications which are abundantly provided by 
national financial and labour-market regulations. Instead, firms import the required factors from 
other economies by drawing on international institutions. For example, companies which pursue 
an RPI strategy in economies where pensions and insurance schemes are administered by the 
state often acquire institutional share capital from countries with a private pension and insurance 
system (see chapter 2: section 2.4.3.). Similarly, Radical Product Innovators in rigid labour 
markets employ scientists from other countries in order to secure the necessary heterogeneous 
knowledge base (see chapter 4: section 4.3.3.).
One may argue that the third pathway of ‘competitiveness though importation* is better 
described as factor provision through foreign national institutions, because firms import those 
factors that emerge from the pension systems and labour-market institutions of another economy. 
However, such factor transfer is only possible in open financial and labour markets. Hence, it is 
international financial and labour-market institutions, rather than foreign national institutions, that 
enable firms to secure input factors from abroad. The best example of this is provided by the 
European Community, where the free circulation of capital, goods, services and people has been 
guaranteed since the Single European Act of 1986. This makes it much easier for Radical Product 
Innovators to secure heterogeneous scientific skills by employing EU rather than non-EU 
scientists. Similarly, Radical Product Innovators find it easier to acquire institutional share capital 
from EU rather than from non-EU investors.
In sum, firms secure input factors in three ways: they use factors provided by national 
institutions; they secure factors by improvising on a contractual basis; and they import scare 
factors by drawing on international institutions. Thus, the abovementioned pathways to 
competitiveness can be summarised as (1) competitiveness through national institutions, (2) 
competitiveness through improvisation, and (3) competitiveness through importation.
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It is interesting to note that the competitiveness literature is somewhat blind towards the 
second and third pathways to competitiveness. Blindness towards the second pathway is 
understandable to the extent that competitiveness through improvisation on a contractual basis 
may be too evident to merit systematic attention. However, the literature’s blindness towards the 
third pathway of competitiveness through importation in line with international institutions is 
striking, in that the literature is very concerned with the question of how globalization, or 
internationalisation impacts on firm competitiveness. Sharing a general understanding of 
internationalisation as a decrease in barriers to trade which leads to an increase in flows of 
goods and capital across national borders (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 55; Chesnais 1992: 280; see 
Nelson 1993: 17-18; 518-519; see Porter 1990: 53; see also Sinn 2005: 53), the literature 
acknowledges that firms can relocate (some of) their facilities to other economies. But why does 
it ignore the fact that internationalisation also enables firms to procure input factors from other 
countries? In essence, the reason resides in the explicit (Ohlin 1924: 83; see Heckscher 1919:48) 
or implicit (Sinn 2005: 66-68; Chesnais 1992: 280-282; Nelson 1993: 518-519; Porter 1990: 53- 
58; 67-68; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56-57) assumption of the competitiveness literature that input 
factors are immobile between economies. Accordingly, the literature acknowledges that firms can 
gain competitiveness through relocation (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56-58; Porter 1990: 55-58; 
Chesnais 1992: 280-282; Nelson 1993: 518-519; Sinn 2005: 18-19), while the possibility of 
gaining competitiveness through acquiring input factors from abroad is neglected.
6.1.4. I n t e r n a t io n a l  C o m p e t it iv e n e s s  t h o u g h  E n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  C r e a t iv it y
In addition to the insight that various pathways to international competitiveness exist, 
another noteworthy conclusion regarding the sources of firm competitiveness can be drawn from 
my research findings. Competitiveness does not primarily arise from the mere provision of input 
factors, but from the inventiveness of entrepreneurs. Let us recall the findings of chapters 2,3 and 
4 that national institutions provide just one set of input factors. Consequently, it is not factor 
provision through national institutions that enables firms to pursue different strategies in different 
institutional environments (see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; Sinn 2005: 68; Andersen 1992: 69; Patel and 
Pavitt 1994: 87-89; Porter 1990: 126-130; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-44). Instead, we have seen 
that it is the inventiveness with which entrepreneurs secure all their required factors that allows 
companies to compete internationally. Hence, firms are competitive as a result of entrepreneurial 
creativity rather than as a result of national regulation.
But how is it possible that the competitiveness literature ignores the importance of 
entrepreneurial creativity? In essence, the answer lies in the causal chain that underlies the
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reasoning of this literature. Except for the literature on national innovation systems (see Lundvall 
1992a: 10-13; Freeman 1995: 10-14; Dalum 1992: 203-207), all other strands argue that national 
institutions determine the quality and/or price of input factors required for a given strategy (see 
Ohlin 1933: 52-53; 6; Sinn 2005: 142-143; Porter 1990: 126-130; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21- 
44). This direct causal link between national regulation, input factors, and competitive strategy 
leads to a perception of entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers. While the literature 
acknowledges that firms can relocate (some of) their facilities to the most favourable institutional 
environment (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 56-58; Porter 1990: 55-58; Chesnais 1992: 280-282; 
Nelson 1993: 518-519; Sinn 2005: 18-19), the possibility that firms may circumvent national 
regulations is ignored. Hence, entrepreneurs are regarded as constrained by national institutions 
to an extent that leaves no room for entrepreneurial creativity.
This is not the case for the literature on national innovation systems which reasons along 
the following lines: depending on how national institutions condition processes of interactive 
learning, different technological opportunities arise (Dalum et al. 1992: 301). The latter translate 
into different types of innovations which, in turn, are at the basis of different competitive 
strategies, reflected by differing national patterns of industry specialisation (see Lundvall 1992a: 
10-13; Freeman 1995: 10-14; Dalum 1992: 203-207). While national institutions are said to 
channel competitiveness, the causal chain between institutions, technological opportunities, 
innovation and competitive strategy leaves room for entrepreneurial creativity. The reason for this 
is that entrepreneurs are perceived as the initiators of this causal process. Pointing to 
Schumpeter’s early work on the theory of economic development, Lundvall writes *(...) 
[Entrepreneurs, who act individually, [are] the most important economic agents bringing 
innovations into the economic system’ (Lundvall 1992a: 9). Accordingly, entrepreneurs are 
recognised as the main driving force behind any innovation and, hence, behind competitiveness, 
because they decide on which type of institutions they want to draw.
The causal chain explored in the course of this research project is akin to the reasoning of 
the innovation literature in that it considers entrepreneurial inventiveness as crucial for firm 
competitiveness. While less concerned with understanding their causes, I identified technological 
opportunities as the main determinant of a firm’s choice of competitive strategy (see chapter 5: 
section 5.3.). Once this choice is made, entrepreneurs secure all required input factors through 
national institutions, improvisation, and importation (see section 6.1.3.). In line with the 
innovation literature, the causal chain between technological opportunities, strategy choice, 
factor provision, and strategy pursuit recognises entrepreneurial creativity as the main driving
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force behind firm competitiveness, because entrepreneurs can only embark on their chosen 
strategy if they succeed in securing all required input factors.
In sum, my findings suggest that entrepreneurs are less constrained by national 
regulations, and more creative than assumed by most strands of the competitiveness literature 
(see Ohlin 1933: 52-53; 6; Sinn 2005: 142-143; Porter 1990: 126-130; Hall and Soskice 2001a: 
21-44). Accordingly, I argue that the perception of entrepreneurs as mere institution-takers does 
not allow us to understand how firms compete in different institutional environments. Instead, I 
agree with the innovation literature that a Schumpeterian perception of entrepreneurs as inventive 
creators (see e.g. Schumpeter 1934, chapter 4; Schumpeter 1942: 81-106) is the most instructive 
approach for understanding firm competitiveness.
6.2. V a r ieties o f  Ca pitalism : A d d r essin g  O pen  Q uestions
In the previous section, I summarised my research findings and discussed how they speak 
to the competitiveness literature in general. To date, the literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
(VoC) constitutes that strand of the competitiveness literature which proposes the most elaborate |
arguments about how national institutions condition firms’ competitiveness. It is precisely for this |
reason that I derived many hypotheses on the link between institutions, input factors and I
competitive strategies from the VoC literature’s reasoning. Therefore, my findings not only shed 
light on the competitiveness literature in general, they also speak to concerns which emerge from 
the VoC literature in particular. It is the aim of section 6.2. to address three of these concerns.
6.2 .1 . In s t it u t io n a l  C o m p l e m e n t a r i t i e s : A  F u n c t io n a l is t  E x p l a n a t io n  o f  
I n s t it u t io n a l  F o r m a t io n
It is one of the central arguments of the VoC literature that institutions are , 
complementary. ‘[T]wo institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or 
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other’ (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 17). Hence, the VoC literature proposes a functionalist explanation of institutional 
development: Institutions in one realm o f economic activity are said to assume a definite shape so 
as to improve the outcome of institutions in another realm of economic activity (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 21-36). It is furthermore important to note that the VoC literature adopts a firm-centered 
approach in that it ‘regards companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy’ (Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 6). Accordingly, the literature perceives the needs of international 
competitiveness for firms as the main determinant of institutional formation. In sum, the VoC 
literature suggests that national institutions assume that complementary shape which is most
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adequate for supporting international firm competitiveness (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 17-21), 
because this results in particularly ‘satisfactory levels of long-run economic performance’ (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 21).
While the functionalist logic of this reasoning may be appealing to institutionalist scholars 
and government officials, my research findings indicate that the VoC argument on institutional 
formation in general, and on institutional complementarities in particular, is grounded on two 
central misconceptions. On the one hand, the VoC literature ignores the existence of functional 
equivalent institutions. I illustrated in section 6.1.4. that firms are more than mere institution- 
takers. Whenever national institutions do not provide the input factors firms require to pursue 
their chosen strategy, entrepreneurs circumvent national institutions and rely on functional 
equivalents in order to make up for this lack on their own. More precisely, entrepreneurs 
improvise by concluding contracts which deliver the required factors, or they import the 
necessary factors from abroad by drawing on international institutions (see section 6.1.3.). 
Consequently, there is no need for national institutions to assume a complementary shape: why 
should they if entrepreneurs can use functional equivalents?
On the other hand, the firm-centered approach of the VoC literature is overly narrow. 
More precisely, the literature seems to be misguided in perceiving firms as ‘the crucial actors in a 
capitalist economy’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 6), and their interests as the central determinant of 
institutional formation (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 17-21). Of course, firms constitute an important 
interest group within a political economy, and their need for competitiveness is of central concern 
to national policy makers. But firms do not constitute the only lobby within the economy; and 
policy makers have to take a variety of socio-economic constraints into consideration when 
issuing new, or reforming existing legislation. It is furthermore likely that firm interests in 
general, and their suggestions about how to improve competitiveness in particular, are not 
homogeneous throughout the economy. This is particularly true as we have seen that firms in the 
same economy pursue different competitive strategies (see chapter 1: section 1.3,2.). In sum, it is 
implausible that institutional formation is functionalist to the extent that institutions assume those 
shapes preferred by (all) firms within the economy.
To conclude, my research findings indicate that the functionalist explanation of 
institutional formation proposed by the VoC scholars falls short in two respects. Not only does it 
ignore the fact that firms can resort to functional equivalent institutions, it also attributes too 
much importance to firms and their -  allegedly homogeneous -  interests for improved 




historical account of institutional development is more instructive for understanding institutional f
«
formation than the functionalist logic underlying the VoC reasoning. |
6*2.2. CMEs a n d  LMS: S t a t ic  I n s t it u t io n a l  C o n s t e l l a t io n s  a c h ie v in g  O p t im a l  F irm 
C o m p e t it iv e n e s s
The idea that institutions are complementary leads the VoC scholars to propose a second \ 
argument which is central to their literature. Two optimal institutional constellations are ; 
identified in which maximum firm competitiveness is achieved (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 8-9; j 
14-33; 36-44). More precisely, financial- and labour-market institutions are said to assume an 
optimal shape if  they assume that (complementary) form which facilitates the pursuit of the same 
competitive strategy. In other words, optimal competitiveness is achieved whenever institutions 
regulate economic interaction in such a way that firms are provided with all necessary factors for ] 
one competitive strategy. Overall, two optimal institutional constellations are identified, namely j 
‘Coordinated Market Economies’ (henceforth CMEs), and ‘Liberal Market Economies* ( 
(henceforth LMEs). In CMEs, financial- and labour-market institutions take forms that provide *'I
all the input factors required for the pursuit of a DQP strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-27; 
36-44). The opposite is true for LMEs, where financial- and labour-market institutions provide all 
necessary factors for Radical Product Innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 27-33; 36-44).
However, the VoC argument on optimal institutional constellations suffers from one 
crucial flaw. It simply cannot account for suboptimal institutional constellations (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001a: 19-21). It cannot explain why financial-market institutions on the one hand, and 
labour-market institutions on the other, assume shapes which support different competitive 
strategies. Switzerland constitutes one example of such institutional mismatch. Although the 
Swiss pension and insurance system contains a strong private component, one could argue that it 
supports a DQP strategy in that its public element hampers the provision of institutional share 
capital. However, the Swiss labour market is highly flexible, thereby facilitating the pursuit of an 
RPI, rather than a DQP strategy (see Borsch forthcoming). The classification of Switzerland as a 
CME therefore seems bold (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 20). Various Mediterranean economies -  
namely France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey -  provide further examples of 
institutional mismatch. On the one hand, these economies are said to have ‘specific kinds of 
capacities for non-market coordination in the sphere of corporate finance* (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 21) which, in turn, support Diversified Quality Production. On the other hand, they are 
also said to have ‘more liberal arrangements in the sphere o f labor relations* (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 21) which are at the basis of Radical Product Innovation. This institutional mismatch 
makes it impossible for the VoC scholars to classify the Mediterranean economies as either
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CMEs or LMEs (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21). In sum, the VoC literature is puzzled with the 
question of why financial- and labour-market institutions in many economies assume a 
suboptimal shape.
My research findings shed light on this question. They suggest that the identification of 
(only two) optimal institutional constellations is not very instructive, as it results from an overly 
narrow focus on national institutions and, consequently, from the neglect of institutional 
equivalents. I illustrated previously that entrepreneurs do not necessarily employ those factors 
which are provided by national institutions. Entrepreneurs also circumvent the latter by securing 
alternative factors through improvising on a contractual basis, or by importing scarce factors from 
abroad (see section 6.1.3.). In the abovementioned cases of Switzerland and the Mediterranean 
economies, for example, open financial and labour markets allow firms to import missing 
financial means and labour qualifications from other countries. Similarly, firms can secure factors 
by resorting to contractual provisions. However, the exclusive study of national institutions leads 
the VoC literature to ignore the fact that entrepreneurs can resort to functional equivalents, 
namely contracts and international institutions. Given the variety of institutions which enable 
international firm competitiveness, the identification of optimal institutional constellations in 
general, and the identification of just two optimal constellations in particular, is not fruitful for 
understanding institutional development on the one hand, and sources of firm competitiveness on 
the other.
6.23 . Institutional Adjustment: D ynamic Institutional Constellations achieving 
Optimal Firm  Competitiveness
The previous section showed that the VoC literature cannot explain static institutional 
mismatches. In other words, it is puzzled with the question of why national institutions assume 
suboptimal shapes, given that two optimal institutional constellations are identified (sec section 
6.2.2.). In a similar vein, the VoC literature wonders about dynamic institutional mismatches: 
what happens if  an optimal institutional constellation -  be it a CME or an LME -  is unsettled by 
an external shock (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 62-63)? According to the VoC literature 
‘[institutional complementarities should play an important, if ambiguous, role in these processes 
of adjustment.* (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 63).
Drawing on their argument about institutional complementarities, the literature identifies 
two types of institutional adjustment as a response to an external shock. *On the one hand, (...) 
institutional reform in one sphere of the economy could snowball into changes in other spheres as 
well.’ (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 63-64). Thus, the first adjustment path consists in the 
fundamental transformation of the entire institutional regime because a change in one area, say in
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financial-market institutions, entails change in another area, i.e. labour-market institutions (Hall 
and Soskice 2001a: 64). To put it differently, a perfect CME could turn into a perfect LME, and 
an ideal LME could become an ideal CME. ‘On the other hand, institutional complementarities 
generate disincentives to radical change. Firms and other actors may attempt to presene 
arrangements in one sphere of the economy in order to protect complementary institutions or 
synergies with institutions elsewhere that are of value to them.* (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 64). 
Accordingly, the second path of adjustment consists in one institution taking a suboptimal shape 
for a limited period of time, after which it reassumes its original complementary form in order to 
end the disadvantages resulting from institutional mismatches. So, even though the institutions 
regulating economic interaction in one area change, the benefits of improved competitiveness 
resulting from institutional complementarities are so strong that firms will seek to restore the 
original institutional constellation (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 65).
It might be surprising that these two adjustment paths are opposing in so far as the first 
path is described as radical institutional change, and the second as institutional readjustment. It 
will, however, hardly come as a surprise that the VoC literature leaves open the question as to 
which path is the more likely response to an external shock (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 62-66). My 
research findings indicate that the incapacity of the VoC literature to make a clear-cut statement 
about the outcome of dynamic institutional mismatches is essentially grounded on two 
misconceptions. Firm interests are less central to national policy-making, and less homogeneous 
throughout the economy, than is assumed by the VoC literature.
I have already argued that whenever contemplating institutional reform, national policy I 
makers definitely take an interest in the opinions and preferences of firms. However, firms do not 
constitute the only interest group within an economy; and policy makers usually have to consider 
a variety of socio-economic constraints when deciding institutional reforms. As a matter of fact, 
the reconciliation of different and often opposing interests is central to national policy-making 
and legitimises its outcome. It is therefore short-sighted to assume that institutional reform is 
driven by the predominant concern o f policy makers to provide firms with an optimal institutional 
environment.
But even in those instances in which economic considerations and, hence, firm interests 
are particularly important to institutional reform, it seems one-sided to assume that the interests 
of firms are homogenous throughout the economy. Given my finding that firms within the same 
economy pursue different competitive strategies (see chapter 1: section 1.3.2.), the question arises 
of to whom policy makers will listen: to Radical Product Innovators, to Diversified Quality 
Producers, or to Low Cost Producers? We can therefore conclude that the functionalist
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explanation proposed by the VoC literature is not very fruitful for understanding institutional 
reform in general, and institutional adjustment to external shocks in particular.
Indeed, examples of institutional adjustment following the functionalist logic proposed by 
the VoC scholars are hard to find. One of the most profound reforms of the German corporate 
governance system in recent years, namely the abolition of capital-gains taxes on the sale of 
corporate shareholdings in 2001 (see Hall and Soskice 2001a: 61), has not had any noticeable 
impact on German financial-market organisation on the one hand (see Deutsche Bundesbank 
2006: 108; 110), and labour-market regulation on the other. Similarly, it is not clear how the 
argument that alleged wage-drift in large German companies entails a deterioration of effective 
wage coordination in some sectors (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 64-65) fits the argument on 
complementary institutional adjustment. Where is the spillover effect of ‘institutional reform in 
one sphere of the economy [snowballing] into changes in other spheres as well* (Hall and Soskice 
2001a: 63-64)? In sum, my finding that firm interests are heterogeneous throughout an economy, 
and presumably not of predominant concern to national policy makers, suggests that institutional 
adjustment to external shocks is not driven by a functionalist logic. As with institutional 
formation (see section 6.2.1.), institutional adjustment to external shocks seems instead to be 
historically grounded, as it differs from one country to another -  depending on the mix of socio­
economic constraints to be addressed.
To conclude, my research findings militate against the functionalist explanations of 
institutional formation and adjustment proposed in the VoC literature. Perceiving financial- and 
labour-market institutions as complementary, this literature identifies two static institutional 
constellations, and two dynamic modes of institutional adjustment, which allegedly entail optimal 
firm competitiveness (Hall and Soskice 2001a). However, my research findings indicate that 
these arguments are grounded on an overly narrow focus on firms on the one hand, and national 
institutions on the other. While the former leads the VoC literature to ignore the fact that firm 
interests do not constitute the main determinant of national policy-making, the latter makes it 
blind to functionally equivalent institutions. As a result, the argument about institutional 
complementarities is not particularly instructive for understanding institutional formation on the 
one hand, and institutional adjustment on the other.
6 3 . Lessons to b e  L earned  about  Institutional D evelopm ent
The following and last section of this chapter elaborates on the implications which derive 
from my research for the development of national institutions. In so doing, I illustrate in section 
6.3.1. which conclusions can be drawn regarding the question of how globalisation impacts on
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institutional development. Will national institutions converge or diverge over time? Elaborates 
on the extent to which institutions diverge in shape, but converge in their ever lower impact oa 
entrepreneurial behaviour, I argue that converging divergence is the most likely outcome of 
institutional development. Section 6.3.2. concludes the chapter by reasoning about the 
possibilities of national policymakers to design competitiveness-enhancing institutions.
63.1. C o n v e r g e n c e  in  I m p a c t  o n  E n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  B e h a v io u r ,  D iv e r g e n c e  in  Shape
It should be borne in mind that the competitiveness literature essentially arose in response 
to the question of how the increasing internationalisation of economic activity impacts on 
national institutions. Will internationalisation lead to institutional convergence as national policy 
makers find themselves obliged to adopt the single best mode of institutional market regulation 
which enables optimal firm competitiveness (see e.g. Sinn 2003)? Or, will internationalisation 
lead to institutional divergence because firms can compete in different ways so that several 
‘good’ ways of institutionalising economic interaction exist (see Lundvall 1992b; Nelson 1993; 
Porter 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001b)?
It will hardly come as a surprise that neo-liberal proponents perceive institutional 
convergence as the most likely outcome of institutional development under internationalisation 
(see e.g. Sinn 2003). The reasoning underlying this argument runs along the following lines: 
given that internationalisation increases competition -  as it increases price-transparency due to 
the removal of international trade barriers -  national policy makers will have to deregulate 
markets in order to enable production at the lowest possible costs. Neo-liberal theory has often 
been criticised for its one-sided perception of firms as mere production functions (see Williamson 
1990: 1-3; Hart 1995: 155; Glenn Thomas 1994: 458-459) which also underlies the reasoning 
behind the convergence argument. Given that companies are perceived as ‘black-box’ production 
functions, all that matters for firm competitiveness from a neo-liberal point of view are the costs 
of production factors. This, in turn, explains the claim on the deregulation of markets, and the 
convergence of national institutions as a result o f increasing internationalisation (see e.g. Sinn 
2003).
Contrary to neo-liberal thought, the competitiveness literature acknowledges firms to be 
an ensemble o f tangible and intangible assets rather than cost-driven production functions (see 
e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001b: 17). Consequently, the competitiveness literature recognises that 
firms not only compete on the basis of costs but also on the basis of quality. Acknowledging the 
quality of production factors as a source of firm competitiveness, the internationalisation of | 
economic activities is said to entail the divergence rather than the convergence of national |
1
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institutions -  depending on the competitive strategy to be supported. Thus, one of the most 
important contributions of the competitiveness literature consists in its insight that more than one 
way of organising economic activity exists which delivers firm competitiveness and, 
consequently, economic prosperity (see Lundvall 1992b; Nelson 1993; Porter 1990; Hall and 
Soskice 2001b).
While my research findings are definitely more in line with the divergence argument of 
the competitiveness literature than with the convergence argument of neo-liberal theory, I discard 
the functionalist logic underlying the former’s reasoning. National institutions do not assume 
their shapes because they must support a specific competition system. Instead, they take shape in 
response to a (historically grounded) variety of socio-economic constraints which often differ 
from one economy to another (see section 6.2.1.). But what can these findings contribute to the 
debate on institutional development under globalisation? Can we expect national institutions to 
diverge rather than to converge over time?
My studies of pension and insurance systems, labour markets, and research regimes in the 
UK, Germany and Italy clearly show that institutions differ in shape. In my view, the reason for 
these differences stems from the fact that socio-economic problems vary from one economy to 
another. Depending on the mix and magnitude of these problems, national policy makers adopt 
different reforms which translate into different ways of institutionalising economic interaction. 
Labour-market reforms in Italy and the UK since the early 1980s provide telling examples. In 
aiming to boost employment in order to alleviate the consequences of the two oil crises in the 
1970s, the British government deregulated the labour market at the beginning of the 1980s (King 
and Wood 1999). Italian policy makers, in contrast, have never considered similar labour-market 
deregulation as it was feared that this would lead to substantial unemployment among older 
employees. Instead, Italian politicians have preferred since the early 1970s to promote the 
employment of young graduates by issuing legislative decrees that grant fiscal relief to firms 
which hire project collaborators for a limited time period (see DPR 597 1973).
Importantly, national politicians can address socio-economic problems through a large 
variety of institutional reforms, because firm competitiveness does not depend on the provision of 
input factors through national institutions (see section 6.1.3.). Even if politicians deem it 
necessary to change institutions which are central to the provision of specific input factors, firm 
competitiveness is not hampered as entrepreneurs can resort to functional equivalents: they can 
improvise and secure required factors on a contractual basis; and they can import scarce factors 
from abroad by drawing on international institutions. From this perspective, it is rather 
unsurprising that the British government launched a pilot project in 2003 evaluating the adoption
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of a professional training system according to the German example. Similarly, it is 
understandable that the left-wing German government under Chancellor Schroeder introduced 
important tax incentives to stimulate private pension insurance.
But what do these insights teach us about the impact of internationalisation on 
institutional development? In essence, I argue that the increasing internationalisation of economic 
activity influences institutional development in two respects. On the one hand, it entails 
divergence in the shape o f national institutions. The reason for this is that both the mix and the 
magnitude of socio-economic problems are more likely to increase rather than to decrease under 
globalisation. Developing countries become more and more competitive, (labour) migration 
increases with the result that the population of a country becomes ever more diverse, while 
cleavages between the rich (winners) and the poor (losers o f internationalisation) are increasingly 
pronounced. Hence, politicians will need to address these problems through a variety of measures 
which will presumably translate into increasing institutional diversity. I therefore argue thaï 
national institutions diverge in shape as a result o f internationalisation.
On the other hand, and as a corollary o f the first development, national institutions 
converge in that they are ever less important as providers o f input factors. As a matter of fact, 
internationalisation enhances competition in that the abolition of trade barriers increases price- 
transparency. This obliges entrepreneurs to be ever more competitive, i.e. to secure all required 
input factors in the most efficient way. Given that internationalisation entails an increasing need 
for institutional reform, entrepreneurs may find it more efficient not to secure necessary input 
factors through national institutions. Instead, they will, presumably, prefer and/or find it 
increasingly necessary to circumvent national institutions by securing required factors through 
improvisation on the one hand, and importation on the other. Increasing internationalisation 
therefore provides an advantage in that it requires more and more international institutions to be 
put in place which regulate economic interaction at a supra-national level. Accordingly, I argue 
that the convergence o f national institutions regarding their impact on entrepreneurial behaviour 
is the second outcome of institutional development as a result of increasing internationalisation.
In sum, my research findings indicate that converging divergence o f national institutions 
is the most likely result of institutional development following internationalisation. It should be 
noted that my understanding of ‘converging divergence’ differs from that of Katz and Darbishire 
(2000) who arrive at the same conclusion in their study of employment systems. Arguing that 
institutions increasingly diverge within the same economy so that institutional differences 
between economies decrease (or converge), Katz and Darbishire twice refer to the same feature 
of institutions, namely their shape (Katz and Darbishire 2000: 263-283). My understanding of
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‘converging divergence* is different in that it refers to two different features of institutions: to 
their shape on the one hand and to their impact upon entrepreneurial behaviour on the other. 
Accordingly, and contrary to Katz and Darbishire, I predict divergence in shape, and 
convergence in impact upon entrepreneurial behaviour to be the most likely outcome of 
institutional development under globalisation.
63.2. C o n c l u s io n s  t o  b e  D r a w n  f o r  N a t io n a l  P o l ic y -M a k in g
As a final point, thought shall be given to the conclusions that can be drawn from my 
research findings for national policy making. How should national institutions ideally be 
designed in order to achieve maximum firm competitiveness? The first, and perhaps most 
relieving lesson to be learned, is that national policy makers do not need to deliver a perfect 
institutional environment to firms. Let us recall that firm competitiveness does not arise from the 
mere provision of input factors, but from entrepreneurial inventiveness (see section 6,1.4.). 
Wherever national institutions fail to provide necessary input factors, entrepreneurs circumvent 
the former and secure missing factors through improvisation and importation (see section 6.1.3.). 
Consequently, firm competitiveness is not undermined as long as entrepreneurs can circumvent 
national institutions and resort to institutional equivalents.
The second, and probably less pleasant conclusion to be drawn is that national policy 
makers cannot provide firms with a perfect institutional environment. My analyses have shown 
the trade-off related to the design of national institutions and their impacts on firm 
competitiveness. Irrespective of whether research systems and labour-market institutions are rigid 
or flexible, and irrespective of whether pension and insurance systems are public or private, they 
only facilitate one competitive strategy, as they provide just one type of input factors (see 
chapters 2 and 4). Given the finding that firms within the same economy pursue different 
strategies (see chapter 1), and given that each strategy requires different input factors (see 
chapters 2 and 4), national institutions cannot assume an ideal shape. They cannot deliver Radical 
Product Innovators and Diversified Quality Producers alike with all their required input factors.
Does this mean that any research, pension and insurance system, as well as any labour- 
market institution facilitates competitiveness to the same extent? Interestingly, this does not seem 
to be the case either. As I have argued previously, firm competitiveness is not undermined as 
long as entrepreneurs can circumvent national institutions. Hence, policy makers have leverage 
over firm competitiveness to the extent that they can design more or less ‘elastic* institutions. 
While I define an elastic institution as a national institution which entrepreneurs can circumvent 
rather easily, inelastic institutions are hard to circumvent. To give an example, rigid labour
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market institutions such as powerful works councils are more elastic if  firms only have to 
introduce them upon a request from their workforce. Yet powerful works councils are less elastic 
if all firms (of a certain size) are legally obliged to install them. A similar example of an elastic, 
rigid labour-market institution is a national wage-bargaining agreement which leaves it up to 
firms whether they wish to adhere or not. If adherence is compulsory, the elasticity of national 
wage-bargaining agreements is reduced.
These examples indicate that although no single model of best-praxis exists national 
institutions can be more or less competitiveness-enhancing, depending on the ease they allow 
entrepreneurs to pursue an alternative (i.e. not predominantly facilitated) strategy. The easier it is 
for entrepreneurs to circumvent national institutions, i.e. the more national institutions are elastic, 
the more they enhance competitiveness. Thus, policy makers do have leverage over firm 
competitiveness: The challenge consists in striking a balance between institutions which support 
the existing production regime, while leaving entrepreneurs the necessary ‘elasticity* to pursue an 
alternative strategy.
That said, a word of caution needs to be added regarding the leverage of national policy 
makers over initiating firm competitiveness. Let us remember that a firm’s decision to compete 
by choosing a specific strategy does not depend on the extent to which entrepreneurs can secure 
required input factors (see chapter 5: section 5.2.). Instead, it results from the active attempts of 
entrepreneurs to turn technological opportunities into marketable products. In other words, 
entrepreneurial sprit is at the basis of any competitive strategy and, hence, of firm 
competitiveness in general (see chapter 5: section 5.3.). Accordingly, the question arises of 
whether policy makers can foster competitiveness through encouraging entrepreneurial spirit.
Economic development in Southern Italy provides a rather discouraging answer to this 
question. Given that research, pension and insurance systems, as well as labour-market 
institutions are homogeneous throughout Italy, it is striking that all Northem-Italian regions are 
well-developed in terms of GDP per capita, whereas most Southem-Italian regions are 
economically underdeveloped. According to scholars of this phenomenon (Trigilia 1992), one 
major reason for the chronic economic backwardness o f the Italian South is the absence of 
entrepreneurial spirit in the regions concerned. Since entrepreneurial success in Southern Italy 
can often be achieved only in collaboration with informal, or even illegal networks, many 
Southern Italians simply prefer not to engage in independent entrepreneurial activities. Until 
today, all attempts by Italy’s policy makers to boost entrepreneurial spirit in Southern Italy 
through regulatory initiatives have essentially failed. While my research findings do not provide
214
i
any insights into how to foster entrepreneurial spirit, the Italian example indicates that the 
leverage of politicians is rather limited.
In sum, how can politicians foster firm competitiveness? Hoping not to discourage 
national policy makers, my studies indicate that possibilities to foster the main source o f firm 
competitiveness, namely entrepreneurial spirit, are limited. But as soon as entrepreneurs decide to 
size a technological opportunity and to turn it into a marketable product, they require specific 
input factors in order to pursue their chosen strategy. In other words, even though the provision of 
required input factors is not sufficient, it is a necessary condition for competitiveness. It is at this 
point that policy makers gain leverage. It is important to note that politicians cannot, and do not 
need to deliver a perfect institutional environment to firms. However, policy makers can design 
more or less elastic institutions, where the former are more competitiveness-enhancing than the 
latter. Thus, the challenge related to fostering firm competitiveness consists in striking a balance 
between institutions which support the existing production regime, while leaving entrepreneurs 
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I. T e c h n ic a l  A ppe n d ix
Criteria  Em plo yed  f o r  Sa m plin g  t h e  PHID D atabase
P o p u l a t io n : C o m p o s it io n  of PHID D a t a b a s e  (13™ N o v e m b e r  2004)
Unit of Analysis
A research project aiming at the development of a pharmaceutical product which has reached at 
least the stage of preclinical development since 1980.
Number of Units of Analysis
16751 pharmaceutical research projects were included in the PHID database on 13th Nov. 2004.
Geographical Coverage
Research projects carried out in 67 countries were included in the PHID database on 13th 
November 2004. In that, the number of research projects was large enough and, hence, 
representative only for 7 countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, USA, UK.
Characteristics of Units of Analysis, relevant for Database Sampling (see below)
For each pharmaceutical research project, the following characteristics could be identified:
Which firms and/or public research organisation (i.e. universities and research institutes) did 
participate in the project in question?
At which stage (preclinical R&D; clinical development phase I; clinical development phase 
II; clinical development phase HI; pre-registration and registration; marketing) did a firm 
and/or a public research organisation participate in the project in question?
Which molecule (new chemical entity, or known chemical entity) is at the basis of the 
research project?
Number of Organisations Included
On 13th November 2004, 3522 firms and public research organisations (had) participated in a 
pharmaceutical project which was included in the PHID database.
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Sa m p l e : C r i t e r i a  U s e d  f o r  Sa m p l in g  t h e  PHID Da t a b a s e
Type of Researching Organisation
Only those research projects were considered, which were carried out by firms. Projects carried 
out by public research organisations (i.e. universities and research institutes) were excluded.
Geographical Coverage
Only those research projects were considered, which were carried out by firms with a head­
quarter in the UK, Germany, or Italy.
Identification of Competitive Strategies (For a complete discussion see section 1.3.)
Firms were identified as Radical Product Innovators, Diversified Quality Producers, and Low 
Cost Producers according to the following criteria:
Radical Product Innovators
Identification of those firms which (had) carried out themselves, or out-licensed a research 
project based on a new chemical entity.
Diversified Quality Producers
Identification of those firms which (had) carried out themselves, or out-licensed a research 
project based on a known chemical entity. Furthermore, those firms were identified which had in- 
licensed a pharmaceutical project at any stage of clinical development.
Low Cost Producers
Identification of those firms which (had) in-licensed a pharmaceutical project at the pre­
registration, registration or marketing phase.
S a m p l in g  B ia s : U n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  F ir m s  i n  t h e  S a m p l e  O b t a in e d  
(Generics) Firms which are not engaged in R&D Activities
Given that the PHID database considers only firms which engage in pharmaceutical research 
projects, (generics) firms abstaining from R&D activities are not included -  unless they specialise 
in the registration or marketing of innovative pharmaceutical products.
Biotechnology Firms in Germany and Italy
Given that many German biotech firms were founded in the mid 1990s, while most Italian 
biotech firms were founded around the turn of the millennium, only few German and almost no 
Italian biotech firm are included, because they had not yet brought a pharmaceutical project 
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2. E m p l o y e e  S k il l s : 2a) Sk il l  P r o f il e  o f  a l l  E m p l o y e e s
2.0. Firm Size
1. How many employees ...
- . .  .does your firm currently (2004) employ; 
- . .  .did your firm employ in 2000:
( □ < 5 0
( □ < 5 0
□ 5 0 -5 0 0
□ 5 0 -5 0 0
□ >500)
□ >500)
2. In terms of number of employees per area, how active is your firm in each of the following 
business areas?
Research : □ very active □ active □ not active at all (Number o f  employees working in this area:____ )
D evelopm ent □ very active □ active □ not active at all (Number o f  employees working in this area:____ )
Production: □ very active □ active □ not active at all (Number o f  employees working in this area:____ )
M arketing: □ very active □ active □ not active at all (Number o f employees working in this area:____ )
Sales: □ very active □ active □ not active at all (Number o f employees working in this area:____ )
2.1. Type of Skills
1. What percentage of your employees fit into the following educational categories?
Primary education, i.e. without vocational training, and
without a university degree (or a comparable degree of higher education):
1
% of employees \
Secondary education, i.e. with a degree in vocational training, but
without a university degree (or a comparable degree of higher education) % of employees J
Tertiary education, i.e. with a university degree (or a comparable degree of higher education): % of employees J
2. Please specify the number of years tha t an employee works for your firm on average: years
3. What is the average age of your employees? _____years
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22 . V o c a t io n a l  T r a in in g  P r o g r a m s  f o r  A p p r e n t ic e s
1. Does your firm offer vocational training programs for apprentices? □ Yes □ No
- IF NO: 2. Why does your firm not offer vocational training programs for apprentices?
□ Because the firm does not need the types o f skills which apprentices acquire during vocational training programs.
□ Because it is difficult to find appropriate apprentices.
□ Because the firm would risk its trained employees being offered work with another finn as soon as training was 
completed.
□ Because it is too costly or time-consuming to organise and monitor vocational training programs.
□ Because it is easier and cheaper to recruit employees that have been trained by another firm.
0  Because numerous employees, having been trained by another firm, apply for a job  at our firm.
0  Other (please specify):_________________________________________________ _______________________
Please go to section 2.3. On-the-job Training
- IF YES: 2. Please specify which vocational training program(s) your firm offers, i.e. which 
certificates are awarded to your apprentices upon completion of the respective program(s)? 
If  your firm offers a large number of vocational training programs, please list only the most 
requested:
3. W hy does your firm offer vocational training programs instead of recruiting trained 
employees from other firms?
0  For financial reasons, because apprentices constitute a source o f comparatively cheap labour.
D Out o f necessity, because training apprentices is the easiest way o f securing highly qualified employees.
D For reasons o f competitiveness, because O the national training system (such as the German Dual System)
O  the regional training system 
O  the local training system
is so well developed that it would be counterproductive not to make use o f i t  
D For image-reasons, because firms that take on apprentices have a better reputation than firms that do not do so.
□ For traditional reasons, because the firm has always been concerned about the education of its employees.
D For reasons o f competition, because most of our competitors offer vocational training programs.
□ For legal reasons, because vocational training is required by law.
D Out o f obligation, because vocational training is required by O a chamber o f  commerce and industry.
O a business association.
□ Other (please specify):
4. W hat measures does your firm take to ensure that, once vocational training is completed, 
employees are not poached by a competitor?_____________________________________
5. On completion of a vocational training program, do your employees receive a diploma 
which is
□ recognised only by your firm .
□ recognised throughout the industry, i.e. by the majority o f (British) firms that are active in the biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical or generics industry.
□ recognised throughout the country, i.e. by the majority o f all (British) firms, even if  they are not active in the 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical or generics industry.
6. Who designs and monitors the vocational training programs which are offered by your
firm?_______________________________________________________________________
7. On average, how many apprentices does your firm employ each year?______apprentices
23 . On-the-Job Training
1. Apart from vocational training programs, does your firm  offer on-the-job training to its 
employees, e.g. computer courses, courses on communication or sales-techniques (etc.)?
□ Yes □ No
- IF NO: 2. Why does your firm not offer on-the-job training to its employees?
□ Because all employees are sufficiently skilled in their jobs.
□ Because it is too costly or time-consuming to  organise and monitor on-the-job training courses.
0  Because employees are not interested in participating in such courses.
□ Other (please specify):________________________________________________________________________
Please go to section 2.4. Salaries and Wages
- IF YES: 2. Please specify which on-the-job training courses are offered to your employees:
□ Mandatory courses for new employees, e.g. an introductory course to the firm
□ Courses on the organisation, functioning or culture o f the firm
□ Courses to prepare employees for promotion, e.g. training programs for (future) managers
□ Vocational retraining courses
□ Courses on the use o f  special technologies, techniques, tools, or machines, e.g. courses in molecular biology/ cell cultures
□ Courses on certain business functions, e.g. courses in finance or sales, or legal training on GMP requirements
□ Personal development courses, e.g. courses on presentation skills, or courses on project- or change-management
□ Computer or software courses
□ Foreign language courses
0  Other (please specify):___________________ _ __________________________________________________ _
3. Please rank the various on-the-job training courses in order of their importance by 
assigning
- ‘1 * to the type of courses which your employees visit most frequently,
- ‘2’ to the type of courses which your employees visit second most frequently,
- ‘3’ to the type of courses which your employees visit third most frequently.
___ Mandatory courses for new employees, e.g. an introductory course to the firm
__  Courses on the organisation, functioning or culture o f the firm
__  Courses to prepare employees for promotion, e.g. training programs for (future) managers
__  Vocational retraining courses
__  Courses on the use o f special technologies, techniques, tools, or machines, e.g. courses in molecular biology/ cell cultures
__  Courses on certain business functions, e.g. courses in finance or sales, or legal training on GMP requirements
__  Personal development courses, e.g. courses on presentation skills, or courses on project- or change-management
__  Computer or software courses
__  Foreign language courses
__  Other (please specify):________________________________________________________________________
4. Please specify whether
□ your firm offers the majority o f on-the-job training courses itself.
□ the majority o f  on-the-job training courses is offered in cooperation with a public body (e.g. a CCI).
□ the majority o f  on-the-job training courses is offered in collaboration with other firms.
□ the majority o f  on-the-job training courses is outsourced to external trainers.
5. Are the skills which your employees acquire by participating in on-the-job training courses 
mostly:
□ firm-specifiCy i.e. the acquired skills are o f  use mainly in the context o f your firm.
□ industry-specific, i.e. the acquired skills are o f use in other (British) firms that are active in the biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical or generics industry.
□ general, i.e. the acquired skills are o f  use in any (British) firm, including those that are not active in the 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical or generics industry.
6. On average, how many employees participate in at least one on-the-job training course per
year? ____________ employees
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7. Why does your firm offer the possibility to participate in on-the-job training courses?
□ For reasons o f competitiveness, because on-the-job training increases employee performance.
□ Out o f  necessity, because on-the-job training is crucial in order to teach employees very specific skills.
□ For image-reasons, because firms that offer on-the-job training have a better reputation than firms that do not do so.
□ For traditional reasons, because the firm has always been concerned about its employees* skills.
□ For reasons o f competition, because most competitors offer on-the-job training.
□ For legal reasons, because on-the-job training is required by law.
□ Out o f obligation, because on-the-job training is required by O a chamber o f commerce and industry.
O a business association.
□ O ther (please specify):
2.4. Salaries and Wages
1. According to you, how important are trade unions for your firm, considering that they 
determine standard w ages/salaries?_______________  _____________^ ____________
n important □ rather □ neither important d rather □ trivial
important nor trivial trivial
Why?
2. In 2003, how many of your employees were a member of a trade union?___ % of employees
3. Does your firm participate in market surveys in order to determine the wage-/salary-profile
of each job required in the pharmaceutical industry? □ Yes □ No
4. On average, are your employees paid:
□ below average wages/salaries? Why?________ __________________________________
□ standard average wages/salaries? Why? _______________________________________
□ above average wages/salaries? Why?_______________________________ ______ __
2.5. W orks Council/ Employee Representative
1. Is the majority of your employees paid for working overtime hours? □ Yes □ No
If necessary, please specify which type of employees is paid overtime hours (i.e. those employees 
working according to the provisions of a collective pay agreement):_____________________
2. Does your firm have a works council, or (an) employee representative(s)?
□ N o □ Yes, □ a works council
0 ____ employee representative^)
- IF NO: 3. Why not?____________________________________________ .
Please go to section 2.6. Labour Market Flexibility
- IF YES:3. Do you consider it
0 very □ advantageous □ neither advantageous □ disadvantageous □ very
advantageous nor disadvantageous disadvantageous
for the firm’s employers that the concerns of the firm’s employees are represented by a works 
council, or respectively by an employee representative^)? Why?___________________
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2.6. Labour Market Flexibility
1. Does the majority of your firm’s employment contracts contain a competition clause?
□ YcsD No
- IF NO: 2. Why not?_________________________________________________________
Please go to question 4
- IF YES: 2. How long is the average period during which an employee is not allowed to work 
for a competitor when his/her employment relationship with your firm ends?__weeks/months
3. Do you consider competition clauses as
□ significant □ fairly 0 neither significant □ fairly □ insignificant
significant nor insignificant Insignificant
obstacle whenever an employee looks for a new job? Why?.
4 .To be asked. Does it occur □ very often □ often □ sometimes □ rarely □ never 
that the firms which are active in your industry recruit employees of their competitors?
To be filled in:
(a. Does it occur 0 very often □ often □ sometimes □ rarely □ never
that a competitor recruits a few  of your employees?
b. Does it occur □ very often □ often □ sometimes □ rarely □ never
that a competitor recruits a considerable number of your employees?
c. Does it occur □ very often □ often □ sometimes 0 rarely 0  never
that your firm recruits a few of your competitor^)’ employees?
d. Does it occur □ very often □ often □ sometimes □ rarely □ never
that your firm recruits a considerable number of your competitors)’ employees?)
5. If mutual ‘poaching’ happens sometimes, rarely or never, what mechanisms prevent this?
6a. What percentage of your employees have- an employment contract o f limited duration: __ %
- an employment contract of unlimited duration: %
6b. What percentage of your employees with an employment contract of unlimited duration
work - full-time:________ %
- part-time:_______ %
7. How long is the average notice period that your firm must respect when employees are 
dismissed as the result of an economic downturn (if necessary, please specify for different 
groups of employees)?
□ Notice periods are negotiated on an individual basis. In most cases, they amount to ____ days/ weeks/ months.
□ The statutary notice periods apply, which (depending on the employee’s seniority) amount to at least___ days.'
weeks/ months.
8. Do you consider these notice periods as
□ too long? Whv? ____________________________________________________
□ about right? Why?__________________________________________________________
□ too short? Whv? ______________________________________________________
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2b) Sk il l  P r o f il e  o f  Sc ien tists
1. Of all scientists who work for your firm in the field of R&D, ( 100 %  )
- how many are employed by your firm: _____ %
- how many are employed by another organisation: _____ %
namely: - a university: _______%
-a  0  public O private research institute: _______%
- another firm: _______%
- another organisation (please specify ):___________________________* _______%
2. From how many different universities do the scientists working for your firm in the field of R&D come?
From___different universities, of which ca.___________ % are universities in the UK.
3. From how many different disciplines do the scientists working for your firm in the field of R&D come?*
From___different disciplines, most importantly_____________________________________
4. From how many different countries do the scientists working for your firm in the field of R&D come?*
From___different countries. Apart from the UK ( ____ %), scientists are mostly from_______
5. How would you describe the overall knowledge of the scientists working for your firm in
the field of R&D?*
□ heterogeneous □ rather □ neither heterogeneous □ rather □ homogenous
heterogeneous nor homogeneous homogeneous
6. Considering the extent of their overall knowledge, how would you describe the
0 discordant □ rather □ □either discordant □ rather □ concordant
discordant nor concordant concordant
7. How would you describe the results delivered by the scientists working for your firm in the 
field of R&D?*
radically new incrementally new conventional
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
discovery improvement imitation
□ n □ □ □ □ □
8. Does your firm pay a bonus to scientists who achieve outstanding results in the field of 
R&D, e.g. by making or contributing to a major innovation?* □ Yes □ No
- IF NO: 9. Why not?________________________________________________________
- IF YES: 9. Is the possibility of rewarding an outstanding R&D performance with a bonus
stipulated in the majority of employment contracts of those scientists working for your firm 
in the field of R&D?* □ Yes □ No
10. Please specify the last occasion on which scientists were awarded a bonus for their 
outstanding performance in the field of R&D:
Year:______  Bonus amount:______________________________________________
Rewarded for:________________________________________________________
Please consider both the scientists employed by your firm, and the scientists who work for your firm but are employed 
by another organisation.
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3. F in a n c ia l  St r u c t u r e
3.1. Overview
1. What accounting principles does your firm use?
□ IAS □ US-GAAP
□ HGB □ Other (please specify):
2. What financial sources did your firm use between 2001 and 2003?*
In Million €uros, or % 2001 2002 2003
a. Share capital, defined as the sum of:
Issued share capital (or called-up share capital)
(=  Common Stock + Preferred Stock- Treasury Stock)
+ Capital surplus
b. Long-term debt ( or loans')







1. How is your firm’s executive board (o r management) appointed?
□ Shareholders directly elect the executive board (management).
□ Shareholders elect a supervisory board which, in turn, elects the executive board (management)
□ Other (please specify):________________________________________________________________
2. In which ways do your firm’s shareholders participate in corporate affairs?
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3. Does your firm have a supervisory board? 
- IF NO: Please go to question 6
□ Yes □ No
- IF YES: 4. In the course o f the last th ree  years, has any person been a member o f  both the executive 
b oard  (management) and the  supervisory board? □  Y es □  N o  (□ because this is forbidden by law)
5. How do the firm’s supervisory board members exert control over the firm’s executive 
board (management)?___________________________________________________________________________
6. How often does the firm’s executive board (management) and the firm’s supervisory board (or 
the shareholders - in the case that no supervisory board exists) meet on average per year?
□ Once a year □ Once every 6 months 0  Once every 3 months
□ Once every 2 months □ Once a month □ More than once a month
7« Do you consider it
□ crucial □ I fairly O neither crucial □ fairly □ trivial
I crucial nor trivial trivial
for the film’s success that the supervisory board (or the shareholders - in the case that no supervisory board 
exists) consults the executive board (management) on major corporate affairs?
Why?_______________________________________________________________________
8. How would you characterise the relationship between the firm’s executive board 
(management) and the firm’s supervisory board (or the shareholders - in the case that no supervisory board 
exists)?________________________________________ neutral________________________________________________
cooperative □ □ □ 0 □ uncooperative
trustful □ □ □ □ □ distrustful
friendly □ □ □ □ □ hostile
9. How were your firm’s shares spread between private and institutional shareholders 
between 2001 and 2003?
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003
S h a r e  c a p ita l,  defined as the sum of ‘issued share 














- Other (please specify):
% % %
10. Do your firm’s shareholders include any institutional investors who exert proxy voting 
rights? □ Yes □ No
11. How would you characterise the present distribution o r your firm’s paie -in share capital?
0 highly □ dispersed □ neither dispersed □ concentrated □ highly j
dispersed nor concentrated concentrated i
12 What sources of information do your f iv e  m ost im p o rta n t shareholders mostly consult in 
order to learn about the firm’s performance?
0  Publicly available accounting indicators, such as the firm’s share price or its annual report.
□ (Reports on) meetings o f  the supervisory board and the executive board (management).
0  Direct consultation o f  the executive board (management).
□ Other sources of information:____________________________________________________________________
3 3 , D e b t  F in a n c e
1. How would you characterise the relationship between the firm’s executive board 
(management) and its creditors (i.e. banks)?
neutral
cooperative □ □ □ □ □ uncooperative
trustful □ □ □ □ □ distrustful
friendly □ □ 0 □ □ hostile
2. How difficult is it for your firm to obtain a loan from a bank?
□ difficult | □ | fairly difficult □ neither difficult □ fairly easy □ easy
1 1 ______________ nor easy
Why?.
3.4. S t a t e  S u b s id ie s
1. Has your firm been granted any state subsidies over the last 10 years? □ Yes □ No
- IF Y E S : 2 . On which conditions? Please specify the time period, the awarding institution, and the form of subsidy:
Thank you very much for your assistance!
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4. S tandards and  Sp e c if ic a t io n s
The legislation concerning the quality-standards that manufacturers of pharmaceutical products 
have to meet is very demanding. ¿ 1  point 33 the European directive 2004/27/EC of 31st March 2004 
stipulates that only those active substances “which have been manufactured in accordance with the 
detailed guidelines on good manufacturing praxis for starting materials” shall be used as starting 
materials. Among the requirements stemming from the guidelines of good manufacturing praxis, the 
quality-standards of active and excipient pharmaceutical ingredients, described in so-called 
‘specifications’, play an important role. The Pharmacopoeia is one collection of such recognised 
‘quality-standards*. Accordingly, the monographs in the Pharmacopoeia meticulously define 
specifications for active and excipient ingredients. Yet, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products 
remains free to define its own specifications.
The following questions refer to the specifications o f those active and excipient ingredients that 
your firm  uses as starting materials in the manufacturing ofpharmaceutical products.
4.1. T ype of and Motives for Specifications of Starting Materials
1. Of all the active and excipient ingredients that your firm uses in producing pharmaceutical 
products, what percentage of these substances are based
- on specifications defined in the Pharmacopoeia: ca. 1 %
- on individual specifications which are not defined in the Pharmacopoeia: ca. I ----- %
If your firm uses exclusively active and excipient ingredients whose specifications correspond 
exactly to those defined in the Pharmacopoeia, please go to question 4.1.5.
2. Let us focus on the active and excipient ingredients - used by your firm - which are based
on in d iv id u a l specifications (i.e. on specifications which are not defined in the Pharmacopoeia). _______
What percentage of these individual specifications are patent-protected?* About. I> %
* Consider all individual specifications used by your firm as the new 1 00%
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3. Let us again focus on the active and excipient ingredients - used by your firm - which are 
based on in d iv id u a l specifications (i.e. on specifications which are not defined in the Pharmacopoeia).* What 
percentage of these ingredients are based on individual specifications because the 
Pharmacopoeia
- does not contain a monograph on the respective active-/excipient ingredient ca. 1 — %
- contains a monograph on the respective active-/excipient ingredient but, for 
various reasons, your firm has decided to rise an alternative specification ca. %
* Consider all individual specifications used by your firm as 100%
If your firm uses individual specifications only because the Pharmacopoeia does not contain a 
monograph on the respective active-/excipient ingredient, please go to question 4.1.5.
4 . For what reasons does your firm use in d iv id u a l specifications  (i.e. on specifications which are not 
defined in the Pharmacopoeia) a lthough  a Pharmacopoeia-specification exists?________________
5. Why does your firm (only) use active-/excipient-ingredients whose specifications are 
defined in the Pharmacopoeia?
C  Because these specifications can be delivered by  many suppliers. This guarantees comparatively low purchase 
prices, because suppliers cannot keep prices ‘artificially’ high.
C  Because both the Pharmacopoeia requirements regarding the ingredient and the GMP-requirements regarding 
its suppliers) are clearly defined. This facilitates the procedure when our firm has to audit the suppliers).
C  Other (please specify):
4*2. E l a b o r a t io n  o f  S p e c if ic a t io n s  for A c t iv e - /E x c i p i e n t -  I n g r e d ie n t s
E l a b o r a t io n  o f  E x c l u s iv e  S p e c if ic a t io n s
The term exclusive specification refers to those specifications o f active-/excipient- ingredients, be 
they patent-protected or not, which can only be accessed and used by your firm or by a very small 
number of firms/ organisations.
1. Does your firm use active-/exipient ingredients based on exclusive specifications?
E v es  C no
If not, please go to question 4.2.4.
2. How are/were the exclusive specifications that your firm uses in the manufacture of 
pharmaceutical products developed?________________________________________________
r By your firm alone. This assertion applies to 1 - ; % of all 
exclusive specifications used.
r By your firm in cooperation with 1 other firm/ research 
institute.
This assertion applies to 1 — % of all 
exclusive specifications used.
r By your firm in cooperation with several other firms/ research 
institutes.
This assertion applies tol - % of all 
exclusive specifications used.
r Other. 1 5 • ■ - -  ..............• •••'- • ..... This assertion applies to 1  ̂% of all 
exclusive specifications used1 : V //
If all exclusive specifications that your firm uses have been developed by your firm alone, 
please go to question 4.2.4.
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3. If your firm (has) cooperates(ed) with other firms/ research institutes to elaborate exclusive 
specifications, please specify«». _________________________________ ________________
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
- ...whether the cooperation(s) in question 
are/ were formal (i.e. based on a contract) or 
informal (i.e. not based on a contract)
E  formal 
E  informal
E  formal 
E  informal
E  formal 
E  informal
- ...whether all participating firms/ research 
institutes have/had the same authority 








El a b o r a t io n  o f  In c l u s iv e  Sp e c if ic a t io n s
The term inclusive specification refers to the specifications of active-/excipient- ingredients which 
can be accessed and used by all interested firms.
4. Are any of your firm’s employees members of expert committees or working groups
- in the Pharmacopoeia commission E no E Y es t namely L — employees
- in any other organisation that elaborates inclusive specifications for active-/excipient-ingredients,
such as e.g. the German Pharmaceutical Codex E N<> E Yes ? namely I- -*— employees
Where applicable, please specify the name o f  the organisation(s):
4 3 . Relationships with Suppliers of Active-/Excipient- Ingredients
1. For how many years do your 3 most important suppliers of active-/excipient ingredients 
work for your firm?**Most important supplier:
2nd most important supplier:
3rd most important supplier:
2. For how many years do suppliers of active-/excipient ingredients work for your firm on 
average?
E  Less than 1 year E  1 -2  years E  2-3 years E  3-5 years E  5-7 years
E  7-10 years E l  1-15 years E 15-20 years E  more than 2 0  years
3. How would you describe the relationship between your firm and its five major suppliers of 
active-/ excipient ingredients? **__________neutral_______________________________
cooperative E E E E E uncooperative
trustful E E E E E distrustful
friendly E E E E E hostile
fori





Thank you very much for your assistance!
The importance of a supplier is determined by the annually invoiced amount of money. Accordingly, the supplier that 
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